# Annals of "Ştefan cel Mare" University of Suceava

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Learning from the Past and Present

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Volume II

Contents

RESEARCH PAPERS

Ancient Egyptian Medicine: A Systematic Review

SAMUEL ADU-GYAMFI, *Lecturer Ph.D.*
Department of History and Political Studies,
Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Ghana
mcgyamfi@yahoo.com

Abstract

Our present day knowledge in the area of medicine in Ancient Egypt has been severally sourced from medical papyri several of which have been deduced and analyzed by different scholars. For educational purposes it is always imperative to consult different literature or sources in the teaching of ancient Egypt and medicine in particular. To avoid subjectivity the author has found the need to re-engage the efforts made by several scholars in adducing evidences from medical papyri. In the quest to re-engage the efforts of earlier writers and commentaries on the medical papyri, we are afforded the opportunity to be informed about the need to ask further questions to enable us to construct or reconstruct both past and modern views on ancient Egyptian medical knowledge. It is this vocation the author sought to pursue in the interim, through a preliminary review, to highlight, comment and reinvigorate in the reader or researcher the need for a continuous engagement of some pertinent documentary sources on Ancient Egyptian medical knowledge for educational and research purposes. The study is based on qualitative review of published literature. The selection of those articles as sources was based on the focus of the review, in order to purposively select and comment on articles that were published based either on information from a medical papyrus or focused on medical specialization among the ancient Egyptians as well as ancient Egyptian knowledge on diseases and medicine. It was found that the Egyptians developed relatively sophisticated medical practices covering significant medical fields such as herbal medicine, gynecology and obstetrics, anatomy and physiology, mummification and even the preliminary form of surgery. These practices, perhaps, were developed as remedies for the prevailing diseases and the accidents that might have occurred during the construction of their giant pyramids. It must be stated that they were not without flaws. Also, the key issues raised from these literatures are but a few among the Egyptian medical corpus across the academic and publishing world. It should therefore afford researchers, students and readers the opportunity to continue the educational dialogue on the medical practices of the Ancient Egyptians.

Keywords: *Ancient Egyptian Medicine, Herbal Medicine, medical profession, mummification, surgery, Diseases.*

Introduction

In an attempt to trace the origins of Ancient Egyptian medical practices for educational purposes, there have been various significant publications on the subject under review. Egyptian medical papyri, which comprises information recorded on the various aspects of ancient Egyptian medicine, remains the most relevant source of information for these publications. Salient among the various medical papyri are the Edwin Smith Surgical Papyrus, the Ebers Papyrus on ophthalmology, diseases of the digestive system, the head, the skin and specific diseases. Others include Kahun gynecological papyrus, the Berlin medical Papyrus, the London medical Papyrus, and the Hearst medical Papyrus (it resumes many of the recipes found in the Ebers papyrus). Herbal medicine, gynecology and obstetrics, mummification and even surgery are the primary medical themes captured in these documents. Very essential arguments have been raised to prove that ancient Egyptians Civilization had developed a complex and specialized medical profession earlier on in its history and that Ancient Egypt (as a cradle of civilization) was not exclusively characterized by the construction of giant pyramids but as an epitome of medical knowledge which had a profound impact on Greek medicine and subsequently spread worldwide. It is therefore pertinent to do an analytical review of some striking issues raised in a number of relevant publications pertaining to the medical knowledge of ancient Egypt.

Methodology

This article is a systematic review of some pertinent literature on ancient Egyptian medicine for educational purposes. All documents used are based on secondary sources. They include works of N. H. Abeolsoud's herbal medicine in Ancient Egypt (2010), J. F. Nunn's "Ancient Egyptian Medicine" (1996), J. F. Nunn and Tapp E's Tropical Diseases in Ancient Egypt (2000), and G. Rawlison *et. al.* "The History of Herodotus" (1861). The others include Robert Ritner's "Innovations and adaptations in Egypt" (2000), Ahmed Shafik and Waseem R. Elseesy's "Medicine in Ancient Egypt" (2003) as well as the work of Richard Sullivan on "The Identitiy and Work of Ancient Egyptian Surgeon" (1996).

Oumeish Youseff Oumeish's work on the "Philosophical, Cultural and the Historical Aspects of Complementary, Alternative, Unconventional and Integrative Medicine in the Old World" (2012) was useful. Of equal importance is the article of B. V. Subbarayappa on "The Roots of Ancient Medicine: An Historical Outline" (2001). Of prime importance is the work of Abelle Vinel and Jacques Pialoux on Ancient Egyptian Medicine and Traditional Chinese Medicine.

These secondary sources have been analyzed to bring to light relevant information for educational purposes; to further enlighten the student of history of science and medicine as well as for the appreciation of some level of continuity and change in both old-time and newer medicine.

Discussions

The review that follows has paid attention to the works of Aboelsoud N. H, "Herbal medicine in Ancient Egypt", Sullivan Richard, "The Identity and Work of the Ancient Egyptian surgeon", Nunn John F., Ancient Egyptian Medicine, and Rawlison G., The History of Herodotus in "The Identity and Work of the Ancient Egyptian surgeon". The others include Richard Sullivan and Ritner Robert's "Innovations and Adaptations in Egypt".

In the article entitled, "The Philosophical, Cultural, and Historical Aspect of Complementary, Alternative, Unconventional and Integrative Medicine in the Old World", Oumeish identified that the old Egyptian medicine was the oldest and dates back to 4 500 BC. According to him, the Egyptians were the first to perform surgery on the human body. To him, the Egyptians were experts in embalming, using of aromatics and herds to preserve flesh for thousands of years and also the using of infusions to extract oils from aromatic plants.[1]

Also, B. V. Subbarayappa in his article, "The roots of ancient medicine", further argues that the Egyptian medicine had two dimensions. The first one was theurgic and the other was the actual practices of the physician. In the first dimension the priest-magicians were largely involved in the in offering magical cures and charms in temples. In the second dimension, ordinary priests employed some natural curative measures, mostly plants. It was also believed that there were thirty-six gods of the atmosphere and thirty-six demons, and conceptually the human body was divided into many parts. If a part of the body was affected, that particular demon had to be invoked for his cure.[2]

N. H. Aboelsoud identified Herbal medicine as one of the major complimentary medicine modalities that originated in Ancient Egypt. To him, much of Egyptian medicine relied on experimentation and observation augmented by magic. He further suggested that they made extensive use of herbs and spices

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[1] Oumeish Youssef Oumeish, "The Philosopical, Cultural, and Historical Aspects of Complementary, Alternative, Unconventional, and Integrative Medicine in the Old World," *Arch Dematol* 134 (1998).

[2] B. V. Subbarayappa, "The roots of ancient medicine: an historical outline," *Journal of Bioscience* 26(2) (2001), 135-143.

(both indigenous and imported) such as garlic, onion, frankincense, mandrake and other food such as honey, fresh meat and breast milk for medicinal purposes.[3] For instance, fresh garlic cloves were peeled, mashed and macerated in a mixture of vinegar and water. This was gargled and used to rinse the mouth or taken internally to treat sore throat and toothache. Again it was also mixed with olive oil, also effective for bronchial and lung complaints including colds.

In as much as he provided a catalogue of medical prescription that was deemed to be effective, some of the prescriptions must be reconsidered due to the "trial and error" circumstances that prevailed at the time. For instance, when it comes to the treatment of opened wounds and cuts with fresh meat and animal dung, I beg to differ on the efficacy of such a prescription considering the severe health implications involved. This treatment may end up introducing bacteria and other infections into the body. A more fascinating point to note in this paper has to do with the Ancient Egyptian own sort of quality control test where the efficacy of medical prescriptions were determined by its ability to cure a reputable figure at the time. Some drugs were accepted based on the belief that they were made by the Sun god- Ra' who is said to have suffered from diseases in his old age. However, it can be deduced that the Ancient Egyptians laid the foundation for natural healings by the use of Natural herbs and magical incantations.

Further arguments raised by Sullivan Richard which suggests that there was a well-developed and hierarchical medical profession in Pharaonic Egypt, where even the earliest form of surgery was practiced. This conclusion was safely reached using both evidence from Palaeo archaeological specimens (paleo-pathological evidence) that demonstrate some forms of surgical procedures were carried out and the information on the likely names of the surgeon mentioned in Edwin Smith Surgical papyrus. Linguistic evidence manifested in the existence of various hieroglyphic and hieratic terminologies which were used in reference to the profession of the surgeon also confirms this proposition. From these Egyptian texts, the lay physician was known as the *"Swnw" or "Sinw"* whiles *"wpy"* which literally means the opener of the body probably referred to the Surgeon.[4]

Again, it has also been pointed out that anatomical knowledge was associated with skillful embalmers who had the opportunity of surgically removing delicate human parts that may decompose rapidly during the mummification

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[3] Neveen H. Aboelsoud, "Herbal medicine in Ancient Egypt," *Journal of Medicinal Plants Research* 4 (2), 2010, 82-86.

[4] Richard Sullivan, "The Identity and Work of the Ancient Egyptian surgeon," *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine* 89 (1996), 467-473.

process. According to B. V. Subbarayappa embalming of a dead body was an accomplished art.[5] However, it has also been noticed that anatomical knowledge was limited and based partly on the socio-cultural beliefs that forbade making incisions on the human body and partly on the fact that no systematic Egyptian work on anatomy has survived, making it difficult to believe that there was any serious study of anatomy at the beginning of the third millennium B.C. It is almost certain that no appropriate climate of enquiry existed at that time. However, the anatomical insight shown for certain parts of the body in some of the medical papyri, especially the Edwin Smith strongly supports the view that there had been quite detailed study of anatomy at an early date and a treatise on anatomy might exist. A closely related theme to the anatomical knowledge is human dissection and vivisection. According to J. F. Nunn, in his book, "Ancient Egyptian Medicine", there is no evidence to show that human dissection was undertaken in Egypt until Herophilus, the Greek physician from Chalcedon, worked at the Alexandrian medical school in the early Ptolemaic period.[6] His works have not survived but there is ample reference by Celsus, Galen and others to show that he enjoyed unrestricted access to human cadavers for dissection and even the possibilities of vivisection on condemned but living criminals. Perhaps, respect for the dead would have prevented this under the Egyptian Pharaohs and also in Greece itself. After Herophilus, human dissection ceased. It is significant to state that in spite of the socio-cultural ramifications placed on the Egyptian physician concerning dissection he might have had the opportunity to observe the human skeleton. The Egyptians are known to have identified and named some important bones such as the collar bones except the skull. Significantly, battle casualties and serious industrial injuries provided an opportunity for the Egyptians to gain further anatomical insights. Sections of the Edwin Smith Papyrus, suggest that such opportunities were not wasted.

These controversies have been extended over the issue of the existence of specializations especially surgery. Herodotus noted on his visit to Egypt during the 5th century BC Persian occupation that:

Medicine is practiced among them on a plan of separation; each physician treats a single disorder and no more…[7]

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[5] Subbarayappa, "The roots of ancient medicine", 135.

[6] John F. Nunn, *Ancient Egyptian Medicine* (London: British Museum Press, 1996).

[7] George Rawlinson, Henry Creswicke and John Gardner Wilkinson, *The history of Herodotus*, vol. 1 (Murray, 1861).

Indeed, this is a clear indication that the Ancient Egyptian medical practice was characterized by specialization. According to Sullivan, perhaps surgery was indeed a separate practice but was practiced in relative secrecy due to the prevailing social or religious taboos which forbade making incisions into the human body. Moreover, the discovery of tools supposed to be used for surgical procedures and the existence of adequate linguistic evidence of surgical terminologies.

Also according to B. V. Subarayappa each physician was expected to be a specialist in curing only one disease. For instance there were specialists like dentists, bonesetters, occultists, etc.[8] Abelle and Jacques further add that the treatments of diseases were according to fixed written percepts, transmitted by a great number of famous doctors. If when following the percepts of the sacred book, they do not succeed in saving the patient, they are declared innocent and exempted from all reproach but if they act contrary to the written percepts they may be accused and condemned to death.[9]

Another essential theme worth considering when examining Ancient Egyptian medicine has to do with the conservative nature of the Egyptian culture. This had a direct bearing on how the people perceived innovations and adaptations. Robert K Ritner, in the article captioned, "Innovations and Adaptations in Ancient Egypt", described Ancient Egypt as a quintessentially conservative culture dedicated to the preservation of traditional concepts and techniques scrupulously maintained through the centuries with little or no modification. To a large extent, the isolated geographical position (natural frontiers) of the land also enhanced this conservative notion of the Egyptian culture. During the Ptolemaic era, the Greek historian, Diodorus Siculus was said to have recorded legislative penalties prescribed for methodological innovation by state-supported physicians in the army.[10] These sanctions portray the high level of austerity the ancient Egyptians attached to their modus operandi and were not in the position to embrace any form of progress and change.

In Egypt, on theoretical level, "Progress" was neither desirable nor necessary. Situations, individuals, and techniques were said to be improved, but such improvement was almost invariably termed as "re-creation" of prior

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[8] Subbarayappa, "The roots of ancient medicine," 135.

[9] Abelle Vinel and Jacques Pialoux, "Ancient Egyptian Medicine and Traditional Chinese Medicine," R.E.S.F Congress, Aix-en-Provence, 31 October 2005.

[10] Robert Ritner, "Innovations and Adaptations in Egypt," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies* 59, 2 (2000), 107-117.

favorable conditions. However, Ritner further argues that the Egyptian conservatism should not be misconstrued as resistance to new or different ideas but recognized instead as reluctance to discard completely society's much praised older conceptions. In view of this, it behooves us to discuss some of the cultural transmissions and transfers that took place in Ancient Egypt. For instance, the Egyptians were said to have established external contacts with the Levant since the Pre-dynastic era. Such contacts culminated in the incorporation of seven incantations in foreign languages transcribed into syllabic Egyptian script (London Medical Papyrus). Eventually these prescriptions became part and parcel of Egyptian legitimate remedies among several other examples. Additionally, medicines were dispatched with Egyptian doctors to heal the Hittite King's eyes, to dislodge a possessing demon, and to provide the king's vassals "with all sorts of prescriptions". As Ramses wrote:

> They will bring to you all the very good remedies which are here in Egypt, and which I allowed in friendly fashion to go to you in order to help you.

A further possible transmission is suggested by the common Egyptian recommendation that plant and mineral mixtures be exposed to the dewdrops overnight. Just like Medieval Europeans, the Egyptians believed that moist air was associated with plague, and nighttime exposure to this force must have been thought to strengthen the medicine. Interestingly, Mesopotamian medicine also advises night-time exposure of medicines, but while the Egyptians practice was common as 1550 B.C., Akkadian references are first attested only in the fourteenth century BC and precisely from trading colonies at the Hittite court. Whichever way the interest might have gone, it seems likely that a foreign practice has been adapted for local theory based on humid air and astrology. The Greeks are said to have borrowed the basic Ancient Egyptian medical knowledge of *wekhedu* (the notion of bodily waste) and the use of enemas was adopted by Greeks resident in Alexandria. Even the pre-Alexandrian Hippocratic corpus displays obvious Egyptian influence, with birth prognoses long recognized as adaptations from pregnancy tests in the Kahun, Berlin and the Carlsberg Papyri. Some Egyptian medical terminology was adopted quite literally into Greek, as is the case with the headache term "half-head" translated as hemikrania (modern "migraine"). Among the numerous significant contributions of ancient Egyptian medicine to classical medicine, the drug therapy is the most important. The symbol for prescription *"Rx"* is said to have been derived from the Egyptian eye of the Horus signifying

the same notion.[11] It has also been revealed that even the administration of drugs had been profoundly influenced by Egyptian medicine for it was only in Alexandrian medicine that Greeks first attempted to quantify specific ingredients in prescriptions. In addition, a vast number of drugs and vegetable substances that have been termed specifically "Egyptian" in the pharmacology of Greece and Rome substantiate their crucial contribution to classical medicine.

As indicated earlier on in this document, specialization is very essential in the practice of Egyptian medicine. This is portrayed in the work entitled, *Medicine in Ancient Egypt* by Ahmed Shafik and Waseem R. Elseesy. The paper seeks to outline the various fields of specialization in Egyptian medicine. The Ancient Egyptian medical physicians had to deal with a wide variety of diseases and complications ranging from those related to pregnancy and childbirth to injuries from accidents. Ahmed and Elseesy, in this work, quoted Warren R. Dawson: "There is no doubt that ancient Egyptians were a highly gifted people with a great capacity for practical achievement" to prove the dexterity displayed by Ancient Egyptians in their various grounds. This paper outlined gynecology and obstetrics, general surgery, circumcision as the principal aspects of Ancient Egyptian medicine. Under Gynecology and obstetrics, for instance, it was pointed out that fertility test was carried out by inserting a bulb of either garlic or onion into the *iuf, (vagina)* overnight, when the scent of either is detected in the mouth this meant that the woman is fertile and could bear children.[12] It has been argued that garlic and onion contain volatile oils that could pass through the respiratory tract and reach the mouth if there are no blockades in the human system. Nevertheless, the prescribed method for sex determination by monitoring the growth pattern of the mixture of wheat and barley grains and urine proved incorrect 16 out of 28 cases. This reveals some shortfalls in their medical practices. It also suggests that some of their practices were not based on practical scientific knowledge. Moreover, breast cancer was said to be diagnosed by examining the breast with the flat of the hand. When it feels like an unripe pear that indicates the presence of cancerous cells. However, for humanitarian reasons, the examiner was expected to tell the relative of the patient (not the patient herself) that her disease is a disease for which he cannot do anything about. Here again, we see that the Ancient Egyptian physicians did not go about their profession haphazardly, but were guided by a laid

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[11] *Ibidem.*

[12] Ahmed Shafik and Waseem R. Elseesy, "Medicine in Ancient Egypt," in *Medicine across Cultures: History and Practice of Medicine in Non-Western Cultures*, ed. H. Selin (Springer Netherlands, 2003), 27-47.

down code of work ethics. They knew the health implications of telling the patient herself about a disease which they could not treat at the time. What was rather unfortunate is that it was obvious that the Ancient Egyptian physicians could diagnose breast cancer but were not in the capacity to treat it. Ahmed and Elseesy went further to point out that the expectant women were delivered while squatting on two large bricks or while seating on a chair from which the center of the seat had been removed. It was also stated emphatically that labor in this method was far less painful than the modern day lithotomy position. To Ahmed and Elseesyl, they established earliest specialized antenatal care hospital as far back as 4 000 years ago. *Mameze* (a separate room for antenatal care) Antenatal care was very essential to the Ancient Egyptians. Interestingly, one may want to know whether the profession of gynecology and obstetrics was solely dominated by females since the inclusion of men could be problematic even in modern times.

There is adequate evidence that suggests the diagnosis of ailments such as Cephalalgia (headaches), malaria, Guinea-worm, Brucellosis, schistosomiasis (bilharzias), leprosy, tetanus, malaria, strongyloides, tuberculosis, etc were treated in Ancient Egypt. The evidence of the occurrence of diseases in Ancient Egypt comes in three main categories: human remains (paleopathology), artistic representations and writings.[13] Various forms of cephalalgia, including one-sided headache, are mentioned in Egyptian papyri. However, more precise descriptions are missing hence there was no clear case of the diagnosis of migraine. They combined both magical and empirical practices for treatment of headaches since the origins of aches and pains, for instance, was attributed to peculiar pain-matter demons.

In the article captioned, "Tropical diseases in Ancient Egypt" by J. F. Nunn and E. Tapp, are outlined the various tropical diseases that prevailed during the Ancient Egyptian era. In the research, they used evidences from three main categories: human remains (paleopathology), artistic representations and writings (linguistics). Nunn and Tapp's research provided enough evidence to suggest that Guinea-worm was diagnosed and treated in Ancient Egypt. The most likely mention of Guinea-worm in medical papyri was in Ebers 875. Linguistic evidence comprising the use of terminologies such as *aat* (swelling), *deqer-ti* (to cling or to press) among others in Eber's papyrus suggests the diagnosis and treatment of Guinea-worm. However, Paleopathological evidence for guinea-worm in Ancient Egypt sparse. J. F. Nunn and E. Tapp identified Mummy 1770 as one of the first

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[13] John F. Nunn and E. Tapp, "Tropical diseases in Ancient Egypt," *Transactions of The Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene* 94(2000), 147-153.

mummies to be autopsied in Manchester. Radiographs of this mummy showed that the legs had been amputated and a dense nodule in the anterior abdominal wall. Following microradiographs, it was discovered that these were features of calcified guinea-worm. More recently, a gravid female worm was found in the leg of one of the mummies from the tomb of Parennefer.

In the course of the intellectual discourse, they further pointed out that the evidence on the existence of schistosomiasis was subjected to a series of debates which need to be analyzed critically in order to make some meaningful inferences. In respect to the existence of schistosomiasis, the authors appear to be in a dilemma. First and foremost, they set out to question the prevalence of Haematuria (a closely related disease) and eventually reached the conclusion that the Ancient Egyptians may well have recognized haematuria but the evidence is not completely convincing. Nevertheless, a series of interpretations of the word *aaa,* as the most likely Egyptian terminology for schistosomiasis. This notion was supported by the famous Egyptologists, Lefebrve in 1956. Ebers 62 remains the basis of the argument that identified "aaa" as schistosomiasis and it is the only passage that referred to "aaa" as a parasite.

> *Another remedy, useful as something prepared for the belly reeds (?Sedge), 1; shames-plant, 1; grind fine, cook with honey and eaten by a man in whose belly (there are) hereret-worms. It is the aaa which created them. Not killed by any (other) remedy.*

The identity of the *hereret*-worms remains unknown. However, it has been suggested that they are the adult parasitic worms of schistosomiasis. Contrastingly, many passages in the Egyptian papyri referred to the driving out of the *aaa* of a god and a dead man clearly implying a malign influence introduced by magic. Hence, it thus appears that the *aaa,* could not be a possible ancient Egyptian word for Schistosomiasis. Then it was put up that, "How then could the ancient Egyptians, with their enormous vocabulary, have failed to assign a word to describe what must have been of their commonest diseases?"[14] Thanks to pathological evidence, Ruffer,[15] in his "Notes on the presence of *Bilharzia Haematobia* in Egyptian mummies of the 20th Dynasty" made first the reference to the identification of Schistosomes in Egyptian mummies. This publication, according to Nunn and Tapp, remains the most convincing evidence of the presence of Bilharzia in ancient Egypt.

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[14] *Ibidem*, 150.

[15] Marc Armand Ruffer, "Notes on the presence of *Bilharzia Haematobia* in Egyptian mummies of the 20th Dynasty," *British Medical Journal* 1(2557) (1910), 16.

Concerning Leprosy, it was pointed out that Moller-Christensen[16] and Sandison[17] were ignorant of any Pharaonic Egyptian mummy which exhibited the appearance of nodular leprosy.[18] Perhaps this was due to the negative stigma the Egyptian society attached to the disease hence mummification was denied to its victims. The ancient Egyptians considered leprosy to be infectious so they isolated its victims and kept them at the outskirts of the society. Nonetheless, a Coptic Christian burial at Bigha in Nubia (6th century AD) was strongly suggestive of leprosy.

Furthermore, it was also pointed out that the Plasmodium falciparum parasite was detected when Miller *et. al.*[19] applied the Parasite-F test to a series of naturally desiccated Egyptian mummies. Hence Miller safely concluded that they all suffered from malaria at the time of their deaths. However, Nunn and Tapp observed that the medical papyri (unlike the Hippocratic corpus) were silent on the characteristic recurrent fever of malaria.

Conclusion

Ancient Egyptian medicine has made very essential strides in the evolution of modern day medicine. They laid the basic foundation for the various fields of medicine we have today. As one of the earliest cradle of civilization they impacted greatly on other cultures such as the Greeks. There is adequate evidence from the Egyptian Medical papyri to prove that ancient Egyptian Civilization had developed a sophisticated and specialized medical profession earlier on in its history and that Ancient Egypt (as a cradle of civilization) was not exclusively characterized by the monumental pyramids but was also an epitome of medical knowledge which had a profound impact on Greek medicine and eventually spread worldwide. Subsequently, their homegrown medical practices and ideas became widespread and well improved in other cultures through interactions. They developed relatively sophisticated medical practices covering significant medical fields such as Herbal medicine, gynecology and obstetrics, anatomy and physiology,

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[16] V. Moller-Christensen, "Evidence of leprosy in earlier people," in *Diseases in Antiquity*, eds. D. Brothwell and A. T. Sandison (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1967).

[17] A. T. Sandison, "Diseases in ancient Egypt," in *Mummies, Disease, and Ancient Cultures*, eds. A. Cockburn and E. Cockburn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

[18] *Ibidem*, 152.

[19] R. L. Miller, S. Ikram, G. J. Armelagos, R. Walker, W. B. Harer, C. J. Shiff, D. Baggett, M. Carrigan, S. M. Maret, "Diagnosis of Plasmodium falcipamm infections in mummies using the rapid manual Pura Sight TM-F test," *Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene* 88, (1994), 31-32.

mummification and even the preliminary form of surgery. These practices, perhaps, were developed as remedies for the prevailing diseases and the accidents that might have occurred during the construction of their giant pyramids.

Limitation to the Study

There is a vast expanse of literature on the subject of medicine in Egypt. For the purposes of scope in education and time constraints, scholars and researchers pay attention to key areas that are considered most pertinent. It is this same challenge this article faces; the need to focus on what is most pertinent.

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Critique of the Millennial Elements of the Third Reich

Antoniu Alexandru FLANDORFER

PhD Candidate
"Ştefan cel Mare" University of Suceava, Romania
tony_flandorfer@yahoo.co.uk

Abstract

The totalitarian regimes installed in Europe during the last century, besides the myriad of victims they produced, they alternatively implemented a highly refined coercive system with ideological usages. The latter aimed at installing terror in order to consolidate its absolute power by transforming the collective mind. In this respect, in a first process of alienation, the totalitarian utopias condensed the society, and then they were present in the atomization of each individual. The human archetype became the societal prototype ideologically reported to both the new man preached by Marxism and fascism and also to the Übermensch created by the National Socialism.

Within the totalitarian political imaginary, we can detect an immutable hypostasis aloof from human condition, under the auspices of the laws of nature inherent to Neo-Darwinism in the case of fascism and National Socialism, and also of the laws of History when we refer to the communist Marxism. Both paradigms are expressed as pretexts for the totalitarian manipulation, demagogically shown as "ideological recipes" (Hannah Arendt) generating evolution and progress. The collective imaginary shaped by the totalitarian myth was reproduced from the aspiration of modernism, according to Roger Griffin, transgressing the cultural dimension into a bio-political one, in Bolshevism and in fascism and Nazism as well. Thus, the cleavage between the two dimensions, the cultural and the socio – political one, will be done through the millennial myth expressed in the collective mind by means of utopian endeavour of creating a "new world".

Keywords: *totalitarianism, National Socialism, utopia, millenarianism.*

Rising from the playfulness of ideas or deriving from the eternal human aspiration to represent a divine dimension as an ideal type of a better world than the one we experience our existential anguish in, utopia, in all its forms (such as eutopia, anti-utopia, dystopia, psychotopia, etc.), belong to the same topos. As a consequence of its paradigmatic conceptualization, utopia trespassed the literature

and developed new hypostases at the level of social imaginary by means of the myths insertion.

Utopia shows an immutable character during history, as it is situated, from a theological viewpoint, in the lapse between Genesis and Eschaton, and, from an ontological viewpoint, from the birth of the human race to the end of history and/or that of humankind. We also notice its entropic character, which determines the frequency of its occurrences, as well as the variety of the hypostases it takes, which project it to the level of the *id*, in Freudian terms, as a form of nostalgia that was inherited from the proto-fathers.

The foundations of utopia lay within the imaginary and are set, axiologically, according to two coordinates: space and time. The notion of space is obvious in the etymology of the term, i.e. *the place that does not exist*, but it is something to pursue and seek while the human being oscillates between experimentation and failure. Time is justified as ideal or, in the case of the primary utopological form, i.e. *eu-topia*, as a vector of the *Golden Age* that becomes a constant of the archetype, immutably reiterated at the proper moment, or the *tempora opportuna*, while the imaginary preserves the two inherent coordinates and causes their cleaving by means of the transcendent factor that acts upon the subject as an intelligible expression through demythologization. The elements of utopia are subject to the coercion of a program that addresses the human being and its habituality. A certain form of ethics is inherent to such a program. The failure of utopia is due to the fact that the imposed ethics exceeded human standards. It is, after all, a flawed imitation of the transcendent model, which the human beings tried to retrospect to in a holistic manner and to substitute by their own value scale, i.e. the parts that compose it will take different values imposed by human nature, so their sum will not equal the whole they are parts of. This sets the stage for the atomization of human being.

In a utopia, the human being is required not to find his own self, unless it is in the form of alterity, by means of relating to an artificial value system. That is why the utopian ideal was compromised, leaving only some constitutive elements that were erroneously implemented at a mundane level.

To a smaller or larger extent, any event in human history is marked by elements of utopia. Alongside the unveiled history an ucronia appears, in which the plans for the future are plotted, which would eventually become parts of history itself. That is why the major events that are bound to change the course of history are recurrent, that means, those scenarios that did not became reality at a

certain point in history, will protrude in the same context at a later moment, which is erroneously viewed as predictable.

Utopias, as fictional manifestations that randomly appear across history, have determined the appearance of a specific criticism. Jean-Jacques Wunenburger has classified its types of argumentation in two categories: on the one hand, those that belong to the anti-utopian paradigm, that underline the incapacity of utopia to circumscribe to the present moment as it escapes the tactical and strategic compromises inherent to the political sphere and become the expression of an imagination act that transgresses reality and loses contact with empiric history. On the other hand, utopia is regarded not so much as a dissolution of reality, but as a deficit of an imagination that is contaminated by a mono-dimensional and overwhelming reason, while the supposed function as a *dream about an alternative society* is suppressed by the lack of the capacity to become detached from stereotypes and prosaic canons.[1]

The paroxysmal forms of utopia that transited the history of humanity were the totalitarian regimes: fascism, National Socialism and communism. National socialism, of all, embraces the most diverse forms of utopia, even if the other ones also "[...] relate to a mythical past according to which it is constructed by an imaginary future"[2], and "between the fabulous past and the ideal future, present does not have a value of its own. [...] The recent past represents the enemy, the present lacks importance, everything is subordinated to the eschatological future, to the supreme goals."[3]

We may affirm that the ontological force which generates new myths within the imaginary that is inherent to any utopian form is situated within the myth itself, which acts as a rotary mechanism. According to Roland Barthes, the myth is a double system within which occurs a sort of ubiquity, and the starting point resides in the constitution of a meaning. For the French semiotician, the significance of a myth is characterized as a "[...] revolving door that keeps spinning, alternating the meaning of the signifier and its form, an object-language and a meta-language, a conscience that is purely signifying and a conscience that is purely imagining; such alternation is somewhat summed in one concept that uses it as an ambiguous signifier, both intellective and imaginary, arbitrary and motivated."[4] Thus, due to

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[1] Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, *Viaţa imaginilor* (Cluj-Napoca: Cartimpex, 1998), 161.
[2] Alain Besançon, *Nenorocirea secolului: despre comunism, nazism şi unicitatea „Şoah"-ului* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 2007), 71.
[3] *Ibidem.*
[4] Roland Barthes, *Mitologii* (Iaşi: Institutul European, 1997), 251.

the ubiquity of the signifier that is inherent to the myth, an alibi is produced within it as a space term, which allows the coexistence of the full and the void, connected through a negative relationship that determine the characteristics of signification. Moreover, we need to specify that *reality* succeeds in stopping the rotary mechanism of the myth. Barthes considers that myth cannot be subjected to the axiological test, because is a value that can act as a permanent *alibi* that enables its signifier to have two sides in order to resort to *somewhere else* whenever necessary. Its meaning is always here to present the *form*, which, on its turn, sets a distance on the *meaning* in order to avoid a contradiction, a conflict or a break between them.[5]

While Jean-Jacques Wunenburger asserts that "[...] utopian images have not only altered social imagination, but they also allowed the mimicking or the simulation of a political rationality that did not always succeeded in freeing itself from the chain of idealized expectations"[6], Jean-Luc Nancy considers that by disassembling the myth logic one can identify that moment in history when the *end of the myth* will occur.

Whether we lament the exhaustion of mythical power or the will of such power acts against humanity, everything leads us towards a world that lacks any mythical resources. Rethinking our world based on this "lack" might turn out to be an indispensable mission.[7]

This is a condition that appears in times when the myth is widely present within the social mentality and penetrates the societal institutional structures; it develops a catalytic function within ideologies, as happened with Nazism. Georges Bataille considers this state of affairs as a *myth absence*, while Nancy characterized it as an *interruption of the myth* that consists in its absence ("*from its own meaning, on its own meaning, by its own meaning*").[8] In other words, if myth develops an operational power, its own characteristics are destroyed; such a power is viewed by Schelling as a generative operation, and by Lévy-Strauss as exchange and distribution. Therefore, the myth needs to be self-significant, as it converts its own fiction into the establishment and inauguration of meaning itself in the form of a symbolic language that is perceived beyond allegory, i.e. tautegorical.

While analyzing the structure of primitive religions, in which totemism and tribal affiliation are connected to the worshiping of the ancestors, Ernst Cassirer

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[5] *Ibidem*, 252.
[6] Wunenburger, *Viaţa imaginilor*, 169.
[7] Jean-Luc Nancy, *Comunitatea absentă* (Cluj-Napoca: Idea Design & Print, 2005), 73.
[8] *Ibidem*, 79.

reaches the conclusion that there is no radical difference between mythical and religious thinking.

> *They both originate in the same fundamental phenomenon of the human life. One cannot set a point in the development of human culture where myth ends and religion begins. During the entire history of humankind religion remains inseparably linked to and defined by mythical elements. On the other hand, even in its rawest and most rudimentary forms, myth contains certain motifs that anticipate, in a certain way, the higher religious ideals to come. From the very beginning, myth is a potential religion.[9]*

The utopian dream that would be compromised by the totalitarianism of the 20th century, when it was confiscated and corrupted in order to create a secularized religion that pointed to a false place that was supposedly inherent to a transcendentality that was de-sacralized by its own imaginary character, had previously materialized in the Augustinian negative pattern that completely revealed the face of this world, as in *civitas terrena sive diaboli*. While the *uomo universale* of Renaissance was placed above all things, freed from the coercions of the Church, responding only to God and endowed with demiurgic potential derived from his own creation, the *Übermensch* of the National Socialism resides *beyond good and evil*, or, as Meister Eckhart puts it, in a *God beyond God*, in a transcendence that is not inherent to any Tradition (which is possible due to the syncretism of different concepts extracted from various religions and accompanied by collective imagination). While in Renaissance the syncretism consisted in the Christianization of other imported traditions, such as Judaism (see Giordano Bruno or Marsilio Ficino), the National Socialism amalgamated certain visions from Christian mystique (see Meister Eckhart or Joachim of Fiore) with Nordic mythology, Brahmanism and Vedism, German Romantic philosophy, scientism, evolutionism and anti-Semitism. It succeeded in creating a *political religion* that replaced the traditional Christian one, based both on the organization of the Roman Catholic Church (the Nazis appreciated the discipline of the organization and the ascetic rigors imposed to his order by Ignatius of Loyola), and on its hieratic character that would provide it with symbols materialized in the architectural sumptuousness (Christian Gothic and ancient Greek were used during the Third Reich), the uniform as a form of psychological impact on the masses, and the heraldry for a mandalic purpose. The millenarian discourse, largely taken from Joachim of Fiore, was transformed by Hitler into a *political liturgy*.

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[9] Ernst Cassirer, *Eseu despre om. O introducere în filosofia culturii umane* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1994), 124.

In order to make the project of the Third Reich more credible, Hans Günther, one of the most famous theoreticians of eugenics, recommended Plato's vision on a state that is to be founded on the selection of aristocratic dynasties. "Certainly, as an idealist, Plato wants a selection that is conditioned not by the free choice of spouses, but by the idea and the purpose to engender the physical and spiritual model of the perfect man of pure breed... After Plato, a state that only protects the frontiers, the culture and the welfare is no longer considered as good enough unless it also protects racial purity."[10] The theory of racial purity, put into practice, on scientific bases, by the Nazi program called *Lebensborn* (*Fount of Life*), led to the hegemonic concept of *Lebensraum or vital space*, which determined the mixture of elements from the utopian ideology and geopolitics in which the *Übermensch*, coined by Friedrich Nietzsche as an archetype of the human victory against divinity, becomes the prototype of the *perfect man*, a *uomo universale* multiplied and reified as the superior Aryan race that is entitled to rule the world.

If we want to establish the exact position of the national socialist *Weltanschauung* within the social imaginary, we need to point out its entropic behaviour, which is apparently ideologically contradicted, as a source for new myths. "Nazism was a German Apocalypse [...]"[11]

The fusion between utopia and revolution was done by millenarianism, which, in the case of National Socialism, took a Gnostic form. According to Alain Besançon,

Nazism focused on the Marcionistic version of Gnosticism. It accepted, formally and temporarily, a 'German' Christianity that invoked another God than Abraham's one. It persecuted the faithful Christians. It tried to accumulate diverse elements from the esoterism and occultism of the late 19th century. It intended to revive the neopaganism of the ancient German gods, another of their manipulations which was an offense to the honourable and beautiful corpus of Germanic mythology and to the elements it has in common with Homeric mythology.[12]

We need to notice here the reference to Marcion of Sinope's heretical vision (approx. A.D. 80-155), as representing a mytheme in the evolution of national socialist anti-Judaism, as early as Jakob Wilhelm Hauer. According to Mircea Eliade:

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[10] Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, *Omul politic între mit şi raţiune. O analiză a imaginarului puterii* (Cluj-Napoca: Alfa Press, 2000), 61.

[11] François Furet, Ernst Nolte, *Fascismul şi comunismul* (Bucharest: Grupul Editorial ART, 2007), 63.

[12] Besançon, *Nenorocirea secolului*, 104.

Marcion professes the essential Gnostic dualism without professing its apocalyptic implications. His dichotomous system counterposes Law and Justice, instituted by the demiurgic God of the Old Testament, to the Love and Gospel revealed by the benevolent God. The latter sends his son Jesus Christ to free humanity from the domination of the Law. Jesus chooses a body capable of feeling and suffering, even though that body is immaterial. In his teachings, Jesus exalts the benevolent God, but avoids showing that it is not about the God of the Old Testament. Besides, Yahweh finds from the teachings of Jesus that there is a transcendent God. He takes revenge as he delivers Jesus into the hands of his persecutors. But death on the cross brings salvation, as Jesus, through his sacrifice, redeems humanity from the demiurgic God. Nevertheless, the world remains under Yahweh's domination, and the believers will be oppressed until the end of time. This is when the benevolent God will make himself known: he will welcome the faithful in his Kingdom, while the rest of the people, along with the matter and its creator, will be brought to nothing.[13]

On the other hand, we notice that the elements which are immanent in utopias and millenarian movements are antinomic, but, at the same time, due to the ideological connection, they give the impression of a *coincidentia oppositorum* that is able to underline the extra-mundane feature of National Socialism that has a mesmerizing effect on the level of collective mentality. It is precisely this ideological dysfunction that intrigued numerous researchers regarding such a powerful manipulation of the masses. "The millenarian activism is mainly based on a paroxysmal perception of disorder and evil; for it is only the excess of tragedies and suffering that can constitute the precedential sign that generates change in the epoch that is circumscribed to the prophecy of the millennium."[14] In this context, the vitalist concept applied to the masses becomes a purging *catharsis* that implies the manifestation of the revolution as a first mechanism for their mobilization. Tribulation acts as a catalyst in the state of ebullition caused by the conjugation between historicity and collective mentality, both for the outburst of the revolution and after the fulfillment of the petty goals of the so-called Saviour, which, by the way, would not determine any change towards social welfare, as it promised, and the miraculous would not be revealed. The recrudescence of masses condition following the instauration of utopian forms at a socio-political level is due to the alienation of the human being in the context of the imaginary that aliments hope. Servier remarks that

[...] the millenarian movements stand in opposition to the utopias they were so many times mistaken, to the fabulous cities effortlessly discovered or founded outside any

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[13] Mircea Eliade, *Istoria credinţelor şi ideilor religioase. De la Gautama Buddha până la triumful creştinismului*, vol. II (Bucharest: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Pedagogică, 1986), 364-365.

[14] Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, *Imaginariile politicului* (Bucharest: Paideia, 2005), 75.

historical process and without the fulfillment of a divine promise. The kingdom millenarianisms aspire to a different from the utopian topos, as it represents the promise of perpetual bliss, the use of all the goods in this world, while utopia is moderation, a scarce life that is strictly regulated. [...] Utopia is in a closed city, while millenarianism is a storm that is supposed to wash away the sins of humankind by the will of God and to offer the conjured brethren the inheritance of earthly goods. The opposition between millenarianism and utopia can only emphasize the difference of social origin between the authors of the utopias and those messiahs who led the millenarian movements and their chosen followers.[15]

We notice that the utopia which lacks a millenarian component remains mere literature and some of its elements can be used, at the most, in certain contexts within a political program. In its traditional form, utopia can be conceived as an existential space for a restrictive group of initiates, and is unconceivable in a social dimension. The introduction of the chiliastic element in the utopian program is justified by the purpose of directing the masses towards revolutionary violence that is supposed to bring, before the power hierarchy, the messiah who is inherent to any movement of social redemption. Even though the millenarian movements in history were defeated, their sustainability acted as an example for the future generations of the Apocalypse messengers, and we notice an evolution in the consistency of imaginary, due to the re-creation of new myths. Consequently, by the continuous amalgamation, up to fusion, of the theological and social levels, and to the *disenchantment of the world*, such beliefs gradually separate from the quest for the *New Jerusalem* in favour of a cyclical time of a primeval nature.

Capitalizing on certain ideas expressed by François Laplantine, Jean-Jacques Wunenburger identifies three ways in which the imaginary relates to reality; the latter is transformed and generates three types of imaginary.

The anarchist-ecstatic way produces an overthrow of the world, in which "[...] utopia manifests affinities to all sort of religious imaginaries that tended, alongside global society, to install alternative lifestyles [...]"[16] He exemplifies with the Essene community in ancient Israel or the Cathars as models for the anarchist groups in the 19th century or the alternative ones in modern days, in which the utopian scenery replaces extant reality.

A second way is the utopian-ecclesiastic one, in which the confrontation with the extant reality receives as a counterpart "[...] a model of alternation according to which the old order will make way, some undetermined day, for a

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[15] Jean Servier, *Istoria utopiei* (Bucharest: Meridiane, 2000), 276-277.
[16] Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, *Imaginarul* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2009), 65.

new order [...]"[17] and the mission to constantly perpetuate the threat is assigned to an ecclesiastic or sectarian organization.

But the way within which utopia interferes with millenarianism is the Messianic-revolutionary way, in which the first human aspiration is installed in a *historical calendar*, submitted to prophecy, and, according to Norman Cohn, the precognition of such a future amelioration of the human society or of the humankind itself is often confirmed by a messianic *persona* and justifies certain measures to be taken, including violence against a pre-established order, so that a better improved world be created.[18]

While the *topos* of the two models is similar, if we refer to *time* we notice that it is linear in a utopia, as it freezes in an ideally autistic space in the moment of the solipsistic fulfillment, whereas in millenarianism the cyclic nature of time is a status *quo* in a desirable space, and it is lived in a convulsive and hyperactive manner. Utopian time has ancestral values and components and it is relived through ritual, while Chiliastic time is a permanent expectancy of the theophanic moment. During the wait it is only the *Chosen* one who controls and conditions a time with an entropic flow, whose hypostasis at a social level is the revolution. According to Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, consequently to the adhesion of millenarianism and messianism to utopia it can be fulfilled, as the utopian project is translated into a religious language that confers "[...] its progressist temporal dimension [...]", while "[...] the sought-for space/time is inserted in a global interpretation of the world history and in a Christology [...]"[19] He also considers that this particular form is an *altercation utopia* with origins in the monotheistic prophetism of the Judeo-Christian temporal eschatology. Borrowed as a form of manifestation specific to the religious dimension, the attitude of the Chiliast, says Karl Mannheim, is of an ecstatic nature, and

> *for this mentality, promises of a better world removed in time and space are like uncashable cheques their only function is to fix that point in the 'world beyond the events' of which we have spoken, and form which he, who is expectantly awaiting the propitious moment, can be assured of detachment from that which is merely in the process of becoming. Not being at one with whatever events transpire in the 'evil' here and now, he awaits only the critical juncture of events and the moment when the*

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[17] *Ibidem*, 66.

[18] *Ibidem*, 66.

[19] Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, *Utopia sau criza imaginarului* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 2001), 114.

external concatenation of circumstances coincide with the ecstatic restlessness of his soul.[20]

The error against humanity that was committed by the use of the national socialist *Weltanschauung* at a societal level is to be identified in its foundation on the elements of the classical fictional utopia and on those of millenarianism, and can be proved by the Bergsonian vision upon *static* and *dynamic religions* that are inherent, respectively, to *closed* and *open societies*. Classical utopia can be characterized in terms of a community that acts as a *closed society*, "[...] whose members are mutually connected, indifferent to the rest of the people, always ready to attack or defend themselves, ultimately to adopt a combative attitude."[21] The millenarian movements aim at a global impact on humanity, as they axiologically restore the previous norms by means of the *vital impetus* (*élan vital*) which propels revolutions in order to transform the human being towards a spiritual revolution, progress (a mytheme that was borrowed from utopian imaginary) and instauration of a transcendent world at a mundane level. Therefore the same juncture can also define *open societies*, which, consequently to the finalization of creations, close the circle that was momentarily opened, and the *moral obligation*, as a constant directory force that ensures the cohesion of the group, consistent with the individual wills of its members, becomes social pressure, while "[...] some part of the new is poured into the molds of the old [...]"[22] Cassirer considered that, in conformity with Bergson's views,

> *[...] the moral life of man reflects the same metaphysical conflict between an active and a passive principle. Social life repeats and reflects the universal process we encounter in organic life. It is divided between two opposite forces. One of them tends towards the conservation and perpetuation of the present state of facts; the other struggles for new forms of human life that have never existed before. The former tendency is specific to the static religion, the latter characterizes the dynamic religion. The two tendencies could never be brought to a common denominator.*[23]

The *German Faith Movement* (*Deutsche Glaubensbewegung*) and the national socialist *Weltanschauung* had similar way of manifesting at the level of the collective psyche, but their impact was different, as it was a moment when a certain faction created inside, the so-called *Aryan Christianity*, entailed the radical wing of the Nordic paganism which completely rejected the Christian element of

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[20] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954), 196.

[21] Henri Bergson, *Cele două surse ale moralei* (Iaşi: Institutul European, 1992), 242.

[22] *Ibidem*, 243.

[23] Cassirer, *Eseu despre om*, 127.

the movement and replaced Christ with Wotan. While the former had all the characteristics of a tribal caste thinking that compelled a sectarian conduct, the latter was supposed to become a global manifestation that incorporated the fundamental elements preached by Jakob Wilhelm Hauer and the proselytes of his theological thinking, while representing subsidiary the pretences for the implementation of the forthcoming national socialist bioethics that would justify the expansionism and domination of the Third Reich *Übermensch*. The organization

> *[...] tried to install a "German faith" based on the German and Nordic traditions and writings, among which those of Meister Eckhart and Goethe. This movement sought to combine a number of different, often incompatible, directions: some of its members adopted a "purified" form of Christianity, while others resisted not only any type Christianity, but any type of religion or God altogether. One of the general articles on faith that the movement introduced in 1934, claimed the religious rebirth of the nation on hereditary bases within the German race as a goal of the German Faith Movement.[24]*

On the apparently stable ground of the Christian morality, it was not the *saint*, but the *Übermensch* to be taken as a model, causing a *transvaluation of values* (Nietzsche). The mixture of racialism, which the ideologists of the Third Reich took from the thinkers of the 19th century, and the introduction of the *Aryan race* in the axiological context of the Nietzschean *Übermensch* originated the Nazi racism. In this respect, Alfred Rosenberg's vision can be divided into three main interconnecting domains:

> *[...] the racial conception on history, the political alternative that implied the recovery of a popular racial community, and, last but not least, the aspects concerning the territorial expansion that derived from the former two elements, synthesized in the Lebensraum principle.[25]*

Ideological extension from the anti-Judaism / Semitism, as developed in the *Jewish Question*, up to the vision of the *genetic conservation of the German people* in maintaining of control over the racial health and the extermination of the *undesirable others*, led to the concepts of *"worthless life"* or "life unworthy of living", introduced in 1920 by Karl Binding, a specialist in criminal law, and by Alfred Hoche, a psychiatrist and professor. The etatization of the biological aspect has set biopolitics as a defining component of the national socialist Weltanschauung. Eugenics and its immediate punitive form, i.e. euthanasia,

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[24] Carl Gustav Jung, *Civilizaţia în tranziţie* (Bucharest: Trei, 2011), 216.

[25] Ferran Gallego, *Oamenii lui Hitler. Elita naţional-socialismului (1919-1945)* (Bucharest: All, 2010), 293-294.

represented the coercive methods imposed by a totalitarian utopia built up around the concept of race as a projection of the people (*Volk*).

Nevertheless, the term racism (if by race we mean a strictly biological concept) does not represent the most correct definition of the biopolitics in the Third Reich: it rather acts in a horizon where "life care" [...] becomes absolute and intermingles with the actual preoccupations for eugenics. In distinguishing between politics (Politik) and police (Polizei), von Justi assigns a purely negative task to the former (to fight against the inner and outer enemies of the state), and a positive task to the latter (to care for and improve the life of the citizens). We cannot understand national socialist biopolitics (and, subsequently, a large part of modern politics, even outside the Third Reich), if we do not understand that it implies the attenuation of the distinction between the two terms: the police becomes political, and life care coincides with the fight against the enemy.[26]

The *sanctity of life*, as ensured by the projections of a perfect new human, created by eugenics and controlled by biopolitics, and viewed by the Nazis as indiscernible between people and race, has utopian values if we refer to More's Utopia, where suicide was acceptable only for the terminal patients in the blissful community, after the priests' decision. Such clerical deciders identify with the Total State.

Racism, therefore, is linked to the functioning of a state that is forced to make use of race in order to exercise its sovereign power. The juxtaposition or, better still, the functioning by means of the bio-power of the ancient sovereign power of the death right implies the functioning, the instauration and the activation of racism. [...] Nazism, undoubtedly, is the paroxysmal development of the new mechanisms of power, which began to be implemented in the 19th century [...] The disciplinary power, bio-power: these are the ones that covered and fully supported the Nazi society (by taking over biology, procreation, heredity; also by taking over sickness and accidents). [...] Nazi state makes fully coextensive both the field of a life that itself sets up, protects, guarantees and cultivate from a biological viewpoint, and the sovereign right to kill anyone − not only the others, but also its own people.[27]

The extermination of 'the others" that Foucault refers to, justifies the pan-national hegemony of the Third Reich, as expressed by the phenomenon concept of 'Vital Space" (*Lebensraum*), the ideal and purged space of the Suprahuman.

The interconnection that goes as far as the complete identification between the *Führer-totale* and the *Statt-Volk* represented the catalyst for the creation of the

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[26] Giorgio Agamben, *Homo sacer. Puterea suverană şi viaţa nudă* (Cluj-Napoca: Idea Design & Print, 2006), 119.

[27] Michel Foucault, *Trebuie să apărăm societatea* (Cluj-Napoca: Idea Design & Print, 2009), 203-204.

suprahuman, essentially different from the *new man* preached by Marxism through communism, projected by the Stalinist vision upon the *homo sovieticus*. In this respect, Alain Badiou highlights the forms of *intramundane religions* (*Voegelin*) in which they set themselves in an egocentric position, acting as a transcendent pattern within each and any utopia in which they were created.

Fascisms try to counterpose to the infinity of emancipation the sanguinary encumbrance of a predicable finitude and the enumerable properties of a conjectural substance (the Aryan, the Jew, the German…). "Communisms" experiment the antinomy (captured by Marx due to his ever present genius) between the finitude of the state and the infinity that is immanent in any truth, including − and especially − the political one. The mythical referential entities accompany the triumph of fascisms and seal implacably the defeat of "communisms".[28]

In the spectrum of *political religions* (Eric Voegelin), the Leader's (Fuehrer) infallibility acted both as a prerequisite and as a consequence of the process of society's atomization inherent to the national socialist totalitarian ideology. In front of masses, the totalitarian leaders have a soteriological position, their mission assuming transcendent grounds to their mission, with a cathartic function of purifying the world. The totalitarian mesmerism of the ideological manipulation deeply marked humanity, producing concentration camps along with the atomization process of the individual and of the society as a whole.

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[28] Alain Badiou, *Secolul* (Cluj: Idea Design & Print, 2010), 103.

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Communication and Pragmatic Skills in Foreign Language Classes

Olda Xhepa BALLIU, *Ph.D candidate*
Department of Italian Language,
Foreign Language Faculty,
University of Tirana, Albania
oldaxhepa@yahoo.it

Abstract

This paper tries to analyze the importance and the relationship between communication and pragmatic skills in foreign language classes. Philosophers and linguists have dealt with language, analyzing it from the psychological viewpoint. Communication in L1 or L2 is related and it depends on the science of pragmatics. While communicating, interlocutors interact impacted by the context, the situation, the receiver, the sender, by using the formal or the informal language according to the circumstances. For this reason, we try, in this paper, to make a thorough description of the relationship between communication and pragmatics.

Students need to master pragmatic skills in order to communicate. If Italian students or foreign language students have developed pragmatic skills in the native language, this will help them learning a foreign language. The goal of the foreign language teacher is to help students achieve communication skills. The pragmatic and communication skills can be practiced through communication activities like in L1 for speech acts are practiced in communication.

Keywords: *communication, speech acts, pragmatic skill, culture.*

Pragmatic Skill in a Foreign Language class

Methods of foreign language teaching were and still are analyzed from theory to practice through sociology, philosophy, psycholinguistics, pragmatics and other sciences, since the human being is exploring new ways of acquiring languages. Foreign language teaching or second language teaching are always a matter of concern and the foreign language is always compared to the way mother tongue is acquired. If in the past the language was considered on a scale ranging

from accuracy to grammar proficiency, nowadays learners are focused on communication. For this reason there is a shift from grammar competence to communication skills.

Then it should be analyzed how this communication is realized in foreign or second language classes, what is the role of speech acts, how they function in relation to the above mentioned sciences and what is their role in realizing such communication acts. In this paper is analyzed the relation and importance of pragmatics in relation to the goal of foreign language classes which is the communication.

Learners acquire language by beginning with utterances, passing to words, sentences, than to a whole speech. But the way learners acquire a foreign language may be different, beginning with their background, their cultural differences, their social relations and behavior. For this reason, have been conducted researches about speech acts belonging to learners of a foreign language. Researchers have tried to analyze the relation between pragmatics and communication.

Learners of the Italian, English, French languages study these languages because globalization offers new possibilities to study, work or make a living. For this reason communication is important. In Longmans dictionary, communication is defined as the process by which people exchange information, while pragmatics is defined as the study of how words and phrases are used with special meanings in a particular situation. For this reason, we can say that we need pragmatics in order to learn how to communicate in a foreign language.

Pragmatics teaches the manner in which the acts of speech should be used in different contexts and the type of language to be used: the formal or the informal one. From my experience, during my Italian classes, students sometimes find it difficult to communicate if they do not have a thorough knowledge of these two concepts. Although many students generally know the Italian language, they make mistakes or errors in communication just because of this lack in pragmatic skills. It is important for a foreign language learner to study pragmatics.

The pragmatic skill is acquired in the mother tongue, by practicing the language through communication activities. This is important to be done during foreign language classes, because this lack of input does not help learners acquire pragmatics and, therefore, communication. By using communication activities, the learners of the Italian language acquire cultural differences, intercultural communication, language and discourse.

Through communication there is an interaction between different interlocutors, who, in our case, study the Italian language. Some students find it

difficult to express themselves in Italian language because of the interference with the Albanian language. It is important to provide meaningful conversational contexts that involve them in communication, possibly materials that contain real life concerns and information to distinguish between L2 and L1 differences. For this reason the *Curricula of Foreign Languages* stresses upon the fact that culture plays an important role in learning a foreign language. By learning a language, students decode that particular language and input different cultural information, which make them appreciate the foreign language.

Acquiring intercultural communication through pragmatics

Pragmatics is the science that analyzes the use of language from real people for their own purposes and the ability to understand and use the language. Learning pragmatic rules help students master conversational skills and interaction. For pedagogical purposes, such conversations help learners decode cultural information without the interference of L1. The social environment in which we live imposes us the rules of our behaviour. Citing Richards[1] Communicative competence includes some aspects of language knowledge such as:

- *Knowing how to vary our use of language according to the setting and the participants (knowing when to use formal and informal speech or when to use language appropriately for written as opposed to spoken communication)*
- *Knowing how to produce and understand different types of texts (narratives, reports, interviews, conversations)*
- *Knowing how to maintain communication despite having limitations in one's language knowledge (through using different kinds of communication strategies)*

The aspects he highlights offer to students the possibility to practice the language. The activities should take place in meaningful contexts to help learners understand the pragmatic use of the language. The interaction in L2 outside the classroom happens rarely and for this reason, teachers should provide classroom activities to help students achieve speech skills.

Nowadays, in teacher-centered classes, it is possible to do it. If teachers bring authentic materials and use them for the communicative purposes of learning a foreign language, in our case the communication in Italian is facilitated. Authentic materials provide authentic cultural information. As an example the use

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[1] Jack. C. Richards, *Communicative Language Teaching Today*, CUP. 3-20, (2006).

of novels, magazines, videos containing documentaries are a good choice to help students develop pragmatic and communication skills.

Providing communication activities to students

As we mentioned above, through communication, students can master everything. In foreign language classes, it is important to choose from a variety of topics and activities to make students practice the language. The topics should be relevant, up to date, interesting, connected to students' interests. The activities should be communicative. There is a list of such aspects, but let us mention what the CLT method, according to Richards, considers as being communication activities: Information gap, gathering activities, jigsaw activities, task completion, role plays. He states that use of authentic materials provide students with cultural information and support a more creative approach to teaching. In the classes of *Text Linguistic with Italian students, I provide them with advertisements, newspapers as materials to be used to analyze texts (argumentative, narrative) because, since they are authentic, students find better what type of texts they deal with, this also helps them analyze the discourse and the speech acts.*

Conclusion

To summarize what we tackled in this paper, we can say that communication can not be seen as something separated from pragmatics. In order to communicate, students need first of all to understand discourse and speech acts from a pragmatic point of view. Students should be exposed to meaningful contexts to understand the pragmatic use of language. If there are limitations in using literature, then both teachers and students may collaborate to make communication possible. By manipulating texts, students develop critical thinking and not just merely a general comprehension. The Pragmatic Skill and the Communicative Skill help students understand the language, its meaning, the cultural differences and the practice of communication skills in meaningful contexts.

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Beliefs and Behaviors in Learning Critical Thinking Skills[*]

Octavian REPOLSCHI, *Lecturer PhD*
West University of Timişoara, Romania
octavian.repolschi@@e-uvt.ro

Abstract

The paper will present the relation between students' beliefs and their behaviours observed in the process of learning critical thinking skills. In the first place some consideration concerning the fundamental epistemological concepts used in the research and about the particular critical thinking skills are to be sketched. Then the testing-learning procedure will be shortly summarized. Thirdly the evaluation of beliefs, their relations with knowledge and the associated behaviors are presented. The results of the periodic testing procedures that were taking place according to the established methodology are to be discussed. Finally, some general considerations concerning the relations between beliefs, behaviors and knowledge that have emerged in the process of learning are going to be presented.

Keywords: *belief, knowledge, justification, decision, critical thinking.*

Introduction

The present paper aims to answer to the following two questions: (1) "How is decision (behavior) supported by reasoning in a critical thinking learning context?", and (2) "What are the actual relations between belief, knowledge and behavior (decision) in such a context?" We think this is important for several reasons. First, it could help us see the progress of the process of applying reasoning procedures as it is reflected in the decision results. Second, it could give an empirical insight in what are the relations between the fundamental epistemological concepts – belief and knowledge – in the context of our

investigation. And last but not least, it could evaluate the relation between the two types of knowledge distinguished by Ryle:[1] the *knowledge-that*, and the *knowledge-how*. This investigation was inspired by the works in experimental philosophy presented by Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols.[2] Before presenting our experiments' methodology and results, we will make some considerations regarding the concepts used and the context of the investigation.

The concepts of *belief* and *knowledge* as they are currently used in the philosophical literature are the fundamental for our investigation. Both "belief" and "knowledge" are defined as *propositional attitudes*,[3] and have a similar logical structure: "S *believes* that *p*" and "S *knows* that *p*". Both types of propositional attitudes possess content and intentionality, as long they are *about* something, in this case they are about p, where *p* is a proposition. S, in the above expression, stands for the cognitive subject that possesses the respective propositional attitude. As it is well known, they differ fundamentally in the attitudinal aspect. For instance, it is perfectly possible for John to *believe* that Peter is in Helsinki now, and that he doesn't *know that* Peter is in Helsinki now. The differences lay especially in what was called in the classical analysis of knowledge *the necessary and sufficient conditions* for a belief to be considered knowledge: the *truth* of the proposition believed in this case "Peter is in Helsinki now", and the *justification* the agent has for his belief. There were many discussions concerning what does it mean for a proposition *p* to be justified. We will shortly present them bellow.

There are many distinguishable types of knowledge:[4]

- *knowledge-that* something is the case – the propositional knowledge
- *adverbial knowledge*: knowing what, when, how, why, and so forth.
- *knowledge by acquaintance* with individuals or things
- *performatory (or "how-to") knowledge*

In the classical analysis of knowledge the focus is on the first type of knowledge, the *knowledge-that* or propositional knowledge. There are some essential features that are assumed in propositional type of knowledge.[5] We are going to refer only to a couple of them. First, there is the condition of *truth* for a

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[1] Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (New York, London, Melbourne, Sydney, Cape Town: Hutchinson House, 1951).

[2] Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols (eds.), *Experimental Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[3] Edward J. Lowe, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 39-101.

[4] Nicholas Rescher, *Epistemology. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), xiv-xv.

[5] Rescher, *Epistemology*, xvi.

proposition *p* in order to be considered a candidate for knowledge. We cannot say that someone *knows that p* is the case unless *p* is true. He may well believe that *p* is the case, but if *p* is false, we cannot say that he *knows that p*. Second, even if *p* is true, *p* must be also *justified* in order to say that the cognitive agent *knows that p*. These necessary and sufficient conditions could be summarized as follows:

> *(1) S* believes *that p*
> *(2) p is* true
> *(3) S is* justified *in believing that p*
> *(4) iff (1), (2), and (3) are the case, then S* knows *that p*

For this research we will accept the conditions (1), (2), and (3) to be necessary and sufficient for (4). There is still something more to say about what it means for a true belief to be justified in order to be considered knowledge. In the epistemological literature there are different answers to this issue, most of them generated by the famous Gettier problem.[6] As Ichikawa and Steup assert in their paper,[7] the answer to the relation between a true belief and knowledge resides in that which prevents the *epistemic luck*. However, the problem is still here, for it has to be clarified *what* will prevent the so-called *epistemic luck*. There have been proposed many different answers to this issue: evidentialism, reliabilism (Justification-Reliabilism, Knowledge-Reliabilism), internalist and externalist views on justification and so on. A few words on the justification issue is necessary in the context of our research as long as the key point in the learning process of critical thinking skills are part of the justification process. In his 1963 paper Gettier presents two counterexamples for the classical analysis of knowledge that shows that it is possible for S to be justified in believing p, yet *p* is not the case. How are the conditions for knowledge to be modified in order to answer Gettier's problem? Two general strategies seem to be available: strengthening the justification condition,[8] or searching for a suitable further condition that would escape the Gettier's counterexamples. If *evidentialism* endorses a conception of knowledge that augments the justified true belief view with a supplementary condition that prevents the epistemic luck, in the last decades the popular perspective about knowledge is reliabilism, the view that advocates the reliability

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[6] L. Edmund Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" *Analysis* 23, 6 (1963), 121-123.

[7] Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Matthias Steup, "The Analysis of Knowledge", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Spring 2014 Edition), accessed July 3, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/knowledge-analysis/.

[8] M. Roderick Chisholm, *The Foundations of Knowing*, Second Edition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983).

of the cognitive process that produces the belief. The two types of reliabilism: one that sees reliabilism as a theory of justification (*J-Reliabilism*) and the other that sees reliabilism as a theory of knowledge (*K-Reliabilism*) could be formally expressed as follows:[9]

J-Reliabilism:
- S knows that *p* iff S's belief that *p* is (a) true and (b) justified
- S is justified in believing that *p* iff S's belief that *p* was produced by a reliable cognitive process (in a way that blocks the epistemic luck)

K-Reliabilism:
- S knows that *p* iff S's belief that *p* (a) is true, and (b) was produced by a reliable cognitive process (in a way that blocks the epistemic luck)

As it was noticed by,[10] evidentialists reject both types of reliabilism. The J-Reliabilism is considered wrong because it sees justification as an internal process, and for evidentialists justification is external to the subject. Chisholm rejects externalism proposing an internal justification sketched as follows:[11]

If a person S is internally justified *in believing a certain thing, then this may be something he can know just by reflecting upon his own state of mind. And if S is thus internally justified in believing a certain thing, can he also know, just by reflecting upon his state of mind, that he is justified in believing that thing? This, too, is possible − once he has acquired the concept of epistemic justification.*

The type of justification internalism Chisholm proposes, called *accessibility internalism*, sustain that justification is recognizable on reflection. The opposed view, the justification type of externalism says simple that justification is not directly recognizable.[12] More, as the cited authors observe, it can be derived that J-Reliabilism is an externalist theory, and the same applies for K-Reliabilism.

There is no space here to dwell into all the complications of the knowledge analysis.[13] Instead we are concerned to define beliefs and knowledge as operational concepts for an empirical investigation that will provide us with enough information to find some connections between such concepts and, hopefully, to clarify some aspects on the knowledge issue, as sketched above.

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[9] Ichikawa and Steup, "The Analysis of Knowledge".
[10] *Ibidem.*
[11] M. Roderick Chisholm, *Theory of Knowledge* (Third Edition, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1989), 7.
[12] Ichikawa and Steup, "The Analysis of Knowledge".
[13] *see* Ichikawa and Steup, "The Analysis of Knowledge," for further details.

What we are going to explore are just the particular type of belief and, accordingly, the particular type of knowledge that are referred to as *propositional*, even though in the process of solving critical thinking problems, the type of knowledge named the *knowledge-how* takes an important part, as long as *doing* seems to play an important role in learning. However, the ability to answer correctly to the questions in a particular amount of time will suffice as an evidence for the *knowledge-how* type of knowledge,[14] as long as the *knowledge-that* type is in this context dependent on the knowledge-how process.

However, to make things simpler, we will try to propose a kind of investigation that will allow us at least to make some observations on the nature of knowledge, belief and decision, as these concepts are inherently connected in a rational decision process. What is going to be taken as *belief* in this research is *the individuals' belief about each of the propositions* that are proposed as answers to the critical thinking questions in the evaluation tests. We could therefore define for this context that *the cognitive agent believes that p*, the propositional attitude that causes the cognitive agent to choose the proposition *p* (the particular answer to one particular question in the test) as being the correct answer to that question. And correspondingly, we will define, according to the justification true belief conditions, that *the cognitive agent knows that p*, iff the proposition *p* is true, the agent believes that p, and the agent is justified in believing p. Thus, when an individual will choose one answer from five possible answers offered to each question, we will suppose that his behavior (his decision in the evaluation context) is based on his *belief that p*, which means that he believes that the chosen answer is true. Furthermore, when the same individual will be asked to say if he is absolutely sure (100%) about the truth of the proposition he has chosen, and subsequently, that he can provide a justification for truth of the proposition chosen as the correct answer to the particular question, and the answer he has chosen is the correct one for the particular question, we will consider that the individual *knows that p*.

In order to assess the decision support offered by reasoning and also to the assumed relations between beliefs, knowledge and the behavior of the respondents, we must say a few words about the context of the decision and its design. The importance of learning critical thinking skills is by now largely accepted. For our study here it is important that the critical thinking tests provides a framework for our rational decision study, for it offers the cognitive agent sufficient information

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[14] Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 25-60.

to make a rational decision in the context. We are postulating that in this particular context, a rational decision is that one which is grounded in the knowledge of the one correct answer from the five possible alternatives given for each critical thinking question. The particularity of the context is such as that each correct (true) answer is perfectly justified in the critical thinking problem's context. We can thus investigate the cognitive and decisional conditions of the cognitive agents that are constraint to solve the critical thinking problems in a certain amount of time. The justification tools were taught in the class as it will be shown bellow. For the purpose of our investigation is also important to mention that if the justification of the correct answer is inherent in the critical thinking particular problems, the kind of justification we are asking from the cognitive agent for his *knowledge that p* is internal in the sense that we are expecting the agent to discover the pre-existing justification of the true proposition p, and thus to support his *belief that p*. For our purpose here, this process that aims to discover what is already there – the justification of the true answer –, the perfect access to it and the capacity to expose in detail the justification is an essential part of the meaning of the *knowledge that p.*

Methodology. Teaching and Evaluation

We have used LSAT tests for three type of critical thinking abilities: analytical reasoning (RA), logical reasoning (RL) and reading comprehension (RC). As a first difference from the classical LSAT tests, in our investigation the time constraint was loosen from less than two minutes to almost four minutes in the regular seminar evaluation and two minutes and a half in the final examination. We have started to teach and evaluate undergraduate students taking the course in Critical Thinking for a period of three years. There were two different teaching schedules that have been used:

- The 2 h course/week and 2 hours seminar *each week* on a 14 weeks program – Teaching Schedule 1 (TS1)
- The 2 h course/week and 2 hours seminar *each two weeks* on a 14 weeks program – Teaching Schedule 2 (TS2).

The seminar consists in guided critical thinking solving problems procedures, according with the LSAT critical thinking types of abilities mentioned above. The preparation time for each theme of the seminar was done according with the TS1 or TS2 schedule as in the table bellow (*Table 1*).

Each evaluation of the specific critical thinking ability (RA, RL, RC) during the semester had 7 questions and took 30 minutes, meaning that the student had approximatively 254 seconds for each question. The standard time applied for the

final evaluation of the critical thinking abilities as it is applied for a typical LSAT test format is 35 minutes for 22-27 questions of one type of critical thinking evaluated ability, meaning that for each question there will be an average between 77.78 to 95.45 seconds to be solved.

	TS1 amount of time/theme (min)	TS2 amount of time/theme (min)
Introduction to Critical Thinking	120	60
Deduction Reasoning & Errors	240	120
Inductive Reasoning & Errors	240	120
Exercises (Deductive & Inductive Reasoning)	150	60
Analytical Reasoning (AR)	240	120
AR Test	30	30
Logical Reasoning (LR)	240	120
LR Test	30	30
Reading Comprehension	240	120
RC Test	30	30
Recapitulation	120	30

Table 1. The Teaching Schedules for Critical Thinking

We haven't done a special diagnostic test for any group involved in the exploratory investigation, yet there were several so called "diagnosis-exercises" in class for each type of ability that were used in similar conditions as the tests that were to be taken for the specific ability. The results of their decisions were not particularity registered, yet there were no significant differences from one group to another in their behavior in the context.

As a general conclusion for the initial contact of the different groups of students with the critical thinking problems, we can say that there were a great discrepancy between what they believe to be the true answer to a question, and what was actually the correct one. For exemplification, we are depicting an image of a table of results for a particular problem in *Table 2*.

The Q/A in the table are the questions and answers. As it can be observed, for each question there are five proposed answers: A, B, C, D, E. The correct answer is marked with bold characters in the table. The last column contains the total number of the answers given by the students in the class, as the sum of the distributed

Q/A	A	B	C	D	E	No. of AGS
1				10	4	14
2	4	2	3	1	3	13
3	5	**5**	1	1	1	13
4	1	5	**5**	2	1	14
5	**11**	1		1		13
6	1	5	4	**3**	1	14

Table 2. The distribution of answers for a first critical thinking exercise

number of answers for each question. It can been noticed that for the questions 1, and 5 the majority of the answers are correctly given, yet for the questions 2, 3, 4 and 6 the correct answers were chosen by a minority of students. The things are even more complicated in the example given in the Table 3 bellow, built after several teaching classes, where the justification procedures for each type of critical thinking exercise were given. Here students are also asked if they are certain about their choice, and if they could provide an explicit justification of the sort they were taught in respect with their choice.

In the *Table 3* are depicted the answers of nine students that had been tested with a Reading Comprehension (RC) exercise in class. The answers are lined on the first column and the questions (represented by numbers) are distributed on the first row. The student's choices are

S/Q	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
S1	C	D*	A*	E	D	C	B	B	D
S2	C	D	C	E	D*	E	B	A	E*
S3	C*	A	C	D	D	E	B	B	C*
S4	A	C	C	E	D	E*	B	A	C
S5	B	A	D*	C	A	E	D	C	C
S6	E	C	E	D	D	E	D	B	D
S7	D	D	C	D	D*	E	B	A	E
S8	C	C	C	D	B	E*	B*	D*	E*
S9	C	A	C	D	D	C	A	A	E

Table 3. The distribution of chosen answers to a RC problem corroborated with knowledge acknowledgment distribution.

represented with letters (A, B, C, D, E) on each column, corresponding to each question and for each student in a row. There are a couple of things to be noticed here: first, because the type of exercise proposed is a RC one, it was scheduled in the class towards the end of the semester, and therefore the students should have a clear understanding of the justification procedure in the context; second, there are cases where the student is sure about his choice (meaning that he believes that *p*, and he believes that he has a justification for his belief that *p* that lead him to his choice, and that he thinks that his choice is true), and yet his answer is not correct, and therefore he doesn't know that *p* (i.e. S1 question 2, S4 question 6, and so on); also, there are cases where the student choses the right answer (p is true, and the student believes that *p*, yet he is not sure about his choice, meaning that he cannot provide an account for his choice, or, if he has it, he is not able to produce it explicitly). These cases of choice "background" are extremely frequent in all the groups investigated.

After a teaching and learning period of 14 weeks, the final evaluation (the final exam) was designed to be of 90 minutes and was composed by 36 critical thinking questions distributed as follows: 25% of them are RA questions, 50% of

them are RL questions, and 25% of them are RC questions. It follows that for each question the student has at his/her disposal about 150 seconds to solve it correctly. It is a stronger constraint than that from the typical class evaluation, yet it is still more permissive than that used in LSAT tests (with an average of 86 seconds/question).

The population involved in the experimental procedure is represented by groups of undergraduate students. The population in the first group (Group A) is ranging between 140 and 180 individuals for each group. The teaching and evaluation procedures were performed in different years for each group, as follows:

- Group A1: year 1 - 140 students
- Group A2: year 2 - 180 students
- Group A3: year 3 - 143 students

Different group types of students from different faculties were used as control groups ranging in each university year from 48 to 110 as follows:

- Groups B: these groups were exposed to a single problem solving procedure for analytical reasoning during a single class; all these groups were tested only for RA ability:
  - Group B1: year 1 - 110 students
  - Group B2: year 2 - 95 students
  - Group B3: year 3 - 75 students
- Group C: it was a single group of 48 students from different faculties which had not been exposed to any preliminary problem solving procedure for a critical thinking test in class; they were tested just for RC ability.

All the testing conditions were the same and also the difficulty of the problems given was in the same range as for the regular students.

Results

The results of the investigation could be summarized as follows:

- The TS1 doesn't seem to be better in terms of results than TS2, as expected: the tested group of regular students group A2 and group A3 which had been exposed to a TS2 teaching schedule did not appear to have significant lower results on all critical thinking tests than the group A1 which has been exposed to a TS1 schedule (see *Table 4* bellow).

Groups/Average tests results	RA	RL	RC	NS	RA-e	RL-e	RC-e	NE	NF
A1	6.62	5.57	5.74	**5.98**	5.08	4.98	4.39	**4.82**	**5.40**
A2	6.11	5.91	5.37	**5.80**	5.34	4.89	5.38	**5.20**	**5.50**
A3	6.44	5.37	5.87	**5.89**	5.44	5.16	4.85	**5.15**	**5.52**

Table 4. The average critical thinking tests results for the three groups A1, A2, A3

Legend: RA – test at seminar (average marks); RL – test at seminar (average marks); RC – test at 4seminar (average marks); RA-e – test at exam (average marks); RL-e – test at exam (average marks); RC-e – test at exam (average marks); NS – seminar final mark (average marks); NE – exam final mark (average marks); NF – average final mark (NS, NE).

- Surprisingly, as the critical thinking skills improved as the more and complicated problems are solved in the class, and thus the students' ability to chose the correct answer is becoming more accurate, the students' feelings of certainty regarding their choices (or self awareness of their knowledge about the correct answer) appear to diminish (see the graphical representation for a series of RA ability tests bellow for the group A1 - *Graph 1*).


Graph 1. The correlation between the % of correct (true) answers given by the groups of students in the Group A1

Because the three groups A1, A2, and A3 are similar in their general results, we could reasonably presume that this kind of attitude regarding their choice is also similar. This assumption was tested in class, yet not on a regular basis as in the group A1 case, due to the time limit in the TS2 teaching schedule.

- The series of groups in the category B (B1, B2, and B3) which were exposed only to a single problem solving situation had obtained results on a single RA test comparable with those of the groups involved in regular teaching schedules TS1 or TS2 (see *Graph 2*).

Graph 2. Average marks on RA tests on A and B type groups.

We have not investigated the possible explanations for this epistemic success of the B groups. However, to the group B2 the one RA exercise of five questions had a different distribution for percent of beliefs in the truth of the answer and percent of certainty that the given answer is true as those obtained on a part of A1 cases for a similar RA exercise (see *Graph 3* and *Graph 4*).


% Certainty that the answer given is correct/true
% Correct answers

Graph 3. The relation between % of certainty that the given answer to a question is correct/true and the % of true answer given to the same question for group B2.

Graph 4. The relation between % of certainty that the given answer to a question is correct/true and the % of true answer given to the same question for group A1.

For representational convenience we are using just the data from a part of the group A1, all the other cases being similar for the entire group. It is perhaps significant that, despite the comparable results on the given topic of RA, the epistemic perspectives at least on a particular critical thinking situation are different. For it is noticeable that if on the *Graph 3* all the percentages of the "certainty" for given the true answer are greater than those for the real true answer in the B2 group, in the *Graph 4* the situation is reversed for a part of the group A1. A closer look into the dynamics of these macroscopic results will give us a better understanding of the development (see *Graph 5* and *Graph 6*).

The macroscopic differences seems to be produced by the a multitude of individual epistemic behaviors concerning the possibilities: a) that an answer is in fact true and is believed to be true and the person is certain to be true (has a clear justification in mind for its belief that the answer is true); b) an answer is in fact false, yet the person believes that it is true and is certain that it is true; c) an answer is believed to be true, it is in fact true, yet the person is uncertain about its truth; d) an answer believed to be true, yet it is in fact false and the person is uncertain about its truth. It can easily be noticed in the *Graph 6* that in the particular cases of the answers given to the questions 1 and 4 there is no cognitive agent that is certain about a false answer, yet this is not the case in *Graph 5*.

Legend:
- ■ %Certainty&Truth
- ▫ %Certainty&False
- ■ %unCertainty&Truth
- ▪ %unCertainty&False

Graph 5. % of Certainty and the Truth of answers distributed per question for the group B2 on the same problem as in the Graph 3.

Graph 6. % of Certainty and the Truth of answers distributed per question for a part of the group A1 on the same problem as in the Graph

Moreover, there is a higher percent of "certainty and truth" for the first three-four answers in *Graph 6* than in *Graph 5*, and this tends to explain the overall "awareness" of the part of the group A1 of the epistemic situation compared with the "epistemic optimism" of the group B2. As it was shown in the *Graph 1*, the so-called "epistemic optimism" diminishes as the agent becomes more and more aware of the requests of the justification process.

- A particular interesting situation, not sufficiently explored in the course of investigation, was encountered comparing the groups A1, A2, A3 on RC results with the control group C, a group which had not been exposed to any critical thinking teaching class at all (see *Graph 7*).

- As it was expected, the greater the individual time spent in solving critical thinking problems, the greater was the final mark.

- It can be reasonably said that the investigation performed brings along with some expected answers to the questions (1) and (2) from above, a couple of other questions as well. For if it was expected that decision (behavior) will be better supported by learning the justification procedures in the context (knowledge-how), the actual relations between belief, knowledge and decision seem to be complex ones. For instance, the fact that the agents are certain about the truth of their choice and the answer chosen is really true does it count as the agent's knowledge that *p*? We have test also this on different cases asking the students to produce the clear justification for their choice, in the manner they were taught in seminars. There were just a couple of cases in which the correct justification was produced according to the rules. The majority of the productions were difficult to be counted as true justifications for their belief that *p*, even if this kind of inconsistency was not accidental. For, as the *Graph 1* shows, the majority of the choices were increasingly correct. Due to the constraints of the paper, we will restrain to just a final remark on the problem of justification. The cvasi-general lack of access to their own justification process in agents that are believing that *p*, as it appear to be supported by the data, seems to endorse an externalist position for justification. However, the issue needs to be explored more for a more clear position. For instance, we have not discussed here the position held by the virtue epistemology,[15] which seems to be a serious candidate to explain the behavior of the epistemic agents in the analyzed context.

Graph 7. Comparison between A groups an C group on RC average marks

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[15] Duncan Prithcard, *What is this thing called knowledge?* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 69.

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Discursivity and Non-discursivity in Tourism Advertising. A Case of Postcolonial Destinations[*]

Ana CRĂCIUNESCU, *PhD student*
"Ștefan cel Mare" University of Suceava, Romania
anna_c00@yahoo.com

Abstract

Even though advertising has an economic finality, its means of construction are rooted to a great extent into humanist sciences. Thus, in the present paper we shall analyze, in an interdisciplinary approach, one important aspect − the image, underlying in this case its referential and non-discursive character. Our research methodology based mainly on Discourse Analysis is enriched with backdrops of language philosophy and communications sciences that will help us to encapsulate more profound resorts that advertising operates with, in order to create the psychological frame of triggering the motivation of consumption. As tourism represents an intangible gratification, yet a form of economic exchange, the promotional (non)discursive strategies must encounter the expectations of a probable Westerner, in quest of authentic experiences. By encountering the Other, the Self rediscovers universal human values and laws that must be firstly integrated within the image of a successful advertising campaign. As tourism represents not only an economic exchange, but also linguistic, cultural, symbolic, etc., all incorporated through gazing, as a form of reciprocal recognition and identification, which lingers beyond territorial borders.

Keywords: *discourse vs. non-discourse, symbol vs. sign, image, advertising, tourism, post-colonialism.*

Introduction

In the present study we have proposed to discuss the relevance of image as a sign and / or as a symbol and to approximate to what extent it is experienced as a non-discursive enunciation within recent audio-visual tourism advertising. The

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hermeneutic / language philosophy perspective, along with the semiotic and communication sciences investigation will help us draw a parallel of similarities and differences between symbol and sign. This parallel is meant to better shape, in a conceptual and ontological understanding, the *state of representativeness* and *the action of representation* (or the language function of referentiality), that the image highlights nowadays within advertising − as a social and cultural act, yet artistic one.

We shall realize a corpus-based investigation on audio-visual materials from tourism promotional practice. From a more general view, our angle of debate will restrain to the identification of verbal and non-verbal elements within the selected material, in order to frame them as non-discursive features of image in the context of advertising.

We have chosen a corpus of advertisements from two countries belonging to the Oriental cultural space (India and Morocco), as we wanted to prompt the innovation of the recent neo-colonial phenomenon that marks, within tourism, an inversion of the former dichotomy dominator/dominated. As tourism has been for a long time considered exclusively an activity specific to the Westerner, we believe that nowadays, tourism represents a form of income that the former colonizing country invests in neo-colonized countries, repaid at the level of an intangible generic capital of the touristic experience that the Westerner lives in the destination. That is why we needed to enriched our study with formulations belonging to qualitative research method from tourism studies, though tributary of sociology: the syntagma *tourist's gaze*.[1] This methodological tool has rapidly transformed into practice, from research field of observation in touristic destinations to the virtual space of the advertising, as a promotional strategy originating in the icon. That is the reason why we shall be also tributary to the theories of non-verbal communication, from communication sciences, in order to comprehensively appreciate the role and the place that the gestural sign comports in the socio-cultural and economic space of advertising nowadays.

The concept of image between discursivity and non-discursivity

Susanne Langer made the distinction between discourse and non-discourse by attributing the first term any textual and / or verbal element (written or oral), and the latter − the image; briefly, the disciple of Ernst Cassirer depicted

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[1] John Urry and Jonas Larsen, *The Tourist's Gaze* (3rd edition, London: Sage Publications, 2011).

separately "visual forms" from "words". Moreover, the author associated rationality to discourse and irrationality to non-discourse. In this light, we can consider that *truth* can be attained beyond rationality, thus, beyond discourse, through intuition, as an *a priori* form of interpretation and cognition. The almost perfectly pure forms of signification can be reached through the capacity of abstracting of the human being, which results into the forming of mental images as incipient forms of cognition, that is, of reason.

Whether we detect image as an iconic sign, as a plastic sign or a linguistic one, the image must be framed within the generic sense of *sign*, interpreted as a message for the alterity. We can understand better the relation language-image-alterity through the words of Gadamer, who said that "man lives in logos and the logos, the «linguistic patter» of its being-into-the-world is determined by the «plasticization» of something, so that the other can see this something".[2] Therefore, the visual element represents the fundament of human communication, whether we understand the world through discursive or non-discursive forms. The contiguity of the concepts "intuition" and "plasticity" in order to reveal the truth through *gaze* is very well highlighted in German language: "To intuit (*anschauen*), to gaze (*schauen*), *to show* are related somewhat from a linguistic point of view with beauty, leading us, as many of our words belonging to the semantic field of visual (re)presentation, towards something visible, but which locks an indication that leaves opened in a particular way what is seen." The word *Schau* can be found in formulations such as "scene" (*Schauplatz, Schaubuhne*), in sayings such as "to intuit something" (*etwas asnchauen*), "to contemplate something" (*etwas beschauen*), or even "being a spectator" (*zuschauen*).[3] *The gaze* is a vehicle of aesthetic experience, non-discursive through the mental reflection of a perceptive projection (thus intuitive) and discursive once it is transformed into a message that establishes a connection between the world of the gazed object and alterity. If the discourse addresses an interlocutor,[4] we can, therefore, attribute to non-discourse the relation between the world of the gazed object and the Self. As we juxtapose intuition, as an irrational element, to our aspiring of the absolute form of knowledge, we recognize that actually, reaching the pure forms cannot be realized in the absence of non-discursivity as "what is essential for the soul, is invisible for the eyes" (Antoine de Saint-Exupéry); eventually, the aesthetic-perceptive experience is the access-key to the sensitive/sensible world, shaped *a priori* at the

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[2] Hans Georg Gadamer, *Actualitatea frumosului* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2000), 146.
[3] *Ibidem*, 145.
[4] Paul Ricoeur, *Eseuri de hermeneutică* (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1995), 160.

level of mental images and transposed subsequently in visual image as a secondary grain of truth registered by the sight and transformed in discursive element at the level of Reason.

Image presents itself as a visual structure which bears secondary grains of truth, because it is "something similar with something else".[5] It comprises an evocative and a referential function. Thus, in Joly's opinion, if image is *representation*, then image is *sign*. But let us see what means referentiality within language functions frame-worked by Jakobson. In Ricoeur's opinion, this function "is so important that it compensates somehow another feature of language, that of separating signs from things; it is through referential function that language «effuses again in the universe» (as Gustave Guillaume says) those signs that the symbolic function evacuated from things at the moment of its appearance".[6] Image as universal language[7] is shaped at the level of memory through images, as "images feed images".[8] For instance, advertising is the result of other advertising recordings, artworks, media images, scientific images, etc.[9] Advertising as media image represents an universal reservoir of referentiality, which crystallizes at the level of a-temporal memory as a track in discourse, as a sign marked through the pre-existence of visual objects of mythical emergence, that are but non-discursive elements − directly inherited from the collective imaginary. On one hand, we associate advertising with a mythical dimension, in connection with generic symbolic practices, but, on the other hand, a sociological dimension intertwines, as the message articulates an economic system and a linguistic one.[10] In other words, both the utilitarian aspect and the signification one remain tributary to an *exchange* and harmonize at the unconscious level through myth.

Image is, thus, sign within sign, quintessence of primordial images, discourse at the level of form, non-discourse at the level of substance, where meaning contours through naturalized universal language, recognisable at the level of the sensitive world of each individual, who, inheritor of the collective imaginary, benefiter of the cultural competence, recognizes a sign beyond the intentionality of the interlocutor. As "any discourse, (...) is both representation (of the real, of the discourse about the real socially constructed) and presentation (a

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[5] Martine Joly, *Introduction à l'analyse de l'image* (2ème édition, Armand Colin, 2009), 31.
[6] Ricoeur, *Eseuri de hermeneutică*, 114.
[7] Joly, *Introduction à l'analyse de l'image.*
[8] *Ibidem*, 100.
[9] *Ibidem*.
[10] Daniela Rovenţa-Frumuşani, *Analiza discursului. Ipoteze şi ipostaze* (Bucharest: Tritonic, 2005), 152.

discourse emitted by a locutor for a certain interlocutor, highly contextualized at his/her own turn)".[11]

Sign vs. symbol

From a hermeneutic perspective, respectively a semiotic one, the modalities of reading the advertising image as an artwork restrain to two possibilities: an interpretative one (interpretation and explanation) and a semio-linguistic one. Both directions attempt to establish a relation between the Self and the represented image, actually between the Self and the alterity of a locutor who has transmitted a message. This identification, or *understanding*, comprises in Gadamer's terms precisely the essence of communication through the identification of its sense. As discussing about artwork in general terms, Gadamer considered that "the hermeneutic identity is the one that edifies the unity of the work. As I understand, I must identify. Because there exists something that I have appreciated, that I have grasped a meaning. I am identifying what it is and only this identity constitutes the sense of the work".[12] At his own turn, Wunenburger asserts that "the symbolic image finds itself at the crossroads of a hermeneutic intentionality, able to pass beyond the sensible/sensitive".[13] Extrapolated, in the case of the advertising "artwork" as an aesthetic and symbolic experience, the process of identification through interpretation can reflect an empirical way of understanding the sense of the adverted message. This knowledge attained through identification is tributary to a *naming* process, synthesised in the advertising field, among other scholars, by G. Péninou in three terms: *le nom* ("the name"), *le oui* ("the yes", "the affirmation") and *le caractère* ("the character"). In his paper with the same title (*Le nom, le oui et le caractère*), Péninou asserted that the icon-as *representation*, transforms the object in an *idol*. The process of naming, thus of identification graves the identity card of the advertised product, whilst its *character* represents the brand image (so image transposed into image), expressing the personality of the proper name that has been articulated through speech.[14]

More recently, Bob Garfield, advertising specialist, brings together advertising and literature, as he remarks the referential character of the former, doubled, yet, by the emphatic function of the object that *it represents* in the communication process with the interlocutor, named here *consumer*:

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[11] *Ibidem*, 183-4.
[12] Gadamer, *Actualitatea frumosului*, 91.
[13] Jean Jacques Wunenburger, *Viaţa imaginilor* (Cluj: Cartimpex, 1998), 22.
[14] That is, reported to discourse.

advertising must refer to something, but in opposition to art, it has most of the time the responsibility of transmitting an explicit message. In this case, the artistic value is just a subsequent component of the ad (...) What matters in this business (...) is the message. It can refer to the benefits that the brand offers, to the image that it projects, to the comprised values or to the problems that it solves. (...) each ad should and should not be in resonance with the targeted consumer.[15]

Actually, as we move the ad's message from the sphere of a rational-informative function towards suggestion and affect, we realize that what people buy is a message: "the product is less bought for an objective utility and rather bought for the associated symbols, that allow an *euphoric identification.*"[16]

The visual image comports, thus, a storage of aesthetic identities, valued through myth by a double force of signification: through itself and its referential character and also through the object of reference and the modality of realisation of this thing. For instance, the object of reference, respectively the modality, can be a symbol, or a sign, that constitutes a message for the alterity: we associate to luxury products a good condition, a certain class-belonging, the need of self-assertion etc. The symbol transgresses beyond the image, completing its meaning through verbal coexistence that expresses the abstract character of a notion which *cannot* be interpreted, as Martine Joly asserts.[17] Despite this, Ernst Cassirer, develops a theory of symbolic forms, showing that "myth, art, language and science appear as symbols; not in the sense of mere figures which refer to a given reality by means of suggestion and allegorical senses, but in the sense of forces each of which produces as posits a world of its own".[18] The philosopher does not consider the symbolic forms as imitation, but as *organs* of reality. In Susanne Langer's opinion, "a symbol differs from the sign in that it does not announce the presence of the object, the being, condition, or whatnot, which is its meaning, but merely *brings this thing to mind*".[19]

Our incursion into the world of the symbolic forms and their challenges allows us to ascend to another sinuous approach of visual image in advertising, that is, the semiotic one. For Barthes, for instance, the semiotics of image in advertising consists in the analysis of "the analogous representation (the copy): once we put aside the linguistic message, there remains the pure image (...) which

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[15] Bob Garfield, *Publicitatea după Garfield* (Bucharest: Europress, 2008), 56-57.

[16] Rovența-Frumușani, *Analiza discursului*, 163.

[17] Joly, *Introduction à l'analyse de l'image*, 98.

[18] Ernst Cassirer, *Language and Myth* (USA: Harper and Brothers, 1953), 8.

[19] Susanne Langer, "Language and Thought" (1953), in eds. Paul Eschholz, Alfred Rosa and Virginia Clark, *Language Awareness: Readings for College Writers* (8thed., Boston: Bedford / St. Martin's, 2000), 96-101.

reveals at once a series of discontinuous signs, randomly ordered, as these signs are not linear".[20]

As it has been considered "degraded myth, fairy tale for little and big children",[21] the message in advertising reveals its intention at the level of images' meaning, as "if advertising disguises meaning,[22] semiotics aspires at revealing the mask of meaning. (...) The role of the specialist in semiotics is thus to reveal the gaming of the mask.[23]

Non-verbal communication in audio-visual tourism advertising. A corpus-based analysis: Morocco (2012) and India (2013)

In opposition with the Cassirer's thesis of the original symbolic forms, it is necessarily to incorporate in our discussion the mimetic side of the image, for a more profound understanding of the construction mechanism of advertising and its interpretation. "Mimesis means a representation in which it is taken into account only the *what* of the substance of what is represented, the given fact that we have in front of us and that we «recognize»".[24] *Mimesis*, which belongs to the Ancient Greek arts of spectacle, can be considered, in Aristotelian terms "the identification, the deep and frightening meeting with ourselves."[25]

Gadamer prefers brushing aside the conceptual and ontological association between *imitation* and *mimesis*, showing that the latter is expressed rather as a transformation; moreover, the artistic experience removes the borders between the *representation* and the *represented*, as he brings again to light the referential character of the object:

> *The original mimics does not report to the imitation that copies and in which someone struggles to get as close as possible to the very prototype, it is rather (re)presentation. (...) To show means (...) to indicate something else than oneself.[26]*

As she referred to the mimetic character of images in the present century, Martine Joly enumerates in the category of *imitated* images the records such as photography, video-clip or film, as "perfectly similar images, pure icons".[27] In this context, audio-visual advertising can constitute the copy of a page from

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[20] Barthes in Martine Joly, *L'image et son interprétation* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2005), 203.
[21] Rovența-Frumușani, *Analiza discursului*, 169.
[22] Georges Péninou, *L'intelligence de la publicité* (Paris: Editions Robert-Laffond, 1972), 38.
[23] *Ibidem*, 170-171.
[24] Gadamer, *Actualitatea frumosului*, 49.
[25] *Ibidem*, 51.
[26] emphasis mine, *ibidem*, 58.
[27] Joly, *Introduction à l'analyse de l'image*, 32.

humankind history at a certain moment, offering to the individual a place on the consumerist scene. At the same time, advertising could not exist in the absence of a public that *identifies* itself with the actors that perform as in Ancient Greek theatre. Even nowadays, this public would take action after ste spectacle has ended (probably under the effects of a cathartic effect), through *imitatio*. We can also assert that often, the contemplation of the advertising image, prefigures hedonism and narcissism as the new heroes of the consumerist society. But even more, advertising reveals nowadays a perfect mélange between science, art and ludic.[28] The aesthetic experience would be impossible without the participation of a "performed being", as Gadamer shows, who asserts that the role of the concept *mimesis* in art's game means more than the non-verbal description of one person's language, as it means "conscious imitation" or even role setting. We shall discuss these aspects as it follows, through examples from audio-visual tourism advertising, where science organizes ludic as art, showcasing a role on the mere scene of each individual, who becomes, on his own life's scene, via *imitatio*, the actor of his/her very wishes and needs.

In the context of touristic experience as aesthetic feeling, we remember the etymologic sense of the word "symbol". In Ancient Greece, this "splinter for remembering", *tessera hospitalis*, had the function of a passport service (metaphorically speaking), a sign of recognition between host and guest, for the next meeting.[29] We believe that this sign of reciprocal recognition is nowadays reiterated through non-verbal communication, especially through *gaze*, as "gaze exchange introduces reciprocity within human relations".[30] Even though tourism is not reduced to a sensorial experience exclusively visual, it carries the mark of recognition and identification through the Other. As a component of non-verbal communication, ontologically responsible for revealing image beyond its appearance, we find the term "gaze" coined by the sociologists within the syntagma "tourist's gaze".[31]

In order to exemplify our theoretical approach, we have chosen two spots, similar in structure, but different in mood / tonality (on the dichotomist principle major / minor). We shall also try to demonstrate the way in which recent audio-visual tourism advertising realizes a transfer of signification at the level of image

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[28] Rovenţa-Frumuşani, *Analiza discursului*, 152.

[29] Gadamer, *Actualitatea frumosului*, 99.

[30] Septimiu Chelcea, *Comunicarea non-verbală: gesturile şi postura* (Bucharest: Comunicare.ro, 2005), 66.

[31] Urry and Larsen, *The Tourist's Gaze*.

and sounds, as it emphasizes the non-verbal elements of communication and gestural semiotics, developed, among other scholars by Valérie Brunétière. The specialist in semiotics proposes a model of organization in the field of gestural semiotics, named the model of *non-verbal communication* (CNV) and of the *non-verbal signification* (SNV); "at the intersection of CNV with SNV we find the intercultural dimension of the gesture. The idiolect of a subject brings proofs of the gestural structure of a culture. This is how the *gesture-sign* could have been identified".[32]

The *represented /performed* gestures are part of non-verbal communication, which had been divided by Adler and Rodman[33] in: vocal communication (the tone of voice, the pauses in discourse, the vocal characteristics) and non-vocal communication (gestures, movements, physic appearance, facial expressions, etc.). In a complete acceptation, we include within non-verbal category: kinesics, proxemics, spatial and territorial perception, chronemics and the perception of time, haptics, olfactics, artifacts and eventually, visual contact.

As we can observe in the first analyzed commercial (Morocco, 2012), the reactions of the tourist-actant at a non-verbal level, are followed from the arrival in the destination to the ending of the vacation. Thus, there are underlined the benefits that the destination bring over the emotional evolution of the tourist-actant, facilitated by the host-actant.

1.

2.

3.

4.

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[32] Sanda-Maria Ardeleanu, „Semnificații ale gestualității mâinii. Studiu de caz", in *Analele* Universității „Ștefan cel Mare" Suceava, Seria Filologie (Suceava: Editura Universității Suceava, 2002), 12.

[33] apud Chelcea, *Comunicarea non-verbală*, 30.

5.

Fig.1. Captures Morocco spot, 2013:
Chronological stages of the tourist's actant emotions
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X1smmGIDw48

    The facial expression of the latter is revealed on the face of four actants −
archetypal prototypes representative for Moroccan culture. In what follows, we
enumerate the emotions of the tourist that can be followed in the chronological
order of his emotional evolution: fear-quest-contemplation-joy-satisfaction (Fig.1);
in the case of the characters representing the host-actant, the "facial semems"
indicate a multiple referential intentionality: 1) gaining the trust of the other (the
host); 2) capturing attention (the teller); 3) availability (the craftsman); 4) the joy
of sharing (the *amazigh*) (Fig.2).

1.

2.

3.

4.

Fig. 2. The four hypostasis of the host-actant's representation:
1) the host; 2) the teller; 3) the craftsman; 4) the *amazigh*
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X1smmGIDw4

As embracing four façettes of the same generic actant, the *host* accompanies the tourist in significant places of the destination. We can observe the way in which communication is emphasized at the level of gazing, amplified in Fig. 2 by touch; the friendly glance, the smile and the touching of the shoulder of the tourist-actant are all elements of visual signification that lead to a multiple referent of the advertised object: the ice-breaking moment of the first contact tourist-host, the welcoming of the tourist in the destination, the overcoming of the cultural shock through reliability, eventually, amiability. From the welcoming face of the *host*, the camera reflects in another frame the face of the *teller* in the *souk*, or typical kind of market for the cultural space of Maghreb. The presence of the teller on the public scene is charged with legendary and mythical empowerment, intensified by the emotion resulted from the connection that he realizes with his public, visibly projected at a non-verbal level, as a strategy of attention capturing. The narration of the tourist-host meeting continues in the craftsman workshop, who shows availability for making a demonstration of his talent, sharing thus with the Other the authentic, the tradition and cultural inheritance of his people. Last but not least, appears the figure of the *amazigh* (the Berber man) who shares in a common experience with the tourist the joy of collective celebration, spirited by local music and dancing.

In this case, image communicates a world of signs and significations, decoded by cultural competence and myth belonging. The epic structure of this commercial is exclusively constructed by *visual and vocal enunciations* (typical Oriental music), that succeed in the temporal logic of a touristic experience (the arrival and the departure).

In the second commercial, launched in 2012 within a long-term promotional campaign of India, the non-verbal aspect has again the exclusivity of transmitting a message revealed only at a visual level. Here, the role of the posture is emphasized as it doubles non-verbal images, in order to suggest different *actions to do* in the destination (see Fig. I in annexes). *Posture* has been defined as "the position of the body or of its components in relation with determined landmarks"; in this respect, Albert Mehrabian (1972) appreciated that posture is more expressive than gestures.[34]

The advertisement that presents the touristic experience of a young white woman within the oriental space of India, offers the spectacle of a series of *symbolic gestures* (after Morris's classification), named as such because they

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[34] Chelcea, *Comunicarea non-verbală*, 152.

comport cultural variations. Actually, emotions and facial expressions rely on the specific of a certain country. For instance, in India, the head gesture accompanying the a local commensality ritual is practiced via *imitatio* by the tourist-actant:

Fig. 3. Symbolic and cultural gestures that accompany Indian commensality rituals
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ChOAVBHc7gI

Furthermore, the new discursive strategies of the commercial propose to erase ethnic and territorial proxemics, marked by postcolonial intrusions. For instance, the ritual of Indian massage from the frame captured in Fig. 4, suggests literally the chromatic superposition of races − white/black, as a nuance of the dichotomy dominator/dominated, reversed now, through haptics, emphasized at the level of hand gesture:


Fig. 4. The ritual of the Indian massage and postcolonial ontological reversions
at the level of haptics
Source: *Ibidem.*

From the street space − *exterior*, to the hotel room space − *interior*, the images representing the arts of spectacle, the motif of the mask or the motif of the tattooed body, succeed rapidly in moving, in order to stabilize within the fix image of the painting that portrays legendary figures, as human actants transmitting a silent message through non-verbal language (see Fig. II in Annexes). Referring to

the painting as the "speechless image" in an essay with the same title, Gadamer asserted that "I would like to discuss about the language of the painting − which is about to become silent. (...) becoming silent is a way of speaking."[35] The explanation of comparing the arts of spectacle with the painting representation is rooted in a common point: *mimesis*, that Plato and Aristotle attributed both to the Greek Ancient theatre and to the painted image.

Conclusions

All in all, we must recognize that our research methodology remains tributary to Discourse Analysis, with inferences from semiotics and communication sciences. This interdisciplinary approach helped us to exemplify through the selected corpus the importance of visual *image* as a non-verbal element that facilitates a sign exchange at an intercultural level. Moreover, the *tourist's gaze* seems to erase territorial boundaries of the dialectics of former relations Coloniser-Colonised. We could also understand how the symbol participates in reshaping the (non)-discursive aspects of the visual image, as it absorbs imagination and *presentificates the object* (Wunenburger). As we could discover the sensible side of the symbol as a universal archetype of signification, we realize that the semiotic approach of advertising facilities the access to a non-discursive aspect of the image, towards a more comprehensive vision over the production and the effects of signification in the so complex field of advertising.

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[35] Gadamer, *Actualitatea frumosului*, 189.

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Annexes

Fig. I. Posture *in tourism audio-visual commercial: India, 2013*
Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ChOAVBHc7gI

Fig. II. The motif of the mask and the "speechless painting"
Source: *Ibidem.*

ESSAYS

PRESENTATIONS

REVIEWS

A Comprehensive Vision for the Problem of Values Nowadays

Review

Ana PASCARU (*coord.*), *"Axiological Decentralization in the Knowledge Society (Philosophical Aspects)"*, Academy of Sciences of Moldova, Chişinău, 2015.

Niadi-Corina CERNICA, *Lecturer Ph.D.*
University "Ştefan cel Mare" of Suceava, Romania
Department of Philosophy, Social and Human Sciences
niadi.cernica@gmail.com

Axiological Decentralization in the Knowledge Society (Philosophical Aspects)[1] is the most recent monograph authored by the group of researchers of the Department of Philosophy from the Academy of Sciences of Moldova. It comprises articles written by experienced researchers in the field as Ana Pascaru (Hab Ph.D.) – "Knowledge Society: Realities and Perspectives", Gheorghe Bobînă (Prof. Hab Ph.D.,) – "Axiomatic aspects of Humanizing Science", Lidia Troianowski (Ph.D.) – "Trends and ethical principles in post-contemporary Ethics", Rodica Ciobanu (Ph.D.) – "The Moral Imperative of Power", Alexandru Cosmescu (Ph.D.) – "Otherness Relation within the Discourse of Contemporary Philosophy", Andrei Perciun (researcher) – "Structural methods for axiological self-significance", Nicolae Bodean (researcher) – "Identitary transformations and developments at the beginning of XXI century".

All the chapters of the books reflect the central thesis, that of undergoing axiological decentralization in the knowledge society, from different standpoints. They share the common assumption for the possibility of axiological decentralization solely in an un-centered globalizing world characterized by Multiple, Diverse, Otherness, and Location. In the modern settings, the core values

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[1] Ana Pascaru (coord.), *Axiological Decentralization in the Knowledge Society (Philosophical Aspects)* (Institute of History from the Academy of Sciences of Moldova, Chişinau, F.E.-P. „Tipografia Centrală", 2015).

are replaced by sets of values adapted to various, multiple and individual aspects of the Reality. In any actual phenomenon co-exist many aspects and implications. As such, all chapters involve interdisciplinary approaches.

The path of reading is indicated even the introduction volumes, from where we present this excerpt:

The imperative of research at stake is the scrutiny of systems' connection through the viewpoint of the networking and interconnections, which become the proper framework for each system, and help to build the borders of knowledge-based society. The new format for structure and integration of systems creates favorable openings for all agents involved in this process, catalyzing, in the conditions of globalization, the formation of unity in diversity that marks contemporary societies and their relationship. In this work was highlighted the importance of unity in diversity tendency, which was substantiated under axiological dimension, beyond the differences / specificities of the societies.[2]

Every chapter highlights, from different points, the perennial conflict/harmony between values and truth, between the ethical, social, cultural, aesthetic, political, and dialogical framework and the truth. The latter one cannot be taken out from this context, in which it forms itself, but with which it doesn't identify itself either (the truth can't be reduced to its social context, cultural and so on): "The research of relativization of knowledge processes is linked to its ethical context,"[3] "Research output data become public good which contribute to the general progress of the society",[4] "Humanization of the Science is a particular case of the relationship between knowledge and values,"[5] and so on.

The monograph *Axiological Decentralization in the Knowledge Society (Philosophical Aspects)* raises the question of the relation of the identity of a society, nation or persons to the values in a world where the multiplicity of interconnections takes place of any other kind of order and communication creates both a new disorder, and a new unification through relationships and interconnections. The order of globalization is based on communication, networking, connections, and not on structures, orders or geopolitical relationships.

The watchwords of the volume are: the transdisciplinarity, the complexity, the multiple rapports of the values to the society, culture, identity, nation, power, information and communication technologies.

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[2] *Ibidem*, 4.
[3] *Ibidem*, 5.
[4] *Ibidem*, 5.
[5] *Ibidem*, 5.

We present this volume as a result of a representative research result for the themes and ideas of philosophical reflection from the present Moldova. It accomplishes to bring together the humanistic values and the new challenges of contemporary reality, the need for a core and the nowadays des-centering world, which finds unity through interconnections and networking and through communication and knowledge.

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