

# Responsibility as an essential structure of the subjectivity by Emmanuel Lévinas

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## Abstract

*Emmanuel Lévinas' central thesis was that ethics is first philosophy. His work has had a profound impact on a number of fields outside philosophy, such as theology, Jewish studies, literature and cultural theory, and political theory. His thinking is an interpretive, phenomenological description of the repetition of the face-to-face encounter, the intersubjective relation at its precognitive core, being called by another and responding to that other. In a phenomenology it is a taking into account the experience related to free human action. Our goal is to take what is irreducible in man that may be developed thanks to the free acts of individuals. Lévinas' assertion of the transcendence of the face should be understood as the most telling point of departure to a respect and human responsibility. This struggle for esteem occurs in the context of different spheres of life: at work, the struggle to prevail, to protect one's rank in the hierarchy of authority; at home, relations of neighborhood and proximity. Basically, the author describes Lévinas' notions: the transition from ontology to the thinking of transcendence, the time and death, the philosophy of dialogue, ethics and religion, another and the metaphysics of Good. Since attempts to overcome the fundamental ontology, outlining the same time as the concept of an identity with the Other, the author proceeds to present Lévinas' reflection on the face, which 'says' no transcendence, but contact with my neighbor, immanence.*

**Keywords:** *Transcendence, Fundamental Ontology, Participation, Beyond Relational Externality, Hypostasis, Immanence, the Neighbor's Radical Responsibility, Substitution.*

## Introduction

There is a view that the thought of Lévinas reflects the concerns of the current civilization. Emmanuel Lévinas, is one of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth century, which also examines the views on the nature of God, man, death and time contained in the works of Heidegger, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Bergson, Plato and Aristotle. He submits its own ideas and questions about those key issues

for philosophy. He is known as the author of many books, including “Totality and Infinity,” and “Otherwise than being or beyond essence.” In the first book his words refer to the dialogic style that respects both sides mutual relation of human being, respect me and my neighbor, in short a freedom of man. “Nothing really improves us. Whatever improves one person will disimprove another,” someone said. Let’s look at different: “What is freedom of expression? Without the freedom to offend, it ceases to exist.” An attempt to respond to such and other problems we found in this book mentioned above. The next book takes up the idea of human subjectivity *sensu stricto*. Thinker presents them in close connection with everyday, yet extraordinary event of responsibility for another human being, to the substitution, or else made the ultimate sacrifice of their lives. “The idea of the sacred is quite simply one of the most conservative notions in any culture, because it seeks to turn other ideas: uncertainty, progress, change into crimes,” someone said. Kaunas philosopher presents philosophical project conceived specifically, granting ethics prevail over ontology.

With Lévinas we find the crossroads that decided on the path of Western thought and the way opened by the Greeks, reporting behavior and thought of a man to a reality of “the beyond”. The transition of Lévinas is both similar to that of Plato and distinct from it, as it considers that the well can be understood as denying beyond the being and essence, but with him, the term of subjectivity is back in thinking from the idea of the Infinite -that is, anyway understood even as the good. This idea of the Infinite - recovered of Descartes - absolutely overwhelmed the mind: “The infinite does not fit into the idea of the Infinite is not entered, this idea is not a concept. Infinity is the radically absolutely other... That experience the radical sense of the term: a relationship with the Other without this exteriority it can be integrate to the Same.” So, the Infinity here, through which the thought is related to an Other, which is external to an absolute way, the Subject further defined, he is not compromised from itself, but from its responsibility the other man not in itself or for itself, but for the other. Here the influence of the Bible. The Infinite is so Good man who already destined him conferring responsibility for the other man in a temporality earlier time or he has the same freedom.

Emmanuel Lévinas also looking for contemporary philosophical references to justice. Thinker was close to the supreme principle of morality by Hans Jonas:<sup>1</sup> “Do so in order to the new affects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life.” The philosophy of Hans Jonas attempts to

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<sup>1</sup>Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility* (University of Chicago Press, 1984).

synthesize the philosophy of matter with the philosophy of mind producing a rich existential understanding of biology, which ultimately simultaneously argues for the material and moral human-nature. So, thinker also relies on phenomenological tradition: every cognitive act is a direct experience. So, the acts not only sensual but also intellectual participate in the immediate objects recognition. The relationship between knowledge and existence was seen as a new. You see, act of intentionality: noesis+noema: *Noesis* (understanding solely through the intellect) and *noema* (objects), technical terms in the Husserl "philosophy of intentionality" tradition. So, I can participate in the whole process of intentional when I see the subject, I can see both components, which comprise the image of the object, seeing a sponge, I can see the material, steps, elements of its production, the worker, the machine that was at the beginning of the existence of the object.

For Lévinas this is naive way, stepping, moving from intentionality to sensation: touching only reverse (sensibility) without averse (head). So, we must remember that the discovery of the intentionality of consciousness, thus transitivity of thinking and existence by E. Husserl, it has revolutionized the understanding of transcendentalism.

*Constitutive nature of consciousness, the idea of pure subject of consciousness.* The idea of the transcendental Ego appeared in Husserl's conception in 1913 year, the first volume of Ideas. It was the result of research by Husserl's transcendental basis of certitude, allowing refute all the arguments of skeptics and relativists. The step towards this goal was phenomenological reduction revealing the area of being that cannot be subject to doubt: pure consciousness and contained within that transcendental Ego inside consciousness. Some of the philosophers would like to see constitutive nature of consciousness as necessary condition for the internal unity of the stream of experience (J. Tischner). So, Emmanuel Lévinas goes further in drawing conclusions from Husserl, he will criticize Husserl that the latter stopped at the *noesis* while he lit the image of *noema*, not so much as an object, but as the Other. We must pay attention to Lévinas' the new ontological approach, which is not subject to any evaluative assessments. Already we do not stop only on the subject-object relationship, but we are interested in the relationship like Another entity. Thus, it is completely different than the traditional ontology. So, Lévinas analysis of the Other at the heart of the analysis in this article.

Husserl's interpretation by Lévinas has significant implications for the idea of immanence and transcendence in his philosophy. According to Lévinas, the sphere of immanence is the realm of the human universe, while the transcendence

or exterior is the radical otherness of this universe. It may therefore be recognized as a trace. Christianity found a way to man and the world. This way is the way of love. Let's say here, some philosophers would like to see in human action, a pattern of human destiny, they want to see this particular pattern on facets of the crystal, in which are trapped the "miracles" of earthly history. They even began to speak again, that a man realizes himself in the experience. Modern man in the face peculiar duality of life, he may be seen through his personal experiences, as of the interior as the external world, through his personal choice of values. Man deposited with the soul and the body. Just a person on the basis of their dignity finalizing action. The end crowns the work (see latin, *finis coronat opus*), you need to do everything, to make our action, just because of the last image of action in the person. It exists causative person, taking all due to the moral goal. The liberty is the gift. Through self-determination is realized transcendence person.<sup>2</sup>

*Part first: The importance of a neighbor in the construction of the moral world: Liberty and responsibility*

A. THE TRANSITION FROM AN ONTOLOGY TO THE THINKING OF A TRANSCENDENCE

In Emmanuel Lévinas there is above all an attempt to overcome the fundamental ontology. Like his great predecessors, Heidegger, Husserl, Kant, he asked: Why is it being rather than Good? In this basic formula a being is to be absent and unavailable of good, in such a being a welfare cannot be encountered. In light of such world a true good is absent... The good is seen as a newcomer of the outside worlds of an ontology. Some ask whether the thinking is capable to think absolute a tunnel gap, an abyss that separates the good from a being? Here is unreliable word "is"... After all, being of "is" as absent as "Good". So why goodness is absent? How to get rid of the word "is"? Overcoming ontology therefore it relates to overcome the disproportionate difference between being and non being. Lévinas' reflections are in the only case against the Western tradition, revealing only the ratio of the philosopher to the fundamental ontology of Heidegger's release. I decide, he writes, to get to the root cause of the fact that so far do not yet found, at least in a sufficiently clear manner, proper and necessary a form of a metaphysics.<sup>3</sup> Lévinas is about more than the criticism of insufficient thoroughness of "thinking material reality", aimed to "surrender to the truth of Being." It is to him about a fundamental change in order to engage in philosophy.

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<sup>2</sup> See: Cardinal Ch. Wojtyła, *The acting person* (Cracow, 1969).

<sup>3</sup> E. Lévinas, *Time, and what is other*, ed. J. Migasiński (Warsaw, 1999), 80.

With persistence he wants to find “the true metaphysics.” According to Lévinas it seems that Kant’s practical philosophy shows successfully that Heidegger’s the reduction to finite of Dasein is not necessary. Heidegger’s question of Dasein sometimes is formulated and it is being examined by Lévinas in the light of a being, the continuance. So, it seems that the heroic ethic of Lévinas is a special answer to Kant’s work, “Justification of metaphysics of morals.” Transcendence of practical reason it forms the basis to grasp the relationship which exists between the realm of phenomena and unknowable directly the external surface, exterior. submits some insight into how the cognitive realm externality is, which lies outside the possible experience, provided, however, it will be understand that in a way completely different than understanding of the analogy in classical metaphysics: and so not as a partial similarity between two different objects, but as the similarity of relations occurring between something that is totally unlike each other, absolutely and radically different. Such “knowledge” it creates the possibility of thinking something completely different and it opens the horizon of the relationship with this “other”, as a different relationship than a cognitive “acquisition of content”.<sup>4</sup> Lévinas agrees with the understanding of philosophy as “a commitment to being”, for him the whole person is an ontology. “To understand our situation, in fact, does not mean defining it, but finding in bipolar mood / ... /. To think, it is not to considered already, but to engage, participate,”<sup>5</sup> Lévinas boldly traces in the ontological thinking a trend, he underlines the genetic affinity with the ruling of this tendency in the entire history of European thought on the attitude of “conquering” as regards of a nature of reason, though he notes up imaginatively an inteligibility, which seeks to subordinate the reality of human punishment. So, in a better light, we see Lévinas’ validity of the special sensitivity to the issue of totality of the world, as a violence as an authority, but also responsibility of a man, being held hostage. The purpose of the thinking of Lévinas is also to expand touch with reality about the implications of “passivity of the senses”.

What is the basic feature Lévinas’ critique of Heidegger? At the starting point rejects the proposition about a secondary depending of the truth from a human existence... not because it is true that there is a man, humanity exists because being in general is inseparable from its sharing, reasoning (Erschlossenheit), humanity is precisely because it is the truth, and life is

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<sup>4</sup> R. Rożdżeński, *Kant and Heidegger and the problem of metaphysics* (Cracow, 1991), 49.

<sup>5</sup> Rożdżeński, *Kant and Heidegger*, 49.

incomprehensible.”<sup>6</sup> According to Heidegger, Lévinas says that “our awareness and conscious a control over our reality does not exhaust the references to reality.”<sup>7</sup> But, unfortunately, the same philosophy, he “retreats”, it returns to the level of the theory of the primacy of the event and situation. “Understanding of being is, therefore, to go beyond being, namely in the open (das Offene), and discover the existence on the horizon of being / ... / individual term life is understood, while it had taken a place outside the definite of something / ... / it seems that there remains nothing else but a subordinate relationship between the beings to the structure of the being, metaphysics to ontology, das Existenzielle den Existenzialen.”<sup>8</sup> Lévinas places the primary ground at Heidegger’s most famous work *Sein und Zeit*, in addressing the ethical implications of a fundamental ontology:

The dissertation *Sein und Zeit* could resist on this one here’s thesis, that a being is inseparable from the understanding of being (which is happening as time), being already refers to the subjectivity / ... / to publish the primacy of being against the existence, it is a speaking about the nature of philosophy; this means to subordinate relationship with someone who is being (ethical relation) to the relationship of being of existence, which as impersonal being, allows for conquest of existence, dominating of that (in form of a cognitive relationship) and which one the justice subordinates freedom / ... / ontology of Heidegger’s subjecting the relation to being to any relationship with being, it proclaims the primacy of freedom over ethics / ... / reference to being that is happening as the ontology, it is neutralizing a being in order to understand or to conquest it /.../ Presentation topics, the conceptualization, moreover, inseparable, they do not make peace with the Other, but the rapture of the Other and capture, the conquest of him / ... / “I think”, it leads to “I can”, it leads to appropriate what actually “is”, to service reality. Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power.

We read also in Lévinas:

Being before a being, an ontology before metaphysics, it is the theory of freedom before justice.<sup>9</sup>

Heidegger’s ontology, which subordinates a reference with the Other to the relationship with the being, in general, it remains as anonymous, Lévinas says, and fatally leads to... tyranny.

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<sup>6</sup> K. Wiczorek, *Lévinas and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Katowice, 1992), 92.

<sup>7</sup> Wiczorek, *Lévinas and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 15-16.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*, 91, 92; E. Lévinas, *Ethics and the Infinite*, ed. B. Opole-Kokoszka (Cracow, 1982).

B. I MYSELF AND ANOTHER PERSON - ASYMMETRICAL RELATIONSHIP

However, another person cannot replace me in building one's self as a person. For Lévinas an ontology is not possible not because any relationship with the being assumes a prior understanding of being, but for this reason, that the understanding of being does not overwhelm relationships with Other which just "goes ahead any ontology". If the philosophy is ontology, then we are here to ask whether Lévinas is a defender of philosophy in the traditional sense? For relationship with Other is within the being the first. Ontology presupposes metaphysics. A meeting with Other – asking me and inquiring the Face of the Other else – it's metaphysical source expertise. "Famous conatus essendi is not the source of all law and meaning,"<sup>10</sup> but as Lévinas says, the newly born in a meeting with Other ethical relationship of responsibility for another. Being is not without reason, on the contrary: Other leads me to the question of being right. "The first question is no longer a metaphysical question of Leibniz:" "Why is there something rather than nothing?" But: "Why is it more evil than good?" This is the de-neutralization of being or going beyond being. Ontological difference is preceded by the difference between good and evil. There is the difference right and source of all meaning. The difference between good and evil, neutralizing the ontological difference, it opens the field of a source expertise. Conversely, a meeting with another, suspending the ontology, the entire sequence of movements, which could be described collectively as the peculiar ontological epoche, it leads us into the field of the difference between good and evil. Ethics for which Lévinas is opening us, it is not constituting more primitive layer from the ontology, but it is what in some ways a more ontological than ontology, there is "emphatically ontology".<sup>11</sup> In other words, ethics as "the emphasis ontology" is an attempt to transplant the ontological difference to another land, on the ground of the difference between good and evil. Lévinas seems to recognize, that the constitution of the order of a sense it has just happened, that in the space of the ontological difference we are no longer between the entities (and their ontological modality: no entities), but between being and existence, and thus in a dynamic process of uncovering and covering of the sense (of being of the being and existence).

As we still mentioned Heidegger's question of Dasein sometimes is formulated and it is being examined by Lévinas in the light of a being, the continuance. An ethical relationship is impossible without thinking of being, as the continuance, namely the ontological difference, which determines the appearance

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<sup>10</sup> Lévinas, *Ethics and the Infinite*, 15-16.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, 17.

of an absolutely different, absolutely Other. An ethical transcendence involves ontological transcendence. It must first be otherwise than being, to be absolutely different, absolutely Other. Speaking against the ontology, Lévinas must somehow assume the thinking of being, as continuance, we suppose. Metaphysics is thus a reflection of the Face of Otherness revealing in the ontological difference. Lévinas listens absolutely Other outside the ontology and he is trying to dispatch the difference of transcendence elsewhere outside last one, and thus give a radically extraterritorial nature of metaphysics. All tests of Lévinas' thinking, they are infinite "an essay on exteriority". Aporia showing up in the way of thought, which – to recall the paradoxical formula of Lévinas – thinks more than thinks, more than is able to think, it is incorporated into the structure of thinking of transcendence. And in this sense, succumbing to the ontological illusion of an abandoning of the ontology, is simultaneously released from it. So, with the absolute openness of the human being, also with the Absolute Other, we are in the metaphysical space of a thinking of transcendence *sensu stricto*.

This sensitivity is always the present in the relationship to the Other! The Other, as Lévinas writes, is not infinite, but disproportionate, that is not located in the topic and it cannot appear to consciousness. Invisibility is revealed in the presentation of the importance, or the knowledge me even by unknown persons. Lévinas maintains, therefore, that the famous dialogue of the soul with itself would never have been possible if there were not the relationship with the Other and a question marked on his face; so, that the creative unrest, "external fate", is something greater than a being. But how exactly is Lévinas' look at the human face? This look also includes a disturbing future, seeing everything protected "by pink glass window" of the new glasses. Lévinas' face to face meeting with the Other can anticipate the disturbing future (in the typical meaning of the author of "Le temps et l'autre", which in this context defined it as "the present future.") Crossing the closed circle of its own immanence, it's like "to give up, serve, forget about my own me, even made myself in sacrifice"; forecasting of expected events following in the presence (the specific "here and now"), but relating to the future, rooted in it the established constitution and confirmation of their own subjectivity, therefore it relates to the simultaneous loss, sacrifice himself to Another. Special case of a meeting with face of the Other is one in which the Another is that me. Epiphany of a own face, watching his mirror image, "narcissistic representation", is the kind of introspection, that on the principle of only a conversion it allows to recognize the entire world's condition, and the selection of a split body, his tears by the two opposing against each other forces. The mirror, in turn, it symbolizes in

the discourse the visual cognition, because it “bounces, reflects, serves for the experience of a visual inspection.” The faces “writes, describes” not transcendence, but immanence: such as smallpox infected only through contact with another person, with the Other.

### C. THE OTHER AS THE TRANSCENDENCE

The Other is a transcendence. What, in fact, means “to think transcendence”? Lévinas says, “thought and freedom come to us from separation and consider the neighbor...”<sup>12</sup> Lévinas distincts three levels of existence: impersonal *il y a*. I am aware of. Identity as a vivid recurring subjectivity. Then level of a self sufficient *hipostasis*, closed on bursting life. And alterity as an external direction, Lévinas’ totality, as a manifestation of a radical proceeding being. Alterity is not an intervention, neutrality.<sup>13</sup> In *Totality and Infinity. An essay on exteriority*, Lévinas is interested in the most phenomenological moment, “entity” describing the same (*du meme*), self (I), sensitivity. He writes about relishing life of household, the separation of the economy, face and infinity of subjectivity in terms of pluralism, the exchange of historical and death. In the problem of identity Lévinas suggested two key concepts, namely the concept of separation and substitution. The first concerns the basic situation of a man living his own world, which is self-sufficient, who can create yourself, your identity by the way of a mastery, a domination and possession. “Separation creates the contours of a subjective existence.”<sup>14</sup> Substitution, it is the level of dialogue. So, someone “is a neighbor”, because he cannot escape the responsibility of speaking. In telling someone puts in the accusative (*accusatif*) as a defendant, it means that every place he loses. Look at your neighbor’s face. Well, with the face of the Other we go up to the good, the right. The desire, the trace of the Infinite, responsibility, announced just inequality (asymmetry) of the sides of ethical relations, in Lévinas’ image, they took the form of the subject’s complete subordination to the Other that requires, demands and even persecutes. Though the subject as responsible for the Other is not on the basis of a universal ethical responsibility, but very specifically, almost on the principle of legal liability for the committed act of human being. Even to say the very, corporeal existence, which Lévinas understood as passivity of aging and susceptibility to injury, predestined us to bear the responsibility for the physical Other, and to die for him finally. Principle here is the supreme law, the sources of

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<sup>12</sup> E. Lévinas, *Totalité et infini. Essai sur l’extériorité (Totality and infinity. An essay on exteriority)* (Martinus Nijhoff, La Haye, 1961), 78.

<sup>13</sup> See M. Blanchot.

<sup>14</sup> E. Lévinas, *Całość i nieskończoność: esej o zewnętrżności (Totality and infinity. An essay on exteriority)*, trans. M. Kowalska (Warsaw, 1998), 160.

which to be found in prehistoric act of creation, beyond time. There is a right that decides on guilt and is subjected to the judgments of the Other. Substitution, this is an event that is happening affected subjectively the subject in his body, to which he is not only predisposed for the reason its corporeal existence, but that is simply his destiny. His fate is a hostage being of good, which it has chosen him. It appears here, *inter alia*, the issue of “absurd hostage”. Indeed it is difficult to avoid here an association with the fate and, surprisingly, the fate of Good.

#### D. EXPOSURE TO THE THIRD PERSON

What is the level of being that Lévinas calls otherness? Alterity, “the other” being, is something that takes what is outside the core, which is different from the dwelling, it just means the same transcendence. Western philosophy is essentially a philosophy of being, remains an insurmountable allergy to the Other, that is not the fundamental structure of existence, and that-this last-stayed structure of an important person. Explanation of immanence and autonomy of consciousness was not yet disturbed by the idea of transcendence. In this Lévinas *zwsiazku* purposed to lead thought in the vicinity of the Other (and what else), here the Other is not be reduced to being, and to say otherwise than being. It’s not a new reduction to the same, but “I think this has just proximity.” The proximity of modern philosophical thought is understood as the ontological far as the border or padding being who is the duration in Himself, being in immanence, the identity of being. Lévinas tries not to think of intimacy as a function of being. It states that you need to understand life from another being. Going to think of being with others for the country, or against a third party, it makes it possible to exceed the selflessness: Responsibility for another is a condition of selflessness, and the only one who can establish ethics.

Responsibility neighbor imposes partial responsibility of the one who meets him. Responsibility is a destination of taking on another, but prior to that act, the judge is the space in which you have to take responsibility. This responsibility is a symmetrical relationship that modifies the relationship between myself and others. Report from the neighbor relationship is not mutual, as it considers M. Buber, on the contrary, as Lévinas notes, in relation to the face neighbor confirmed asymmetry affair of his face to me before all this, for which I am responsible.<sup>15</sup> Lévinas wrote: “I am in fact responsible for the neighbor’s when crimes happen when other people do crimes / ... / This is the essence of human consciousness: all people are responsible for one another, and I’m more and more like everyone

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<sup>15</sup> E. Lévinas, *Entre nous. Essai sur le penser-a-l’autre* (Paris: Grasset, 1991), 123.

else.”<sup>16</sup> Replace with everyone and no one can replace me. With responsibility for the neighbor get marks, individuation: an individual becomes himself. Individuality is not supported on the help of God. God can not replace me. Lévinas describes the ethical: to earn God's help, you may want to do what I need to do without his help.<sup>17</sup>

Lévinas wrote that the sensible world is a world in which there is a different person... Denoting the mark it with the other man. This act modifies the determination of my relationship with things, because I put it in the perspective of the other. Since then, objects retain objectivity that comes... the speech. The latter allows you to challenge the ownership of things. The fact of the speech is the first visible crack in the psyche Which seeks to meet the performance, fulfillment. The expression of some ideas in the language is not equal to its reflection in the inert mirror, it is assumed in the experience of meaningfulness of the relationships other than one's the intentional, the relationships That to not include anything but concern the very otherness of the Other . Lévinas is Whiting bit further, objectivity is not a correlate of some features of the subject, but his relationship with the Other. It is thanks to objectify the body like rose over their existence, it must distance itself into your being, the more steeply than the distance home. Entity owned by them things mean to another human being, just as a person, “he says,” it rises above its own existence. As a result, triggers the body from itself, it owes its adoption infinity of the Other. Finally, liberation of the entity derives from a desire that comes from an excess of the idea of infinity. Blessed dependence on the Other... At the end of this road is the majesty of the face uncovered.<sup>18</sup> It was not until the appearance of the face, Lévinas writes, puts me in a relationship with the entity. Relationship with another man challenges including my freedom. And every social relationship is derived from the presence of the Other before the same is-Himself.

*Part second: Moral consciousness and the idea of the Infinity (radical responsibility)*

#### A. MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS-AUTONOMY OR HETERONOMY

Emmanuel Lévinas reveals in this aspect the category of closeness of neighbor, which it is not a limitation of me by the Other, or the desire for their

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<sup>16</sup> Lévinas, *Entre nous*, 19.

<sup>17</sup> See Sorin-Tudor Maxim, *Lévinas et la question de la morale* (Université de Lyon, Faculté de Philosophie, Lyon, 1992), 11.

<sup>18</sup> See Lévinas, *Totalité et Infini* (Totality and infinity), 251.

future their unity, but the desire that feeds his hunger, or the love that for the soul is more precious than the totality of his formal self. Each new item contained in the charity, it can be compared to starvation. Thus, there is the idea of infinity within us. Here are valuable concepts such as proximity and religion. Proximity is better for me than any interiorization and symbiosis. And no fulfillment means a higher level. So, we start not from experience but from the transcendent. Kierkegaard is the one who first thinking of God, he does not think him on the basis of the world. The proximity of the Other is not “a detachment of being itself.” The desire, a thirst, is not a pure absence, the social relationship is more worth than enjoying himself. A nearness of God, which is attributable to a man, is perhaps the fate more divine than the fate of God enjoyed its own divinity. Kierkegaard writes: “In the case of temporal goods, the person as less needs he wants as it becomes more perfect / ... / But in the relationship between man and God, this principle is reversed: the man as more he needs God, as he is the perfect /... / belief is just that dialectical balancing act, which, though, which, though constantly in fear and trembling, always perseveres in the hope; the faith is precisely the infinite care, which orders to watch and all to risk, it is an internal concern about whether I really have faith.”<sup>19</sup>

The verb “be” expresses the activity, in which there shall be no change, neither the quality nor the place, but which satisfies precisely the same identification with what is identical, non-double identity. Therefore, we pride ourselves on being’s an identity. Rationality still involves , a reason is the presence of existence, showing a real awareness of beings. The crisis of traditional philosophy, which is still ahead of us, represents the internal disintegration of meaning, contained in the knowledge and expressing an identity or a retiring of being. Privilege of such presence has been challenged in the article titled “The voice and the phenomenon” of Jacques Derrida.<sup>20</sup> He denied the very possibility of full presence. It appears that presence is always postponed, always “just indicated”. This is the most radical critique of the philosophy of being, revealing that the transcendental illusion begins at the level of immediacy. It seems therefore that we should abandon the model of cognition, according to which the fulfillment of thought was a being.

Moral consciousness is a complex reality that manifests autonomy with heteronomy. Thus, there is an antinomy that any theory of moral consciousness

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<sup>19</sup> E. Lévinas, *O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl* (Of God who comes to mind), trans. Malgorzata Kowalska (Cracow: Znak, 1994), 181-182.

<sup>20</sup> J. Derrida, “Violence and metaphysics. Essay on the thoughts of E. Lévinas,” in *Scripture Philosophy*, chose by B. Banasiak (Cracow, 1992).

must solve. Autonomy and heteronomy? Autonomy and heteronomy? Immanence or transcendence? For Lévinas, showing the dual nature of moral consciousness seems to solve for the second time this antinomy. Heteronomy expresses our relationship to the order of things, which we can not change without a conviction to do so. A law that obliges us more than us. But the moral law is both transcendent and immanent, because these orders are imposed from outside in us accomplices: they explain the internal requirement of our being and in a sense it is our deep desire that makes them to manifest, it causes our autonomy. Against the background of the antinomy between autonomy and heteronomy moral relationships are important, coupled with the knowledge that the spiritual life, namely, responsibility-free, God-the moral life. According to E. Lévinas against any Cogito, consciousness is structured by moral responsibility, sensitivity to the neighbor who is to direct yourself to face another despite myself, despite my Cogito. To Infinity, which commands us by face neighbor. Here's a formula that tells you all about the work of Lévinas: "Where could I remain a spectator, I am responsible, it still means talking. There is no longer a theater, drama is no longer a game. Because everything is important."

So, in fact Lévinas moral responsibility is as important as the structure of subjectivity. Responsibility is always responsible for his neighbor. In *Autrement qu'être au-delà de l'essence* thinker states that liability is inicjuçaco, initially for one's neighbor, I'm responsible for this is accountability. This responsibility is not just an attribute of subjectivity, but it defines the structure of the same subjectivity. "La subiectivite se Construit meme dans le mouvement ou elle a incombe d'être responsable pour l'autre, va jusqu'à la substitution pour cars heat / ... / Elle repond jusqu'à expier pour les autres."<sup>21</sup> The movement of responsibility, being that withdraws from his condition of being: selflessness, other than to be. It is about the identity of the human ego itself from responsibility for one's neighbor. I am I, as much as I am responsible, and even God himself can not cancel this responsibility.

The responsibility is to direct me to face another even though it establishes me as a hostage in place of the neighbor, because there is no choice: subjectivity is obliged to neighbor (prochain) is a breach of this time being exceeded by Infinity. Lévinas wrote: "Subjectivity in his withdrawing (invalidate) the essence of taking the place of one's neighbor / ... / The identity of the body remains here, in fact, the impossibility of resorting to the responsibility in taking rank else / ... / invalidate the essence of selflessness."<sup>22</sup> This is the essence of ethics violation. Subjectivity is

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<sup>21</sup> Lévinas, *Éthique et Infini*, 96.

<sup>22</sup> E. Lévinas, *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence* (Kluwer Academie, Nijhoff, 1974), 29.

understood as a responsibility is no longer a modality of being. The essence of the subjectivity is the “the spirit”, besides being in an otherwise than being, in her relations with others. The proximity neighbor manifests itself hidden the birth entity; absolute appropriations shall subject, that it takes consciousness of the Infinite, brotherhood forever.

B. THE DIMENSION OF THE IDEAL AND THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Specific is Lévinas’ ethics, which the last word finally is a reflection on God “until the absence of the transcendent.” (See: God and onto-teologia) Let us say the first, that the Cartesian ontology primarily encompasses everything other, thereby removes what would otherwise exceed the whole, removes all the transcendent. Meanwhile, with the sole view of the whole, the position of humility, desire, transcendence is emerging. On the contemporary violence and loss of authority Lévinas responds with a reflection on philanthropy of Good as the grace! Here the good-being, a benefaction and charity, they do not mean prosperity of good-being. The sole good is equated here with God. It is realized as if beyond good and evil, in the fulfillment of the Triad: Creation-selection-the salvation! In the face of the Greek misfortune thinker shows the salvation of Christianity brought by the victory over time, as the possibility of renewal, which ensures that the presence has not been undergone of past. “Atrida-people who are debating under the pillory of the past, foreign and brutal as the evil, Christianity would have opposed the mystical drama. A cross liberates us through the Eucharist, which triumphs over time, this liberation is happening every day. Salvation that Christianity brings about humanity is what is something very valuable. This there had been done by the promise of a new conception of a definitive determination that the passage of time was completed; the conception of this past, that there was took with reason, and it is always taken as a problem.”<sup>23</sup>

This freedom in the face of time, he is growing in a man who always intends to transform his live as more meaningful. The human soul is transcendent. This means that a man with one hand has the power to tear up of a concrete variable fate’s the railways, on the other hand he represents the equal dignity of all souls due to their social conditioning. From the depths of man’s evocation we are opening ourselves to the moral order of human existence. According to Lévinas’ ethical order is not preparation, but the accession to... Divine. Then the “rest” is a delusion.<sup>24</sup> Though, the evil you can not erase with the rite, he says. Personal

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<sup>23</sup> cfr. E. Lévinas, *Difficile Liberté. Essais sur le Judaïsme* (Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism) (Paris: Albin Michel, 1963/1976).

<sup>24</sup> cfr. Lévinas, *Difficile Liberté* (1963), 137.

liability of man to man consists in the fact that God cannot cancel her. Evil is not the principle of mystical rite that can be blurred. It is offensive act that a man is doing to man. Nobody, not even God, it cannot put yourself in the place of sacrifice, a victim. Although Lévinas' God abandons the time, as if he waited for the return of man, his independence or rebirth. In the concept of Kaunas Thinker a world as well as all-powerful a forgiveness are inhumane. Judaism believes in the rebirth of man without the intervention of superhuman agents, he is based on the recognition of Good and Law essentially. "Everything is in God's hands, except the fear of God", he said. Possibilities of a human effort are endless, but any possible social assistance cannot be compared to the communion of saints. The Talmudic doctrine is guided by the ethical order of the individual soul to salvation. And so goes the Talmudic doctrine of an ethical salvation of the individual soul. Lévinas very slowly coming to Christianity by presenting two forms of Christianity, social and dogmatic Christianity. In the article "Ethics and the Spirit", published in 1952 the year as a reaction to the encyclical "Humani Generis", Lévinas retained the ability to approximate to the whole Judeo-Christian. He survived the very moment when he noticed that there is a limit not to be overcome, namely, when it turned out that this approximation is akin to the theology of substitution. Christian thought deserves to be the only respect in particular the Passion of Jesus, which contains the meaning of the last of what is human. Of events that constitute this drama 'exudes all rationality'. Just let us ask here is it a need to make this only humane dignity it would have entailed any further transfer of deed? In *Difficult Freedom* Lévinas writes: "As the Ark of Noah bravely embodies only tree that symbolizes a Cross; as the wells drilled by Isaac prepare meeting the Samaritan woman and Jesus; as Miriam's leprosy symbolizes whiteness of Mary and the burning bush- a crown of thorns of Jesus; as well all that it leads us straight to the stage of logic, that exceeds the logic or which precedes it." Lévinas' critique of it remains formal. Here God has visited us. Sometimes people were on the roads. Let recall here at least the scene of the three passengers at home of Abraham. Is the dignity of the human spirit of the Old Testament did not rely more on drama situated on the wonderful plan of holiness, rather than on a sense of that life as a consciousness, which is giving itself, on its own.

Radical externality, which occurs in pure determination, indicates the existence of a different order of meaning. Externality, namely the relationship which excludes any relationship, it is where one of the members shall be marked by what is not to take, capture by Infinity. Lévinas is based at this point on the

closeness of God, which is drawn as a social relationship, irreducible to knowledge, better than the synthesis and fulfillment of a being, as continuance, in the self-consciousness; proximity, in which by what is “better than”, it starts to mean and shine the Good only. The proximity conferring a meaning for a pure persistence, a pure patience of a life, by which we live simply, without any reason for being; a rationality older than the unfolding of a being. We need to see against this background the only relationship, namely the relation of transcendence, which appears in the philosophies of knowledge under different names. It is more than being by Plato. It is manifested through the active intellect in Aristotle. It is the ascent of the theoretical reason to practical one in the philosophy of I. Kant. As a desire to be recognized, appreciated by another man, it appears in thinking of G. F. W. Hegel. It is a renewing continuance of H. Bergson, is also the awakening of reason in M. Heidegger.

It seems to be moved by Emmanuel Lévinas the issue of a proximity of neighbor is this continuing responsibility for the other, from which it cannot be escape. Although Lévinas does not mention about it, however, let note how difficult it is to open to the proximity of the Another. Thinker says: unrelenting responsibility pushes me, potentially, to be for other people, and even to his only substitution, to replace another person, to the non-contingent being held hostage. A responsibility gives meaning to the subject, which presents itself in a situation of responsibility. I face this responsibility as the first, as the first person pulled from a convenient location, which as protected person he dealt under the concept of “I” in general, in the philosophy of self-awareness. The question is born out from a feeling what the other is, this question is converted into responsibility for another human being now, and the fear of God turns to fear for your neighbor, and the fear that one day he would die. Thus, there is in a man a rationality older than that, which it manifests itself as an understanding of existence, of which it can give up to embrace, and from a being constituted by the consciousness that overcomes the world. According to Lévinas what other, which eludes, defies identification (ie thematisation and hypostasis), which the traditional philosophy attempted to comprehend by using the concept of developing a self-consciousness, it should be understood quite differently, in the thinking criticized by Infinity; in the image is criticized by Infinity, whose prospects cannot comprehend; in waking, in the constant questioning of peace and the identity of the Same. Passivity more passive than any passivity, constantly waking up yet, thought that thinks more than a

being's thinking, an awakening that philosophy it tries to communicate in a language, that constantly contradicts himself and just only to suggest something.<sup>25</sup>

C. DIACHRONIA BETWEEN CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE- IDEA OF THE INFINITY IN US

In traditional philosophy we had a certain primacy of knowledge over the continuance of individuals and the duration of species, what is more-over human speech, dialogue. Gabriel Marcel said in the twentieth century, that only the relationship between two beings deserves to be called spiritual. A new philosophy of dialogue teaches us that to ask the other person as to you and to talk to him, it has no need to have prior experience of the Other. Dialogue is not the experience of a link between speaking to each other the people. The dialogue is a spiritual event, at least as old and irreducible as the cogito. For Buber's the right Thou is forever you, which cannot be objectify, not to submit under any name You God. We do not understand God, speaking to him in the third person, Marcel said. In the dialogue it creates an absolute distance between I and Thou, which are strictly separated by the inexpressible secret of their interiors; as each person is unique, absolutely different from each other, without any common measure, and without the area of possible coincidences. Also it arises here, "intervenes" unusual and direct relationship that exceeds this distance, although he does not remove it. There is different, another way to reach the Other than knowing. How to reach other people? It exists a new way of getting closer to our neighbor. When I returns to You, it is formed on the-ordinary and direct access, stronger than any ideal relationship, than any fusion had been made by a fact that "I think". Because you is absolutely different than me. The dialogue gives meaning to something that "bigger" or "better", it is not created by the use of a supernatural voice or as a result of superstition. "More" or "better" is the undeserved gift of grace that is coming out of the Other to meet me. Of course it's not about the fact that we should take another human being as God, or that God, Thou forever, he is simply an extension of the human race. The important thing is here that only through relationships with Another man, the infinite dialogue starts to mean as a word for thought, and not vice versa.

The ethical thinking, a social relationship, which is the proximity or fraternity, there is not a synthesis of the relationship. There is liability independent of what I make or what I could not do for another human being, independent from everything, it is as if I was given Another before only myself. The authenticity

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<sup>25</sup> Lévinas, *O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl*, 196.

here, whose a measure is not what is mine own, what I have already experienced, it uncovers pure selflessness towards otherness. We have a liability without fault, however, I am revealing to the prosecution, which cannot stand no alibi; a responsibility, which precedes my freedom, each beginning within me, every presence. Moreover this responsibility for one's neighbor precedes my freedom in a past that I do not remember, I cannot recall it, which was never present, older than any consciousness of something. This trace of the "deep past" that I do not remember, it is flowing to me, from the face of another human being, as a command and request, as the commandment of God. The invisible God, which cannot cover any relationship (even intentional, because it is no end of anything), which is infinite. God's time, the only code, is also a giving and transcendence. With a focus toward God it is revealed the essence of our humanity, present in the face of our neighbor, more than what a man he can be, in his "not of this world I am". God dictates something to my responsibility. Lévinas writes: "Is it forcing you, this a falling-on-me of a stranger, it is not the way in which «he enters the scene» or the way how God is haunting thinking; who loves the stranger, who by a stranger's question puts me into question, so about him certifies my word «here I am»."<sup>26</sup> Here I am in the accusative, at your disposal, my colleague. In the face which asks about me, it makes sense, different meaning, and older than ontological, waking me up to think otherwise than knowledge.

The sense of human being is not measured by the presence, even the presence to himself. Closeness to say thanks transcendence and thanks to God-in-me, which put my existence into question. The problem of the existence of God becomes the only meaning within the world. Since only describes the circumstances in which the word God has visited the mind in a way more compelling than whatever presence. The Face, outside display and intuitive exposing as to-God, it reveals the slow birth of only sense. It must be able to see a plot other than the ontological sense, intrigue, in which the law itself is being called into question. Please it must be re-awaken to God, for I'm not dead reflection, for me who are the brother of another human being and on the brotherhood of having someone else responsible, non-indifferent to the mortality of the Other, accused of everything, though without fault, he could recall it, "me" before of making any decision, before any free act, and thus before sin, from which this liabilities could have emerge; a hostage-responsibility, which leads to only the replacement of another human being.

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<sup>26</sup> E. Lévinas, "God and Philosophy," in *Of God who comes to mind*, ed. B. Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).

D. CONTINUOUS OPERATION FOR CREATING INTIMACY OF ANOTHER PERSON

World history is not the interpretation of the thesis dissertation. The history of the world's only guided by the logic of life. So, relation to another exceeds subjectivity. So, a neighbor is principle, he is condition that becomes a subject as a person. This latter is the one that has been set at infinity alone, and not on his mind. He takes the infinite consciousness that is responsible, sensitive to another man, in the temporality earlier from the time of the same freedom. If history has become a transcendent, it is because it has been articulated in the lives of real human freedom. Lévinas wants to do no clutter here. Well, we're not, he says, only the actors in the theater, freedom of conscious man develops into a kind of sacred fate, in which on the site being is listed a man. And so, Lévinas claimed ignorance of Hebrew grammar by Paul Claudel. Man as a person, as the perpetrator of the story, it seems less real to him as a man-figure, as man-statue. That brings us to excuse Auschwitz-style rhetoric, false friends of Job. At this point, Lévinas' position is based on defending the law, and specifically the Talmud. Judaism is not confined only to the noble appeals, but to the general appeals of the Prophets. Christianity, though not taking place to that. Yes, Vicar of Christ on earth he is talking about, for example, that a woman has the right to maternity. Commonly, however, seems to diminish the fact that at presence it as if pursued spiritual meaning exhortations of the Prophets.

Emmanuel Lévinas courageously opposed the findings, that the Judaism he attached his importance to the letter of the law, forgetting his spirit; because the charity was announced (promised) by Christianity carried the status of justice in a primitive, for the price of grace and not justice the same Christianity occupied evil. So, in the Talmud and the Law there is a law of justice, which models the real society. It is here it meets the implement of the spiritual meaning exhortations of the Prophets. "God is concrete, says Lévinas, is not by the incarnation, but by law."<sup>27</sup> And that economic life is the ontological place where creation is transformed into the spirit, in which "the body opens up to the word." Relationship with his neighbor can be realized only when someone engages substantively, and consistently he does everything with justice. This leads to a real responsibility. And makes us disposables for a reason of the task of ministers of grace. Theology is criticizing the substitution, this putting oneself in the place of another, expiation for the other. Israel certainly does not define itself in opposition to Christianity. He

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<sup>27</sup> See *Proper Names* by Emmanuel Lévinas, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); also, *Difficile Liberté*, 192.

wants an agreement with all people who are related to morality. In the Lévinas' words by Christianity we believe internally to another inspiration. These internal beliefs, we could not keep their guard for themselves if, from two thousand years, Christian theologians were not offered for implementers, perfectionists, perfect followers of Judaism, like the followers of Kant, who in his studies supplemented him, or the confessors of Platon who had perfected his thinking. Maybe a good thing that we have those workers of eleven our.<sup>28</sup>

In Lévinas there is a problem of ethical rationality that is independent of the theoretical thinking and the thinking of a being. "To reject the philosophy is still to philosophize, he writes." In this context, let us note again Lévinas' thought about God. God of the Bible, he says, he means in a manner unprecedented, no analogy has to the idea that we surrender of the truth or falsity criteria, it means more than a being and a continuance, it means as a transcendence. Some philosophers put forward the view that the concept of God is not a problematic concept, because in general is not a concept (Delhomme). In the philosophy extends the priority of ontology and immanence. An awareness already broke with a selflessness, says Lévinas. We think the awareness starting with the emphasis of presence. Consciousness in its persistent identity, in the simultaneity of its moments, makes the reality of history as a process in the presence. Today the religious man instinctively interprets his survival as an experience. Contrary to himself he interpretes of God, which he himself has experienced, in terms of being, presence and immanence. But there is also a consciousness that can open to transcendence. Just the idea of infinity, the idea of God breaks the idea that as a commitment to the existence and his synthesis, pulls everything down to the presence, to some occurrence in the world. Let us recall at this point, what Malebranche said: no idea of God or God is his own idea. Thus, we go beyond the order in which the idea leads to existence. The idea of God is the God in me, but God, which is different from all content. Infinity lives thinking, but completely different than cogitatum. It is a living passive and nothing dissimilar. The idea of Infinity is meaning earlier than the presence of significance, earlier than any of the birth of consciousness, becomes available as available, accessible as a trace.<sup>29</sup> Lévinas is speaking about the growing abundance of Infinity, which is called glory. The idea of Infinity questioned any experience. We cannot take it on ourselves as we accept for example the love. Lévinas is talking about desire. "Being good is a weakness, the weakness and folly in being. Being good is the height and the arrogance outside

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<sup>28</sup> See Lévinas, *Difficile Liberté*, 146.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*, 126.

being, an ethics is not the moment of being. It's otherwise and better than being. It is the very possibility of transcendence.”<sup>30</sup> In this regard, the responsibility still picks up, is unselfishness, making getting rid of a being's existence. Responsibility is not a consequence of the brotherhood, comes from outside of my freedom. Here you see me, you got me here in front of you as your servant and a debtor. “Each of us is guilty before everyone, to all and for all, and I more than others,” said Dostoyevsky in *The Brothers Karamazov*. Transcendence in the split ground truth of life (divine self of mine) is an adventure experience with God or by God. Ambiguity is a necessary element of transcendence, which has to stop its own showing up, its phenomenal. It has a need of a diachronia and of a sparkle, twinkle mystery, and so on.

*Part third: Metaphysics of Good and the sensibility as subjectivity*

A. ANOTHER AND THE METAPHYSICS OF GOOD

I wish now to draw attention to some consequences of the foregoing over the Lévinas. Thinker asks: Does it make of sense thinking is not a refutation of being, selflessness, a way out, exit of Order?” We read in Lévinas' work: “Liability is establishing being, which is not for myself, but that is for everyone – is both being and selflessness – where for himself it means a self-awareness, and for all – responsibility for others, sustaining the universe.”<sup>31</sup> Lévinas writes: “Infinity, whose testimony – and not the subject – is the sign given out to another person, namely through the responsibility for other man, it means thanks to a one-for-other, thanks to the subject supporting all, to everything subordinating, that is suffering for everyone and raising everything, although he had not decided on this load, that increases as glorious as it is imposed.” And further we read: “But at the same time this God, who hides his face and left his fair-man his justice without a victory - this distant God - comes from within.”<sup>32</sup> What could be more imminent than Good to be entrusted. It is absolutely incredible in Lévinas'! This eschatology of justice, which leads from the spirit and out of time; to this end that, in an ethical gesture of substitution to become closer to Good and in some sense to go to his website. She actually had nothing to say, there is not already speaks man.

It is fascinating, how our thinking “haunting” God. At this point we are looking for answers to the following questions. Thinking, which openly or secretly aspired to become a religious is always aroused a curiosity, because it is bordered

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<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*, 132.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 152.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibidem*.

by a world in which we are ourselves. Another is this world, and yet close, neighboring. What is the otherness of his neighborhood? How does religion affect thinking? Is this a lack or surplus in relation to the irreligious thinking? How is his language, not only in terms of vocabulary, but also because of the inherent logic of language and grammar? And perhaps the most important and interesting question for us: what language is possible a dialogue between these worlds? Is the principle of that dialogue is the translation, which implies a certain community, despite differences, or vice versa: the pursuit of domination and appropriation, and so the intentions not knowing, without dialogue? What happens to my thinking, when is haunted by God, as Lévinas would say? The only sample of religious thinking we have in the texts of Lévinas. My attention and curiosity have always attracted those thinkers for whom the thinking was a religious mystery worth special consideration.

Religion is based on an act of faith, and this act is indisputable. The debate between supporters and opponents of religion, like the dispute between the blind and deaf as to whether the sounds are colorful and resonant colors, and about whether the color is more important, whether the sound. Of course, a completely different meaning to such controversy has a dispute in the political or ethical space. Who treats this controversy as *Mein Kampf*, it must reckon with the fact that there will be blood, regardless of whom is right side. In the name of religion, including the secular, most wars were held, in the name of one God poured the oceans of blood and roused up the corpses. This is one of the favorite toys of children of God. In Lévinas there is still a problem inevitability of God. Faith is this paradox, the key and resource of conceptual tools, without which no thinking is would care, but on which rarely probing look is focusing. In the Gospel can believe or not. Proof case and logic have little things here. The Gospel is full of things offending to reason - and not about the resurrection, or the immaculate conception mostly goes, but a matter over which them is, the scribes had to break your head in vain for centuries about: how to reconcile the omnipotence and omniscience of God with the prevalence of evil, evil reign, his goodness and agape with human misery and suffering? Such “nonsenses” show an inadequacy of the human wisdom and especially failure of the human mind (things are happening, what the human mind cannot comprehend, the things about which philosophers have not dreamed of) – and thus indirectly prove of not only the existence what the need, necessity, inevitability of God... Today in the world affected by an excess rather than the deficiency of the evidences, the proof for anything that can be dreamed, in a world where on every popular proof is trampling at the heels no less

popular contra-proof, in which persistently and noisily are offered “evidences”, that fiercely are competing for attention and approval of the recipients, arguing with each other, contradicting each other and undermining their position in such a world, then it the need for faith is probably greater than ever. Trust, so much to a man for a balance of mind needed, is looking in vain for a peaceful harbor, where would have had the anchor.

A man needs faith; it is not to say that receives that. Almost nothing in our runaway world does not retain the shape in the long run. Even strong, in fact, shapes are suspected of latent frailty. Powerful apparently the institutions seemingly disappear without notice. They bankrupt or are eaten by even more powerful and fierce competitors. Today, seemingly infallible recipe of success in life they are unmasked after few days there as bad clues. Let us recall some of our tabloid slogans. The patented designs of “effective solutions” they are compromising in use and the regulations appear to be tragic. People whom believed that they know, they can and they want to, they turn out to be untrustworthy, and a chronicle of the establishment of policies making the world more Catering, more human, more friendly and favorable to him, is littered with the graves of unfulfilled promises. And it is without people who believe it overcomes cynicism. Someone said: Given the inertia of the Church and to the fact that belief disappears, I believe. Lévinas calls for faith without beginning, the issue is a man like a hostage of the presence. A good man does not meet Good, but thanks to the opportunity of Good he may meet another and others. Faith is still growing in spite of the anger and getting deeper and sophisticated spells of deontologisation. For Lévinas pesky word “be” is waiting for him at the beginning and at the end of way of thinking an absolutely different, another thought.

Reflecting on the issue of good and evil in terms of axiological, we remain, as Lévinas says, on the ground of the ontologics, because we understand it in the language of “freedom” - “free choice”. The same is the case, when we think Good. The latter is a relative prior terms of freedom. Good chooses me before I could choose them. Charity and Benefaction. Good ahead of any open choice in my circle of good and evil. “To be dominated by Good does not mean to choose the good from a neutral place. To be dominated by Good it means to be excluded from the possibility of choice.”<sup>33</sup> This “exclusion” is not a consequence of, but the foundation of any choice. Exclusion of choice is “the original pact with the good”, which allows for a freedom. I choose – secondarily – in a world of good and evil,

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<sup>33</sup> See E. Lévinas, *Otherwise than being or beyond essence*, trans. A. Lingis (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 118.

because – initially – I was chosen by the Good with the “worlds” of this world. Is grace enough here? Good do not present on the stage of being and nonbeing, right and wrong... or remains in the shadows? You can also accused Lévinas of it is not about freedom? Commentary on Lévinas will let the words of Zbigniew Herbert of a body of Another, which like the body of Mr. Cogito (like the body of every other human) remains, “what is repulsive and attract and seductive at the same time, and as such completely never gets cleaned.”

At this point in relation to Lévinas’ thought are born still other questions and some discoveries. Birthplace of humanity is the human drama of good and evil in which man participates both as a passive object and as an active subject-player.<sup>34</sup> Axiological Space – the space of dramatic relationships with the other man in the circle of good and evil – sets the limits of “the source experience.” Thinking seeking “transcendental aposteriori” becomes “thinking in values”. Man is born when wandering in the element of good and evil. “Elemental” at this point is synonymous with “source”, “err” – of “experience.” The other’s paint of the border situation – Man “dies” when the field of his experience becomes a space “jenseits von Gut und Böse” (beyond good and evil). The drama of good and evil, therefore, is primarily a metaphysical drama. A man in touch with another man constantly finds himself somehow beyond good and evil. And it is “not to die, you have to somehow not be beyond good and evil.” Thus, how as liberating from the relative good and evil can come to the absolute Good?

#### B. HUMANISM OF THE SUBJECT (SEPARATION, SUBSTITUTION, IRREVOCABLE PASSIVITY)

Emmanuel Lévinas asks us to think about experiences in our life which be lie the assumptions of “totality” – of the self as complete, as the origin of all knowledge and the justification for all morality. He then treats these aspects as instances which point towards a new way of thinking about what it means to be a human subject, which is not self-absorbed, but in which our responsibility to another comes before our self-interest. He began to think in the context and the wake of great trauma and violence. And his purpose is this: to explain it, and explain above all why the suffering of others matters to us. Only in a world of infinite responsibility would future oppression prove inconceivable. We can kill

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<sup>34</sup> Cfr. Substitution and the Trace of the Other by E. Lévinas. The substitution of the one for the other is the basis of the ethical and of sacrifice. A dying for the other does not, like the Cartesian Ego, rest in its ability to be active. However, the Levinasian self can act. It is exactly the biblical assertion: Feed the hungry, clothe the naked, give drink to the thirsty, give shelter to the shelterless. So, the Levinasian self is passively attuned to the other, while actively consumed by responding to his or her call.

the other but in that very moment they escape their subjection once and for all and haunt our dreams forever... the duty of care just happens to you... Lévinas' work is concerned with the very opening of the question of ethical-the ground of its possibility and impossibility-prior to the production and elaboration of all moral codes. Lévinas describes ethics as an interruption of the self's habitual complacency that occurs in the encounter with the face of the other. As he demonstrates in his main philosophical books, and in numerous important essays, consciousness is not reducible to a consciousness of being. Consciousness is radically put into question by the face. Rather than being the result of any kind of cognition, the self's responsibility to the other who faces is immediate, originary, and irreducible. We do not and never have existed "in and for oneself". "Before the neighbour I am summoned and do not just appear; from the first I am answering an assignation." Moreover, it is neither the state nor contract that constitutes us, but rather this unique and primary responsibility to an other. It is the foundation of our consciousness, our society – and our selves... Already the stony core of my substance is dislodged. But the responsibility to which I am exposed... does not apprehend me as an interchangeable thing, for here no one can be substituted for me... Subjectivity is not one for myself; it is, one more time, initially for the other. To say: "here I am". To do something for an other. To give. It obliges me as someone unreplaceable and unique, someone chosen... This responsibility is not merely social and expedient but personal and ethical. It is directed not towards the preservation of autonomy, but instead towards the recognition of suffering. The combination of these two features provides us with a new way of conceiving of the justification of a system of private actions in tort law... Responsibility establishes both a sense of self and a sense of relationship, and it is these in turn which create the very possibility of agreement, and law, and justice. But Lévinas is not satisfied also with love as Eros, he wants to extend love to the stranger, to the Other as neighbour and fellow human, which is love without concupiscence. For the child is still a being of the Same and the Other, while love of the neighbour and fellow human is to accept the absolute alterity of the Other. Every Other is an unfathomable subjectivity which represents infinity. Ultimately peace is possible only if we can love the stranger as neighbour and fellow human. a person's decision is always an inevitable result of their genetic makeup combined with environmental influences. So if a person decides to commit a crime, this can always be explained as a result of past influences. Any individual who had the same genetic makeup and the same environmental influences would have decided exactly the same thing. This is because a person's decision is always

completely caused by what happened in the past. The above results have several implications for our understanding of moral responsibility. First, not morally responsible – level of agreement was assessed to the following questions: in such a world it is impossible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions. Second, blameworthy – people should still be morally blamed for committing crimes; third, If these scientists are right, then it is impossible for people to make truly free choices-not free. As for responsibility, our results indicate that should neuroscience or philosophy lead the folk to come to think, correctly or mistakenly, that our minds are mechanistic and our choices are determined, our judgments about moral responsibility will remain largely intact. We should not be deterred from a scientific appreciation of the mind by fears of nihilism or social disintegration. So, we should give hospitality to the stranger, let them enjoy the rights we enjoy. We have to establish institutions to guarantee justice. For this purpose, we have to employ our knowledge and wisdom. But knowledge and wisdom at the service of love and not vice versa. So for Emmanuel Lévinas, love is prior to knowledge and wisdom. Though, you make love.

#### C. THE NEIGHBOR AT THE BASE OF THE PROPER RESPONSIBILITY

You can talk about the radicalization of Lévinas subjectivity. Taking the reflection of the death Lévinas draws attention to the fact that the inner consciousness, which precedes any intention, he is not an act, but it is a passive receptivity of any world. Not as a being-in-the-world, he writes, but a being called into question, it would have been the source interiority of mental life. I, which affirms in the world and in the existence, is rather ambiguous, or rather puzzling; so, as Pascal says, it can be regarded as worthy of hatred in the emphatic identity, in his unsubstitutability demonstrating itself in language, speech, etc. Passivity as is not so much describing the “bad conscience”, as it can be described by that. Lévinas writes: “My death is always before filling up the time, is a failure of a being, as for his own existence being, but this scandal does not affect a clear conscience or morality of a being based on the inalienable right to increase its potency of a being and the thinking. (see: *conatus*) In the passivity of non-intentional survival / ... / is challenged itself the righteousness of a place in a being, whose an affirmation is an intentional thinking, knowledge and the domination of «now».”<sup>35</sup> It refers me to another person who gives this calling the sense, to one’s neighbor, of which we ought to be afraid. It is the fear that goes further than “self-awareness”, that one anxiety arouses in me the face of the Other, its extreme

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<sup>35</sup> cfr. Lévinas, *O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl*, 262.

simplicity. Simplicity to expose ourselves to death, without defense, and earlier than any other language and facial expressions, the question-asking, coming to me from the depths of absolute solitude; a request, which has a meaning of a command, which calls into question my presence and my responsibility. In the face of death do not leaving of the second man alone, thus consist in the fact that I answer, "Here I am" (me Voici) for a request that calls me. Love without lust. Death is the immobilization of the variability of the face, which denies of a death.<sup>36</sup> The face is the annihilation of some way of being, which dominates over all others.<sup>37</sup> Death is to remain unanswered. So, in terms of Lévinas a death would have been a disturbance of the Same by the Other.<sup>38</sup>

According to professor J. Tischner person subject is possible only in the space of good, right, which allows not only a similar conflicts, but also it is sanctioned, contrary to common sense, paradoxes of subjectivity, such as the metaphysical desire, call the Face of the Other, anarchic responsibility). Lévinas rejects call of good when he rejects the axiom of intentionality, opposing that to the notion of patience with forming time. "I do not know, Lévinas says, if one can speak of hope, because hope has wings and no patience like that, becoming the ethics he absorbs intentionality, so still living in hope."<sup>39</sup>

Salvation of a person, of this "being for itself" meets the highest recognition by God. The man, he entrusts to the absolute Good, which saves him even when he has to be put to death. "Responsibility establishes the being who is not for himself, but that is for all, he is both being and selflessness, where «for myself» is self-awareness, and «for all» the responsibility for others, as maintaining of the universe." "Infinity, whose testimony, and not the subject, is the sign given out to another person, he says, he is obtaining the authority, we say, with responsibility for another man, thanks to one for another, thanks to a subject sustaining everything, which subordinates to everything; so, thanks to the suffering for everyone and raising everything, although he had not decided on this load, which increases as glorious as it is imposed." And further Lévinas writes: "But at the same time that God, who hides his face and is leaving his fair to a justice without a victory, this distant God comes from within."<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> E. Lévinas, *God, death and time* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

<sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*, 16.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibidem*, 27.

<sup>39</sup> Lévinas, *O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl*, 165.

<sup>40</sup> E. Lévinas, *Otherwise than being or beyond essence*, trans. P. Mrówczyński (Warsaw: Aletheia, 2000), 196. He writes: "I sustain the universe", *ibidem*, 249.

Lévinas develops the above idea in the statement that in the next period of history a Speaking silenced in that what Said. According to the thinker is important to re-engage in history, talking about death on the basis of the time, asking God's freedom. There is also a problem of the presence, of the models and others ontologies. Death is an absolute mystery, as has been written many times before. The fact is one that when it comes to me, you cannot say about it to the others nothing. It is apparently the moment of deepest loneliness, breaking off all contact, breaking a sudden and irreversible, whose sense it cannot be uttered. In his discussion of the death Lévinas refers to G. W. Hegel, commenting on his thesis, he tries to figure out what is our relationship with death. It does not seem to him it simple. For the fact is that it does not have an intellectual nature, does not extend our knowledge. Death cut everything, even the hope of my survival in the memory of our social world, which is the only concrete, individual behavior, next a being of mine part of my non-physical immortality. Other of her dreams, mythical, religious, even though sometimes full of faith, do not give up any claims of final, definitive statement of the conclusion. What with the time "is doing"! "Or I do not have the time and I cannot, or I have the time and still do not have, or ...". What is the age in which perhaps it will be some time hard to distinguish man from machine. And yet I am sometimes time! Lévinas says: "Time gets certified, giving themselves." Focusing on God, death and time Lévinas demands of a radical responsibility, which is born in the unequal sensitivity of man as the truth about the man himself.

#### D. SENSIBILITY AS SUBJECTIVITY WITHOUT SUBJECT

I allow myself here for a digression. The free will of a rational being just wants to satisfy itself, and therefore wishes to meet what is not our inner truth. We ought to read our authentic nature. Today in opposition to Saint Augustine it argues that authentic humanity has never been "intentionally destroyed". You can destroy lives, but not a gift. It shows an area of stronger will, our opportunities given by God. There is the problem of a response for a gift from God. Human will often is lacking the capacity to meet with the facts. Thus encouraged to move from the level of a will to the possibilities, from "voluntas" to "possibilitas". Augustine is writing about human nature as fallen. After the fall, he says, we do not have access to human nature. A man needs grace. Someone is accepted by God. Only redemption takes the place of ignorance. The thought of another philosopher, Pelagius, is established by statement, a man gets his own nature, not by thinking, rather by religion, which he is making always. He is writing that a gift of nature it comes from God. We are accepted by God as a gift! For a humanity was given by

the Other. Pelagius' commentators are writing today, a man cannot be "intentionally destroyed." Someone may encounter in life "the anonymous gift giver", who "with the creation of any time", will show him new horizons. And the "anonymous giver", it helps him to do something... We also can create the actions. Currently, therefore I am not talking about a man what he is, but what he should be! We somehow learn to love the truth, not so much getting to know her (see latin, *valentior Voluntas*).

I believe the value thinking of Joseph Tischner supplements the "metaphysical" Lévinas' reflection. "Value thinking" chooses the path "from" bad "to" good. This arose from the belief that the good is indeed closer to our hopes, but the evil, however, is closer to our experience. In Tischner thinking we have the wealth and breadth of analysis of how the appearance of evil in the human environment, closely: inter-human experience. Analyses, which emphasize, are to take place in order make sense - or, in other words in the order of the metaphysical - where evil is revealed in the relationship between man and man. And in many ways - as a betrayal, denial, Holocaust denial, condemnation, etc. (each as a form of bondage) - constitutes the source meanings of these experiences. Evil does not happen otherwise than in "the dialogue" - and this is an area of "words" rather than "things", to be precise - meaning, rather than entities. Evil needs a man's encounter with a man to be able to show... Evil is a dialogical (Human evil, like a spook)? This means that there is a phenomenon out of the order of being. That is not happening - using Tischner (not Heidegger) terminology - in the field of ontology, or the ontological stage drama. Evil "is." He can threaten and entice, persuade and seduce, and kill and destroy; is different than what is "otherwise than being".

Axiological drama is the first - in the sense of source of an experience - the ontological. Agathological experience concerns of being in the light of the good, the experience relates to events in the axiological light of what they value."<sup>41</sup> This is what agathological gives food for thought. What appears axiological orientations. What agathological makes the very existence becomes a problem. What agathological shows ways to save".<sup>42</sup> The introduction of the new agathological dimension of experience does not correct the fundamental optics ethically: "A man can die for what is invisible. Why not spend your «real life» in the name of what is «over being». Ontological drama is only a prelude to the

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<sup>41</sup> cfr. J. Tischner, *Filozofia człowieka dla duszpasterzy i artystów* (The Philosophy of Man for Preachers and Artists) (Kraków, 1991), 9; J. Tischner, *Spór o istnienie człowieka* (The Controversy over the existence of man) (Kraków, 1998), 169.

<sup>42</sup> cfr. J. Tischner, *Myślenie według wartości* (Thinking in values) (Kraków, 1982), 516.

agathological drama.”<sup>43</sup> “On the subject of human rights, we must abandon the area of ontology and stand on the agathological ground.”<sup>44</sup> “Ontology of the person is subjected to the laws of agathology.”<sup>45</sup> And decisive for our critical peregrinations thesis: “Agathological space of a awareness is a prerequisite for the possibility of man’s humanity.”<sup>46</sup>

What is agathological gives food for thought, allows for some comments. But it appears, first, that salvation goes beyond continuance in the public Good, beyond even the freedom of God... The Creator-God created the cosmos, as a worthy ruler of the universe created our first parents, Adam had formed on the side of Eve, then gave the word of man about his salvation, was recommended to listen to him, “from a tree in the middle of the garden you must not eat.” Do not listen, so God said, “do not diminish my accomplishments, not destroy me.” In the end they came out first parents from Paradise, and by command of God made the earth itself has been subjected, full of true hope. Since God has no grandchildren, so we must choose, must cultivate a gift of time. And now as a Christian, at any time I must choose love, the invisible. There is the last the particular lesson, both of Lévinas’ wisdom of the Talmud and of the Sermon on the Mount of Jesus of Nazareth.

So, Lévinas’ thought, which woke up to God it goes beyond experience. For the man is naked, identity comes to him only by the inalienable responsibility. It is a condition or unconditional, that it must distinguish from the structures representing the presence of an ontological fragility, mortality and fear. Lévinas writes: “We must be able see the plot other than the ontological sense, intrigue, in which the law itself is being called into question.”<sup>47</sup> So, we should be free. It can be promised “the presence” to a bursting life. We are constantly neighbors, Today transcendence is running out at the psychology of values, rather than overall survival ethical interpretation. Today no liability for a word, crisis of truth, doom governing in common sense, utilitarian approach to human only, desacralisation and alienation of the values, the concept of a man is purified by emotions, passions. Logic rule of Greeks, legislative thinking of Rom still are insufficient. Lévinas’s Self reveals the secret, it means unconscious in the history of subjectivity. So, Lévinas offers us sensibility as subjectivity even without subject, I suppose. However, infinity remains prior intentionality. And life is a struggle

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<sup>43</sup> cfr. J. Tischner, *Filozofia dramatu (The Philosophy of drama)* (Kraków-Paris, 1990), 58.

<sup>44</sup> cfr. Tischner, *Filozofia człowieka*, 97.

<sup>45</sup> cfr. Tischner, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*.

<sup>46</sup> Tischner, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*.

<sup>47</sup> Lévinas, *O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl*, 255.

enough; you have to win not at all. So, we have to be open to others and their needs.

### *Conclusion*

As the human species we have been accustomed to schematize the phenomena of life. What's more, we noticed that our consciousness is no longer disinterested. We see, therefore, the validity of a particular sensitivity to the issue of Lévinas' totality, violence, authority, responsibility, being held hostage, a replacement. Lévinas boldly underlines the genetic affinity with the prevailing ontological trends in the entire history of European thought on the attitude of "conquering" nature of reason, though imaginatively notes its role of reason, which is now punishable by man subordinate reality. As an heir to Jewish tradition, it accepts the mission of Jesus. For in order of salvation is presented an absolute good charity. That's what gives, what agathological scale it gives us food for thought, and it allows for some comments else. First it appears, that salvation goes beyond being in the public good, beyond the freedom of God. The Creator-God created the cosmos, as a worthy ruler of the universe created the first parents. So, we need to lovingly nurture the human dimensions of common humanity and given to us of a human time personally. Thus it has to be organic work of ours. This is what it means to protect your neighbor.

Specific is Lévinas' ethics, reflected in the final a reflection of God who is "transcendent until his absence". To coincide the religion with the spiritual life you have to experience the essence of ethics.<sup>48</sup> Personal responsibility of man to man consists in the fact that God cannot cancel it. The God who hides his face and left his fair justice without a victory – this distant God – "comes from the inside". So what could be more imminent than Good to be entrusted. Contemporary Philosophy extents also personal skills which can be recognized by others. The question thus arises as to whether social ties refer only to struggle for recognition, or it is also a kind of goodwill based on a specific affinity for one person to another in the great human family. Let us love.

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<sup>48</sup> See Lévinas, *Difficile Liberté*.

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