

Annals of “Ștefan cel Mare” University of Suceava

Philosophy, Social and Human Disciplines

2013

Volume II



PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE



ISSN 2069 – 4008 (online: ISSN 2069 – 4016)

Annals of “Ștefan cel Mare” University of Suceava

**PHILOSOPHY, SOCIAL AND HUMAN
DISCIPLINES SERIES**

2013

VOLUME II

Co-editors:

Bogdan POPOVENIUC

Marius CUCU

Founding Editor:

Sorin-Tudor MAXIM

“Ștefan cel Mare” University of Suceava Press

**Annals of “Ștefan cel Mare” University of Suceava
Philosophy, Social and Human Disciplines Series**

Bogdan Popoveniuc; Sorin-Tudor Maxim; Marius Cucu;

© Suceava : “Ștefan cel Mare” University Press, 2013

ISSN 2069 – 4008 (online: ISSN 2069 – 4016)

**Analele Universității “Ștefan cel Mare” din Suceava
Seria Filosofie și Discipline Socio-umane**

Bogdan Popoveniuc; Sorin-Tudor Maxim; Marius Cucu;

© Suceava : Editura Universității “Ștefan cel Mare”, 2013

ISSN 2069 – 4008 (online: ISSN 2069 – 4016)

ANNALS
of
Philosophy, Social and Human Disciplines

(Annals of “Ștefan cel Mare” University of Suceava, PHILOSOPHY, SOCIAL
AND HUMAN DISCIPLINES SERIES)

Advisory Board:

- Professor Anton **Adămuț**, *Al. I. Cuza University of Iași*
Associate Professor Alexandru **Baumgarten**, *Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca*
Professor Alexandru **Boboc**, Corresponding Member of the Romanian Academy
Professor Ionel **Bușe**, *University of Craiova*
Associate Professor Gheorghe **Clitan**, *West University of Timișoara*
Associate Professor Aurelian **Crăiuțu**, *Indiana University, USA*
Associate Professor Cristina Emanuela **Dascălu**, *Apollonia, Iași*
Professor Teodor **Dima**, Corresponding Member of the Romanian Academy
Professor Marius **Dumitrescu**, *Al. I. Cuza University of Iași*
Associate Professor Miyoko **Enomoto**, *Tokyo International University, Japan*
Professor Luciano **Floridi**, *University of Hertfordshire, St. Cross College, University of Oxford*
Lecturer Ph.D. Harumi **Higashi**, *Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan*
Senior researcher Ionuț **Isac**, *Institute of History “G. Barițiu” of the Romanian Academy, Cluj-Napoca branch*
Researcher, Ph.D. Ruxandra **Mărginean Kohno**, *Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan*
Professor Basarab **Nicolesco**, Honorary Member of the Romanian Academy
Professor Florea **Lucaci**, *Aurel Vlaicu University of Arad*
Professor Kuruvilla Joseph SJ **Pandikattu**, *Jnana-Deepa Vidyapeeth, Pontifical Institute of Philosophy and Religion, Pune, India*
Professor Vladimir **Petercă**, *Sfânta Tereza Roman Catholic Theological Institute of Bucharest and Roman Catholic Theological Institute of Chișinău, Republic of Moldova*
Professor Lia **Pop**, *University of Oradea*
Associate Professor Colin T. A. **Schmidt**, *Le Mans University & ENSAM-ParisTECH, France*
Professor Alexandru **Surdu**, Member of the Romanian Academy
Professor Keiji **Sawada**, *Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan*
Professor Victor **Voicu**, *Dunărea de Jos University of Galați*
Professor Jean-Jacques **Wunenburger**, *Jean Moulin Lyon III University, France*

Editorial Board:

Co-Editors:

Bogdan **Popoveniuc**, *Ștefan cel Mare* University of Suceava

Marius **Cucu**, *Ștefan cel Mare* University of Suceava

Founding Editor:

Sorin Tudor **Maxim**, *Ștefan cel Mare* University of Suceava

English Language Assistant:

Silvia-Oana **Alestar**

Book Review Editor:

Marius **Cucu**, *Ștefan cel Mare* University of Suceava

Copy Editor:

Laura **Dumitriu**

ANNALS

ANNALS

of
University "Ștefan cel Mare" of Suceava
University "Ștefan cel Mare" of Suceava

PHILOSOPHY, SOCIAL AND HUMAN DISCIPLINES SERIES

Philosophy and Literature

2013

Volume II

Contents

RESEARCH PAPERS	7
James Joyce’s Trojan Hobby-Horse: The Iliad and the Collective Unconscious Ulysses	11
Responsibility as an essential structure of the subjectivity by Emmanuel Levinas.....	19
From Simulacrum to Phenomenon: the Status of Art in the Contemporary World	53
‘The measure of past waltzes’: Time and Memory in Arthur Symons’s Poetry	65
Incentives for academic excellence: sex, money and self-advertising in David Lodge’s Changing Places and Small World	75
Elements for the Theory of Value in Ancient Philosophy	85
Notes towards a Theory of Contestational Architecture	99
The Role and Place of the “Secular Element” in the Process of Preserving the Ecclesiastic and Religious Life of Orthodox Believers in the Post-brest Period.....	123
ESSAYS, PRESENTATIONS, REVIEWS	
About Philosophy, on Its Birthday	143

RESEARCH PAPERS

James Joyce's Trojan Hobby-Horse: The Iliad and the Collective Unconscious Ulysses

Dieter FUCHS, *Professor Ph. D.*
Institute of English, German and Communication Studies,
University of Technology, Koszalin, Poland
dieter.fuchs@tu.koszalin.pl

Abstract

James Joyce's Ulysses rewrites the Homeric Odyssey in such a way that the ancient myth provides a structural pattern, which gives order and meaning to a seemingly chaotic and meaningless contemporary world – an aspect which T. S. Eliot called the “mythical method”. As the characters of Ulysses are ignorant of this ordering device, they function as Jungian archetypes rather than individuals: Their deeds correspond to a mythical framework which is not actively remembered but provides a collective unconsciousness that guides their lives as a principle of order and continuity. What they do is meaningful although they consider themselves as insignificant agents thrown into a seemingly chaotic world.

Whereas scholars have focused on Homer's Odyssey as an archetypal (i.e. collective unconscious) key to the cultural memory of the mythical roots of Western culture, they have turned a comparatively blind eye to the fact that Homer's corresponding work of the Iliad has a similar function for the mythopoetic design of Ulysses. This paper is going to reconstruct Joyce's neglected intertextual dialogue with the Iliad as an archetypal key to the cultural memory of the roots of Western civilisation.

Keywords: *James Joyce, Ulysses, Homer, Iliad, intertextuality, T. S. Eliot, mythical method, C. G. Jung, archetypes, Collective Unconscious.*

It is well known that James Joyce's *Ulysses* reflects the roots of our cultural memory by referring to the Homeric *Odyssey* as one of the foundational myths of western culture. Joyce, however, applies the ancient myth of Odysseus in a “presentist” rather than historicist way: he applies the Homeric epic as an ordering device that gives coherence and meaning to a seemingly chaotic and meaningless contemporary world – an aspect which T. S. Eliot called the “mythical method”: “a way of controlling, of ordering, of giving a shape and a significance to the immense panorama of futility and anarchy which is contemporary history.”¹

¹ T. S. Eliot, “Ulysses, Order, and Myth,” in *Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot*, ed. Frank Kermode (London: Faber & Faber, [1923] 1975), 177.

As the characters of Joyce's fiction are ignorant of this ordering device, they function as Jungian archetypes rather than individuals. Their deeds correspond to a mythical framework, which is not actively remembered but provides a collective unconscious that guides their lives as a principle of order and continuity. What they do is, archetypically speaking, meaningful although they consider themselves as insignificant agents thrown into a seemingly chaotic contemporary world.

Whereas the scholars in pursuit of Joyce's "mythical method" have focused on Homer's *Odyssey* as the structural backbone of *Ulysses*, they have turned a comparatively blind eye to the fact that Homer's *Iliad* has a similar function for the mythopoetic design of Joyce's text.² Hence, this article is going to reconstruct Joyce's neglected intertextual dialogue with the *Iliad*, whose plot reflects the pre-history of the *Odyssey*: the Judgement of Paris as the archaic Ur-scandal responsible for the outbreak of the Trojan War. Whereas the *Odyssey* focuses on the incidents that occurred after the Fall of Troy, the *Iliad* tells us what happened before and thus constitutes an even more archaic allusive background for the cultural memory stored in James Joyce's *Ulysses*.

Before we are going to elucidate this intertextual dialogue in detail, let us recall the mythical Judgement of Paris – a judgement which not only triggered off the Trojan War as the greatest armed conflict of the ancient world; it also resulted in the Fall of the Trojan mega-city and the rise of Greco-Roman culture as a long-term shift of imperial hegemony from the Eastern to the Western hemisphere.³

The Judgement of Paris and the subsequent Fall of Troy originate in a debate between God and Man over an apple as a key to potentially destructive knowledge: to take revenge for not being invited to an Olympian dinner party, Eris, the goddess of discord, throws a golden apple into the round: the famous Apple of Discord inscribed with the words "for the fairest one". When three goddesses – Hera, Athena and Aphrodite – claim this award of beauty, Zeus determines that it is up to Paris – the son of the king of Troy – to decide the beauty contest. When offered the bribe of kingship by Hera, wisdom and martial success by Athena, and the world's most beautiful woman by Aphrodite, Paris crowns the love goddess queen of divine beauty. His reward is fair Helen, wife to the Spartan king

² cf. Dieter Fuchs, "«Judgements of Paris and Falling Troy» – The French Metropolis as a Site of Cultural Archaeology in James Joyce's *Ulysses* and F. Scott Fitzgerald's «Babylon Revisited»,” in *Rive Gauche - Paris as a Site of Avant-Garde and Cultural Exchange in the 1920s*, eds. Margarete Rubik and Elke Mettinger-Schartmann (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010).

³ The Fall of ancient Troy, or Ilium situated in the Eastern borderland of Europe and Asia fosters the growing hegemony of the Greek city states described in Homer's *Iliad* and the subsequent rise of imperial Rome fashioned in Virgil's *Aeneid*.

Menelaus, whose abduction to Troy causes the Trojan War and the mortal hatred of Athena and Hera alike.

James Joyce's Ulysses approaches the Olympian beauty contest corrupted by the bribe of mortal Helena as an archetypal example of the folly and vanity of mankind:

“A woman brought sin into the world. For a woman who was no better than she should be, Helen, the runaway wife of Menelaus, ten years the Greek made war on Troy” (U⁴ 2; 390-2).⁵

In order to integrate this aspect into the main intertextual framework of the Homeric *Odyssey* indicated in the title of *Ulysses*, the unfaithful Helen is furthermore fashioned as the vain and infidel counterpart of Penelope, the faithful wife of Odysseus, who is presented as the positive example of married womanhood:

“Antisthenes [...], took the palm of beauty away from Kyrios Menelaus's brooddam, Argive Helen, the wooden mare of Troy in whom a score of heroes slept, and handed it to poor Penelope” (U 9; 621-3).

Paris, the corrupt judge of feminine beauty – who is referred to as “the wellpleased pleaser” (U 9; 268) of himself, Helen and Aphrodite alike – enters the world of *Ulysses* when Stephen Dedalus takes a walk on Sandymount beach and recalls the memories of the time he spent in the modern city of Paris (cf. U 3; 199 & Ellmann 1982, 128 & U 3; 209-64). Although the mythical Paris and the city of Paris have, etymologically speaking, nothing in common at all, Joyce's Irish humour and eccentricity fuse Paris the man and Paris the city in terms of punning and wit. Even if in the following quotation Stephen may primarily recall the famous horse race known as the “Grand Prix de Paris”, it cannot be denied that he links this thought with the archetypal Judgement of Paris the king of Troy's son: “*Prix de Paris*: beware of imitations. Just you give it a fair trial” or judgement. (U 3; 483-4, cf. entry in Gifford & Seidman)

As a brilliant example of Joyce's mythical realism – which fuses the topical and the archetypal – the empirical horse, which won the *Prix de Paris* a few days before the plot of *Ulysses* sets in on June 16 1904 – carried the name of the Greek hero Ajax⁶ – a hero who, like Menelaus, Achilles, Hector and Ulysses, fought the

⁴ James Joyce, *Ulysses*, ed. Hans Walter Gabler (New York: Vintage, 1986). Further on *U*.

⁵ This, however, is the vantage point of a minor character of *Ulysses*: Mr. Deasy, a pedantic and anti-semitic bromide.

⁶ Cf. the online archive of *The New York Times*: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9407E2DE113DE633A25750C1A9609C946597D6CF (01/12/2013).

battle of Troy in order to retrieve Helen the beautiful from her illegitimate spouse Paris.

As far as the scrupulously realist plot of *Ulysses* is concerned, Stephen receives the topical information of Ajax winning the Paris derby from daily gossip or from the Dublin newspaper, whereas the reader of *Ulysses* remains entirely ignorant of this background unless he actively engages in archival research. As the reader is denied such information, he has to reconstruct these data from a flood of circumstantial evidence from the actual world of 1904. Thus the reader is forced into the position of a cultural archaeologist teased by the Joycean game of authorial irony.

As far as the archetypal dimension of these circumstantial raw data is concerned, the reader has to connect this set of realist allusions to modern everyday life with the mythopoetic framework of the Judgement of Paris and the Battle of Troy as a storehouse of the collective memory of the western world.

Owing to the fact that this exemplary text passage hides an archetypal truth under the disguise of realist contemporary life, – the mythical Judgement of Paris alluded to via the modern Paris derby – this technique of multi-layered allusion may be justly called Joyce's "Trojan Hobby-Horse." This is the quite astonishing background of Joyce's tongue in cheek statement that: "The demand that I make of my reader, is that he should devote his whole life to reading [and one may add studying] my works".⁷

Let us look at a second example of Joyce's ironically blurred method of mythopoetic allusion lurking behind the Trojan Horse-like disguise of realist contemporary everyday life. Whereas our first example focused on Stephen Dedalus' thoughts presented in the third chapter of *Ulysses* known as the Proteus-Episode, our second piece of intertextual evidence concentrates on Joyce's modern Odysseus-figure Leopold Bloom in the thirteenth chapter modelled on the Odysseyan Nausicaa-Episode.

In this section of the book, Leopold Bloom rests at the same part of Sandymount beach where Stephen contemplated Paris as an actual place and a mythical person in chapter three. By way of multiple allusion, Bloom's archetypal role profile does not only correspond with that of Ulysses mentioned in the title of

⁷ Richard Ellmann, *James Joyce* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 703.

Joyce's book; as mentioned by Margot Norris, Bloom's role profile also corresponds with that of Paris in this situation:

For Joyce layers myth in "Nausicaa", letting the Homeric narrative conceal and [...] repress one of its own causal myths, the Trial of Paris, the beauty contest whose outcome contributed to the Trojan War.⁸ [Thus] Joyce undermines his own mythical intertext with a hidden mythical counter-text, Homer's "Nausicaa" reinterpreted by the Trial of Paris.⁹

Without being consciously aware of it, Bloom re-enacts the unfortunate judgement of divine beauty and becomes the alpha and the omega of Joyce's intertextual network owing to the fact that he is fashioned as both Paris responsible for the Trojan War and the witty Odysseus trying to return to his home after having brought about the Fall of Troy as the inventor of the trick of the wooden horse:¹⁰ when Bloom watches three young women – Gerty MacDowell, Cissy Caffrey and Edy Boardman, who take the baby twins Jacky and Tommy to the beach – he not only functions as a modern Odysseus washed ashore on the land of the Phaeacians when he is hit by a ball which escapes Princess Nausicaa and her friends during their game; he also has to cope with the task of Paris and to elect one of the three girls as the recipient of the apple-shaped toy:

The twins were now playing in the most approved brotherly fashion till at last Master Jacky who was really as bold as brass there was no getting behind that deliberately kicked the ball as hard as ever he could down towards the seaweedy rocks. Needless to say poor Tommy was not slow to voice dismay but luckily the gentleman in black who was sitting there by himself came gallantly to rescue and intercepted the ball. Our two champions claimed their plaything with lusty cries and to avoid trouble Cissy Caffrey called the gentleman to throw it to her please. The gentleman aimed the ball once or twice and then threw it up the strand towards Cissy Caffrey but it rolled down the slope and stopped right under Gerty's skirt near the pool by the rock. [...] Gerty smiled assent and bit her lip. (U 13; 345-60).

Conversely Gerty MacDowell – who gets hold of the orb-like object thrown back by Bloom – is not only presented as a mock-heroic counterpart of Nausicaa

⁸ Margot Norris, "Modernism, Myth, and Desire in «Nausicaa»," *James Joyce Quarterly* 26 (1988), 37.

⁹ Norris, "Modernism, Myth, and Desire in «Nausicaa»," 48. As far as the macro-structural intertextual analogies are concerned, Norris states: "In their competition to win the attention of the exotic stranger on the beach, Cissy, I would say, takes the part of Hera, Gerty, the part of Aphrodite, and Edy Boardman [...] plays the part of Athena [...]." *Ibidem*, 43.

¹⁰ Like the Homeric Odysseus, Leopold Bloom constructs a "Trojan Horse" in *Ulysses*. Although he is not aware of it, Bloom's statement that he is about to throw his newspaper away is retrospectively taken as an inside tip that Throwaway (note the phonetic similarity with "Troy"!), an apparently chanceless horse scheduled for the Ascot race, will be the champion to bet upon. Quite unexpectedly Throwaway wins the derby.

meeting Ulysses while playing at ball, but also as Aphrodite flirting with “Parisian” Bloom in order to receive the ball-shaped “Apple of Discord” as a beauty award.¹¹ Like the Greek goddess of love, who undresses herself and asks Paris to “examine me thoroughly, part by part, slighting none, but lingering upon each” (Lucian [[2nd ct. A.D.]] [1921] 1995, 403), the “Greekly perfect” Gerty (U 13; 89) tries to attract Bloom’s favour by showing off as much of her private bodily parts as possible. As both parties – like Aphrodite and Paris at the original Judgement – engage in this voyeuristic encounter for selfish purposes only, their flirt at the beach climaxes in the circumstance that “Aphrodisiac” Gerty and “Parisian” Bloom have sex with themselves rather than each other:

The eyes that were fastened upon her set her pulses tingling. She looked at him for a moment, meeting his glance, and a light broke in about her. Whitehot passion was in that face, passion silent as the grave, and it had made her his. [...]. His hands and face were working and a tremor went over her. She leaned back far [...] and she caught her knee in her hands so as not to fall back looking up and there was no-one to see only him and her when she revealed all her graceful beautifully shaped legs [...] and she saw that he saw [...] and she was trembling in every limb from being bent so far back that he had a full view high up above her knee where no-one ever not even on the swing or wading and she wasn’t ashamed and he wasn’t either to look [...]. (U 13; 689-730)¹²

In addition to that, the rubber ball thrown by Bloom functions not only as an Apple of Discord among the girls, but also as a bone of contention among the baby twins in their company (“Our two champions claimed their plaything with lusty cries” U 13; 350-1), so that the Judgement of Paris is fused with the Trojan war it leads up to.

As we shall see now, this mythopoetic syncretism can be also observed from the circumstance that Joyce presents the twin toddlers’ quarrel about a sandy toy fortification they built on the beach as an “apple of discord” and a parody of the battle of Troy alike:

The apple of discord was a certain castle of sand which Master Jacky had built and Master Tommy would have it right go wrong that it was to be architecturally improved by a frontdoor [...] (U 13; 42-4).

¹¹ In allusion to Aphrodite accompanied by Cupid, the eyebrows of Gerty are compared to “Cupid’s bow” (U 13; 88).

¹² This “telekinetic way of sexual intercourse clearly indicates the circumstance that – like Paris, who awards Aphrodite the «Apple of Discord» to enjoy the pleasures of Helen in recompense – it is Leopold Bloom’s wife Molly rather than «aphrodisiac» Gerty who turns out to be the champion of his love in the end.” (cf. Norris, “Modernism, Myth, and Desire in «Nausicaa»”).

As the fraternal conflict culminates in the debate over the castle's architectural improvement of a front door, *Ulysses* parodies the decisive turning point of the siege of Troy at the moment when the witty Odysseus comes up with the strategy of the wooden horse, which was built in such a size that the Trojans had to remove the fortifying wall covering their city gate in order to move it into their citadel.¹³

By presenting the girls' combat for beauty and the boys' struggle for honour and power as two related aspects of the one and the same coin of vanity and self-deception, *Ulysses* sheds light on the human condition and reduces the alleged greatness of Homeric goddesses and heroes to all too human dimensions. By satirizing the mythical greatness of the siege of Troy as a children's quarrel about a sandy toy, *Ulysses* elucidates the fact that – be it in the archaic or the contemporary period – people wage war for rather petty and selfish reasons. Fusing the cultural memory from the archaic past with a strictly realist presentation of contemporary life, Joyce's *Ulysses* alludes to the Trojan War as an archetypal counterpart of the Great War at the beginning of the twentieth century. In this respect, *Ulysses* may be considered a satire on the timeless stupidity, complacency and self-destructive disposition of mankind.

Works Cited:

1. Eliot, T. S. "Ulysses, Order, and Myth." In *Selected Prose of T. S. Eliot* edited by Frank Kermode. London: Faber & Faber, [1923] 1975, 175-8.
2. Ellmann, Richard. *James Joyce*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
3. Gifford, Don & Seidman, Robert J., eds. *Ulysses Annotated. Notes for James Joyce's Ulysses*, Berkeley: University of Carolina Press, 1988.
4. Fuchs, Dieter. "«Judgements of Paris and Falling Troy» – The French Metropolis as a Site of Cultural Archaeology in James Joyce's *Ulysses* and F. Scott Fitzgerald's «Babylon Revisited»." In *Rive Gauche - Paris as a Site of Avant-Garde and Cultural Exchange in the 1920s*, edited by Margarete Rubik and Elke Mettinger-Schartmann, 21-39. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010.
5. Joyce, James. *Ulysses*. Edited by Hans Walter Gabler. New York: Vintage, 1986.
6. Lucian, "The Judgement of the Goddesses." *Lucian*. Vol. III. Trans. A.M. Harmon. Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, [[2nd ct. A.D.]] [1921] 1995. 383-409.

¹³ Maro Publius Virgilius, *The Aeneid*, ed. J. W. Mackail (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [29-19 B.C.] 1930), II; 1-245.

7. Norris Margot. "Modernism, Myth, and Desire in «Nausicaa»." *James Joyce Quarterly* 26 (1988): 37-50.
8. *The New York Times* Online Archive: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9407E2DE113DE633A25750C1A9609C946597D6CF (01/12/2013).
9. Virgilius, Maro Publius. *The Aeneid*, edited by J. W. Mackail. Oxford: Clarendon Press, [29-19 B.C.] 1930.

Responsibility as an essential structure of the subjectivity by Emmanuel Lévinas

Stanislaw BARSZCZAK,
University of Silesia, Faculty of Social Sciences
Institute of Philosophy, Department of Ethics, Katowice
s.barszczak@wp.pl

Abstract

Emmanuel Lévinas' central thesis was that ethics is first philosophy. His work has had a profound impact on a number of fields outside philosophy, such as theology, Jewish studies, literature and cultural theory, and political theory. His thinking is an interpretive, phenomenological description of the repetition of the face-to-face encounter, the intersubjective relation at its precognitive core, being called by another and responding to that other. In a phenomenology it is a taking into account the experience related to free human action. Our goal is to take what is irreducible in man that may be developed thanks to the free acts of individuals. Lévinas' assertion of the transcendence of the face should be understood as the most telling point of departure to a respect and human responsibility. This struggle for esteem occurs in the context of different spheres of life: at work, the struggle to prevail, to protect one's rank in the hierarchy of authority; at home, relations of neighborhood and proximity. Basically, the author describes Lévinas' notions: the transition from ontology to the thinking of transcendence, the time and death, the philosophy of dialogue, ethics and religion, another and the metaphysics of Good. Since attempts to overcome the fundamental ontology, outlining the same time as the concept of an identity with the Other, the author proceeds to present Lévinas' reflection on the face, which 'says' no transcendence, but contact with my neighbor, immanence.

Keywords: *Transcendence, Fundamental Ontology, Participation, Beyond Relational Externality, Hypostasis, Immanence, the Neighbor's Radical Responsibility, Substitution.*

Introduction

There is a view that the thought of Lévinas reflects the concerns of the current civilization. Emmanuel Lévinas, is one of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth century, which also examines the views on the nature of God, man, death and time contained in the works of Heidegger, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Bergson, Plato and Aristotle. He submits its own ideas and questions about those key issues

for philosophy. He is known as the author of many books, including “Totality and Infinity,” and “Otherwise than being or beyond essence.” In the first book his words refer to the dialogic style that respects both sides mutual relation of human being, respect me and my neighbor, in short a freedom of man. “Nothing really improves us. Whatever improves one person will disimprove another,” someone said. Let’s look at different: “What is freedom of expression? Without the freedom to offend, it ceases to exist.” An attempt to respond to such and other problems we found in this book mentioned above. The next book takes up the idea of human subjectivity *sensu stricto*. Thinker presents them in close connection with everyday, yet extraordinary event of responsibility for another human being, to the substitution, or else made the ultimate sacrifice of their lives. “The idea of the sacred is quite simply one of the most conservative notions in any culture, because it seeks to turn other ideas: uncertainty, progress, change into crimes,” someone said. Kaunas philosopher presents philosophical project conceived specifically, granting ethics prevail over ontology.

With Lévinas we find the crossroads that decided on the path of Western thought and the way opened by the Greeks, reporting behavior and thought of a man to a reality of “the beyond”. The transition of Lévinas is both similar to that of Plato and distinct from it, as it considers that the well can be understood as denying beyond the being and essence, but with him, the term of subjectivity is back in thinking from the idea of the Infinite -that is, anyway understood even as the good. This idea of the Infinite - recovered of Descartes - absolutely overwhelmed the mind: “The infinite does not fit into the idea of the Infinite is not entered, this idea is not a concept. Infinity is the radically absolutely other... That experience the radical sense of the term: a relationship with the Other without this exteriority it can be integrate to the Same.” So, the Infinity here, through which the thought is related to an Other, which is external to an absolute way, the Subject further defined, he is not compromised from itself, but from its responsibility the other man not in itself or for itself, but for the other. Here the influence of the Bible. The Infinite is so Good man who already destined him conferring responsibility for the other man in a temporality earlier time or he has the same freedom.

Emmanuel Lévinas also looking for contemporary philosophical references to justice. Thinker was close to the supreme principle of morality by Hans Jonas:¹ “Do so in order to the new affects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life.” The philosophy of Hans Jonas attempts to

¹Hans Jonas, *The Imperative of Responsibility* (University of Chicago Press, 1984).

synthesize the philosophy of matter with the philosophy of mind producing a rich existential understanding of biology, which ultimately simultaneously argues for the material and moral human-nature. So, thinker also relies on phenomenological tradition: every cognitive act is a direct experience. So, the acts not only sensual but also intellectual participate in the immediate objects recognition. The relationship between knowledge and existence was seen as a new. You see, act of intentionality: noesis+noema: *Noesis* (understanding solely through the intellect) and *noema* (objects), technical terms in the Husserl "philosophy of intentionality" tradition. So, I can participate in the whole process of intentional when I see the subject, I can see both components, which comprise the image of the object, seeing a sponge, I can see the material, steps, elements of its production, the worker, the machine that was at the beginning of the existence of the object.

For Lévinas this is naive way, stepping, moving from intentionality to sensation: touching only reverse (sensibility) without averse (head). So, we must remember that the discovery of the intentionality of consciousness, thus transitivity of thinking and existence by E. Husserl, it has revolutionized the understanding of transcendentalism.

Constitutive nature of consciousness, the idea of pure subject of consciousness. The idea of the transcendental Ego appeared in Husserl's conception in 1913 year, the first volume of Ideas. It was the result of research by Husserl's transcendental basis of certitude, allowing refute all the arguments of skeptics and relativists. The step towards this goal was phenomenological reduction revealing the area of being that cannot be subject to doubt: pure consciousness and contained within that transcendental Ego inside consciousness. Some of the philosophers would like to see constitutive nature of consciousness as necessary condition for the internal unity of the stream of experience (J. Tischner). So, Emmanuel Lévinas goes further in drawing conclusions from Husserl, he will criticize Husserl that the latter stopped at the *noesis* while he lit the image of *noema*, not so much as an object, but as the Other. We must pay attention to Lévinas' the new ontological approach, which is not subject to any evaluative assessments. Already we do not stop only on the subject-object relationship, but we are interested in the relationship like Another entity. Thus, it is completely different than the traditional ontology. So, Lévinas analysis of the Other at the heart of the analysis in this article.

Husserl's interpretation by Lévinas has significant implications for the idea of immanence and transcendence in his philosophy. According to Lévinas, the sphere of immanence is the realm of the human universe, while the transcendence

or exterior is the radical otherness of this universe. It may therefore be recognized as a trace. Christianity found a way to man and the world. This way is the way of love. Let's say here, some philosophers would like to see in human action, a pattern of human destiny, they want to see this particular pattern on facets of the crystal, in which are trapped the "miracles" of earthly history. They even began to speak again, that a man realizes himself in the experience. Modern man in the face peculiar duality of life, he may be seen through his personal experiences, as of the interior as the external world, through his personal choice of values. Man deposited with the soul and the body. Just a person on the basis of their dignity finalizing action. The end crowns the work (see latin, *finis coronat opus*), you need to do everything, to make our action, just because of the last image of action in the person. It exists causative person, taking all due to the moral goal. The liberty is the gift. Through self-determination is realized transcendence person.²

Part first: The importance of a neighbor in the construction of the moral world: Liberty and responsibility

A. THE TRANSITION FROM AN ONTOLOGY TO THE THINKING OF A TRANSCENDENCE

In Emmanuel Lévinas there is above all an attempt to overcome the fundamental ontology. Like his great predecessors, Heidegger, Husserl, Kant, he asked: Why is it being rather than Good? In this basic formula a being is to be absent and unavailable of good, in such a being a welfare cannot be encountered. In light of such world a true good is absent... The good is seen as a newcomer of the outside worlds of an ontology. Some ask whether the thinking is capable to think absolute a tunnel gap, an abyss that separates the good from a being? Here is unreliable word "is"... After all, being of "is" as absent as "Good". So why goodness is absent? How to get rid of the word "is"? Overcoming ontology therefore it relates to overcome the disproportionate difference between being and non being. Lévinas' reflections are in the only case against the Western tradition, revealing only the ratio of the philosopher to the fundamental ontology of Heidegger's release. I decide, he writes, to get to the root cause of the fact that so far do not yet found, at least in a sufficiently clear manner, proper and necessary a form of a metaphysics.³ Lévinas is about more than the criticism of insufficient thoroughness of "thinking material reality", aimed to "surrender to the truth of Being." It is to him about a fundamental change in order to engage in philosophy.

² See: Cardinal Ch. Wojtyła, *The acting person* (Cracow, 1969).

³ E. Lévinas, *Time, and what is other*, ed. J. Migasiński (Warsaw, 1999), 80.

With persistence he wants to find “the true metaphysics.” According to Lévinas it seems that Kant’s practical philosophy shows successfully that Heidegger’s the reduction to finite of Dasein is not necessary. Heidegger’s question of Dasein sometimes is formulated and it is being examined by Lévinas in the light of a being, the continuance. So, it seems that the heroic ethic of Lévinas is a special answer to Kant’s work, “Justification of metaphysics of morals.” Transcendence of practical reason it forms the basis to grasp the relationship which exists between the realm of phenomena and unknowable directly the external surface, exterior. submits some insight into how the cognitive realm externality is, which lies outside the possible experience, provided, however, it will be understand that in a way completely different than understanding of the analogy in classical metaphysics: and so not as a partial similarity between two different objects, but as the similarity of relations occurring between something that is totally unlike each other, absolutely and radically different. Such “knowledge” it creates the possibility of thinking something completely different and it opens the horizon of the relationship with this “other”, as a different relationship than a cognitive “acquisition of content”.⁴ Lévinas agrees with the understanding of philosophy as “a commitment to being”, for him the whole person is an ontology. “To understand our situation, in fact, does not mean defining it, but finding in bipolar mood / ... /. To think, it is not to considered already, but to engage, participate,”⁵ Lévinas boldly traces in the ontological thinking a trend, he underlines the genetic affinity with the ruling of this tendency in the entire history of European thought on the attitude of “conquering” as regards of a nature of reason, though he notes up imaginatively an inteligibility, which seeks to subordinate the reality of human punishment. So, in a better light, we see Lévinas’ validity of the special sensitivity to the issue of totality of the world, as a violence as an authority, but also responsibility of a man, being held hostage. The purpose of the thinking of Lévinas is also to expand touch with reality about the implications of “passivity of the senses”.

What is the basic feature Lévinas’ critique of Heidegger? At the starting point rejects the proposition about a secondary depending of the truth from a human existence... not because it is true that there is a man, humanity exists because being in general is inseparable from its sharing, reasoning (Erschlossenheit), humanity is precisely because it is the truth, and life is

⁴ R. Rożdżeński, *Kant and Heidegger and the problem of metaphysics* (Cracow, 1991), 49.

⁵ Rożdżeński, *Kant and Heidegger*, 49.

incomprehensible.”⁶ According to Heidegger, Lévinas says that “our awareness and conscious a control over our reality does not exhaust the references to reality.”⁷ But, unfortunately, the same philosophy, he “retreats”, it returns to the level of the theory of the primacy of the event and situation. “Understanding of being is, therefore, to go beyond being, namely in the open (das Offene), and discover the existence on the horizon of being / ... / individual term life is understood, while it had taken a place outside the definite of something / ... / it seems that there remains nothing else but a subordinate relationship between the beings to the structure of the being, metaphysics to ontology, das Existenzielle den Existenzialen.”⁸ Lévinas places the primary ground at Heidegger’s most famous work *Sein und Zeit*, in addressing the ethical implications of a fundamental ontology:

The dissertation *Sein und Zeit* could resist on this one here’s thesis, that a being is inseparable from the understanding of being (which is happening as time), being already refers to the subjectivity / ... / to publish the primacy of being against the existence, it is a speaking about the nature of philosophy; this means to subordinate relationship with someone who is being (ethical relation) to the relationship of being of existence, which as impersonal being, allows for conquest of existence, dominating of that (in form of a cognitive relationship) and which one the justice subordinates freedom / ... / ontology of Heidegger’s subjecting the relation to being to any relationship with being, it proclaims the primacy of freedom over ethics / ... / reference to being that is happening as the ontology, it is neutralizing a being in order to understand or to conquest it /.../ Presentation topics, the conceptualization, moreover, inseparable, they do not make peace with the Other, but the rapture of the Other and capture, the conquest of him / ... / “I think”, it leads to “I can”, it leads to appropriate what actually “is”, to service reality. Ontology as first philosophy is a philosophy of power.

We read also in Lévinas:

Being before a being, an ontology before metaphysics, it is the theory of freedom before justice.⁹

Heidegger’s ontology, which subordinates a reference with the Other to the relationship with the being, in general, it remains as anonymous, Lévinas says, and fatally leads to... tyranny.

⁶ K. Wiczeorek, *Lévinas and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Katowice, 1992), 92.

⁷ Wiczeorek, *Lévinas and the Problem of Metaphysics*, 15-16.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *Ibidem*, 91, 92; E. Lévinas, *Ethics and the Infinite*, ed. B. Opole-Kokoszka (Cracow, 1982).

B. I MYSELF AND ANOTHER PERSON - ASYMMETRICAL RELATIONSHIP

However, another person cannot replace me in building one's self as a person. For Lévinas an ontology is not possible not because any relationship with the being assumes a prior understanding of being, but for this reason, that the understanding of being does not overwhelm relationships with Other which just "goes ahead any ontology". If the philosophy is ontology, then we are here to ask whether Lévinas is a defender of philosophy in the traditional sense? For relationship with Other is within the being the first. Ontology presupposes metaphysics. A meeting with Other – asking me and inquiring the Face of the Other else – it's metaphysical source expertise. "Famous conatus essendi is not the source of all law and meaning,"¹⁰ but as Lévinas says, the newly born in a meeting with Other ethical relationship of responsibility for another. Being is not without reason, on the contrary: Other leads me to the question of being right. "The first question is no longer a metaphysical question of Leibniz:" "Why is there something rather than nothing?" But: "Why is it more evil than good?" This is the de-neutralization of being or going beyond being. Ontological difference is preceded by the difference between good and evil. There is the difference right and source of all meaning. The difference between good and evil, neutralizing the ontological difference, it opens the field of a source expertise. Conversely, a meeting with another, suspending the ontology, the entire sequence of movements, which could be described collectively as the peculiar ontological epoche, it leads us into the field of the difference between good and evil. Ethics for which Lévinas is opening us, it is not constituting more primitive layer from the ontology, but it is what in some ways a more ontological than ontology, there is "emphatically ontology".¹¹ In other words, ethics as "the emphasis ontology" is an attempt to transplant the ontological difference to another land, on the ground of the difference between good and evil. Lévinas seems to recognize, that the constitution of the order of a sense it has just happened, that in the space of the ontological difference we are no longer between the entities (and their ontological modality: no entities), but between being and existence, and thus in a dynamic process of uncovering and covering of the sense (of being of the being and existence).

As we still mentioned Heidegger's question of Dasein sometimes is formulated and it is being examined by Lévinas in the light of a being, the continuance. An ethical relationship is impossible without thinking of being, as the continuance, namely the ontological difference, which determines the appearance

¹⁰ Lévinas, *Ethics and the Infinite*, 15-16.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, 17.

of an absolutely different, absolutely Other. An ethical transcendence involves ontological transcendence. It must first be otherwise than being, to be absolutely different, absolutely Other. Speaking against the ontology, Lévinas must somehow assume the thinking of being, as continuance, we suppose. Metaphysics is thus a reflection of the Face of Otherness revealing in the ontological difference. Lévinas listens absolutely Other outside the ontology and he is trying to dispatch the difference of transcendence elsewhere outside last one, and thus give a radically extraterritorial nature of metaphysics. All tests of Lévinas' thinking, they are infinite "an essay on exteriority". Aporia showing up in the way of thought, which – to recall the paradoxical formula of Lévinas – thinks more than thinks, more than is able to think, it is incorporated into the structure of thinking of transcendence. And in this sense, succumbing to the ontological illusion of an abandoning of the ontology, is simultaneously released from it. So, with the absolute openness of the human being, also with the Absolute Other, we are in the metaphysical space of a thinking of transcendence *sensu stricto*.

This sensitivity is always the present in the relationship to the Other! The Other, as Lévinas writes, is not infinite, but disproportionate, that is not located in the topic and it cannot appear to consciousness. Invisibility is revealed in the presentation of the importance, or the knowledge me even by unknown persons. Lévinas maintains, therefore, that the famous dialogue of the soul with itself would never have been possible if there were not the relationship with the Other and a question marked on his face; so, that the creative unrest, "external fate", is something greater than a being. But how exactly is Lévinas' look at the human face? This look also includes a disturbing future, seeing everything protected "by pink glass window" of the new glasses. Lévinas' face to face meeting with the Other can anticipate the disturbing future (in the typical meaning of the author of "Le temps et l'autre", which in this context defined it as "the present future.") Crossing the closed circle of its own immanence, it's like "to give up, serve, forget about my own me, even made myself in sacrifice"; forecasting of expected events following in the presence (the specific "here and now"), but relating to the future, rooted in it the established constitution and confirmation of their own subjectivity, therefore it relates to the simultaneous loss, sacrifice himself to Another. Special case of a meeting with face of the Other is one in which the Another is that me. Epiphany of a own face, watching his mirror image, "narcissistic representation", is the kind of introspection, that on the principle of only a conversion it allows to recognize the entire world's condition, and the selection of a split body, his tears by the two opposing against each other forces. The mirror, in turn, it symbolizes in

the discourse the visual cognition, because it “bounces, reflects, serves for the experience of a visual inspection.” The faces “writes, describes” not transcendence, but immanence: such as smallpox infected only through contact with another person, with the Other.

C. THE OTHER AS THE TRANSCENDENCE

The Other is a transcendence. What, in fact, means “to think transcendence”? Lévinas says, “thought and freedom come to us from separation and consider the neighbor...”¹² Lévinas distincts three levels of existence: impersonal *il y a*. I am aware of. Identity as a vivid recurring subjectivity. Then level of a self sufficient *hipostasis*, closed on bursting life. And alterity as an external direction, Lévinas’ totality, as a manifestation of a radical proceeding being. Alterity is not an intervention, neutrality.¹³ In *Totality and Infinity. An essay on exteriority*, Lévinas is interested in the most phenomenological moment, “entity” describing the same (*du meme*), self (I), sensitivity. He writes about relishing life of household, the separation of the economy, face and infinity of subjectivity in terms of pluralism, the exchange of historical and death. In the problem of identity Lévinas suggested two key concepts, namely the concept of separation and substitution. The first concerns the basic situation of a man living his own world, which is self-sufficient, who can create yourself, your identity by the way of a mastery, a domination and possession. “Separation creates the contours of a subjective existence.”¹⁴ Substitution, it is the level of dialogue. So, someone “is a neighbor”, because he cannot escape the responsibility of speaking. In telling someone puts in the accusative (*accusatif*) as a defendant, it means that every place he loses. Look at your neighbor’s face. Well, with the face of the Other we go up to the good, the right. The desire, the trace of the Infinite, responsibility, announced just inequality (asymmetry) of the sides of ethical relations, in Lévinas’ image, they took the form of the subject’s complete subordination to the Other that requires, demands and even persecutes. Though the subject as responsible for the Other is not on the basis of a universal ethical responsibility, but very specifically, almost on the principle of legal liability for the committed act of human being. Even to say the very, corporeal existence, which Lévinas understood as passivity of aging and susceptibility to injury, predestined us to bear the responsibility for the physical Other, and to die for him finally. Principle here is the supreme law, the sources of

¹² E. Lévinas, *Totalité et infini. Essai sur l’extériorité (Totality and infinity. An essay on exteriority)* (Martinus Nijhoff, La Haye, 1961), 78.

¹³ See M. Blanchot.

¹⁴ E. Lévinas, *Całość i nieskończoność: esej o zewnętrżności (Totality and infinity. An essay on exteriority)*, trans. M. Kowalska (Warsaw, 1998), 160.

which to be found in prehistoric act of creation, beyond time. There is a right that decides on guilt and is subjected to the judgments of the Other. Substitution, this is an event that is happening affected subjectively the subject in his body, to which he is not only predisposed for the reason its corporeal existence, but that is simply his destiny. His fate is a hostage being of good, which it has chosen him. It appears here, *inter alia*, the issue of “absurd hostage”. Indeed it is difficult to avoid here an association with the fate and, surprisingly, the fate of Good.

D. EXPOSURE TO THE THIRD PERSON

What is the level of being that Lévinas calls otherness? Alterity, “the other” being, is something that takes what is outside the core, which is different from the dwelling, it just means the same transcendence. Western philosophy is essentially a philosophy of being, remains an insurmountable allergy to the Other, that is not the fundamental structure of existence, and that-this last-stayed structure of an important person. Explanation of immanence and autonomy of consciousness was not yet disturbed by the idea of transcendence. In this Lévinas *zwsiazku* purposed to lead thought in the vicinity of the Other (and what else), here the Other is not be reduced to being, and to say otherwise than being. It’s not a new reduction to the same, but “I think this has just proximity.” The proximity of modern philosophical thought is understood as the ontological far as the border or padding being who is the duration in Himself, being in immanence, the identity of being. Lévinas tries not to think of intimacy as a function of being. It states that you need to understand life from another being. Going to think of being with others for the country, or against a third party, it makes it possible to exceed the selflessness: Responsibility for another is a condition of selflessness, and the only one who can establish ethics.

Responsibility neighbor imposes partial responsibility of the one who meets him. Responsibility is a destination of taking on another, but prior to that act, the judge is the space in which you have to take responsibility. This responsibility is a symmetrical relationship that modifies the relationship between myself and others. Report from the neighbor relationship is not mutual, as it considers M. Buber, on the contrary, as Lévinas notes, in relation to the face neighbor confirmed asymmetry affair of his face to me before all this, for which I am responsible.¹⁵ Lévinas wrote: “I am in fact responsible for the neighbor’s when crimes happen when other people do crimes / ... / This is the essence of human consciousness: all people are responsible for one another, and I’m more and more like everyone

¹⁵ E. Lévinas, *Entre nous. Essai sur le penser-a-l’autre* (Paris: Grasset, 1991), 123.

else.”¹⁶ Replace with everyone and no one can replace me. With responsibility for the neighbor get marks, individuation: an individual becomes himself. Individuality is not supported on the help of God. God can not replace me. Lévinas describes the ethical: to earn God's help, you may want to do what I need to do without his help.¹⁷

Lévinas wrote that the sensible world is a world in which there is a different person... Denoting the mark it with the other man. This act modifies the determination of my relationship with things, because I put it in the perspective of the other. Since then, objects retain objectivity that comes... the speech. The latter allows you to challenge the ownership of things. The fact of the speech is the first visible crack in the psyche Which seeks to meet the performance, fulfillment. The expression of some ideas in the language is not equal to its reflection in the inert mirror, it is assumed in the experience of meaningfulness of the relationships other than one's the intentional, the relationships That to not include anything but concern the very otherness of the Other . Lévinas is Whiting bit further, objectivity is not a correlate of some features of the subject, but his relationship with the Other. It is thanks to objectify the body like rose over their existence, it must distance itself into your being, the more steeply than the distance home. Entity owned by them things mean to another human being, just as a person, “he says,” it rises above its own existence. As a result, triggers the body from itself, it owes its adoption infinity of the Other. Finally, liberation of the entity derives from a desire that comes from an excess of the idea of infinity. Blessed dependence on the Other... At the end of this road is the majesty of the face uncovered.¹⁸ It was not until the appearance of the face, Lévinas writes, puts me in a relationship with the entity. Relationship with another man challenges including my freedom. And every social relationship is derived from the presence of the Other before the same is-Himself.

Part second: Moral consciousness and the idea of the Infinity (radical responsibility)

A. MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS-AUTONOMY OR HETERONOMY

Emmanuel Lévinas reveals in this aspect the category of closeness of neighbor, which it is not a limitation of me by the Other, or the desire for their

¹⁶ Lévinas, *Entre nous*, 19.

¹⁷ See Sorin-Tudor Maxim, *Lévinas et la question de la morale* (Université de Lyon, Faculté de Philosophie, Lyon, 1992), 11.

¹⁸ See Lévinas, *Totalité et Infini* (Totality and infinity), 251.

future their unity, but the desire that feeds his hunger, or the love that for the soul is more precious than the totality of his formal self. Each new item contained in the charity, it can be compared to starvation. Thus, there is the idea of infinity within us. Here are valuable concepts such as proximity and religion. Proximity is better for me than any interiorization and symbiosis. And no fulfillment means a higher level. So, we start not from experience but from the transcendent. Kierkegaard is the one who first thinking of God, he does not think him on the basis of the world. The proximity of the Other is not “a detachment of being itself.” The desire, a thirst, is not a pure absence, the social relationship is more worth than enjoying himself. A nearness of God, which is attributable to a man, is perhaps the fate more divine than the fate of God enjoyed its own divinity. Kierkegaard writes: “In the case of temporal goods, the person as less needs he wants as it becomes more perfect / ... / But in the relationship between man and God, this principle is reversed: the man as more he needs God, as he is the perfect /... / belief is just that dialectical balancing act, which, though, which, though constantly in fear and trembling, always perseveres in the hope; the faith is precisely the infinite care, which orders to watch and all to risk, it is an internal concern about whether I really have faith.”¹⁹

The verb “be” expresses the activity, in which there shall be no change, neither the quality nor the place, but which satisfies precisely the same identification with what is identical, non-double identity. Therefore, we pride ourselves on being’s an identity. Rationality still involves , a reason is the presence of existence, showing a real awareness of beings. The crisis of traditional philosophy, which is still ahead of us, represents the internal disintegration of meaning, contained in the knowledge and expressing an identity or a retiring of being. Privilege of such presence has been challenged in the article titled “The voice and the phenomenon” of Jacques Derrida.²⁰ He denied the very possibility of full presence. It appears that presence is always postponed, always “just indicated”. This is the most radical critique of the philosophy of being, revealing that the transcendental illusion begins at the level of immediacy. It seems therefore that we should abandon the model of cognition, according to which the fulfillment of thought was a being.

Moral consciousness is a complex reality that manifests autonomy with heteronomy. Thus, there is an antinomy that any theory of moral consciousness

¹⁹ E. Lévinas, *O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl* (Of God who comes to mind), trans. Malgorzata Kowalska (Cracow: Znak, 1994), 181-182.

²⁰ J. Derrida, “Violence and metaphysics. Essay on the thoughts of E. Lévinas,” in *Scripture Philosophy*, chose by B. Banasiak (Cracow, 1992).

must solve. Autonomy and heteronomy? Autonomy and heteronomy? Immanence or transcendence? For Lévinas, showing the dual nature of moral consciousness seems to solve for the second time this antinomy. Heteronomy expresses our relationship to the order of things, which we can not change without a conviction to do so. A law that obliges us more than us. But the moral law is both transcendent and immanent, because these orders are imposed from outside in us accomplices: they explain the internal requirement of our being and in a sense it is our deep desire that makes them to manifest, it causes our autonomy. Against the background of the antinomy between autonomy and heteronomy moral relationships are important, coupled with the knowledge that the spiritual life, namely, responsibility-free, God-the moral life. According to E. Lévinas against any Cogito, consciousness is structured by moral responsibility, sensitivity to the neighbor who is to direct yourself to face another despite myself, despite my Cogito. To Infinity, which commands us by face neighbor. Here's a formula that tells you all about the work of Lévinas: "Where could I remain a spectator, I am responsible, it still means talking. There is no longer a theater, drama is no longer a game. Because everything is important."

So, in fact Lévinas moral responsibility is as important as the structure of subjectivity. Responsibility is always responsible for his neighbor. In *Autrement qu'être au-delà de l'essence* thinker states that liability is inicjuçaco, initially for one's neighbor, I'm responsible for this is accountability. This responsibility is not just an attribute of subjectivity, but it defines the structure of the same subjectivity. "La subiectivite se Construit meme dans le mouvement ou elle a incombe d'être responsable pour l'autre, va jusqu'à la substitution pour cars heat / ... / Elle repond jusqu'à expier pour les autres."²¹ The movement of responsibility, being that withdraws from his condition of being: selflessness, other than to be. It is about the identity of the human ego itself from responsibility for one's neighbor. I am I, as much as I am responsible, and even God himself can not cancel this responsibility.

The responsibility is to direct me to face another even though it establishes me as a hostage in place of the neighbor, because there is no choice: subjectivity is obliged to neighbor (prochain) is a breach of this time being exceeded by Infinity. Lévinas wrote: "Subjectivity in his withdrawing (invalidate) the essence of taking the place of one's neighbor / ... / The identity of the body remains here, in fact, the impossibility of resorting to the responsibility in taking rank else / ... / invalidate the essence of selflessness."²² This is the essence of ethics violation. Subjectivity is

²¹ Lévinas, *Éthique et Infini*, 96.

²² E. Lévinas, *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence* (Kluwer Academie, Nijhoff, 1974), 29.

understood as a responsibility is no longer a modality of being. The essence of the subjectivity is the “the spirit”, besides being in an otherwise than being, in her relations with others. The proximity neighbor manifests itself hidden the birth entity; absolute appropriations shall subject, that it takes consciousness of the Infinite, brotherhood forever.

B. THE DIMENSION OF THE IDEAL AND THE MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Specific is Lévinas’ ethics, which the last word finally is a reflection on God “until the absence of the transcendent.” (See: God and onto-teologia) Let us say the first, that the Cartesian ontology primarily encompasses everything other, thereby removes what would otherwise exceed the whole, removes all the transcendent. Meanwhile, with the sole view of the whole, the position of humility, desire, transcendence is emerging. On the contemporary violence and loss of authority Lévinas responds with a reflection on philanthropy of Good as the grace! Here the good-being, a benefaction and charity, they do not mean prosperity of good-being. The sole good is equated here with God. It is realized as if beyond good and evil, in the fulfillment of the Triad: Creation-selection-the salvation! In the face of the Greek misfortune thinker shows the salvation of Christianity brought by the victory over time, as the possibility of renewal, which ensures that the presence has not been undergone of past. “Atrida-people who are debating under the pillory of the past, foreign and brutal as the evil, Christianity would have opposed the mystical drama. A cross liberates us through the Eucharist, which triumphs over time, this liberation is happening every day. Salvation that Christianity brings about humanity is what is something very valuable. This there had been done by the promise of a new conception of a definitive determination that the passage of time was completed; the conception of this past, that there was took with reason, and it is always taken as a problem.”²³

This freedom in the face of time, he is growing in a man who always intends to transform his live as more meaningful. The human soul is transcendent. This means that a man with one hand has the power to tear up of a concrete variable fate’s the railways, on the other hand he represents the equal dignity of all souls due to their social conditioning. From the depths of man’s evocation we are opening ourselves to the moral order of human existence. According to Lévinas’ ethical order is not preparation, but the accession to... Divine. Then the “rest” is a delusion.²⁴ Though, the evil you can not erase with the rite, he says. Personal

²³ cfr. E. Lévinas, *Difficile Liberté. Essais sur le Judaïsme* (Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism) (Paris: Albin Michel, 1963/1976).

²⁴ cfr. Lévinas, *Difficile Liberté* (1963), 137.

liability of man to man consists in the fact that God cannot cancel her. Evil is not the principle of mystical rite that can be blurred. It is offensive act that a man is doing to man. Nobody, not even God, it cannot put yourself in the place of sacrifice, a victim. Although Lévinas' God abandons the time, as if he waited for the return of man, his independence or rebirth. In the concept of Kaunas Thinker a world as well as all-powerful a forgiveness are inhumane. Judaism believes in the rebirth of man without the intervention of superhuman agents, he is based on the recognition of Good and Law essentially. "Everything is in God's hands, except the fear of God", he said. Possibilities of a human effort are endless, but any possible social assistance cannot be compared to the communion of saints. The Talmudic doctrine is guided by the ethical order of the individual soul to salvation. And so goes the Talmudic doctrine of an ethical salvation of the individual soul. Lévinas very slowly coming to Christianity by presenting two forms of Christianity, social and dogmatic Christianity. In the article "Ethics and the Spirit", published in 1952 the year as a reaction to the encyclical "Humani Generis", Lévinas retained the ability to approximate to the whole Judeo-Christian. He survived the very moment when he noticed that there is a limit not to be overcome, namely, when it turned out that this approximation is akin to the theology of substitution. Christian thought deserves to be the only respect in particular the Passion of Jesus, which contains the meaning of the last of what is human. Of events that constitute this drama 'exudes all rationality'. Just let us ask here is it a need to make this only humane dignity it would have entailed any further transfer of deed? In *Difficult Freedom* Lévinas writes: "As the Ark of Noah bravely embodies only tree that symbolizes a Cross; as the wells drilled by Isaac prepare meeting the Samaritan woman and Jesus; as Miriam's leprosy symbolizes whiteness of Mary and the burning bush- a crown of thorns of Jesus; as well all that it leads us straight to the stage of logic, that exceeds the logic or which precedes it." Lévinas' critique of it remains formal. Here God has visited us. Sometimes people were on the roads. Let recall here at least the scene of the three passengers at home of Abraham. Is the dignity of the human spirit of the Old Testament did not rely more on drama situated on the wonderful plan of holiness, rather than on a sense of that life as a consciousness, which is giving itself, on its own.

Radical externality, which occurs in pure determination, indicates the existence of a different order of meaning. Externality, namely the relationship which excludes any relationship, it is where one of the members shall be marked by what is not to take, capture by Infinity. Lévinas is based at this point on the

closeness of God, which is drawn as a social relationship, irreducible to knowledge, better than the synthesis and fulfillment of a being, as continuance, in the self-consciousness; proximity, in which by what is “better than”, it starts to mean and shine the Good only. The proximity conferring a meaning for a pure persistence, a pure patience of a life, by which we live simply, without any reason for being; a rationality older than the unfolding of a being. We need to see against this background the only relationship, namely the relation of transcendence, which appears in the philosophies of knowledge under different names. It is more than being by Plato. It is manifested through the active intellect in Aristotle. It is the ascent of the theoretical reason to practical one in the philosophy of I. Kant. As a desire to be recognized, appreciated by another man, it appears in thinking of G. F. W. Hegel. It is a renewing continuance of H. Bergson, is also the awakening of reason in M. Heidegger.

It seems to be moved by Emmanuel Lévinas the issue of a proximity of neighbor is this continuing responsibility for the other, from which it cannot be escape. Although Lévinas does not mention about it, however, let note how difficult it is to open to the proximity of the Another. Thinker says: unrelenting responsibility pushes me, potentially, to be for other people, and even to his only substitution, to replace another person, to the non-contingent being held hostage. A responsibility gives meaning to the subject, which presents itself in a situation of responsibility. I face this responsibility as the first, as the first person pulled from a convenient location, which as protected person he dealt under the concept of “I” in general, in the philosophy of self-awareness. The question is born out from a feeling what the other is, this question is converted into responsibility for another human being now, and the fear of God turns to fear for your neighbor, and the fear that one day he would die. Thus, there is in a man a rationality older than that, which it manifests itself as an understanding of existence, of which it can give up to embrace, and from a being constituted by the consciousness that overcomes the world. According to Lévinas what other, which eludes, defies identification (ie thematisation and hypostasis), which the traditional philosophy attempted to comprehend by using the concept of developing a self-consciousness, it should be understood quite differently, in the thinking criticized by Infinity; in the image is criticized by Infinity, whose prospects cannot comprehend; in waking, in the constant questioning of peace and the identity of the Same. Passivity more passive than any passivity, constantly waking up yet, thought that thinks more than a

being's thinking, an awakening that philosophy it tries to communicate in a language, that constantly contradicts himself and just only to suggest something.²⁵

C. DIACHRONIA BETWEEN CONSCIOUSNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE- IDEA OF THE INFINITY IN US

In traditional philosophy we had a certain primacy of knowledge over the continuance of individuals and the duration of species, what is more-over human speech, dialogue. Gabriel Marcel said in the twentieth century, that only the relationship between two beings deserves to be called spiritual. A new philosophy of dialogue teaches us that to ask the other person as to you and to talk to him, it has no need to have prior experience of the Other. Dialogue is not the experience of a link between speaking to each other the people. The dialogue is a spiritual event, at least as old and irreducible as the cogito. For Buber's the right Thou is forever you, which cannot be objectify, not to submit under any name You God. We do not understand God, speaking to him in the third person, Marcel said. In the dialogue it creates an absolute distance between I and Thou, which are strictly separated by the inexpressible secret of their interiors; as each person is unique, absolutely different from each other, without any common measure, and without the area of possible coincidences. Also it arises here, "intervenes" unusual and direct relationship that exceeds this distance, although he does not remove it. There is different, another way to reach the Other than knowing. How to reach other people? It exists a new way of getting closer to our neighbor. When I returns to You, it is formed on the-ordinary and direct access, stronger than any ideal relationship, than any fusion had been made by a fact that "I think". Because you is absolutely different than me. The dialogue gives meaning to something that "bigger" or "better", it is not created by the use of a supernatural voice or as a result of superstition. "More" or "better" is the undeserved gift of grace that is coming out of the Other to meet me. Of course it's not about the fact that we should take another human being as God, or that God, Thou forever, he is simply an extension of the human race. The important thing is here that only through relationships with Another man, the infinite dialogue starts to mean as a word for thought, and not vice versa.

The ethical thinking, a social relationship, which is the proximity or fraternity, there is not a synthesis of the relationship. There is liability independent of what I make or what I could not do for another human being, independent from everything, it is as if I was given Another before only myself. The authenticity

²⁵ Lévinas, *O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl*, 196.

here, whose a measure is not what is mine own, what I have already experienced, it uncovers pure selflessness towards otherness. We have a liability without fault, however, I am revealing to the prosecution, which cannot stand no alibi; a responsibility, which precedes my freedom, each beginning within me, every presence. Moreover this responsibility for one's neighbor precedes my freedom in a past that I do not remember, I cannot recall it, which was never present, older than any consciousness of something. This trace of the "deep past" that I do not remember, it is flowing to me, from the face of another human being, as a command and request, as the commandment of God. The invisible God, which cannot cover any relationship (even intentional, because it is no end of anything), which is infinite. God's time, the only code, is also a giving and transcendence. With a focus toward God it is revealed the essence of our humanity, present in the face of our neighbor, more than what a man he can be, in his "not of this world I am". God dictates something to my responsibility. Lévinas writes: "Is it forcing you, this a falling-on-me of a stranger, it is not the way in which «he enters the scene» or the way how God is haunting thinking; who loves the stranger, who by a stranger's question puts me into question, so about him certifies my word «here I am»."²⁶ Here I am in the accusative, at your disposal, my colleague. In the face which asks about me, it makes sense, different meaning, and older than ontological, waking me up to think otherwise than knowledge.

The sense of human being is not measured by the presence, even the presence to himself. Closeness to say thanks transcendence and thanks to God-in-me, which put my existence into question. The problem of the existence of God becomes the only meaning within the world. Since only describes the circumstances in which the word God has visited the mind in a way more compelling than whatever presence. The Face, outside display and intuitive exposing as to-God, it reveals the slow birth of only sense. It must be able to see a plot other than the ontological sense, intrigue, in which the law itself is being called into question. Please it must be re-awaken to God, for I'm not dead reflection, for me who are the brother of another human being and on the brotherhood of having someone else responsible, non-indifferent to the mortality of the Other, accused of everything, though without fault, he could recall it, "me" before of making any decision, before any free act, and thus before sin, from which this liabilities could have emerge; a hostage-responsibility, which leads to only the replacement of another human being.

²⁶ E. Lévinas, "God and Philosophy," in *Of God who comes to mind*, ed. B. Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).

D. CONTINUOUS OPERATION FOR CREATING INTIMACY OF ANOTHER PERSON

World history is not the interpretation of the thesis dissertation. The history of the world's only guided by the logic of life. So, relation to another exceeds subjectivity. So, a neighbor is principle, he is condition that becomes a subject as a person. This latter is the one that has been set at infinity alone, and not on his mind. He takes the infinite consciousness that is responsible, sensitive to another man, in the temporality earlier from the time of the same freedom. If history has become a transcendent, it is because it has been articulated in the lives of real human freedom. Lévinas wants to do no clutter here. Well, we're not, he says, only the actors in the theater, freedom of conscious man develops into a kind of sacred fate, in which on the site being is listed a man. And so, Lévinas claimed ignorance of Hebrew grammar by Paul Claudel. Man as a person, as the perpetrator of the story, it seems less real to him as a man-figure, as man-statue. That brings us to excuse Auschwitz-style rhetoric, false friends of Job. At this point, Lévinas' position is based on defending the law, and specifically the Talmud. Judaism is not confined only to the noble appeals, but to the general appeals of the Prophets. Christianity, though not taking place to that. Yes, Vicar of Christ on earth he is talking about, for example, that a woman has the right to maternity. Commonly, however, seems to diminish the fact that at presence it as if pursued spiritual meaning exhortations of the Prophets.

Emmanuel Lévinas courageously opposed the findings, that the Judaism he attached his importance to the letter of the law, forgetting his spirit; because the charity was announced (promised) by Christianity carried the status of justice in a primitive, for the price of grace and not justice the same Christianity occupied evil. So, in the Talmud and the Law there is a law of justice, which models the real society. It is here it meets the implement of the spiritual meaning exhortations of the Prophets. "God is concrete, says Lévinas, is not by the incarnation, but by law."²⁷ And that economic life is the ontological place where creation is transformed into the spirit, in which "the body opens up to the word." Relationship with his neighbor can be realized only when someone engages substantively, and consistently he does everything with justice. This leads to a real responsibility. And makes us disposables for a reason of the task of ministers of grace. Theology is criticizing the substitution, this putting oneself in the place of another, expiation for the other. Israel certainly does not define itself in opposition to Christianity. He

²⁷ See *Proper Names* by Emmanuel Lévinas, trans. Michael B. Smith (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997); also, *Difficile Liberté*, 192.

wants an agreement with all people who are related to morality. In the Lévinas' words by Christianity we believe internally to another inspiration. These internal beliefs, we could not keep their guard for themselves if, from two thousand years, Christian theologians were not offered for implementers, perfectionists, perfect followers of Judaism, like the followers of Kant, who in his studies supplemented him, or the confessors of Platon who had perfected his thinking. Maybe a good thing that we have those workers of eleven our.²⁸

In Lévinas there is a problem of ethical rationality that is independent of the theoretical thinking and the thinking of a being. "To reject the philosophy is still to philosophize, he writes." In this context, let us note again Lévinas' thought about God. God of the Bible, he says, he means in a manner unprecedented, no analogy has to the idea that we surrender of the truth or falsity criteria, it means more than a being and a continuance, it means as a transcendence. Some philosophers put forward the view that the concept of God is not a problematic concept, because in general is not a concept (Delhomme). In the philosophy extends the priority of ontology and immanence. An awareness already broke with a selflessness, says Lévinas. We think the awareness starting with the emphasis of presence. Consciousness in its persistent identity, in the simultaneity of its moments, makes the reality of history as a process in the presence. Today the religious man instinctively interprets his survival as an experience. Contrary to himself he interpretes of God, which he himself has experienced, in terms of being, presence and immanence. But there is also a consciousness that can open to transcendence. Just the idea of infinity, the idea of God breaks the idea that as a commitment to the existence and his synthesis, pulls everything down to the presence, to some occurrence in the world. Let us recall at this point, what Malebranche said: no idea of God or God is his own idea. Thus, we go beyond the order in which the idea leads to existence. The idea of God is the God in me, but God, which is different from all content. Infinity lives thinking, but completely different than cogitatum. It is a living passive and nothing dissimilar. The idea of Infinity is meaning earlier than the presence of significance, earlier than any of the birth of consciousness, becomes available as available, accessible as a trace.²⁹ Lévinas is speaking about the growing abundance of Infinity, which is called glory. The idea of Infinity questioned any experience. We cannot take it on ourselves as we accept for example the love. Lévinas is talking about desire. "Being good is a weakness, the weakness and folly in being. Being good is the height and the arrogance outside

²⁸ See Lévinas, *Difficile Liberté*, 146.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, 126.

being, an ethics is not the moment of being. It's otherwise and better than being. It is the very possibility of transcendence."³⁰ In this regard, the responsibility still picks up, is unselfishness, making getting rid of a being's existence. Responsibility is not a consequence of the brotherhood, comes from outside of my freedom. Here you see me, you got me here in front of you as your servant and a debtor. "Each of us is guilty before everyone, to all and for all, and I more than others," said Dostoyevsky in *The Brothers Karamazov*. Transcendence in the split ground truth of life (divine self of mine) is an adventure experience with God or by God. Ambiguity is a necessary element of transcendence, which has to stop its own showing up, its phenomenal. It has a need of a diachronia and of a sparkle, twinkle mystery, and so on.

Part third: Metaphysics of Good and the sensibility as subjectivity

A. ANOTHER AND THE METAPHYSICS OF GOOD

I wish now to draw attention to some consequences of the foregoing over the Lévinas. Thinker asks: Does it make of sense thinking is not a refutation of being, selflessness, a way out, exit of Order?" We read in Lévinas' work: "Liability is establishing being, which is not for myself, but that is for everyone – is both being and selflessness – where for himself it means a self-awareness, and for all – responsibility for others, sustaining the universe."³¹ Lévinas writes: "Infinity, whose testimony – and not the subject – is the sign given out to another person, namely through the responsibility for other man, it means thanks to a one-for-other, thanks to the subject supporting all, to everything subordinating, that is suffering for everyone and raising everything, although he had not decided on this load, that increases as glorious as it is imposed." And further we read: "But at the same time this God, who hides his face and left his fair-man his justice without a victory - this distant God - comes from within."³² What could be more imminent than Good to be entrusted. It is absolutely incredible in Lévinas'! This eschatology of justice, which leads from the spirit and out of time; to this end that, in an ethical gesture of substitution to become closer to Good and in some sense to go to his website. She actually had nothing to say, there is not already speaks man.

It is fascinating, how our thinking "haunting" God. At this point we are looking for answers to the following questions. Thinking, which openly or secretly aspired to become a religious is always aroused a curiosity, because it is bordered

³⁰ *Ibidem*, 132.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 152.

³² *Ibidem*.

by a world in which we are ourselves. Another is this world, and yet close, neighboring. What is the otherness of his neighborhood? How does religion affect thinking? Is this a lack or surplus in relation to the irreligious thinking? How is his language, not only in terms of vocabulary, but also because of the inherent logic of language and grammar? And perhaps the most important and interesting question for us: what language is possible a dialogue between these worlds? Is the principle of that dialogue is the translation, which implies a certain community, despite differences, or vice versa: the pursuit of domination and appropriation, and so the intentions not knowing, without dialogue? What happens to my thinking, when is haunted by God, as Lévinas would say? The only sample of religious thinking we have in the texts of Lévinas. My attention and curiosity have always attracted those thinkers for whom the thinking was a religious mystery worth special consideration.

Religion is based on an act of faith, and this act is indisputable. The debate between supporters and opponents of religion, like the dispute between the blind and deaf as to whether the sounds are colorful and resonant colors, and about whether the color is more important, whether the sound. Of course, a completely different meaning to such controversy has a dispute in the political or ethical space. Who treats this controversy as *Mein Kampf*, it must reckon with the fact that there will be blood, regardless of whom is right side. In the name of religion, including the secular, most wars were held, in the name of one God poured the oceans of blood and roused up the corpses. This is one of the favorite toys of children of God. In Lévinas there is still a problem inevitability of God. Faith is this paradox, the key and resource of conceptual tools, without which no thinking is would care, but on which rarely probing look is focusing. In the Gospel can believe or not. Proof case and logic have little things here. The Gospel is full of things offending to reason - and not about the resurrection, or the immaculate conception mostly goes, but a matter over which them is, the scribes had to break your head in vain for centuries about: how to reconcile the omnipotence and omniscience of God with the prevalence of evil, evil reign, his goodness and agape with human misery and suffering? Such “nonsenses” show an inadequacy of the human wisdom and especially failure of the human mind (things are happening, what the human mind cannot comprehend, the things about which philosophers have not dreamed of) – and thus indirectly prove of not only the existence what the need, necessity, inevitability of God... Today in the world affected by an excess rather than the deficiency of the evidences, the proof for anything that can be dreamed, in a world where on every popular proof is trampling at the heels no less

popular contra-proof, in which persistently and noisily are offered “evidences”, that fiercely are competing for attention and approval of the recipients, arguing with each other, contradicting each other and undermining their position in such a world, then it the need for faith is probably greater than ever. Trust, so much to a man for a balance of mind needed, is looking in vain for a peaceful harbor, where would have had the anchor.

A man needs faith; it is not to say that receives that. Almost nothing in our runaway world does not retain the shape in the long run. Even strong, in fact, shapes are suspected of latent frailty. Powerful apparently the institutions seemingly disappear without notice. They bankrupt or are eaten by even more powerful and fierce competitors. Today, seemingly infallible recipe of success in life they are unmasked after few days there as bad clues. Let us recall some of our tabloid slogans. The patented designs of “effective solutions” they are compromising in use and the regulations appear to be tragic. People whom believed that they know, they can and they want to, they turn out to be untrustworthy, and a chronicle of the establishment of policies making the world more Catering, more human, more friendly and favorable to him, is littered with the graves of unfulfilled promises. And it is without people who believe it overcomes cynicism. Someone said: Given the inertia of the Church and to the fact that belief disappears, I believe. Lévinas calls for faith without beginning, the issue is a man like a hostage of the presence. A good man does not meet Good, but thanks to the opportunity of Good he may meet another and others. Faith is still growing in spite of the anger and getting deeper and sophisticated spells of deontologisation. For Lévinas pesky word “be” is waiting for him at the beginning and at the end of way of thinking an absolutely different, another thought.

Reflecting on the issue of good and evil in terms of axiological, we remain, as Lévinas says, on the ground of the ontologics, because we understand it in the language of “freedom” - “free choice”. The same is the case, when we think Good. The latter is a relative prior terms of freedom. Good chooses me before I could choose them. Charity and Benefaction. Good ahead of any open choice in my circle of good and evil. “To be dominated by Good does not mean to choose the good from a neutral place. To be dominated by Good it means to be excluded from the possibility of choice.”³³ This “exclusion” is not a consequence of, but the foundation of any choice. Exclusion of choice is “the original pact with the good”, which allows for a freedom. I choose – secondarily – in a world of good and evil,

³³ See E. Lévinas, *Otherwise than being or beyond essence*, trans. A. Lingis (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 118.

because – initially – I was chosen by the Good with the “worlds” of this world. Is grace enough here? Good do not present on the stage of being and nonbeing, right and wrong... or remains in the shadows? You can also accused Lévinas of it is not about freedom? Commentary on Lévinas will let the words of Zbigniew Herbert of a body of Another, which like the body of Mr. Cogito (like the body of every other human) remains, “what is repulsive and attract and seductive at the same time, and as such completely never gets cleaned.”

At this point in relation to Lévinas’ thought are born still other questions and some discoveries. Birthplace of humanity is the human drama of good and evil in which man participates both as a passive object and as an active subject-player.³⁴ Axiological Space – the space of dramatic relationships with the other man in the circle of good and evil – sets the limits of “the source experience.” Thinking seeking “transcendental aposteriori” becomes “thinking in values”. Man is born when wandering in the element of good and evil. “Elemental” at this point is synonymous with “source”, “err” – of “experience.” The other’s paint of the border situation – Man “dies” when the field of his experience becomes a space “jenseits von Gut und Böse” (beyond good and evil). The drama of good and evil, therefore, is primarily a metaphysical drama. A man in touch with another man constantly finds himself somehow beyond good and evil. And it is “not to die, you have to somehow not be beyond good and evil.” Thus, how as liberating from the relative good and evil can come to the absolute Good?

B. HUMANISM OF THE SUBJECT (SEPARATION, SUBSTITUTION, IRREVOCABLE PASSIVITY)

Emmanuel Lévinas asks us to think about experiences in our life which be lie the assumptions of “totality” – of the self as complete, as the origin of all knowledge and the justification for all morality. He then treats these aspects as instances which point towards a new way of thinking about what it means to be a human subject, which is not self-absorbed, but in which our responsibility to another comes before our self-interest. He began to think in the context and the wake of great trauma and violence. And his purpose is this: to explain it, and explain above all why the suffering of others matters to us. Only in a world of infinite responsibility would future oppression prove inconceivable. We can kill

³⁴ Cfr. Substitution and the Trace of the Other by E. Lévinas. The substitution of the one for the other is the basis of the ethical and of sacrifice. A dying for the other does not, like the Cartesian Ego, rest in its ability to be active. However, the Levinasian self can act. It is exactly the biblical assertion: Feed the hungry, clothe the naked, give drink to the thirsty, give shelter to the shelterless. So, the Levinasian self is passively attuned to the other, while actively consumed by responding to his or her call.

the other but in that very moment they escape their subjection once and for all and haunt our dreams forever... the duty of care just happens to you... Lévinas' work is concerned with the very opening of the question of ethical-the ground of its possibility and impossibility-prior to the production and elaboration of all moral codes. Lévinas describes ethics as an interruption of the self's habitual complacency that occurs in the encounter with the face of the other. As he demonstrates in his main philosophical books, and in numerous important essays, consciousness is not reducible to a consciousness of being. Consciousness is radically put into question by the face. Rather than being the result of any kind of cognition, the self's responsibility to the other who faces is immediate, originary, and irreducible. We do not and never have existed "in and for oneself". "Before the neighbour I am summoned and do not just appear; from the first I am answering an assignation." Moreover, it is neither the state nor contract that constitutes us, but rather this unique and primary responsibility to an other. It is the foundation of our consciousness, our society – and our selves... Already the stony core of my substance is dislodged. But the responsibility to which I am exposed... does not apprehend me as an interchangeable thing, for here no one can be substituted for me... Subjectivity is not one for myself; it is, one more time, initially for the other. To say: "here I am". To do something for an other. To give. It obliges me as someone unreplaceable and unique, someone chosen... This responsibility is not merely social and expedient but personal and ethical. It is directed not towards the preservation of autonomy, but instead towards the recognition of suffering. The combination of these two features provides us with a new way of conceiving of the justification of a system of private actions in tort law... Responsibility establishes both a sense of self and a sense of relationship, and it is these in turn which create the very possibility of agreement, and law, and justice. But Lévinas is not satisfied also with love as Eros, he wants to extend love to the stranger, to the Other as neighbour and fellow human, which is love without concupiscence. For the child is still a being of the Same and the Other, while love of the neighbour and fellow human is to accept the absolute alterity of the Other. Every Other is an unfathomable subjectivity which represents infinity. Ultimately peace is possible only if we can love the stranger as neighbour and fellow human. a person's decision is always an inevitable result of their genetic makeup combined with environmental influences. So if a person decides to commit a crime, this can always be explained as a result of past influences. Any individual who had the same genetic makeup and the same environmental influences would have decided exactly the same thing. This is because a person's decision is always

completely caused by what happened in the past. The above results have several implications for our understanding of moral responsibility. First, not morally responsible – level of agreement was assessed to the following questions: in such a world it is impossible for a person to be fully morally responsible for their actions. Second, blameworthy – people should still be morally blamed for committing crimes; third, If these scientists are right, then it is impossible for people to make truly free choices-not free. As for responsibility, our results indicate that should neuroscience or philosophy lead the folk to come to think, correctly or mistakenly, that our minds are mechanistic and our choices are determined, our judgments about moral responsibility will remain largely intact. We should not be deterred from a scientific appreciation of the mind by fears of nihilism or social disintegration. So, we should give hospitality to the stranger, let them enjoy the rights we enjoy. We have to establish institutions to guarantee justice. For this purpose, we have to employ our knowledge and wisdom. But knowledge and wisdom at the service of love and not vice versa. So for Emmanuel Lévinas, love is prior to knowledge and wisdom. Though, you make love.

C. THE NEIGHBOR AT THE BASE OF THE PROPER RESPONSIBILITY

You can talk about the radicalization of Lévinas subjectivity. Taking the reflection of the death Lévinas draws attention to the fact that the inner consciousness, which precedes any intention, he is not an act, but it is a passive receptivity of any world. Not as a being-in-the-world, he writes, but a being called into question, it would have been the source interiority of mental life. I, which affirms in the world and in the existence, is rather ambiguous, or rather puzzling; so, as Pascal says, it can be regarded as worthy of hatred in the emphatic identity, in his unsubstitutability demonstrating itself in language, speech, etc. Passivity as is not so much describing the “bad conscience”, as it can be described by that. Lévinas writes: “My death is always before filling up the time, is a failure of a being, as for his own existence being, but this scandal does not affect a clear conscience or morality of a being based on the inalienable right to increase its potency of a being and the thinking. (see: *conatus*) In the passivity of non-intentional survival / ... / is challenged itself the righteousness of a place in a being, whose an affirmation is an intentional thinking, knowledge and the domination of «now».”³⁵ It refers me to another person who gives this calling the sense, to one’s neighbor, of which we ought to be afraid. It is the fear that goes further than “self-awareness”, that one anxiety arouses in me the face of the Other, its extreme

³⁵ cfr. Lévinas, *O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl*, 262.

simplicity. Simplicity to expose ourselves to death, without defense, and earlier than any other language and facial expressions, the question-asking, coming to me from the depths of absolute solitude; a request, which has a meaning of a command, which calls into question my presence and my responsibility. In the face of death do not leaving of the second man alone, thus consist in the fact that I answer, "Here I am" (me Voici) for a request that calls me. Love without lust. Death is the immobilization of the variability of the face, which denies of a death.³⁶ The face is the annihilation of some way of being, which dominates over all others.³⁷ Death is to remain unanswered. So, in terms of Lévinas a death would have been a disturbance of the Same by the Other.³⁸

According to professor J. Tischner person subject is possible only in the space of good, right, which allows not only a similar conflicts, but also it is sanctioned, contrary to common sense, paradoxes of subjectivity, such as the metaphysical desire, call the Face of the Other, anarchic responsibility). Lévinas rejects call of good when he rejects the axiom of intentionality, opposing that to the notion of patience with forming time. "I do not know, Lévinas says, if one can speak of hope, because hope has wings and no patience like that, becoming the ethics he absorbs intentionality, so still living in hope."³⁹

Salvation of a person, of this "being for itself" meets the highest recognition by God. The man, he entrusts to the absolute Good, which saves him even when he has to be put to death. "Responsibility establishes the being who is not for himself, but that is for all, he is both being and selflessness, where «for myself» is self-awareness, and «for all» the responsibility for others, as maintaining of the universe." "Infinity, whose testimony, and not the subject, is the sign given out to another person, he says, he is obtaining the authority, we say, with responsibility for another man, thanks to one for another, thanks to a subject sustaining everything, which subordinates to everything; so, thanks to the suffering for everyone and raising everything, although he had not decided on this load, which increases as glorious as it is imposed." And further Lévinas writes: "But at the same time that God, who hides his face and is leaving his fair to a justice without a victory, this distant God comes from within."⁴⁰

³⁶ E. Lévinas, *God, death and time* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000).

³⁷ *Ibidem*, 16.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, 27.

³⁹ Lévinas, *O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl*, 165.

⁴⁰ E. Lévinas, *Otherwise than being or beyond essence*, trans. P. Mrówczyński (Warsaw: Aletheia, 2000), 196. He writes: "I sustain the universe", *ibidem*, 249.

Lévinas develops the above idea in the statement that in the next period of history a Speaking silenced in that what Said. According to the thinker is important to re-engage in history, talking about death on the basis of the time, asking God's freedom. There is also a problem of the presence, of the models and others ontologies. Death is an absolute mystery, as has been written many times before. The fact is one that when it comes to me, you cannot say about it to the others nothing. It is apparently the moment of deepest loneliness, breaking off all contact, breaking a sudden and irreversible, whose sense it cannot be uttered. In his discussion of the death Lévinas refers to G. W. Hegel, commenting on his thesis, he tries to figure out what is our relationship with death. It does not seem to him it simple. For the fact is that it does not have an intellectual nature, does not extend our knowledge. Death cut everything, even the hope of my survival in the memory of our social world, which is the only concrete, individual behavior, next a being of mine part of my non-physical immortality. Other of her dreams, mythical, religious, even though sometimes full of faith, do not give up any claims of final, definitive statement of the conclusion. What with the time "is doing"! "Or I do not have the time and I cannot, or I have the time and still do not have, or ...". What is the age in which perhaps it will be some time hard to distinguish man from machine. And yet I am sometimes time! Lévinas says: "Time gets certified, giving themselves." Focusing on God, death and time Lévinas demands of a radical responsibility, which is born in the unequal sensitivity of man as the truth about the man himself.

D. SENSIBILITY AS SUBJECTIVITY WITHOUT SUBJECT

I allow myself here for a digression. The free will of a rational being just wants to satisfy itself, and therefore wishes to meet what is not our inner truth. We ought to read our authentic nature. Today in opposition to Saint Augustine it argues that authentic humanity has never been "intentionally destroyed". You can destroy lives, but not a gift. It shows an area of stronger will, our opportunities given by God. There is the problem of a response for a gift from God. Human will often is lacking the capacity to meet with the facts. Thus encouraged to move from the level of a will to the possibilities, from "voluntas" to "possibilitas". Augustine is writing about human nature as fallen. After the fall, he says, we do not have access to human nature. A man needs grace. Someone is accepted by God. Only redemption takes the place of ignorance. The thought of another philosopher, Pelagius, is established by statement, a man gets his own nature, not by thinking, rather by religion, which he is making always. He is writing that a gift of nature it comes from God. We are accepted by God as a gift! For a humanity was given by

the Other. Pelagius' commentators are writing today, a man cannot be "intentionally destroyed." Someone may encounter in life "the anonymous gift giver", who "with the creation of any time", will show him new horizons. And the "anonymous giver", it helps him to do something... We also can create the actions. Currently, therefore I am not talking about a man what he is, but what he should be! We somehow learn to love the truth, not so much getting to know her (see latin, *valentior Voluntas*).

I believe the value thinking of Joseph Tischner supplements the "metaphysical" Lévinas' reflection. "Value thinking" chooses the path "from" bad "to" good. This arose from the belief that the good is indeed closer to our hopes, but the evil, however, is closer to our experience. In Tischner thinking we have the wealth and breadth of analysis of how the appearance of evil in the human environment, closely: inter-human experience. Analyses, which emphasize, are to take place in order make sense - or, in other words in the order of the metaphysical - where evil is revealed in the relationship between man and man. And in many ways - as a betrayal, denial, Holocaust denial, condemnation, etc. (each as a form of bondage) - constitutes the source meanings of these experiences. Evil does not happen otherwise than in "the dialogue" - and this is an area of "words" rather than "things", to be precise - meaning, rather than entities. Evil needs a man's encounter with a man to be able to show... Evil is a dialogical (Human evil, like a spook)? This means that there is a phenomenon out of the order of being. That is not happening - using Tischner (not Heidegger) terminology - in the field of ontology, or the ontological stage drama. Evil "is." He can threaten and entice, persuade and seduce, and kill and destroy; is different than what is "otherwise than being".

Axiological drama is the first - in the sense of source of an experience - the ontological. Agathological experience concerns of being in the light of the good, the experience relates to events in the axiological light of what they value."⁴¹ This is what agathological gives food for thought. What appears axiological orientations. What agathological makes the very existence becomes a problem. What agathological shows ways to save".⁴² The introduction of the new agathological dimension of experience does not correct the fundamental optics ethically: "A man can die for what is invisible. Why not spend your «real life» in the name of what is «over being». Ontological drama is only a prelude to the

⁴¹ cfr. J. Tischner, *Filozofia człowieka dla duszpasterzy i artystów* (The Philosophy of Man for Preachers and Artists) (Kraków, 1991), 9; J. Tischner, *Spór o istnienie człowieka* (The Controversy over the existence of man) (Kraków, 1998), 169.

⁴² cfr. J. Tischner, *Myślenie według wartości* (Thinking in values) (Kraków, 1982), 516.

agathological drama.”⁴³ “On the subject of human rights, we must abandon the area of ontology and stand on the agathological ground.”⁴⁴ “Ontology of the person is subjected to the laws of agathology.”⁴⁵ And decisive for our critical peregrinations thesis: “Agathological space of a awareness is a prerequisite for the possibility of man’s humanity.”⁴⁶

What is agathological gives food for thought, allows for some comments. But it appears, first, that salvation goes beyond continuance in the public Good, beyond even the freedom of God... The Creator-God created the cosmos, as a worthy ruler of the universe created our first parents, Adam had formed on the side of Eve, then gave the word of man about his salvation, was recommended to listen to him, “from a tree in the middle of the garden you must not eat.” Do not listen, so God said, “do not diminish my accomplishments, not destroy me.” In the end they came out first parents from Paradise, and by command of God made the earth itself has been subjected, full of true hope. Since God has no grandchildren, so we must choose, must cultivate a gift of time. And now as a Christian, at any time I must choose love, the invisible. There is the last the particular lesson, both of Lévinas’ wisdom of the Talmud and of the Sermon on the Mount of Jesus of Nazareth.

So, Lévinas’ thought, which woke up to God it goes beyond experience. For the man is naked, identity comes to him only by the inalienable responsibility. It is a condition or unconditional, that it must distinguish from the structures representing the presence of an ontological fragility, mortality and fear. Lévinas writes: “We must be able see the plot other than the ontological sense, intrigue, in which the law itself is being called into question.”⁴⁷ So, we should be free. It can be promised “the presence” to a bursting life. We are constantly neighbors, Today transcendence is running out at the psychology of values, rather than overall survival ethical interpretation. Today no liability for a word, crisis of truth, doom governing in common sense, utilitarian approach to human only, desacralisation and alienation of the values, the concept of a man is purified by emotions, passions. Logic rule of Greeks, legislative thinking of Rom still are insufficient. Lévinas’s Self reveals the secret, it means unconscious in the history of subjectivity. So, Lévinas offers us sensibility as subjectivity even without subject, I suppose. However, infinity remains prior intentionality. And life is a struggle

⁴³ cfr. J. Tischner, *Filozofia dramatu (The Philosophy of drama)* (Kraków-Paris, 1990), 58.

⁴⁴ cfr. Tischner, *Filozofia człowieka*, 97.

⁴⁵ cfr. Tischner, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*.

⁴⁶ Tischner, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*.

⁴⁷ Lévinas, *O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl*, 255.

enough; you have to win not at all. So, we have to be open to others and their needs.

Conclusion

As the human species we have been accustomed to schematize the phenomena of life. What's more, we noticed that our consciousness is no longer disinterested. We see, therefore, the validity of a particular sensitivity to the issue of Lévinas' totality, violence, authority, responsibility, being held hostage, a replacement. Lévinas boldly underlines the genetic affinity with the prevailing ontological trends in the entire history of European thought on the attitude of "conquering" nature of reason, though imaginatively notes its role of reason, which is now punishable by man subordinate reality. As an heir to Jewish tradition, it accepts the mission of Jesus. For in order of salvation is presented an absolute good charity. That's what gives, what agathological scale it gives us food for thought, and it allows for some comments else. First it appears, that salvation goes beyond being in the public good, beyond the freedom of God. The Creator-God created the cosmos, as a worthy ruler of the universe created the first parents. So, we need to lovingly nurture the human dimensions of common humanity and given to us of a human time personally. Thus it has to be organic work of ours. This is what it means to protect your neighbor.

Specific is Lévinas' ethics, reflected in the final a reflection of God who is "transcendent until his absence". To coincide the religion with the spiritual life you have to experience the essence of ethics.⁴⁸ Personal responsibility of man to man consists in the fact that God cannot cancel it. The God who hides his face and left his fair justice without a victory – this distant God – "comes from the inside". So what could be more imminent than Good to be entrusted. Contemporary Philosophy extents also personal skills which can be recognized by others. The question thus arises as to whether social ties refer only to struggle for recognition, or it is also a kind of goodwill based on a specific affinity for one person to another in the great human family. Let us love.

Bibliography:

1. Derrida, J. "Violence and Metaphysics. Essay on the thoughts of E. Lévinas." In *Scripture Philosophy*, chose by B. Banasiak. Cracow, 1992.
2. Jonas, Hans. *The Imperative of Responsibility*. University of Chicago Press, 1984.

⁴⁸ See Lévinas, *Difficile Liberté*.

3. Lévinas, E. "God and Philosophy." In *Of God who comes to mind*, edited by B. Bergo, 55-78. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.
4. Lévinas, E. *Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence*. Kluwer Academic, Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
5. Lévinas, E. *Całość i nieskończoność: esej o zewnętrznosci (Totality and infinity: An essay on exteriority)*. Translated by Malgorzata Kowalska, ed. OWN, Warsaw, 1998.
6. Lévinas, E. *Difficile Liberté. Essais sur le Judaïsme (Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism)*. Paris: Albin Michel, 1963/1976.
7. Lévinas, E. *God, death and time*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
8. Lévinas, E. *Entre nous. Essai sur le penser-a-l'autre*. Paris: Grasset, 1991.
9. Lévinas, E. *Etics and the Infinite*. Edited by B. Opole-Kokoszka. Cracow, 1982.
10. Lévinas, E. *Ethics and the Infinite: interview with Philippe Nemo*. Translated by Bogna Opole-Kokoszka ed. Scientific Publishing House of the Pontifical Academy of Theology, Cracow, 1991.
11. Lévinas, E. *O Bogu, który nawiedza myśl (Of God, who comes to mind)*. Translated by Malgorzata Kowalska. Cracow: Znak, 1994.
12. Lévinas, E. *Otherwise than being or beyond essence*. Translated by A. Lingis, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.
13. Lévinas, E. *Otherwise than being or beyond essence*. Translated by Mrówczyński Peter. Warsaw: Aletheia, 2000.
14. Lévinas, E. *Proper Names*. Translated by Michael B. Smith. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.
15. Lévinas, E. *Time, and what is other*. Edited by J. Migasiński. Warsaw, 1999.
16. Lévinas, E. *Totalité et Infini. Essai sur l'extériorité (Totality and infinity. An essay on exteriority)*. Martinus Nijhoff, La Haye, 1961.
17. Maxim, Sorin-Tudor. *Lévinas et la question de la morale*. Université de Lyon, Faculté de Philosophie, Lyon, 1992.
18. Rożdżeński, R. *Kant and Heidegger and the problem of metaphysics*. Cracow, 1991.
19. Tischner, J. *Filozofia człowieka dla duszpasterzy i artystów (The Philosophy of Man for Preachers and Artists)*. Kraków, 1991.
20. Tischner, J. *Filozofia dramatu (The Philosophy of drama)*. Kraków-Paris, 1990.
21. Tischner, J. *Myślenie według wartości (Thinking in Values)*. Kraków, 1982.

22. Tischner, J. *Spór o istnienie człowieka* (The Controversy over the Existence of Man). Kraków, 1998.
23. Tischner J. *Wobec zła* (In the Face of evil). "Tygodnik Powszechny," (2) 1992.
24. Wieczorek, K. *Lévinas and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Katowice, 1992.
25. Wojtyła, Ch. Cardinal. *The acting person*. Cracow, 1969.

From Simulacrum to Phenomenon: the Status of Art in the Contemporary World

Roxana DONCU, Assistant Professor, Ph.D.
University of Medicine and Pharmacy "Carol Davila"
roxana.doncu@gmail.com

Abstract

In Fury, the story of a retired historian of idea that turns into a dollmaker and writer, Salman Rushdie takes up the mythical story of Pygmalion and Galathea and adapts it to the changing environment of the contemporary globalized world. Threatened by the mechanization of the human, the artist is forced to choose between exerting/resuming control over his creation or becoming prey to the Furies (symbols of his repressed traumas and frustrations). The first option is discarded, as the creator is envisaged as granting freedom to his creatures. The dilemma is solved when art is reconceptualized as moving from representation to simulacrum (in the Delleuzian sense) and given new meanings by the possibilities of the new electronic media, which abolishes the traditional linearity of the story for a simultaneity of multiple story lines. The artist learns to give up control over his production, as what really matters is the ongoing process of creation taking place in the "ocean of memory, imagination and dreams."

Keywords: *Salman Rushdie, Creation, Simulacrum, Phenomenon, Pygmalion Effect.*

Introduction

The distinction between mythos and logos stands at the basis of our technological civilization and the development of science. Ever since Plato logos was equated with truth, certainty and light, whereas mythos has enjoyed the precarious status of all ambiguities: neither true nor false, mythos was excluded from the proper domain of philosophical and later scientific thought and relegated to the lower realms of persuasion by appealing to the senses or the passions.

An outcast of philosophy and reason, Mythos has found its home in literature, which thrives on ambiguities of all kinds. The more science and reason progressed, literature and the arts witnessed an intense resurgence of mythos- to the extent that modern and post-modern literature can be adequately described as

mere re-visitations of ancient myths, just as philosophy was said to be only footnotes to Plato.

By the ambiguity that lies at its very heart, myth has proven to be the favourite framework for postcolonial writers that have exploited its openness and its loose structures to give voice to alternative counter-hegemonic histories or have used it to reflect the oral dimensions of their autochthonous cultures. Structuralist anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss contended that the function of myth is “to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction”¹ – and thus mythos can evade the hierarchical model of binary oppositions that engenders oppression and exploitation which formed the basis of Western imperialist policies. By virtue of its non-exclusiveness (McLuhan observes that myth does not exclude any aspect of experience, as in myth all the levels of signification are simultaneous),² myth offers postcolonial writers the chance to unearth or recover the forgotten histories of peoples and social categories that were wiped out, oppressed or silenced during centuries of Western colonization.

Fury: a reworking of the Pygmalion myth

Salman Rushdie, a prolific Indian-British postcolonial writer has used both local and Western myth and mythology in his novels. His use of myth is always finely tuned to the necessities of the story: in *The Satanic Verses*, for instance, the Western myth of Lucifer falling from the sky is employed to reflect on how immigrants are perceived by their host cultures, while the mythology of pre-Islamic Arabia becomes the critical lens through which the meanings of Islam are re-evaluated. Similarly, in *Midnight's Children*, Indian mythology serves as an alternative framework for narrating Indian history from an indigenous perspective.

Fury, a much later novel, takes up the Pygmalion-Galathea story in order to comment upon the condition of the writer in the contemporary globalized world. Actually, the mythological cocktail that spawns the novel is more complex, as the Pygmalion-Galathea story is accompanied by the recurring motif of the Erinyes or the Furies, the goddesses of retribution, as well as by allusions to canonical works such as *Macbeth* or *Frankenstein*, which have generated some of the most enduring myths of modernity.

The protagonist of the novel, Malik Solanka is a somewhat elderly academic Pygmalion, who falls in love with miniature dolls after a visit to the Amsterdam

¹ Claude Levi Strauss, “The Structural Study of Myth,” in *Structural Anthropology*, Vol. 1 (New York: Basic, 1963), 224.

² Marshall McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 72.

Rijkmuseum. His enthusiasm is equally sparked by the complexity of details that the Dutch dolls and doll's houses exhibit as well as by an underlying dissatisfaction with the "narrowness, infighting and ultimate provincialism"³ of academic life which is looked at critically, as another cog in the machine. In a bout of despair and under a sudden impulse to give in to the creative drive that academic life no longer encouraged, he gives birth to Little Brain, a doll with a narrative and a philosophic personality, who challenges the prevailing mentality of the day. Solanka's psychic, emotional and intellectual investment in Little Brain is total- and this is the reason why the subsequent subversion of the doll's character by the media will give birth to sudden and unexplainable bouts of anger. She is both an expression of Solanka's anima (in Jungian terms) and an externalization of his critical attitude towards the altered intellectual climate of academia, which gives in to the imperatives of globalizing capitalism. If the domain of culture was traditionally one in which resistance to the mainstream ideology could still be expressed, global capitalism takes it over and transforms it into an industry that becomes as repressive as ideology: "The industry of culture would in the coming decades replace that of ideology, becoming «primary» in the way that economics used to be, and spawn a whole new nomenclatura of cultural commissars, a new breed of apparatchiks engaged in great ministries of definition, exclusion, revision and persecution."⁴ As simultaneously an expression of Solanka's unconscious feminine psychological qualities and his conscious critique of the contemporary subversion of the meanings of culture by global capitalism, the doll is so intimately linked to Solanka that she becomes a kind of magical voodoo doll- whatever happens to Little Brain will have consequences for Solanka as well. She becomes "by the alchemy of art,"⁵ which transforms Self into Other and Other into Self, an image of Solanka himself. The relationship between him and the doll is one of magical correspondence, as she will give voice to his repressed revolutionary ideas: "Little Brain was smart, sassy, unafraid, genuinely interested in the deep information, in the getting of good quality wisdom; not so much a disciple as an agent provocateur with a time machine, she goaded the great minds of the ages into surprising revelations."⁶

In the Greek story of Pygmalion and Galathea, the sculptor, disappointed with women, fashions for himself an adequate object of desire, whom, with the help of Aphrodite (the personification of love) brings to life with a kiss. This is a

³ Salman Rushdie, *Fury* (London: Vintage, 2002), 14.

⁴ Rushdie, *Fury*, 24.

⁵ *Ibidem*, 16.

⁶ *Ibidem*, 17.

typical creation myth that rests on the underlying patriarchal notion of woman as passive, submissive and totally responsive to the male's needs. The male fantasy par excellence of the perfect woman. In *Fury*, the relationship between Solanka and Little Brain is more than one way communication between the creator who gives life to his creation, and the creation which fulfills his desire. Rushdie compares this kind of relation to that of a marionettist to his puppets; in contrast, Little Brain exceeds the role of the passive disciple that has been ascribed to her by the tradition and turns into "an agent provocateur". Of course, the Jewish-Christian undertones of the creation of man in the likeness of God, endowed with freedom, cannot be neglected. The relationship between Creator and creation is envisaged as a reciprocal one, the creation act manifesting its effect on both Creator⁷ and creation- as a result of the Creator's resolution to "retire from the post of divine marionettist,"⁸ cutting the strings that keep the created attached to himself.

The motif of the creature endowed with freedom of choice by its creator is resumed in the story of Akasz Kronos and the Puppet Kings on the Rijk planet, Solanka's second creative attempt. In this story Akasz Kronos created an army of cyborgs, the Puppet Kings, out of the egotistical desire to "guarantee nobody's survival or fortune but his own."⁹ Yet in spite of his self-serving opportunism, he grants his creature a certain degree of independence, in order to see "how these new life-forms resolved the battle that rages within all sentient creatures, between light and dark, heart and mind, spirit and machine." Endowing his cyborgs with a system of six values: lightness, quickness, exactitude, visibility, multiplicity and consistency, he embeds dual definitions of these values into the cyborgs' default programmes, thus allowing them the very human choice between good and evil. The possibility of freedom is thus conceived as part of a system of non-absolute values, which can be read either in a positive or a negative key, thus allowing for the specific human task of contextualization:

⁷ This reworking of the Pygmalion Galathea story into a two-way relationship between the Creator and his creation may be interpreted, of course, in the light of autobiographical detail, as an echo of Rushdie's own experience after the publication of *The Satanic Verses*. After the book was publicly burned in Bedford by a group of Muslim fanatics and ayatollah Khomeini pronounced a fatwa on Rushdie calling for his death, his life changed radically. He was forced to go into hiding and live under close police protection for more than 10 years. His marriage to the novelist Marianne Higgins was abruptly terminated; one of the most influential books of the 20th century, *The Satanic Verses* changed not only its author's life, but also those of its translators (the Japanese translator of the book was murdered, the Norwegian one only injured) or its public defenders (two Islamic officials that spoke in favour of the book were murdered).

⁸ Rushdie, *Fury*, 17.

⁹ *Ibidem*, 161.

Thus “lightness” might be defined as “doing lightly what is in reality a heavy duty”, that is to say, grace; but it might also be “treating frivolously what is serious”, or even “making light of what is grave”, that is amorality. And “quickness” could be “doing swiftly what is necessary”, in other words, efficiency: however, if the emphasis were to be placed on the second part of that phrase, a kind of ruthlessness would result. “Exactitude” could tend towards “precision” or “tyranny”, “visibility” might be “clarity of action” or “attention-seeking”, “multiplicity” was capable of being both “open-mindedness” and “duplicity” and “consistency”, the most important of the six, could mean either “trustworthiness” or “obsessiveness.”¹⁰

The ambiguity and the need for contextualization that lies at the heart of this ethical system make freedom both possible and necessary. The story of Akasz Kronos and the Puppet Kings on the Rijk planet is a sort of postmodernist allegory of humanity’s progressive liberation from its master narratives (the grand narratives of Religion, History, the State, the Sovereign Self, etc.) At first Kronos’ loyal subjects, the cyborgs learn in the course of time and after many successive experiences “to modify their own system without Kronos’ help.”¹¹ This lends them “a new sense of individual worth, even of “rights”.¹² An account of resistance of the cyborgs to the successive “interpellations” of Kronos’ ideological and repressive apparatuses ensues, under the Darwinian slogan of “Let the Fittest Survive”.

Redefining the relationship between the creator and creation

The reinterpretation of the Pygmalion- Galathea myth that Rushdie’s novel puts forth throws light on the signification of creation and on the relationship between the creator and its creation/creature. On the whole the novel is structured like a mise-en-abyme of the creation process: the story of Akasz Kronos and the Puppet Kings is an allegory and a comment on the creation of Little Brain and her subsequent liberation from its master; at the same time Solanka comes gradually and increasingly to resemble his protagonist Akasz Kronos, while the story of the cyborgs’ liberation is appropriated by a revolutionary Che Guevara figure, who turns fiction into reality in his Republic of Filbistan (Free Indian Liliput-Blefuscu). The myth is able to provide an integrative framework for all the different levels of the novel, which reflect on one another ad infinitum, like a row

¹⁰ Rushdie, *Fury*, 164.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, 165.

¹² *Ibidem*, 166.

of parallel mirrors. The real and the virtual worlds exist in a relation of reciprocity and interdependence, each of them acting on the other and being acted on in its turn. Thus, for instance, if Akasz Kronos creates his cyborgs to ensure his personal survival, the same holds true for Kronos' own creator – Solanka creates Kronos and his Puppet Kings in an attempt to come to terms with the subversion of his earliest creation, Little Brain. And just as Kronos' cyborgs fight their creator back and establish their own version of reality, the fictional story created by Solanka is appropriated by reality and turned into a real revolution. Reality fights Solanka back – during a journey to the Republic of Filbistan (a translation of his virtual story) he is taken prisoner and his girlfriend dies in the attempt to save the revolution.

This second trauma is a re-enactment of the tragedy that triggered Solanka's first murderous impulse, led to the break-up of his marriage and brought about his irascible temper and the bouts of sudden anger during which he loses all consciousness of himself. The Erynies, the goddesses of retaliation that haunt his present life come from a past of which he has lost all awareness. There is a secret that lies buried in his unconscious, and both his creation of Little Brain and the story of Akasz Kronos are attempt to draw the hidden trauma to light. Creation is thus equated with heightened consciousness – as in *The Ground beneath Her Feet*, where the trope of katabasis (the descent into Hell) becomes one of the metaphors of creation, creativity is a practice that requires a descent into a personal Hell / unconscious, whose traumatic content is then translated into art. Rushdie often writes about art as alchemy or the philosopher's stone: it is the means by which each thing can be translated into its opposite. By virtue of art's transformative power traumas can be healed- but the reverse can also happen, and evil, followed by the vindictive Furies, may be brought about into the world.

The childhood trauma that prompted an aging academic to create dolls is revealed to the reader only towards the end of the novel, when it transpires that a fatherless Malik had been repeatedly abused and “dollified” (dressed up as a girl) by his step-father. Although carefully hidden, this incident is responsible for his failed relationships with women. All Solanka's relationships end violently and abruptly because he fails to acknowledge the traumatic event: “his women [...] dropped their defenses and relaxed into all the good stuff, and never saw the hidden twisting in him [...] until the day he snapped and the alien burst out of his stomach, baring multiple rows of teeth.”¹³ The adult represses the unpleasant content of the childhood memory, yet this returns to haunt him in the form of what

¹³ Rushdie, *Fury*, 30.

Freud called the “unheimlich” – the strange which at the same time vaguely familiar. In Amsterdam, Solanka haunts the Rijkmuseum for days on end until he decides to construct microcosms of his own, peopled with dolls. The puppeteer’s sense of control over his puppets helps him temporarily to deal with the content of the repressed memory – until the character of Little Brain, his favourite doll, is taken over and subverted by the media. Disillusioned with the way his creature of critical imagination had turned into a mainstream figure and monster of celebrity, Solanka asks his wife to send all the Little Brain figures away from their home and then one night he finds himself holding a knife over the sleeping bodies of his wife and child. Then he decides to flee to New York to lose himself among the teeming multitudes of a city that “boiled with money.”¹⁴ By losing control over his creation of Little Brain, Solanka loses control over that part of himself that had managed to silence the childhood trauma. The bouts of fury that seize Solanka, the Erynies that haunt his every step are symbols of the intermittent eruptions of the traumatic memory, which fights for a way to resurface. When he finally remembers and decides to share the memory with his new girlfriend Neela, the Furies (artfully disguised under the shape of a “great black bird” reminiscent of Poe’s Raven) will disappear: “Solanka understood that his own cure, his recovery from his rare condition, was complete. The goddesses of wrath had departed; their hold over him was broken at last.”¹⁵

The creative impulse is thus linked to the problem of evil, – first of all, art is understood as a specific way of dealing with inherent traumatic aspects of life. Secondly, creation, as a non-absolute value system that remains open to different readings and contextualizations can itself be used to engender evil. If the relationship between the creator and its creation acquires certain religious undertones (echoing both Christian and Muslim myths of the creation of Adam and his endowment with free will), the act of creation itself is regarded as a complete manifestation of our humanity. When Solanka started to carve out his clay or wooden figurines “he thought of them as people. When he was bringing them into being, they were as real to him as anyone else he knew. Once he had created them, however, one he knew their stories, he was happy to let them go their own way.”¹⁶ Once outside the mind and the control of their creator, the creatures fall prey to the evils of the world. The greatest of this evils, is, in Solanka’s opinion, the mechanization of the human by the proliferating industries

¹⁴ Rushdie, *Fury*, 3.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, 219.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, 95.

of global capitalism. Whereas before the Self was regulated only by institutions like the state, the education system and the church, the advent of neo-liberalism gave rise to a whole new knowledge/power system devised to control and regulate selfhood:

Here at the outset of the third millennium, medication was really available to deal with the irruption into the adult self of the outrageous and the inchoate. [...] every good American knew the names of half a dozen effective mood-management medicaments. [...] All around him the American self was reconceiving itself in mechanical terms, but everywhere running out of control. An industry of controllers [...] had arisen to deal with its problems of performance. Redefinition was this industry's mode of operation. Unhappiness was redefined as physical unfitness, despair as a question of good spinal alignment. Happiness was better food, wiser furniture orientation, deeper breathing technique.¹⁷

Little Brain, his philosophic doll, falls prey to this mechanization and standardization and turns from the philosophic doll "able to hold her own with Erasmus and Schopenhauer" that Solanka had created out "of his best self and purest endeavour" into a "creature of the entertainment microverse", with "the intellect of a slightly over-average chimpanzee."¹⁸ Although Solanka is deeply affected by this transformation, so affected that it ruins his marriage and family life, he does not try to correct himself the second time, when he creates Akasz Kronos and the Puppet Kings. He makes the same mistake that he did with Little Brain, allowing his creations the freedom to be manipulated, or transformed, by themselves or by others. Finally, by granting his creations freedom, he opens himself to the wounds that they will inflict on him: the break-up of his marriage, the murder of his girlfriend Neela.

From simulacrum to phenomenon

Rushdie's version of the Pygmalion story is intended as a comment on the status of art in a globalized world. The myth is there to point to the origin of art (born as an externalization of the artist's desires, ideals, value systems) as well as attempt a redefinition of its significance for the contemporary globalized world. In the beginning, Solanka remarks, "the doll was not a thing in itself but a representation."¹⁹ This was of course the first theory of art as representation of an idea outlined by Plato. The relation between the realm of truth/reality and art was a

¹⁷ Rushdie, *Fury*, 183.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, 98.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, 73.

hierarchical one, as art imitated the original by producing copies. Yet Plato operated a distinction between the creation of likenesses (eikons) and semblances or phantasms (simulacra). The simulacrum appears as a perversion of the original or the model- a false likeness which corrupts the purity of truth. After the character of Little Brain is appropriated and subverted by the media, Solanka notes with despair that “This was not the life he had imagined for her. This had nothing to do with the back story he had created for his life and joy. This L.B. was an impostor, with the wrong history, the wrong dialogue, the wrong personality, the wrong wardrobe, the wrong brain.”²⁰ From a faithful copy of Solanka’s innermost thoughts and desire, from an expression of his anima, Little Brain turns into a simulacrum- in the Platonic sense. Nevertheless, her worldwide success that defies the barriers of “language, race and class”, the sheer number of her admirers (a success that becomes possible only in the globalized world characterized by the space-time compression) has an unexpected consequence: “Little Brain [...] was no longer a simulacrum. She was a phenomenon. The fairy’s wand had touched her, and she was real.”²¹ Although denying the original intention of her creator, Little Brain becomes a symbol for democratization and the erasing of boundaries and hierarchies that is also a part of the process of globalization. From a simulacrum in the Platonic sense, she become a simulacrum in the terms of Gilles Deleuze:

The simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbors a positive power which denies the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction. At least two divergent series are internalized in the simulacrum- neither can be assigned as the original, neither as the copy... There is no longer any privileged point of view except that of the object common to all points of view. There is no possible hierarchy, no second, no third... The same and the similar no longer have an essence except as simulated, that is as expressing the functioning of the simulacrum.²²

The conditions of global neoliberal capitalism are beneficial for the liberation of art from the tyranny of its creator and from the hierarchies of representation. Art as simulation, a parallel virtual world no longer serving the needs of the real is the nightmare of the artist. Solanka shudders with horror at his remembrance of the final scene of the movie *Solaris*.²³

At the end of the science fiction film *Solaris*, the story of an ocean covered planet that functions as a single giant brain, can read men’s minds and make their

²⁰ Rushdie, *Fury*, 98.

²¹ *Ibidem*, 98.

²² Gilles Deleuze, “Plato and the Simulacrum,” *October*, No. 27 Winter (1983), 53.

²³ *Solaris* was directed by the Russian movie-maker Andrei Tarkovsky, being inspired by the eponymous novel of the Polish science-fiction writer Stanislas Lem.

dreams come true, the spaceman-hero is back home at last, on the porch of his long-lost Russian dacha, with his children running joyfully around and his beautiful dead wife alive again at his side. As the camera pulls back, endlessly, impossibly, we see that the dacha is on a tiny island set in the great ocean of Solaris: a delusion, or perhaps a deeper truth than the truth.²⁴

The deeper truth that Solanka the creator has to face is that about the significance of creation. While in the case of Little Brain he reified his creation and wanted to immortalize it in the role that he had originally assigned for it, with Akasz Kronos and the Puppet Kings he learns that what really matters is the creative potential itself whose image is the “mighty seductive ocean of memory, imagination and dream, where nothing dies”, the ocean of endless simulation: “Fiction had him in his grip, and the figurine themselves began to feel secondary: not ends in themselves, but means.”²⁵ The story taken on a new life when it becomes translated into an online game on the Puppet Kings website. Solanka becomes entranced by the new experience of time that online gaming affords “Until the advent of hyperlinks, only God had been able to see simultaneously into past, present and future alike; human beings were imprisoned into the calendar of their days.”²⁶ Moreover, the fact that the story is transformed into an open-ended project subject to infinite transmutations of the “world’s storehouse of old stories and ancient histories” feels like his “imagination was fed from a thousand streams. It began to swell and grow.”²⁷

The difference between the positive transformation of the Puppet Kings into a long-term electronic project with infinite possibilities and the negative transformation of the Little Brain when appropriated by the media can of course be explained by the specific features of the two medias. While television offers ideologically charged representations of life which distort and aim at controlling the masses, electronic space and the Internet constitute a more democratic space where a variety of opinions can interact and coexist. Solanka stands in awe at the new possibilities offered by the “brave new electronic world, [...] with its formal preference for lateral leaps and its relative uninterest in linear progression, a bias that had already bred in its users a greater interest in variation than in chronology.”²⁸ Unlike television, which acts as a kind of visual logos aiming to control knowledge production, electronic space may be compared to a mythical

²⁴ Rushdie, *Fury*, 220.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, 186.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, 187.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, 191.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, 186.

space which harbours simultaneously different levels of significance. It is both this magical mythical space and changed relationship between the artist and the artefact that give art the status of a phenomenon in the contemporary globalized world.

Conclusion

In *Fury*, Salman Rushdie takes up the ancient story of Pygmalion and Galathea and adapts it to the changing environment of the contemporary globalized world. Threatened by the mechanization of the human, the artist has to choose between resuming control over his creation or becoming prey to the fury and frustration that eat him up. The first option is discarded, as the creator is envisaged as granting freedom to his creatures. The dilemma is solved when art is reconceptualized as moving from representation to simulacrum (in the Delleuzian sense) and given new meanings by the possibilities of the new electronic media, which abolishes the traditional linearity of the story for a simultaneity of multiple story lines. The artist learns to give up control over his production, as what really matters is the ongoing process of creation taking place in the “ocean of memory, imagination and dreams.”

Bibliography:

1. Deleuze, Giles. “Plato and the Simulacrum.” October, No. 27 (Winter 1983): 52-3.
2. Levi-Strauss, Claude. “The Structural Study of Myth.” In *Structural Anthropology*, Vol. 1, 206-31. New York: Basic, 1963.
3. McLuhan, Marshall. *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962.
4. Rushdie, Salman. *Fury*. London: Vintage, 2002.

‘The measure of past waltzes’: Time and Memory in Arthur Symons’s Poetry

Wojciech KLEPUSZEWSKI, *Assistant Professor Ph.D*
Department of Cultural and Language Studies,
Institute of English, German and Communication Studies,
Koszalin University of Technology, Poland
wojciech.klepuszewski@tu.koszalin.pl

Abstract

As Eric Warner and Graham Hough observe, “Arthur William Symons has long been one of the ghosts of literary history”. Indeed, he tends to be neglected and forgotten, though at the time his poems stirred the imagination, fascinated and inspired such literary figures as W.B.Yeats. It seems that there is an ironic parallel between Symons’s poetry and the place of his literary heritage in contemporary criticisms. The article focuses on a selection of poems in which Symon’s links the past and the present in what seems both a symbolic and decadent treatment of time and the way it transfigures the memory of the past.

Keywords: *British literature, Poetry, Symons, Symbolism, Decadence, Time, Memory.*

“To say that the work of Arthur Symons has been undeservedly neglected is to invoke one of the most shop-worn clichés of literary scholarship, but it is nonetheless true.”¹ Indeed it is difficult to disagree with Munro, whose comment reflects a general attitude towards Symons and his literary achievement. As early as 1934, Thouless referred to Symons as “an aloof figure, survivor of the bygone age,”² the word “age” referring, presumably, to the closing years of the nineteenth century. Five decades later, in 1983, Warner and Hough, on a similar note, call Symons “an obscure, rarely glimpsed figure.”³ Admittedly, Symons tends to be

¹ John M. Munro, *Arthur Symons* (New York: Twayne, 1969), 136.

² Priscilla Thouless, *Modern Poetic Drama* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1934), 126.

³ Eric Warner and Graham Hough (eds.), *Strangeness and Beauty: An Anthology of Aesthetic Criticism 1840-1910*. Vol 2. Pater to Arthur Symons (Cambridge: CUP, 1983), 210.

neglected and forgotten, though at the time his poems stirred the imagination of the readers and men of letters, to mention W. B. Yeats.⁴

Despite all this, Symons “has virtually dropped from sight” and remains “much neglected as his grave in Wittersham, Kent.”⁵ It seems that there is an ironic divergence between Symons’s poetry and the level of critical appreciation he has received. To a lesser extent, this article revives the memory of Arthur Symons and claims his role in literature, but predominantly it focuses on the way Symons links the past and the present in what seems both a symbolic and decadent treatment of time.

In his *History of Modern Poetry*, David Perkins devotes relatively much attention to Arthur Symons, though he does not appear to be fully consistent in his assessment. Listing a number of poets of the 1890s, namely Arthur Symons, Ernest Dowson, Lionel Johnson, and John Davidson, Perkins claims that “they are minor poets, and there is perhaps no poem of the 1890s that is not minor.”⁶ In his further discussion on the poetry of the period, Perkins seems to contradict himself by stating the following:

If we usually think of the 1890s as Aesthetic, Decadent, or fin-de-siècle, one reason is that the late Victorian avant-garde was unusually colorful and magnetizes attention. With Yeats, Dowson, Johnson, and Symons, the group included much of the poetic talent of the time.⁷

However, as far as Symons is concerned, Perkins appears to rate his achievement more in the realm of literary criticism than poetic output. This appreciation comprises *An Introduction to the Study of Browning*,⁸ and *The Symbolist Movement in Literature*,⁹ the latter hailed by Perkins as “the most important single work in transmitting the ideas and practices of the French poets to

⁴ An account of their friendship and mutual appreciation can particularly be found in epistolary exchanges. See Bruce Morris, *Arthur Symons and W.B. Yeats: a biographical and critical study*. PhD Thesis (University of Denver, 1977); Bruce Morris (ed.), *Letters to W.B. Yeats, 1892-1902 / Arthur Symons* (Edinburgh: Tragara Press, 1989); *Letters from W.B. Yeats to Arthur Symons, Miss Boughton, Mrs. Arthur Symons and Rhoda Symons*, circa 1904-1922. Manuscript held at the National Library of Ireland.

⁵ Warner and Hough, *Strangeness and Beauty*, 210. It has to be admitted, though, that most graves in Britain tend to be neglected. See, for example, Stephen Butler and Wojciech Klepuszewski, *All the Vs of Life: Conflicts and Controversies in Tony Harrison’s Poetry* (Koszalin: Wydawnictwo Uczelniane Politechniki Koszalińskiej, 2013), 7.

⁶ David Perkins, *A History of Modern Poetry* (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1976), 8.

⁷ Perkins, *A History of Modern Poetry*, 30.

⁸ Published in 1886, when Symons was only twenty-one.

⁹ First published in 1899.

the younger writers in English,"¹⁰ an opinion echoing that of T. S. Eliot who, more than half a century earlier, praised Symons's book by referring to it as "an introduction to wholly new feelings" and "a revelation."¹¹

The Symbolist Movement in Literature mirrors Symons's interest in symbolist poetry, not only as a critic, but also as a poet. Roger Lhombreaud's claim in the preface to *Arthur Symons: A Critical Biography* that "Symons lived aside and aloof from any movement" seems to be a highly idiosyncratic point of view, and one that is hard to account for, if only because of the publication of *The Symbolist Movement in Literature*, which was Symons's critical contribution in terms of introducing French symbolist poetry, also through the translation of French poets, a contribution which influenced English poets, but, more importantly, Symons as a poet. In the introduction to *London Nights*¹² Symons writes:

The whole visible world, we are told, is but a symbol, made visible in order that we may apprehend ourselves.¹³

And this outlook permeates many of his poems. Much as the French Symbolists, Symons employs the unequivocal to suggest and represent the invisible. Poetic rendition in much of Symons's poetry is consequently symbolist, one in which meaning is manifold, if not, at times, evasive, and its aim is to stir the readers' imagination.

As to the main themes in Symon's poetry, there is a transparent strand that links many of his poems, namely a recurrent motif of passing time and the memory it evokes. Typical lines that reveal the role of time in Symon's poetry can be found in a great number of poems, to mention *The Last Memory*¹⁴ or *An Ending*.¹⁵ In many of the poems memory is often "an instant from oblivion," to quote a line from *Stella Maris*,¹⁶ and expressed in a symbolic dimension, as can be seen in *Perfume*:¹⁷

¹⁰ Perkins, *A History of Modern Poetry*, 51. Particularly Verlaine and Baudelaire, the two precursors of Symbolism that Symons translated abundantly.

¹¹ T. S. Eliot, *The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism* (London: Methuen, 1920), 4.

¹² Arthur Symons, *London Nights* (London: Leonard Smithers, 1895).

¹³ Symons, *London Nights*, xiv.

¹⁴ Arthur Symons, *Poems by Arthur Symons*, Vol. I. (London: William Heinemann, 1916), 177.

¹⁵ Symons, *Poems by Arthur Symons*, 161.

¹⁶ Symons, *London Nights*, 42.

¹⁷ Perfume is often used by Symons in his poems as a poetic means of relating to the past. As Gaston Bachelard observes, 'scent or perfume in its association with the general symbolism of the air is tantamount to the wakes or tracks that mark the passage of solid bodies through the

You fade, a ghost, upon the air;
Yet ah! the vacant place still keeps
The odour of your hair.¹⁸

However, the means through which Symons renders the theme in his poems is not entirely symbolist, as his admiration for the movement might suggest. To fully comprehend this, one has to remember that the literary scene of the fin-de-siècle was somewhat complex, for the last two decades of the century were influenced not only by Symbolism, but also Decadence, a post-romantic movement¹⁹ that preceded Symbolism, and was mainly associated with the French symbolist poets, who often shocked the public. Besides, Symbolism and Decadence partly overlap, not only in the temporal context, but also because both literary trends use symbols in a manner that is very much similar, so when Guy observes that for the Decadents “symbols were by their very nature polyvalent; open to multiple interpretations,”²⁰ it is a comment that may well refer to Symbolism.

By the same token, Symons, though usually associated with Symbolism, is not homogenous as a poet and while he remains principally symbolist, he simultaneously retains decadent moods. The decadent trends are discernible particularly in two of his collections, namely *Images of Good and Evil* (1899) and *Silhouettes* (1896), which came under a barrage of accusations suggesting the essential immorality of the poems in the collection. Consequently, it seems that no critical appreciation of Symons’s poetry can be undertaken without encompassing both literary trends, at least in some of his poems, one of the most representative examples being *The Old Women*, published in *Images of Good and Evil*:

They pass upon their old, tremulous feet,
Creeping with little satchels down the street,
And they remember, many years ago,
Passing that way in silks. They wander, slow
And solitary, through the city ways,
And they alone remember those old days
Men have forgotten. In their shaking heads

atmosphere, and consequently symbolic of memories or reminiscences, (quoted in J. E. Cirlot, *A Dictionary of Symbols* (London: Routledge, 1971), 252.

¹⁸ Arthur Symons, *Silhouettes* (London: Leonard Smithers, 1896), 41.

¹⁹ Decadence was a new outlook that was a negative reaction to Romanticism, but Kermode suggests that Symons drew much inspiration from the Romantics. Frank Kermode, *Romantic Image* (London: Routledge, 2002), 127. To an extent this view may be justified, at least in terms of the time/memory dimension, which echoes Keatsian moods.

²⁰ Josephine M. Guy (ed.), *The Victorian Age: An anthology of sources and documents* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 319.

'The measure of past waltzes': Time and Memory in Arthur Symonss Poetry

A dancer of old carnivals yet treads
The measure of past waltzes, and they see
The candles lit again, the patchouli
Sweeten the air, and the warm cloud of musk
Enchant the passing of the passionate dusk.
Then you will see a light begin to creep
Under the earthen eyelids, dimmed with sleep,
And a new tremor, happy and uncouth,
Jerking about the corners of the mouth.
Then the old head drops down again, and shakes,
Muttering.

Alternating between the decadent and symbolist moods, the poem perfectly embodies the palette of features typical of both literary trends. In a characteristic symbolist manner, it lingers on connotations and associations in phrases such as “the measure of past waltzes”, or “warm cloud of musk”, evoking the past events. At the same time, what is sensuous instantly falls into decay in other lines of the poem – “shaking heads [and] earthen eyelids, dimmed with sleep.” Much as the poem’s temporal reference oscillates between the past and the present, its diction shifts from symbolist to decadent:

Sometimes, when the swift gaslight wakes
The dreams and fever of the sleepless town,
A shaking huddled thing in a black gown
Will steal at midnight, carrying with her
Violet bags of lavender,
Into the taproom full of noisy light;
Or, at the crowded earlier hour of night,
Sidle, with matches, up to some who stand
About a stage-door, and, with furtive hand,
Appealing: “I too was a dancer, when
Your fathers would have been young gentlemen!”
And sometimes, out of some lean ancient throat,
A broken voice, with here and there a note
Of unspoiled crystal, suddenly will arise
Into the night, while a cracked fiddle cries
Pantingly after; and you know she sings
The passing of light, famous, passing things.
And sometimes, in the hours past midnight, reels
Out of an alley upon staggering heels,
Or into the dark keeping of the stones
About a doorway, a vague thing of bones
And draggled hair.

The quoted lines reflect what Perkins calls “fugitive moods”²¹ in Symons’s poetry. The ephemeral is rendered in a symbolic dimension of light (“the swift gaslight wakes the dreams”), sound (“broken voice”, “fiddle cries”) and scent (“bags of lavender”). And again, the sublime transforms into final degeneration of “bones and dragged hair”. The closing lines of the poem are predominantly decadent:

And all these have been loved.
And not one ruinous body has not moved
The heart of man’s desire, nor has not seemed
Immortal in the eyes of one who dreamed
The dream that men call love. This is the end
Of much fair flesh; it is for this you tend
Your delicate bodies many careful years,
To be this thing of laughter and of tears,
To be this living judgment of the dead,
An old gray woman with a shaking head.²²

Symons concludes the poem with an air marked by pessimism and a sense of alienation. The mood of the poem is well-framed within the end-of-the-century pessimistic outlook, so characteristic of Decadence, which in *The Old Women* depicts the passing time and the transfiguration it entails. To an extent, the poem retains moods reminiscent of some of Yeats’s poems, particularly the last line of *The Old Men Admiring Themselves in The Water*, in which the title “old men” conclude:

“All that’s beautiful drifts away
Like the waters.”²³

In the case of Symons’s poems, the Yeatsian “old men” are replaced, as it were, by “old women”, and this is so in a number of Symons’s poems, to mention another brilliant example, *The Unloved*, in which Symons reverses the setting and portrays women who have never experienced the ecstasy of youth, as depicted in *The Old Women*:

These are the women whom no man has loved
Year after year, day after day has moved.
These hearts with many longings, and with tears
And with content; they have received the years
With empty hands, expecting no good thing;
Life has passed by their doors, not entering.

²¹ Perkins, *A History of Modern Poetry*, 58.

²² Arthur Symons, *Images of Good and Evil* (London: William Heinemann, 1899), 57-59.

²³ William Butler Yeats, *Collected Poems* (London: Picador, 1990), 91.

...

They too in certain windless summer hours
Have felt the stir of dreams, and dreamed the powers
And the exemptions and the miracles
And the cruelty of Beauty.

...

And they have wept, with bowed heads; in the street
They hear the twittering of little feet,
The rocking of the cradles in their hearts.
This is a mood, and, as a mood, departs
With the dried tears; and they resume the tale
Of the dropt stitches; these must never fail
For a dream's sake; nor, for a memory,
The telling of a patient rosary.²⁴

The poem strikes a note similar to that of *The Old Women*: Symons merges symbolist and decadent moods in a general aura of transience, and women in his poems seem to function somewhat as “a symbol comparable with the volatile principle in alchemy, signifying all that is transitory”.²⁵ Consequently, the image of old women evokes all that is bygone and forever enfolded in memory.

Conclusions

Much as Baudelaire, Verlaine, Mallarmé and Rimbaud in France, Symons was in the vanguard of Symbolism in England, though unlike his French counterparts, he was in a way a solitary figure, as other English poets were inspired by Symbolism, but did not necessarily become its followers. More to the point, again, much as the French poets, Symons “espoused Decadence,”²⁶ though with time he diverted from it, labelling it as “a noisy moment in literary history”.²⁷

²⁴ Symons, *Images of Good and Evil*, 60-62.

²⁵ Cirlot, *A Dictionary of Symbols*, 376.

²⁶ Karl Beckson, *Arthur Symons: A Life* (Oxford: OUP, 1987), 1. Sebastian Hayes seems to be more extreme in framing Symons within the context of Decadence, evidence of which can be found in his criticism. See Sebastian Hayes, *Arthur Symons: Leading Poet of the English Decadence* (Shaftesbury: Brimstone Press, 2007).

²⁷ Ruth Zabriskie Temple, *The Critic's Alchemy: A Study of the Introduction of French Symbolism into England* (New Haven: College and University Press, 1953), 155. Beckson argues that it was Yeats who became “instrumental in luring his friend away from the perversity of Decadence to the mystical association with the French Symbolists.” Karl Beckson, “The Tumbler of Water and the Cup of Wine: Symons, Yeats, and the Symbolist Movement,” *Victorian Poetry* 28, No. 3/4 (1990): 125.

Much more important is the fact that Symon's poetry, be it in its symbolist or decadent dimension contradicts the claim, not singular among critics, that "Symons's creative achievement is much inferior to his criticism."²⁸ In the preface to *London Nights* Symons writes:

whatever I find in humanity – passion, desire, the spirit of the senses, the hell or heaven of man's heart – is part of the eternal substance which nature weaves in the rough for art to combine cunningly into beautiful patterns...²⁹

And these patterns are indeed beautifully rendered in Symons's poetry, particularly when they pertain to time and memory. In poems such as *The Old Women* these memories link the past and the present in what seems both a symbolic and decadent treatment of time, or to be more precise, a transfiguration in which the past, embedded in the vivid, though fleeting recollections, is juxtaposed against the morbid decay, much as it is in *The Lamentation Of The Old Pensioner* by W. B. Yeats, a poem similar in theme and rendition:

My contemplations are of Time
That has transfigured me.

...

And yet the beauties that I loved
Are in my memory;³⁰

This transfiguration of time is perfectly pronounced in Symon's poetic oeuvre, in which feelings and emotions are conveyed both in the symbolist and decadent dimension. At the same time, one must emphasise that while the essence of Symons's poetry is generally symbolist, he does embrace Decadence, particularly in the poems discussed above, though his is never extreme as some of the French representatives of Decadence. So, if there is general pessimism and a sense of deterioration and decay, it never evolves into the more radical, if not perverse tastes with which the French poets often scandalized the society. As can be seen in the poems discussed in this article, Symons fuses the two literary trends in his rendition of time and memory/ies it evokes, all in the ambience of, to quote another poem, *Memory*, "fragrant memories [that] come and go."³¹

Bibliography:

1. Beckson, Karl. *Arthur Symons: A Life*. Oxford: OUP, 1987.

²⁸ Warner and Hough, *Strangeness and Beauty*, 210.

²⁹ Symons, *London Nights*, xiv.

³⁰ W. B. Yeats, *Collected Poems* (London: Picador, 1990), 52.

³¹ Symons, *London Nights*, 98.

2. Beckson, Karl. "The Tumbler of Water and the Cup of Wine: Symons, Yeats, and the Symbolist Movement." *Victorian Poetry* 28, No. 3/4 (1990): 125-133.
3. Cirlot, J. E. *A Dictionary of Symbols*. London: Routledge, 1971.
4. Eliot, T. S. *The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism*. London: Methuen, 1920.
5. Guy, Josephine M. (ed.) *The Victorian Age: An anthology of sources and documents*. London and New York: Routledge, 2002.
6. Hayes, Sebastian. *Arthur Symons: Leading Poet of the English Decadence*. Shaftesbury: Brimstone Press, 2007.
7. Kermode, Frank. *Romantic Image*. London: Routledge, 2002.
8. Munro, John M. *Arthur Symons*. New York: Twayne, 1969.
9. Perkins, David. *A History of Modern Poetry*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1976.
10. Roger Lhombreaud. *Arthur Symons: A Critical Biography*. London: The Unicorn Press, 1963.
11. Symons, Arthur. *London Nights*. London: Leonard Smithers, 1895.
12. Symons, Arthur. *Silhouettes*. London: Leonard Smithers, 1896.
13. Symons, Arthur. *Images of Good and Evil*. London: William Heinemann, 1899.
14. Symons, Arthur. *Poems by Arthur Symons*, Vol. I. London: William Heinemann, 1916.
15. Temple, Ruth Zabriskie. *The Critic's Alchemy: A Study of the Introduction of French Symbolism into England*. New Haven: College and University Press, 1953.
16. Thouless, Priscilla. *Modern Poetic Drama*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1934.
17. Warner, Eric and Hough, Graham (eds.). *Strangeness and Beauty: An Anthology of Aesthetic Criticism 1840-1910*. Vol 2. Pater to Arthur Symons. Cambridge: CUP, 1983.
18. Yeats, W. B. *Collected Poems*. London: Picador, 1990.

Incentives for academic excellence: sex, money and self-advertising in David Lodge's *Changing Places* and *Small World*

Felix NICOLAU, Associate Professor PH.D.,
Department of Foreign Languages and Communication,
Technical University of Civil Engineering, Bucharest, Romania
felixnicolau1@gmail.com

Abstract

The paper will focus on two novels of David Lodge's trilogy, namely Changing Places. A Tale of Two Campuses and Small World. An Academic Romance. During the 1970's the university life was profusely sponsored by the state. Consequently, academics travelled extensively and improved their professional expertise by leading tumultuous lives. Thus, the latest theories were intertwined with empirical experiments in hedonistic enterprises. The academic rivalries used to be appeased by parallel satisfactions. The legends of the Holy Grail, the Arthurian Cycle, and the Green Knight constituted ferments of a hermeneutics of fertility imbued with post-structuralist relativization. Interculturality received political implications and, in this way, professors had to assume a social standing. This involvement secured their status of authentic intellectuals, beyond the ivory tower. The research resorts to diverse studies on the campus novel. The main scholars to be quoted are Chris Baldick, Catherine Belsey, Eva Lambertsson Björk, and Elaine Showalter.

Keywords: *academy, competition, hedonism, hermeneutics, rivalry.*

“Human beings are troubled with the opinions [*dogmata*] they have of things, and not by the things themselves [*pragmata*]”
Epictetus as cited by Laurence Sterne

Introduction

The world of academe is perceived as a competitive, full of rivalry milieu. The professors find themselves in the midst of a whirlpool of ideological and conceptual trends. The effort of the academics to stay tuned and to catch every new intellectual issue transforms universities into the fiercest professional environment. David Lodge humorously analyses the effects of this excessive professionalization on the academics' personalities and personal lives. His

approach in *Changing Places: A Tale of Two Campuses* (1975) and *Small World: An Academic Romance* (1984) is different from the tenser one adopted by Malcolm Bradbury in *The History Man* (1975).

The aim of such an intellectual impetus is not personal development, but a life-long effort to get better integrated into the social system. The subtitle of the first novel, *A Tale of Two Campuses* is an intertextual link to Charles Dickens' *A Tale of Two Cities*. The opening statement of the Victorian novel testifies, unwillingly of course, to the loose moral, intellectual and humanitarian principles. What at Dickens announced the Nietzschean epistemological perspectivism, in postmodernism is a sign of debilitation or, at least, of complete disorientation:

It was the best of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the Spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way...¹

The need of vitality, of continuous displacement and confrontation indicates that these professors are not what Martin Heidegger called *Being-toward-Death*, with respect to *Dasein*. In the same time, Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) points out that: "The transitions from one shape to another involve a form of logical suicide or «dialectical negation» whereby a shape of consciousness discovers incoherence between what it thinks it can know and what it does know."² Hegel sustains that it is compulsory to grasp the whole of life in order that one could attain freedom or self-consciousness.³ The faculty members do not seem preoccupied with the limits. Actually, their philosophy – rather primitive – is to break any limitation and live life to the full. If we admit to Dragan Glavasic's statement that "in any normal society philosophy should have the pivotal place as the most important, most profound and most remarkable cognitive activity,"⁴ it consequently results that the world of academe represented in David Lodge's novel is not a "normal society". Careerism and hedonism are not philosophical attitudes. Willingly or not, the faculty put between brackets principles and norms and in this way they resort to a twisted phenomenology. The only theoretical approaches accepted are the literary and hermeneutic ones.

¹ Ch. Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities* (London: Penguin Books, 1994), 1.

² L. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (ed.), *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism* (USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006), 280.

³ Dreyfus and Wrathall, *A Companion to Phenomenology*, 280.

⁴ Dragan Glavasic, *Ascertaining the Intellectual Horizon* (Odin & Thor, Belgrade, 2008), 16.

*Incentives for academic excellence: sex, money and self-advertising in David Lodge's
Changing Places and Small World*

If Kierkegaard considers that faith needs a “leap of decision”, able to bracket every prior reasoning,⁵ the characters in Lodge’s novels isolate every value or tradition that could reduce their chances of self-indulgence. They do not want to search for their subjectivity. This happens only in the case of those who do not overestimate their profession. Apart from the existentialist approach, they do not picture their “everydayness negatively.”⁶

The seductive profession. Acting capacities

In such a slippery environment, people cling to whatever offers them at least short-term certainties. During the ‘70s and until the ‘90s professorship is a profession of the stage. Students expected to be seduced on all plans by their tutors. Even the timid Philip Swallow – although with a budding charisma while he reaches full maturity – gets involved in putting “spells” on his students. One of his “victims” reproduces such an episode in her test paper:

Question 5. By what means did Milton try to justify the ways of God to man in *Paradise Lost*? – My tutor Professor Swallow seduced me in his office last February, if I don’t pass this exam I will tell everybody. John Milton was the greatest English poet after Shakespeare. He knew many languages and nearly wrote *Paradise Lost* in Latin in which case nobody would be able to read it today. He locked the door and made me lie on the floor so nobody could see us through the window. I banged my head on the wastepaper bin. He also considered writing his epic poem about King Arthur and the knights of the Round Table, which is a pity he didn’t as it would have made a more exciting story.⁷

I had to reproduce the quotation in full as its implications, besides its humour, are revealing. Milton’s puritanism is abruptly abolished by the academe. The intellectual guides are not spiritual masters too. Lodge exploits the myth of King Arthur and his knights; for instance, Morris Zapp declares: “Scholars these days are like the errant knights of old, wandering the ways of the world in search of adventure and glory”.⁸ “Adventure” obviously stands for “affairs”. But more than an errant knight the postmodern professor assumes the role of an actor. There is an issue of imagology here: the academic actors and actresses resort to a plethora of means in order to seduce their young auditorium: they try to keep fit, to be fashionable and updated even in terms of pop culture, to be trendy when it comes to theoretical developments, and to stay in contact with the world-wide

⁵ Dreyfus and Wrathall, *A Companion to Phenomenology*, 278.

⁶ *Ibidem*, 281.

⁷ D. Lodge, *A David Lodge Trilogy: Changing Places, Small World, Nice Work* (London: Penguin Books, 1989), 288.

⁸ Lodge, *A David Lodge Trilogy*, 291.

academic milieu and with the political one too. For example, Morris Zapp jogs even if he dislikes physical training, buys sophisticated clothes and invests in a new sports car able to transmit his sexual openness. The same Zapp fascinates Swallow's 11-year-old daughter with his knowledge of pop-music and cartoons, while he greedily absorbs the latest literary theories with the declared purpose of becoming the highest paid English-professor in the world. Even the provincial Philip Swallow once arrived in the USA gets involved in the political turmoil. All in all, professors need to stay in good shape in order to resist on the academic stage. That is why the private lives of the best professionals are different from the common bourgeois families. A discussion between the former erotic rivals in *Changing Places*, but on friendly terms in *Small World*, between the anti-theoretical British Swallow and the over-theoretical American Zapp synthesizes the attitude of some academics. Swallow: "Perhaps that's what we're all looking for – desire undiluted by habit." Zapp invokes the "Defamiliarization" (*Ostranenie*) of the Russian Formalists and quotes Viktor Shklovsky: "Habit devours objects, clothes, furniture, one's wife and the fear of war... Art exists to help us recover the sensation of life."⁹

Stimulants for vitality and hypocritical reactions

The question is whether these super-professionals are super-beings boiling with vitality or they suffer a devitalizing process the more they climb the social ladder. "The sensation of life" is assured, surprisingly, by approximately the same necessities at persons who seem different. This unsuspected similarity explains the involuntary swapping of wives between two characters with opposite profiles. Harold Bloom remarked that the swarming opportunities and collective enthusiasms of the '60s and '70s were just traps set by the establishment. The authentic avant-gardist movements were over: "The Nineteen Sixties benefit from a general nostalgia compounded by political correctness and the sad truth that erstwhile Counter-culture has become Establishment-culture, visible upon every page of The New York Times."¹⁰

This competitive, not to say aggressive behaviour characteristic to men generates strange responses from women: Hilary, Swallow's wife, when informed about her husband's infidelity, instead of divorcing him installs central heating in the house. The cheated wife reacts like a responsible mother, but her husband's

⁹ Lodge, *A David Lodge Trilogy*, 306.

¹⁰ H. Bloom (ed.), *Bloom's Modern Interpretations: Ken Kesey's One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest* (New York: InfoBase Publishing, 2007), 2.

*Incentives for academic excellence: sex, money and self-advertising in David Lodge's
Changing Places and Small World*

problems are weird. While he is cheating on her he is fearful of Zapp's allure of a perverse Humbert Humbert in front of his daughter Amanda, possibly a future Lolita.¹¹ When Zapp proves an unexpected humanitarian side by asking Hilary to shelter his American ex-student, the pregnant Mary Makepeace, Swallow reproaches her from the States the acceptance of "an unmarried mother on the premises."¹² Once his hypocrisy is revealed, he tries to make amends by inviting Hilary to the USA. She rejects his proposal using Mary Makepeace's psychoanalytical-feminist interpretation: "men always try to end a dispute with a woman by raping her, either literally or symbolically."¹³ The humorous intertextuality masks an uttermost confusion in regards to the capital choices made in life. Thus Zapp is a catastrophic father. He had walked out on his daughter from his first marriage "leaving her a five-dollar bill to buy candy," a decision considered by his second wife, Désirée, "the most sordid transaction in the history of conscience-money." The twins resulted from his second marriage take to cultivating marijuana or what their mother calls "avant-gardening."¹⁴ The competitive life grants no time for family or for spirituality. The interesting fact is that these competitors are not forced to climb up at a quick step the professional ladder. The tempo is set by everyone depending on their ambition. At the beginning of *Changing Places*, in the year 1969, we meet two professors, Philip Swallow and Morris Zapp. The former is only a lecturer and published a few essays and reviews: "He lacked will and ambition, the professional killer instinct which Zapp abundantly possessed." Zapp is a full professor and published "five fiendishly clever books (four of them on Jane Austen)."¹⁵

The poststructuralist kitsch

Under such circumstances, "self-realization and self-fulfilment have become central aspirations of self-polity [...] in which every desire is a potential right, it is forbidden to forbid."¹⁶ Hedonism and maximal professional development are more than interconnected: they fuel each other. One cannot resist the tough rhythm of competition without renewing their pleasures. In the same time, competition is a pleasurable activity in itself. Only those academics that evolve between these two

¹¹ Lodge, *A David Lodge Trilogy*, 112.

¹² *Ibidem*, 120.

¹³ *Ibidem*, 130.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, 126.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, 12.

¹⁶ P. Goulimari (ed.), *Postmodernism: What a Moment?* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 65.

poles are able to establish complex communicational routes. The other ones, the monomaniacs get isolated and bury themselves in all sorts of minutiae. This is the reason why Euphoria State University, with its gorgeous surroundings (rivers, lakes, forested mountains and a splendid bay), favours the gathering of highly-competitive academics. If the American euphoric paradise suggests the Californian geography, the British Rummidge reflects the dire cityscape of Birmingham, encompassed by factories, smog and motorways. Academic life here gets asphyxiated by routine and pettiness. The broken parallelism between the two institutions is described by the quality of the symbolic simulacra they both find pride in. Rummidge and Euphoria have on their campuses a replica of the inclined Tower of Pisa, but restored to verticality in both cases. The American replica is built of white stone and “twice the original size”, while the British one is made of red brick and “to scale.”¹⁷ The architectural artifices are telling about the pomposity and loftiness in one case, and of deplorable scarcity in the other one. When the two universities pay no attention to the original materials of construction and, worse, they change the peculiar and authenticating mark of a renowned monument they both fall into hubris, through excess or through insignificant approach. In postmodernity hubris is imbued with kitsch. Bad taste should not be the attribute of superior education. But, again, what are the purposes of such an elite education? Zapp dreams of writing a *nec plus ultra* book on Jane Austen. This aspiration has structuralist implications: civilization is a hierarchical structure and some interpretations are central while others fall at periphery. Structuralism is implicitly colonialist. Ten years later, Zapp makes a pirouette and gives up Jane Austen studies taking to poststructuralism. Not that he disliked his initial preoccupations, on the contrary, but he needed to stay fashionable if he wanted to remain a communicational relay in the academic world. On the other hand, Zapp’s humour makes him more suitable to the relativistic poststructuralism than to the rigid structuralism. That is why his conference paper “Textuality as striptease” excludes the possibility of establishing a final meaning. The true intellectual existence implies an eternal quest:

The classical tradition of striptease, however, which goes back to Salome’s dance of the seven veils and beyond, and which survives in a debased form in the dives of your Soho, offers a valid metaphor for the activity of reading. The dancer teases the audience, as the text teases its readers, with the promise of an ultimate revelation that is infinitely postponed.¹⁸

¹⁷ Lodge, *A David Lodge Trilogy*, 10.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, 253.

*Incentives for academic excellence: sex, money and self-advertising in David Lodge's
Changing Places and Small World*

Aiming at a crystal-clear understanding of texts and, in the end, of the world would be similar to living in a possessive and reductionist couple. Zapp invokes psychoanalytical hermeneutics: “Freud said that obsessive reading [...] is the displaced expression of a desire to see the mother’s genitals.” The text reacts as an untameable bachelor to this superficial and target-oriented reading: “The text unveils itself before us, but never allows itself to be possessed; and instead of striving to possess it we should take pleasure in its teasing.”¹⁹

The academic weaponry

The transparency of the meaning encourages, paradoxically, the earthliness of the researchers. The multiple ways of interpretation seem to excuse the necessity to ground in material attachments. Matter can be spiritualized in Zarathustra’s view: “Remain faithful to the earth, my brothers, with the power of your virtue! Let your bestowing love and your knowledge serve the meaning of the earth.”²⁰

Excess is the rule of thumb in this academic enclave. A postmodernist mythology of hubris is frantically frequented by those who aspire to the highest ranks of academics. Swallow, in his turn, if he is not a fertile and creative scholar, compensates this drawback with excessive scrupulosity in examining his undergraduates. When Zapp arrives at Rummidge University and browse through Swallow’s observations on his students, he is amazed at the level of knowledge regarding students’ public and private lives.²¹

In the same line, in *Small World*, the young Angelica Pabst shows an erudition that baffles even the all-knowing ever-trendy Morris Zapp. She masters mediaeval culture as well the latest theories in literary criticism.²² If Zapp is an academic who approaches the university as if it were a corporation and “aims for financial and sexual success, loves power and is not despised or punished for being crass, sexist, competitive, hedonistic and horny,”²³ Angelica, as her name suggests, is fond of knowledge not only as power, but as intellectual nutrient in itself. She does not belong to that category of “successful female intellectuals [who] are

¹⁹ Lodge, *A David Lodge Trilogy*, 254.

²⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*, trans. Adrian DelCaro (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 57.

²¹ Lodge, *A David Lodge Trilogy*, 14.

²² *Ibidem*, 257.

²³ E. Showalter, *Faculty Towers: The Academic Novel and Its Discontents* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 78.

necessarily either frigid or sexually deviant in one way or another.”²⁴ She follows the same track pursued by the older professors: flies to conferences all over the world, writes articles and books, does a lot of documentation. But we can suppose, on account of her passion, that The Robbins Report of the Committee on Higher Education from 1963, upon which the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher based their politics of cutting financial resources for the universities would not affect her dramatically.

The variegated perks

The main difference between Philip Swallow and Morris Zapp is the approach to pleasure. Zapp ‘professionalizes’ pleasure whenever he resorts to it, which is not a rare choice. Even the private facets of pleasure are part of a competitive endeavour, as Désirée confesses: “with Morris it had to be a four-star fuck every time. If I didn’t groan and roll my eyes and foam at the mouth at climax he would accuse me of going frigid on him.”²⁵ This is one reason – getting tired with such performances in marriage – for Désirée’s transformation into a writer of feminist best-sellers. Philip Swallow indulges in milder pleasures, even if, with the occasion of landing on the American territory, he diversifies the range of hedonistic involvements. He reads out of pure interest and does not have a PhD. The English academic milieu tolerates such a relaxed professional life. In exchange, Morris Zapp is disconcerted by the cosy atmosphere in the British university: “No talk of «lows» or «highs» here: all was moderate, qualified, temperate.”²⁶ A non-competitive environment seems stifling for him, as he needs external stimuli. Sex is another mark of domination and that is why he interprets Jane Austen’s later novels in terms of Eros and Agape. When one male character of Jane Austen offers a woman a pencil without lead this is interpreted as a semiotic suggestion of impotence.²⁷ Such a “hermeneutic of suspicion”²⁸ is indicative of the fissures in self-assurance and in inner resources. In order to boost his energy, Morris Zapp proposes “group marriage”, as a unique opportunity to “pool their [the two swapping couples] resources”.²⁹

²⁴ E. Lambertsson Björk, *Campus Clowns and the Canon. David Lodge Fiction* (Stockholm: University of Umeå, Almqvist&Wiksell Int., 1993), 120.

²⁵ Lodge, *A David Lodge Trilogy*, 144.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, 173.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, 186.

²⁸ P. Ricoeur (ed.), *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, trans. and introduced by John B. Thompson (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 334.

²⁹ Lodge, *A David Lodge Trilogy*, 213.

Conclusion

In *Small World: An Academic Romance*, professors are presented as modern knights-errant, flying from one conference to another. The archetypal model for the globalized academic world is the Arthurian romance. But exactly as it happened at Camelot, the knights – be they old or new – need challenges in order to preserve their high-spirits. Intellectual and spiritual contemplation does not constitute a sufficiently-powerful incentive. Derek Pearsall highlighted the Arthurian passivity, if not exhaustion:

In the English tradition from which he was transplanted, King Arthur himself had a very limited romantic interest: he has no interesting love-affairs either before or after his early marriage. It seems impossible to imagine any being invented for him. So in Arthurian romance he is relegated to the role of, at best, a great king who stays at home while his knights go off on romantic adventures and report back to him, or, at worst, an ineffectual cuckold. Nothing is said of his campaigns against the Saxons and the Romans. Arthurian romance has Arthur's court as its background or point of reference, but it is not about Arthur.³⁰

But we should consider King Arthur wisdom and self-possession as an explanation for his sedentary attitude. On the contrary, faculty members in the postmodern era continuously seek stimulants to keep them in the academic race. The imperative of external stimuli indicates that they are not super-humans, but only super-clerks, dependent on the resources allocated by the government to the universities. Sooner than later, in Margaret Thatcher's epoch the politicians spotted the weak point and aimed at it: universities were forced to become corporatist in the educational approach. As if anticipating the calamitous reforms, they act frantically, in way specific to immortal beings. Rainer Maria Rilke's Malte Laurids Brigge was preoccupied with the individuality of his own death: "The desire to have a death of one's own is becoming more and more rare. In a short time it will be as rare as a life of one's own."³¹ Lodge's professors stay away from philosophical dilemmas; they show no interest in eschatological considerations. The only thing they need is a transitory liberty, in the hope that the Mephistophelean pact will not be enacted afterwards.

³⁰ D. Pearsall, *Arthurian Romance: A Short Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 20.

³¹ Rainer Maria Rilke, *The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge* (trans. Stephen Mitchell, New York: Vintage, 1990), 9.

Bibliography:

1. Bloom, H. (ed.). *Bloom's Modern Interpretations: Ken Kesey's One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest*. New York: InfoBase Publishing, 2007.
2. Couzens Hoy, David. Chapter 20 "Death." In *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism* (pp. 280-289), edited by Dreyfus, L. Hubert and Mark A. Wrathall. USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006.
3. Dickens, Ch. *A Tale of Two Cities*. London: Penguin Books, 1994.
4. Dreyfus, L. Hubert and Mark A. Wrathall (ed.) *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*. USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006.
5. Goulimari, P., ed. *Postmodernism: What a Moment?.* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011.
6. Lambertsson Björk, E. *Campus Clowns and the Canon. David Lodge Fiction*. Stockholm: University of Umeå, Almqvist&Wiksell Int. 1993.
7. Lodge, D. *A David Lodge Trilogy: Changing Places, Small World, Nice Work*. London: Penguin Books, 1989.
8. Nietzsche, F. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None*. Translation Adrian DelCaro, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
9. Pearsall, D. *Arthurian Romance: A Short Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005.
10. Ricoeur, P., ed. *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*. Translated and introduced by John B. Thompson. London: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
11. Rilke, Rainer Maria. *The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge* (trans. Stephen Mitchell). New York: Vintage, 1990.
12. Sherman, David, Chapter 19 "Absurdity", pp. 271-280. In *A Companion to Phenomenology and Existentialism*, edited by Dreyfus, L. Hubert and Mark A. Wrathall. USA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2006.
13. Showalter, E. *Faculty Towers: The Academic Novel and Its Discontents*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Elements for the Theory of Value in Ancient Philosophy

Ivan IVLAMPIE, Ph.D.

“Lower Danube” University of Galați, Romania

ivanivlampie@yahoo.com

Abstract

Although axiology is a new philosophical discipline (the second half of the 19th century), we can talk about both a prehistory and a protohistory of axiology. The most important aspect of axiology belongs to its prehistory. Examining the doctrines of ancient philosophers one can conclude that, although no Greek thinker had the distinct conscience of a specific realm of values, yet each generation had intuitions proper to the axiological perspective. Their intuitions regarded the human act of founding the world of values (the Sophists), or the argumentation in favour of the general character of values (Plato and Aristotle) or a hierarchy of values as a model of human education and formation.

Keywords: *Value, Hierarchy of Values, Axiology, Prehistory, Protohistory, Gorgias, Protagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Epicurus.*

For a Protohistory of Axiology

It is well-established in the field of Philosophy that Axiology has entered late the area of human reflection: in the second half of the nineteenth century. Why the human being became aware of the intrinsic existence of value only at that point may be difficult to explain, but it is certainly not futile. Leaving this query aside for now, it is worth mentioning that, although Axiology is a new branch of Philosophy, it has existed since forever, in the form of prehistory and protohistory. Its most important aspects belong to its prehistory; however, a few explanations are required for the proper understanding of this fact.

Prehistory is an ordinary term, but one concealing the prejudice that mankind moves beyond its anthropogenesis phase with the invention of writing. The dilation of memory with its narcotic effects on time – occurring with the invention of writing – is not the sign for the end of prehistory, an aspect actually emphasised by Plato as embarrassing and dishonourable for the spirit (*Phaedrus*, 274 – 276).

Much more significant events should be regarded as determining criteria for this end. The tool-making, language, symbolisation, ludic, valorisation, etc. represent, in the contemporary thinkers' view, not only distinctive elements from the animal world, but also crucial indices in the history of mankind. Thus, reconsidered, prehistory may be the time interval in which takes place the qualitative leap from the incidental production and usage of tools to the generalisation of this way of living, or from the communication of various emotions or sensations through inarticulate sounds to the emergence of utterances which settle out ideas about emotions and sensations, etc. Questions such as how to advance towards creative life or how verbal communication emerges must be accompanied – as for a *prehistory of axiology* – by wonderment with regard to the origin of values in the existence of humanoids. A survey daring enough to bring forth a few data from the shadows of prehistory should resort to instruments of sociology, psychology, linguistics, ethology, as well as of their sub-branches.¹ Such an endeavour is not one of the aims of the present undertaking; suffice it to mention it in order to understand what one ought to pursue in the *protohistory of axiology*.

In this case, too, the common meaning of the term protohistory, as an interval between prehistory and history, should be reinterpreted from the perspective of our topic of interest: axiology. In the classical sense, history begins with Herodotus, as he is “the first” to put forward the deeds of men in writing, *so that neither what has come to be from man in time might become faded*. It is not a proper history of mankind, but rather the awareness with regard to the necessity of recording some facts (“great and wondrous deeds, those shown forth by Greeks and those by barbarians”). It is not that history begins with them, but from their conscious recording begins the historical conscience of the European humanity. In the classical sense, the “history” that begins with Herodotus is the science of history. Likewise, Axiology, which stems from the nineteenth century philosophers – Lotze, Ehrenfels, Meinong, Rickert, Scheler, etc. – is the science of values. These authors are the first to record the self-contained domain of values and elaborate treatises on a particular world: the world of values. This is the reason why one can speak about a history of axiology only by taking them as starting point, whilst the past centuries may only be recovered as protohistorical. In other words, for a long interval of time, values were perceived unconsciously, not reflected from the perspective of values categories, without acknowledging the existence of the genre or, even more primitively, by considering value types often

¹ About the origin of *Homo Aestimans*, the biblical story of paradise lost provides suggestions capable to trigger multiple interpretations within the domain of prehistory of axiology.

particular and peripheral. The aim of this demarche is to account for the crucial moments preceding the birth of Axiology. Resorting to a diachronic approach, we shall further highlight the axiological insights of the ancient thinking.

The Matter of Value in Antiquity

The Presocratics show, apparently, no preoccupation with the issue of values. Their concern with reshaping the image of the genesis of all that there is by identifying the beginning (*arche*) somewhere else than the traditional mentality placed it has been interpreted as a disinterested and speculative production of an effort aiming at an objective and sensible research on nature. Nevertheless, in its substratum, this action of turning the explanation from mythological irrational to theoretical rational is an axiological gesture. And if nature was the topic of interest for the brightest of the minds, it does not mean that the issue of value is non-existent: its presence is related with each and every answer to the question of the world principle; each naturalist philosopher – besides the secondary ambition to earn the universal adherence to his views – asserted, at the same time, the universal value of his own truth. The multitude of explanatory paradigms actually underlines the way of interpreting the origin of the universe from a free and personal valorisation. Considering, it is wrong to place the first debates on values with the Sophists. The Naturalists also spoke about values: about the value of their scientific explanations.

The role of the Sophists has been recorded as remarkable and pioneering, as their subjectivist perspective met the subjectivist nature of value. Further, it is worth mentioning that the Sophists bring forth a radical change in the approach to metaphysical issues: from the simple, non-critical reflection of the origin of cosmos, they make the transition towards the critical reflection of the *human deed* oriented towards surveying the diversity of phenomena. The individual nature of the human deeds led them to the assertion that no value can acquire universal nature or a foundation that would justify its normative nature.

Protagoras, most famous for his assertion that “man is the measure of all things” and, consequently, “individual things are for me such as they appear to me, and for you in turn such as they appear to you” (Plato, *Cratylus*, 385, e), radically expresses the relativity and subjectivity of all human deeds. Commenting upon this idea, Aristotle points out that it leads to the assertion that everything that appears to someone actually exists: “But if this is so, it follows that the same thing is and is not, and is bad and good, and that all the other implications of opposite statements are true; because often a given thing seems beautiful to one set of people and ugly

to another, and that which seems to each individual is the measure”.² Man is the criterion of the reality from the perspective of appearance. And in order to exclude any possibility of human reasoning with regard to appearance, Protagoras claims that they stem from two different sources: on the one hand, from the perpetual change of things, and on the other hand, from the changes that occur in the human body. In *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (I, 216-219), Sextus Empiricus accounts for the impossibility of establishing the truth as scientific value:

So this philosopher claims that matter is in flux and that as it flows additions are continuously made, replacing the effluvia; and that the senses are restructured and altered depending on the age and the other structural features of our bodies. [...] But people apprehend different things at different times depending on the different conditions they are in. For the person who is in a natural condition apprehends those features of matter that can appear to people who are in a natural condition, while those who are in an unnatural condition apprehend what can appear to people in an unnatural condition. And the same account applies in relation to age and as regards being asleep or awake and for each type of condition. For him, therefore, man becomes the criterion of existence, since whatever appears to somebody exists, and what does not appear to anybody does not exist.³

We may note that the Sophists ground the validity of their assertions on Heraclitean reasoning so that from any intersection of the flux which disentangles the inconsistency of things with the constant variation of human deeds, in relation to senses, age, illness, the condition of being awake or asleep, might only result a *grounding* of appearances.

Protagoras' perseverance in denying the general character of values was eventually fatal to him. According to certain information, his ideas in *On Gods* triggered the Athenians' rage and his sentence to death. His works were burnt in the public square and their author, although he eloped, could not escape the divine wrath: he shipwrecked and died at sea. Indeed, his ideas are scandalous from the perspective of the collective mindset, offensive for the way of reasoning of the common citizen who, we must believe, projected his numerous needs for security and prosperity onto gods. “As far as the gods are concerned” – Protagoras claimed – “I have no means to know whether they truly exist or they do not exist; for many

² Aristotel, *Metafizica (Metaphysics)* (Bucharest, IRI, 1996), 1062, b.

³ *Filosofia greacă până la Platon (Greek philosophy until Plato)*, vol. II, Part. 2 (Bucharest, 1984), 290.

are the reasons that prevent knowledge; both the obscurity of the matter and the brevity of human life.”⁴

There is no realm of values that may evade the sceptical nihilism of the Sophists. Euripides notes rhetorically, with the help of a character, the new irritating trend against reason: “What is evil if the perpetrator does not see it as evil?” It is problematic that moral grounding is denied to the human behaviour itself. If men are still righteous, it is the result of weakness, inability, or resignations that give birth to conventions which account for human degradation. Moral human behaviour is the symptom of his nature degenerescence. This thesis, re-acted passionately in modern times by Nietzsche, is worth considering for the reconsideration of human nature as the Sophists inferred it, reconsideration that may underline not only the originality and perennity of the challenges of this current, as retrieved from the detractors’ texts, but also the rare occurrence in the field of human reflection of the topic of the importance – in axiological sense – of human subjectivity and individuality. The Sophists only seem to acknowledge the inexistence of a hierarchy of values: after all, how can one layer individual opinions on reality, personal beliefs or the irreducible diversity of behaviours? This impossibility generates an axiological void on whose background one should see the rise of a unique value: human individuality. This notion will reappear only in the twentieth century Existentialism.

Plato, a ruthless author with Socrates’ collocutors, as he authorizes them only to giving replies which validate the answers, rarely manifests the urge to substantially reproduce the opposing point of view. However, in *Gorgias* (483, b) he seems to present the Sophists’ view:

For the suffering of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die than live; since when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are weak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the stronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may not get the better of them; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and unjust; meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to have more than his neighbours; for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they are too glad of equality. And therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice, whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more

⁴ Diogene Laertios, *Despre viețile și doctrinele filosofilor (On the lives and doctrines of philosophers)* (Iași: Polirom, 1997), 299.

powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior.

Justice is the expression of the relation of forces. If the right is naturally grounded in the force of each human individual, within the social order, on the contrary, the many, due to their weakness, conventionally establish laws in which the right is prohibitive: not to be above the others, not to seek possessing more than the others, so as the Socratic virtue of rather suffering from injustice than causing it appears as a supreme form of human nature degradation. The good, the justice in the order of nature are values that escape universalization, being the fruit of the power of each individual. If there is, however, an attempt to validate these values, it is artificial, as it is the fruit of the weak meant to frighten and curse the powerful. This is the very reason why Nietzsche will later denounce such values as manifestations of human weakness, of the decadence of spirit. One can sense in Nietzsche something from the spiritual strength of the Sophists which could not pass the censorship of time, probably because of the polemicists' too great a concern to reasonably justify the elevated and patterning order of the human values.

With Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, the first moment of the birth of the European intellectual (in the modern sense of the term) is attested. They are creators of utopias in whose core a new type of humanity is projected, one of a spiritual elevation inaccessible to an ordinary existence. What is interesting is that the values which define the spiritual elevation of this new type of humanity are, nonetheless, conjugated with the aspirations of the many: those of reducing suffering and unjustified oppression. The individualist perspective of the Sophists was in favour of the actions in which the end – the manifestation of power – cannot be fenced by anything, in which everything is permitted. Hence their admiration for slave and usurper Archelaos, who ascends to the throne of Macedonia through horrible crimes, worthy of the works of Shakespeare or Dostoyevsky.

Plato, overwhelmingly impressed by Socrates' efforts to give a foundation to human aspirations, takes up his demarche to such an extent that one cannot make the difference between what is Socratic and what is Platonic. When it comes to such a school of wisdom, delimitations do not matter. In the realm of axiological ideas, the school's direction is clearly that of defining the most important

categories of values. Plato's *Dialogues* have been subtitled so as to help our immediate understanding with regard to the values approached: on duty, courage, lie, piety, beauty, justice, friendship, virtue, etc.

Maieutics, the determinative philosophical exercise, elevates our understanding of these values from particular judgements to judgements that comprise the general specificities of, say, beauty or friendship. The maieutic exercise is all the more illuminating with respect to the understanding of the nature of the respective values when the partners abide by the rules of the game (rules proper to any human dialogue) – to accept the other's opinion and, in situations when evidence requires consensus, to firmly accept the truth thus established. Contemporary Axiology teaches us that the general character of values is grounded in people's coincidence with regard to fundamental desiderative deeds. This is the reason why Plato's *Dialogues* are models of arguments in which the characters become paradigmatic incarnations of the way in which mankind as a whole ends up agreeing to adhere to a valorisation type. In this way, Plato points to our access towards a hierarchy of values.

In *Hippias Maior*, in the identification of beauty, the debate advances gradually: "beauty as individual expression, as a general matter, as conformity or adequacy to the matter, as human appropriateness, as self-appropriateness, as appropriateness useful in itself and as a selfless delight."⁵

To the first definition of the Sophist, Socrates agrees that beauty is a beautiful girl, without making any mistake from the desiderative point of view. This agreement is rather didactic: he wants to teach the Sophist that his question was not referring to a beautiful thing, but to beauty in general. And then, as Hippias still did not get the meaning of the question, the comparisons with the beautiful monkey, the beautiful stallions, and the beauty of the divine women make him understand that beauty is relative from the individual perspective and that Socrates was in fact seeking for the absolute beauty. Like gold, for instance, replies Hippias, illuminated. Indeed, gold, this general material, is coveted by everybody, at all times. We may as well settle for this. But Socrates is hard to please: how come Phidias did not know that gold was beauty and used ivory for the statue of Athena? Ivory also represents beauty. Then, why didn't he use ivory for the eyes of the goddess, but a certain gem? This way, using the example with the fig wood spoon, which is more adequate for using in a boiling pot than a golden spoon, Socrates gives birth to a new definition of beauty: matching,

⁵ Constantin Noica, "Interpretare la *Hippias Maior*" (Interpretation on *Hippias Maior*), in Platon, *Opere (Works)*, vol. II (Bucharest, 1976).

harmony of things and, in the human order, to be rich, healthy, esteemed by your fellow citizens, to live as long as possible, to bury your parents in accordance with traditions and to be, in turn, buried by your sons. Socrates' discontents do not come to an end here. Heracles is the son of Zeus. How impious is then this definition! We will put an end at this point, as the dialogue as a whole is rather interesting for Aesthetics. Nonetheless, we must note Socrates' discontent and his closing remark: "how difficult are the beautiful". His discontent reflects the difficulty of the sensible deed to comprise the irrational nature of values; it also reflects the inadequate nature of our judgements on values, whose core can be but accessed by desire. The argument between Hippias and Socrates must be construed as a dialogue between a man who defines beauty through desiderative deeds and another one who tries to encompass beauty by reasoning. The difference is that Hippias will never be aware of and interested in a scale of values, whilst a Socratic strives after it.

Focalised in the form of consensus with regard to its original meaning, the world of values will be gradually integrated by Plato in the sphere of those general elements of reality with a shaping impact in the realm of foundation. We are in the most confounding area of ancient philosophy, as behind these models lie concepts, as abstractions of the human mind knowledgeable of things (Aristotle) and values, as genetic desiderative expressions, the fruits of a long internalisation of the historical human experience. Concepts are explanatory in the order of physical determinism, whilst values are normative in the order of human formation. We can meet Platonism half way, by identifying the world of ideas in Mendeleev's periodic table or in the genetic information, in the world of archetypes or in the stylistic matrix. Platonism consecrates its immunity in such representations. But, a distinction that was not clear in antiquity is in order: between the physical universe with its predetermined order, and a spiritual, teleological universe, between a world of nature and a world of culture. Socrates in *Phaidon* was aware that not his bones, tendons or muscles had sent him to prison to drink the hemlock, but the idea of good that he had pursued towards the perfect self-shaping. However, Plato does not make the distinction between shaping Values in the order of spirit – by choices made by individuals (the *choices* themselves are the result of predetermination, of the time the soul has for reining itself in the demiurgical world of ideas), because the Ancients were short-sighted when it came to the importance of the value of human freedom – and Forms, as constitutive principles of the individual reality, of the physical order. To him, the world of spirit and that

of nature are subjected to a single cause, that of supra-sensible reality, associated with the Idea of Good.

Plato hereby accomplishes a lot in the direction of overcoming the Sophist nihilism. The sensible reality is flowing, but in doing so, it aims to a certain end. This end is the essence. It is the idea that determines teleologically the foundation of the thing. Human reason can scientifically establish the truth about reality by acknowledging this convergent end. Inasmuch as the validity of our knowledge depends on the perpetual existence of some absolute models accessible to the effort of sensible knowledge, our individual behaviour and our subjective experience acquire the highest expression due to the rational elevation towards the Idea of Good or Beauty.

The acknowledgement of the values through sensible deeds, and not through the desiderative ones, may be explained with the help of their ontological status. As values cannot be characterised according to this status, the platonic system abounds in such aporias, as those which concern the possibility of teaching virtue or the necessity of condemning art. If in *Menon* the absolute premise is that virtue cannot be taught, this is more than the consequence of the fact that Pericles is unable to educate his sons: it is the consequence of a vague inference that this value evades the human reason. Plato chooses the theoretical path: the virtue consists in acknowledging the good. There are no teachers for such knowledge, but this does not mean that there cannot be in the future, he thought, keeping Socrates in mind. On the other hand, art should be condemned because, since it is a copy of the copies of ideas (an imitation in the second degree), it moves farther and farther from the true reality, reminding less and less of the true values. And, more often than not, the art triggers immoral passions and thus becomes dangerous for the citizens' virtues.

Aiming at knowing a perpetual and unchangeable ideal, the human beings reach perfection by releasing themselves from the actual world. Truth, Good, Beauty and Justice belong to this world only inasmuch as they are able to arouse the spirit from the sleep of the matter and to redeem it to an authentic reality. In *The Banquet*, there is a hierarchy of values which underlines the ascension of the soul: individual beauty arouses the Idea of Beauty, and, by loving a person one reaches the righteous love for people (*Philanthropy*) and thus acquires a first science. Ascending towards the wholeness of knowledge, one reaches love for wisdom. This ascension towards the Good, highlighted by Beauty, Justice and Truth, is redemptive. Other than that, Plato shows nothing but disdain for the

terrestrial values. Whatever they may be – money, earthly goods, political power, and honour – they can but bedraggle the soul into the glory of lifelessness.

Aristotle, a realist spirit, does not identify the foundations of the various categories of values in a supra-sensible reality, although we may ultimately note an understanding resembling that of his master in what the teleological determination of the individual relations is concerned. A philosopher and a scientist, he delineates the theoretical from the sphere of practical actions. Truth, good and justice are not grounded in a world of immutable essences, but in various types of deeds done by people on this world. Anti-platonic, Aristotle also refutes the Sophists.

Humanity can found generally-valid truths, as the act of knowledge does not presuppose only sensorial perceptions, but also rational ones. The truth as scientific value is founded at the level of judgement: to assert that what it is actually is not or that what it is not actually is constitutes a false proposition; on the contrary, a true proposition is that by which one asserts that what it is, is and what it is not, is not. The phrase “truth - correspondence” resulted from the Aristotelian definition of truth and falsehood may be misleading in what concerns the dependency of the scientific truth value on an external continuity. The value of the scientific truth depends to the same extent on the logical principles which, as Aristotle rightfully observes, can be only proven by reduction to absurdity. Never will people agree that one thing is and is not at the same time. The truth is not only the correspondence of what is asserted in this proposition with what it actually exists in reality, but also the virtual consensus of the whole mankind with regard to the said correspondence, a consensus that is subject to the normative control of the logic principles.

The justification for the good, justice and economic assets are identified by Aristotle through the communitary nature of the human being. The need to define the man as *zoon politikon* stems from the foundation of values on a demonstrative support, and not on a hypothetical one, as in the case of Platonism. Naturally, by their articulate language, the human beings manifest a predisposition towards uttering the just and unjust, the right and wrong, what is useful or detrimental to them, whilst the other beings can only express pleasure or pain through onomatopoeia. Without virtue, the human being encounters either the degeneration down to animals’ level, which will result in isolation from the social body, or the spiritual elevation whose consequence lies in the overcoming of the natural

condition, and the sanctity acquired in this way determines the ascetic escapement from the social values sphere. Between the two extremes, delimited up to the present day by gaol and monastery, there is enough room for *Homo Aestimans*' public exercises, which Aristotle regarded as actions of the will meant to safeguard the *via media*.

The philosophical schools at the end of Antiquity have more limited ontological and gnoseological concerns, focus being now laid on soul redemption. What is more important to the soul? The different answers to this question will further define a few philosophical trends of those times: the pleasures of life (the Epicureans), the severe completion of duty (the Stoics), or the abstention to assert something too precise in relation to truth (the Sceptics).

The Stoics distinguish between things in our power and things that are not in our power. The events, everything that happens to us, the goods, fame, and leadership do not depend on us and it would be insane to connect them to our power. Representations and judgements we make about things, impulses, desires and aversion depend on us. Axiologically speaking, the distinction is remarkable: it cautions against a confusion that may derogate the human dignity. If we need to set ourselves free from all the things that are not in our power, the fact is evident from the very nature of these things.

Less remarkable is another Stoic assessment that has triggered serious accusations of insensitivity. In axiological terms, they caution us that when we head towards values (those "goods" that are in our power), we should not do it through sentient deeds, in order to avoid derogating the nature of the respective value. Not only would we derogate its nature, but we would also fail to acknowledge the value as a whole, but only its respective affects, by allowing incidents and favourable or unfavourable circumstances to lead us. The detachment from these affects creates the space of human freedom. The wise man soothes all the affects, passions and inner instincts. Free from the domination of inner impulses and insensitive to external influence, the wise man, self-sufficient, "ceases to aspire to anything alien and fears nothing in the world, for no external incident is capable to move him and no passion can torment his sovereign peace of mind."⁶

Let us keep in mind that the purpose of this ascesis is that of guiding the human being towards values in their purity and not in their accompanying of

⁶ Nicolae Balca, *Istoria filozofiei antice (The history of ancient philosophy)* (Bucharest, 1982), 258.

passions, economic calculation, political stakes or other circumstantial interests. This idea is not forwarded directly, but illustrated by the absolute value that the human being should acquire: virtue. In its purity, this value does not accept intermedial stages between it and the vice. A human being is either completely virtuous, in all the circumstances of his life, or irremediably vicious. There is no means. This is what constitutes human grandeur and the heroism of the Stoic ethic.

The Epicurean also try to provide a relieving solution in a universe divested of sacred significance understood as an emptiness in which wandering atoms haphazardly combine and give birth to ephemeral things. In this world devoid of meaning, what men still have to prize? In their worshipping condition, the Gods are indifferent to the world of physical combinations. Justice is just an artifice of the cities, a convention that may prove useful once in a while, but that can never affect one who becomes aware of the world non-sense. There is no greater misery in life than marriage.

In a devalued world, Epicurus asks us to focus on our own body, the transient structure in which the soul – also corporeal – brings forth imbalance meant to multiply the sufferings. The only aim one should have in his life is getting pleasure, thus eliminating the suffering of the body and the torment of the soul.

Our body is anchored in the present. To remove present sufferings involves the satisfaction of our sensorial necessities. The soul torment is harder to quench, as it is tightly knit with past regrets and future desires and plans. To live in the present, to seize the day can be the solution. We have natural and necessary desires, such as the need to eat and to quench our thirst; desires that are natural, but not compulsorily necessary: the desire to eat better; but also desires that are neither natural, nor necessary, such as glory, wealth, power, honours, etc. We must acquire the virtue to find the wise measurement for balancing these desires in order to attain maximum pleasure. Paradoxically, at the end of this calculation, we find only pleasures that are the consequence of abstention and that lead the wise man to *ataraxia*, to inner peace, as reclusion from the public sphere whilst still dwelling at the very centre of this space. We may consider that the Epicureans promoted the refusal of values as converting tool for our straggling valuations in one supreme good: personal happiness.

What is the lesson on value that one can learn by reading the philosophers of Antiquity? The first thing to note is that they have no awareness of a proper realm

of values. However, all generations had intuitions proper to the axiological perspective, no matter whether they concerned the human deed of founding the world of values (the Sophists), or whether they supported and defended the general character of values (Plato and Aristotle) or they promoted a hierarchy of values as a model for human formation and education.

Works Cited:

1. *** *Filosofia greacă până la Platon (Greek philosophy until Plato)*, vol. II, Part. 2. Bucharest: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1984.
2. Aristotel. *Metafizica (Metaphysics)*. Bucharest: IRI, 1996.
3. Balca, Nicolae. *Istoria filozofiei antice (The history of ancient philosophy)*. Bucharest: I.B.M.B.O.R, 1982.
4. Diogene, Laertios. *Despre viețile și doctrinele filosofilor (On the lives and doctrines of philosophers)*. Iași: Polirom, 1997.
5. Guthrie, W. K. C. *Sofiștii (The sophists)*. Bucharest: Humanitas, 1999.
6. Noica, Constantin. “Interpretare la *Hippias Maior*” (“Interpretation at *Hippias Maior*”), in Platon, *Opere (Works)*, vol. II. Bucharest: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1976.
7. Vianu, Tudor. *Filosofia culturii și teoria valorilor (The philosophy of culture and the theory of values)*. Bucharest: Nemira, 1998.

English translations:

1. Plato. *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, vol. 12, translated by Harold N. Fowler. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1921.
2. Aristotle. *Aristotle in 23 Volumes*, Vols. 17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989.
3. Sextus Empiricus. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*. Translated by Benson Mates. Oxford University Press, 1996.
4. Plato. *Gorgias*. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg. <<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm>> retrieved on December 3rd 2013.

Notes towards a Theory of Contestational Architecture

Sabin BORȘ, *Curator, Ph.D student,*
“Babeș-Bolyai” University Cluj-Napoca
sabin.bors@gmail.com
Dragoș DASCĂLU, *Architect, Ph.D student,*
Technical University of Cluj-Napoca
sddascalu@yahoo.com

Abstract

With very few exceptions since Ancient Greece, architecture has ignored for most of its history, its relation to power and politics, focusing instead on different ideals of beauty, perfection and purity of forms. It is no surprise then that architecture was used for political purposes mainly by people who are not architects, like Charles Fourier, Robert Owen, N.A. Miliutyn, to name just a few. Architecture is, and always was, linked to power, power holders, and to the idea of organizing the lives of groups or individuals. In the recent years, when the economic crisis hit stronger the residential sector and other real estate developments, the architects' role in the perpetuation of the established economic and political system has been put to scrutiny. Critics argue that architecture and architects lost their social role, or even more radically, that it can be considered an accomplice of power holders in the perpetuation of the current system. Critical architectural practices, based on the philosophy of conflict and the rejection of the idea of consensus, challenge the existing power structures and have gained in the recent years more and more ground both inside the profession and outside. But these practices are marginal more often than not, with a very limited impact, because however idealistic and well intentioned these practices are, architecture is still dependent on capital. How can architects produce spaces which are less about the power holders which finance and/or own them and more about the users? How can contestational architectures create anticipative geographies without remaining marginal?

Keywords: *Architecture, Consensus, Philosophy of Conflict, Urban Tactics, Contestational Strategies.*

I. Politics – conflict – consensus

It is not architecture as such that is at stake here, but the ways it comes to establish a set of social and functional urban relations. As architecture is the arrangement and distribution of relations in space, it holds the authority to regulate

these distributions in order to create social nodes around which the entire urban dynamics is set. Constructions are not just arrangements of form and functions. The city has become a simultaneous landscape of co-existence where morphological principles replace the framework of classical dichotomies and urban strategies replace compositional formulations. But with architecture becoming strategy and interest, the architect's role is increasingly political in that the architect traces life spaces, draws crossing lines, and creates events around the places one must describe. Architectural constructions are not restricted to bilateral (private client ↔ architect) or trilateral relation (institutional/economical client ↔ architect ↔ public), and should not be considered as an ideological practice of synthetic refusal of the data architecture must operate with. As capital is used for the benefits of colonial initiatives provided by the current ideology of separation, ideological contradictions are all the more so difficult to reconcile. *The political task of architecture is to surpass the conflict of today's political representations.*

Architectural action is political action. Defining politics in the broadest sense as the practice and theory of organizing the action of a group of individuals, and architecture as the practice of organizing spaces for the action of individuals, the link between the two is obvious. In Ancient Greece, for example, *polis* was both the physical space of the city and its political organization. This link however, has rarely been acknowledged, as Cohen argues, or when it was acknowledged, it was exaggerated as a “paranoid version of an architecture rigidly determined by politics.”¹ Even at one of the heights of the political involvement of architects, the link between the two was not explicit. During the 20s and 30s, urbanism and architecture were seen as the science of organizing all the functions of collective life, extending from the urban agglomerations to the rural environments.² The idea was that by means of scientifically planned spaces the everyday lives of individuals can be improved. Without expressing these goals explicitly as their political agenda, the actions themselves can be described as political. However, during the same sessions of the CIAM³ where new spatial configurations for the better organization of individual actions were conceived and discussed, Le Corbusier stated that: “we are not dealing with politics and sociology here (...) I

¹ Jean Louis Cohen, “Scholarship or Politics? Architectural History and the Risk of Autonomy,” *Journal of the Society of American Historians* 67, (3) (2008): 325-329.

² Eric Mumford, *The CIAM Discourse on Urbanism, 1928 – 1960* (Cambridge, London: MIT press, 2000), 25.

³ *Congres International d'Architecture Moderne.*

repeat it to you, we have to stay architects and urbanists here.”⁴ And here is *the paradox in which architecture has created its objects – thinking that although their actions have as final goal the organization of the lives of individuals (sometimes even in a deterministic fashion), the actions in themselves are not political.*

Today, there are two different traditions at work when it comes to understanding politics and democracy and both these traditions have a counterpart in architectural practices. The liberal tradition is based on the respect and rule of law, on rationality, and consensus as an achievable goal. Consensus can be reached, as Habermas or Rawles have stated, through building rational norms with universal validity through the use of language. Habermasian thought is based on the idea that language can be used in order to achieve a mutual understanding, in an ideal speech situation. In this process, the interests and preferences of individuals, but also their passions, are repressed in favor of a rational purpose and rationality: “Their central aim is that it is possible thanks to adequate procedures of deliberation, to reach forms of agreement that would satisfy both rationality (understood as defense of liberal rights) and democratic legitimacy (as represented by popular sovereignty).”⁵ In Corbusier’s famous saying: “Architecture or Revolution. Revolution can be avoided,”⁶ the architect didn’t think that revolution was not necessary, but that through the rules established by the design he created, a perfect functional system would appear, in which all tensions between individuals are alleviated. Consensus is achieved. In general, for modernist architects, the rationality of design was based on universal basic rules, such as geometrical and functional relations which should be accepted as norms and the basis of discussion.

The democratic tradition is based on the ideas of equality, identity between governors and the governed, with a relationship of articulation and contamination between them.⁷ It is not the intention of this text to reiterate the concepts of Marxism and neo-Marxism. What is of particular importance to the relation between architecture and politics is that in this line of political thought, consensus is not only undesirable, but also impossible. Politics is based on conflict. For Ranciere, consensus is the death of politics, making it the exclusive domain of the state. His argument resides in the dialectic between politics and police. Through

⁴ *Apud* Claudio Secci, “Réceptions et appropriations des sciences humaines par les architectes. Les cas des CIAM et du Team Ten (1928-1962),” *Espace et Sociétés* 142 (2010), 20.

⁵ Chantal Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox* (London, New York: Verso, 2000), 83.

⁶ Le Corbusier, *Towards a New Architecture* (New York: Dover Publications, 1986 [1923]), 283.

⁷ Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox*.

police, Ranciere understands the natural order of things, the symbolic constitution of the social, meaning the perpetuation of groups defined by wealth, interests, nationality, etc.: “society here is made of groups tied to specific modes of doing, to places in which these occupations are exercised and to modes of being corresponding to these occupations and these places. In this matching of functions, places and ways of being, there is no place for any void. It is this exclusion of what `is not` that constitutes the police principle at the core of statist practices.”⁸ The political, on the other hand, is born out of the conflict with the natural order, with the police and it is always temporary, precarious. Its essence is *dissensus*, the division inserted in `common sense` by creating a dispute, a conflict over what is given and about the frame within which we see something as given.⁹ Consensus, therefore is either an annulment of dissensus, and the transformation of politics into the police, as argued by Ranciere, or, as Mouffe (2000) argues, if realized it leads to the perpetuation of existing power relations and the annulment of any the agency of individuals to change society when the system fails. In this democratic tradition of politics and democracy, based on the Marxist tradition, conflict is the centerpiece, arguing that only through keeping antagonism, a critic of the *status-quo* is possible, and thus real change is possible.

Architectural processes, or at least those which concern and affect a larger population, have passed from their instrumental logic and the cold facts of rationalism to the idea of gaining the support of people, thus making their appropriation easier. Here is where the two traditions of political thought have a direct impact on the way architecture is conceived and presented to its potential users. The majority of architectural processes today are based on the idea of consensus, or at least, the limitation of any potential conflict. Consensus building today in spatial matters is even required by law in some countries such as the UK or France. The idea of some rationality at the basis of conceiving space and thus the possibility of consensus in what concerns issues related to space is the meeting place of both architects and clients of buildings, in general power holders (be they economic or political agents). As architect Christopher Day argues, for building design, the idea of arguing about issues related to architecture is unacceptable because it lacks efficiency and it leads to compromises in building design which is not a desirable goal. As in the Habermasian line of thought, Day argues for participation by all relevant individuals in the discussion as long as they “step back

⁸ Jaques Ranciere, *Dissensus. On Politics and Aesthetics* (London, New York: Continuum, 2010), 36.

⁹ Ranciere, *Dissensus*, 69.

from the ideas, opinions and strong feelings most people start with (...) their premature form, personalized viewpoints and associations obstruct any coming together. If they're expressed at the wrong time, they easily obstruct agreement, if not lead to argument."¹⁰

Compromise and consensus building are powerfully criticized through the democratic tradition of political thought because of the inescapable relation to power and domination. Architecture must balance the disequilibria between the various constructions it tries to articulate; in doing so, compromise is not wide of stereotypes, clichés or preconceptions. As urbanism sets rules of fragmentation and subdivision between nodes, centers and peripheries, compromise is often an attempt to bridge rights and deeds, values and behaviors, rules and aspirations. It is a question of how does one reach the appropriate convention meant to ensure the structural stability of forms and the ability to accommodate the spatial frames created within our habitus. In fact, compromise is a key element within the structure of the symbolic space drawn by the specific practices that articulate the distribution of cultural capital to class habits and spaces. It regulates the politics of desire and the politics of anticipation equally, the relation between conventions and exclusions, and the transformation of social realities and collective representations. Therefore, compromise is already a constituent part of hegemony. As long as it is assimilated to hegemonic structures and used as a production instrument of holistic entities, compromise coming from the social might not be real and the replacement of political systems might only be an adaptation to new types of order through a basic process of transferring influence from one source of power to the other.

Consensus building leads to similar outcomes. In fact, through the actions of the power-holders involved (choosing the place of debate, the tools of debate, the rules, etc.), consensus becomes pragmatic consensus. Richardson and Connely argue that consensus based on the Habermasian ideal speech act and ideal argumentation leads in reality to a form of pragmatic consensus in which central issues or important issues can be strategically avoided. Although they agree that it is still a step forward from the instrumental logic of rationalist based design which tends to exclude the values of individuals and their rationality, replacing them with the rationality of the experts, the process is still flawed because: power cannot be ignored in deliberative processes; it neglects the multiple strategies which

¹⁰ Christopher Day, *Consensus Design. Socially inclusive process* (Oxford, Amsterdam, Boston, London, New York, Paris, San Diego, San Francisco, Singapore, Sydney, Tokyo: Architectural Press, 2003).

influence the modelling of planning politics; it is not concerned with empowering individuals (or rather it considers every individual capable of exerting their own opinion, which is rarely the case). Pragmatic consensus is achieved either by eliminating certain difficult persons, through well targeted invitations or relying solely on the idea of representation, which raises the issue of legitimacy. As many individuals do not actually take part in decision making meetings, however democratic and open consensus building is intended to be, it always becomes restricted or exclusive. Pragmatic consensus can also be achieved through an exclusion of issues, being based on problems in which understanding is easier but which might not be the most important. Or through an exclusion of outcomes, in which the process is not directed towards delivering meaningful outcomes but towards a lowest common denominator which makes consensual agreement easier.¹¹ As Maxence Bohn, from the architectural studio “collectif etc.” has argued: “In France we use this word «participative» a lot. It’s very bad because for big projects there are politicians who say that they did a participative project because they asked people to choose between pink and blue for the color of the façade.”¹² The main criticism brought to consensus building is, therefore, that it does not bring any sort of relevant change in the current system of the production of architecture. However, critical practices are still quite marginal in architectural production. Because they operate within the same context of economics, politics and culture, *architectural practices need to retrieve an agency that lies in investigative or experimental approaches* that could possess their own kind of power.

II. Contestational architecture

Ever since the 60s and especially after May 68, the philosophical change of paradigm to post-structuralism had a powerful impact on architectural practices. Participatory practices, do-it-yourself, squatter movements, tactical appropriations of cities, guerrilla architecture have appeared and have criticized the established ways of architectural production. Manifests and writings sprung up, such as *Non-Plan*,¹³ *Housing: An Anarchist Approach*,¹⁴ or the manifestos of Team X members

¹¹ Tim Richardson, Stephen Connely, “Reinventing public participation: Planning in the Age of Consensus,” in *Architecture and participation*, eds. Peter Blundell Jones, Doina Petrescu, Jeremy Till (Oxon: Taylor and Francis, 2005), 77-104.

¹² Maxence Bohn at the Architecture Days debate “Crossing borders for the common good”, Cluj-Napoca, 16th May 2013, [transcript online on: <http://arhiforum.ro/agora/crossing-borders-common-good>].

¹³ Non-plan: An Experiment in Freedom is the 1969 manifest of Reyner Banham, Paul Barker, Peter Hall and Cedric Price, arguing for a renouncement of all planning regulations.

such as Giancarlo de Carlo or Alison and Peter Smithson. Although these were highly praised at the time, even by members of the profession, the effects they produced were minimal. Except for some notable examples (such as Lucian Kroll's *Maison Medicale* in Louvain or Ralph Erskine's *Byker Wall* in Newcastle upon Tyne), architectural production based on the democratic tradition and the philosophy of conflict remained quite marginal. Today, in the context of an economic crisis which massively hit the building sector, we are witnessing a new surge of architectural thinking based on the same democratic tradition and philosophy of conflict. They are based on the fact that the current system of architectural production is more and more limited to elites, excluding most individuals who do not "fit in". As Negri argues, the spaces produced today are controlled, captured and exploited by power holders, be they economic or political agents.¹⁵ Again, just as during the 60s and early 70s, there is an extensive attention given to these practices. For example, The Venice Architecture Biennale in 2012, one of the most important architectural events, was considered one of the most political biennales in history,¹⁶ showcasing a revival of participatory practices, squatter movements, "do-it-yourself" initiatives through an explicit political point of view. The Zumtobel Awards for Architectural Research or the European Prize for Public Space have recognized in the last years, these types of practices as well.¹⁷

It is not our intention make a thorough study of the recent revival of political involved architectural practices. However, most of these are based on the idea of conflict and a direct challenge towards the established system of architectural production. Even though there is a renewed attention towards critical practices, with projects being developed in almost every large city in Europe, they are marginal in comparison with the number of buildings created through the standard procedures. But contestational architecture based on the philosophy of conflict cannot be anything else but marginal. Architecture, as Sudjic argues, is about

¹⁴ C. Ward, *Housing: an anarchist approach* (London: Freedom Press, 1976).

¹⁵ Antonio Negri, Constantin Petcou, Doina Petrescu Petrescu, Anne Querrien, *What makes a biopolitical space?*, ([online] in Eurozine, www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-01-21-negri-en.html, 2007) [accessed 24.11.2011].

¹⁶ As described by Vanessa Quirk in her editorial: *Venice Biennale 2012: The Most Political Biennale Yet* [online] <http://www.archdaily.com/271897/> or Steve Rose for The Guardian in his editorial *Starchitects and Squatters: Venice Architecture Biennale* [online] <http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2012/aug/29/venice-architecture-biennale>.

¹⁷ A Special Category Award was given by the European Prize for Public Space to the "*Acampada en la Puerta del Sol*" intervention in Madrid in 2011, a large-scale demonstration by citizens which supposed the temporary occupation of the Puerta del Sol public space in Madrid.

power, as it depends on capital.¹⁸ Contestational architecture, because it fights tactically against the established system has no capacity to access power, or rather it refuses the idea of power. That leads us to an apparent paradox: contestational architectures try to change the world and the current system of architectural production but they can never access the power needed to do that, because of the very way they are conceived.

Contestational architecture could partly be seen as a pragmatopic practice. In describing the idea of “pragmatopia”, Andreas Ruby claims that while it is situated “in the no man’s land of the modernist dialectics between utopia and pragmatism, pragmatopia suggests an alternative territory of architectural operation. Thus it resists the escapism of the utopian which imprisons its vision in a *no-place*. At the same time, it bypasses the automatism of the pragmatic with its tendency to kill the idea for the sake of sheer action. Pragmatopia instead rolls out a new plane of events in order to enable action (*pragma*) to take place (*topos*).”¹⁹ The question we need to ask ourselves is what place do we actually occupy through our actions? What sort of space can contestational architectures generate? In his article “The Functional Site”, James Meyer (2000) distinguishes between a literal and a functional site. The literal site is the singular place occupied by a construction; it carries along conformity and compromise for, in a literal site, a construction can only be understood in its relation to the actuality of the place itself. By contrast, the functional site exceeds the physical constraints and constitutes itself as pure process or transformation describing the “mapping of institutional and textual filiations” traced by a space.²⁰ This distinction could be added up to Michel de Certeau’s distinction between “place” and “location”: “A place (*lieu*) is the order (of whatever kind) in accord with which elements are distributed in relationships of coexistence. It thus excludes the possibility of two things being in the same location (*place*). [...] A place is thus an instantaneous configuration of positions. It implies an indication of stability. A space exists when one takes into consideration vectors of direction, velocities and time variables. Thus, the space is composed of intersections of mobile elements. It is in a sense actuated by the ensemble of movements deployed within it. Space occurs as the effect produced by the

¹⁸ Deyan Sudjic, *The Edifice Complex. The Architecture of Power* (London: Penguin Books, 2011, [2005]).

¹⁹ Andreas Ruby, “pragmatopia,” in *The Metapolis Dictionary of Advanced Architecture. City, Technology and Society in the Information Age*, eds. Manuel Gausa, Vicente Guallart, Willy Muller et al. (Barcelona: ACTAR, 2003), 488.

²⁰ James Mayer, “The Functional Site; or, The Transformation of Site Specificity,” in *Space, Site, Intervention: Situating Installation Art*, ed. Erika Suderburg (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 24-25.

operations that orient it, situate it, temporalize it, and make it function in a polyvalent unity of conflictual programs or contractual proximities. [...] In short, space is a practiced place.”²¹ It is this “polyvalent unity of conflictual programs or contractual proximities” that is essential to our discussion. It is a synthetic formula for the way architecture negotiates its own insertion into reality, its own *realization*. It also describes the critical action through which a place transforms, performs and makes a space effective.

In contestation we see that architecture faces a triple shift:²² a *cultural* shift that would reclaim the knowledge of the historical city in the service of immediate action; an *imaginal* shift that would enable architecture to separate from the media codes of society and propose not only a new architectural language, but the emergence of a mobile practices to activate the city; and a *functional* shift encompassing spaces that are compatible with today’s social dynamics. What is the discursive and practical turn of architecture that would enable its morphological variations to lay down the program of a new field of architectural contingency? How can we develop active alternatives for the contemporary city beyond its historical narrative? How can architecture interfere with the territoriality of historical representations in order to reclaim an-historical meanings and dispositions that are adherent to the present? Willy Müller introduces the concept of “adherence” as an answer to this, referring to occupation tactics meant to de-territorialize the territoriality of historical representations and enact an essential mutation of meaning that would bring “into crisis the model that sustains it.”²³ Therefore, in order to surpass its representational limitations, architecture must perform the space of its constructions. It must not be the accomplice of its formal and historical functions or representations, but the accomplice of today’s practical conditions, producing meaningful interaction, the empathy of forms and the locality of architectural contingent fields. It should produce situations and conditions instead of plan; locality and geography instead of spatial territorialities; the performance of space as infiltration and engagement instead of its bare production. It is no longer the reality of a context architects should describe in their projects, but the divergent realities of specific conditions and situations reclaiming the locality of habitation. Architectural adherence must accommodate

²¹ Michel De Certeau, *L'invention du quotidien 1.arts de faire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1990 [1980]), 117-118.

²² This idea is presented at large in Sabin Borş, “Architectural Inheritances and An-Historical Adherences,” *Igloo magazine*, no. 130 (October 2012), 66-69.

²³ Willy Müller, “Adherence,” in *The Metapolis Dictionary of Advanced Architecture. City, Technology and Society in the Information Age*, eds. Manuel Gausa, Vicente Guallart, Willy Muller et al. (Barcelona: ACTAR, 2003), 33.

structural tactical actions and evolutionary systems of engagement into contemporary urban dynamics. It must engage the temporal potential of structures in the performance and restructuring of conditional possibilities. *The conflict of architecture is the conflict between habitation spaces and living spaces.*

III. Contestational architecture – shifting between the tactical and the strategic

The last few years have shown us through some notable examples the idea of contestational architecture and the possibility of answering its apparent paradox. One of them is Torre David in Caracas, Venezuela, which refers to how contestation as practice takes over a strategically planned building. The second, Open Air Library by KARO Architekten and Architektur-Netzwerk in Madgenburg, Germany refers to the way a tactical, contestational intervention becomes strategic through the empowerment and the further involvement of citizens.

Torre David is a 45-story skyscraper in Caracas that remained uncompleted since the 1994 collapse of the Venezuelan economy. While the government took control of the building after the banking crisis in 1994, this “accidental monument” has been left half-built, as no strategy or investment plan has been made that could raise enough capital to finish the building. With no elevators, electricity, running water or balcony railing, the building became the improvised home of more than 750 families who moved inside the building starting October 2007. This communal housing project, that some call a “vertical slum”, has since been the subject of political controversy, as the tower was originally part of an urban renewal plan to privatize and modernize Caracas’s business district. But inhabitants have managed to build a vibrant community inside an extra-legal squat, managing a series of operations into a micro-economy within the building. Occupants have adapted the building’s interior, creating enclosures to house rooms and working places that suit their own needs. They’ve wired the tower with electricity and have managed to install a plumbing system. In the absence of a formal infrastructure, residents have organized themselves and formed a cooperative to collect dues and manage the space.

Torre David is a clear evidence of the perils and failures of inadequate urban social programs, but it is also a proof of the collective’s will to transform this derelict building into a vertical community where people could build new lives for themselves and organize life according to their own needs. It is an example of how people adapt to conditions and have the power to transform spaces that were

formerly part of a political and economic strategy, into informal settlements of social experimentation. A contestational practice such as this could be a sign that architecture will be increasingly challenged to adapt to similar calls for action, with the goal of putting architecture and design in service to equitable social practices. Torre David's spontaneous organic occupation is, indeed, a model of "good practice" acknowledged by architects throughout the world. Yet its presence in media and at professional events is a proof of this project's ambiguous state of affairs. On the one hand, this project was made possible precisely by the fact that the building was left unfinished, undisputed, and unclaimed by local authorities or power-holders. On the other hand, it shows that informal structures can rise from the actions of various kinds of "subcultures" and be recognized in various sectors of society, including management and economics, as having a real capacity to operate from the ground up. On a larger scale, Torre Davis is a proof of the possibility to shift multiculturalist principles of governmental politics into the civic action; here, the globalization of market economy and the generation of poly-centralized capital turns into a globalization of the critical action, in support of micro-societies. The failure of civic society as determined by the power-holders brings into question the problem of commons. While the standard arguments for eliminating the idea of commons is to say that common or shared property is an inefficient way to manage resources, any claim that efficiency is a totalizing good is an example of the particular values of the powerful being represented and internalized as universal. People living inside Torre David are challenging the very syntax of "property lines" and community, generating an active form of sabotage and subversion of the power-holders' strategic planning based on property, real estate and capital. Waste urban entities such as Torre David reveal a social and collective reflex the unexisting aims of which could constitute an alternative politics and nomadic capital. The squatting activity is less important, in this case, than the idea that a peripheral collective mass could consolidate rightful social and urban marks.

In 2005, KARO Architekten initiated a project called City in Trial aimed at reinforcing the social networks in Magdenburg's Salbke District. Magdenburg, and this specific district in particular, have been hit hard by the process of deindustrialization during the 80s and 90s. Generally, in these situations of physical and social decadence of a neighborhood or city, there are two standard answers in the minds of power-holders: building a new architectural icon in the idea of regenerating the area through tourism (the now famous Bilbao effect); or abandoning it completely and ignoring investing in that area in particular. KARO

and their local partners Architektur Netzwerk challenged the standard ways of dealing with these types of neighborhoods. They organized a two weeks workshop with local associations and residents in which it was decided that what the neighborhood needed was a library, as a reminder of the old library which burned down in the late 80s. Instead of focusing on designing a new library, an icon for the neighborhood, as it happened in the UK, with such libraries as the Peckham Library by starchitect William Alsop, or the Canada Water Library, both representations of the care of local authorities for its people and glorifying the architectural object and their architects, KARO and Architektur-Netzwerk proposed an entirely new type of process, a direct contestation of the current practice. Instead of relying on power holders, it relied on individuals and their organizations. Instead of relying on the ingenuity of the architects and their instrumental logic, or the power of architectural icons, it relies on the creativity of individuals. At the end of the two week workshop, residents and architects alike built a real life model of what they decided together the building should look like, out of beer crates supplied by a local brewery. Alongside this 1:1 model, books were collected from the residents and thus an Open Air Library was both created and tested at the same time. So far, this looks as any other participatory project, and thus it might be considered marginal. However, after this participatory work, Architektur-Netzwerk with the local associations Farmersleben Salbke and Westerhusen eV, continued the work initiated then, by collecting books and opening a community library nearby the Open Library site. This community library was the debate place which attracted the attention of authorities and in which a proposal for a permanent library was created through the help of both the architects and the citizens. In 2009, a permanent Open Air Library was inaugurated, with the same form and function as the one created four years earlier. Its image now, in comparison with the beer crate intervention from which it started, has high design qualities, putting it alongside mainstream architectural objects. And here lies our interest in the context of our previously stated paradox.

The Open Air Library in Magdenburg is put alongside mainstream architecture worldwide. In 2010 it won the European Prize for Public Space, being a joint winner alongside the Oslo Opera House. A contestational architectural project was considered equal with a state driven, strategic, iconic, mainstream architectural object. Whereas in the case of the Opera House, the objectives, surface and budget of the project were determined by the State, who, in the end it represents, in the case of the Open Air Library power-holders, meaning the local authorities, which financed the endeavor, played only a marginal role with little

influence over the process. Querrien argues that when authorities try to create a permanent situation, meaning transforming a tactical intervention into a strategic intervention, this is done by imposing the rules of the State or of the power-holder upon the intervention. Thus the contestational character is replaced.²⁴ The Open Air library, however is currently managed and owned by the local residents associations, thus keeping a permanent reminder of the process which created it. This is why it represents an answer to our apparent paradox, because it is a tactical intervention which became strategic without losing its contestational character.

The two architectural spaces are not a synthesis to the consensus – conflict dialectic, or even more, to the liberal – democratic dialectic. What the two projects manage is to show the possibility of a shift between the strategic (an attribute of power-holders) and the tactic (an attribute of those dominated). However, both acknowledge conflict but neither of them engage in it, nor do they avoid it. What these two architectural spaces manage is to be conflictual and non-conflictual at the same time. Here lies their example: *creating an ambiguity between formal-informal, strategic-tactic, conflict-consensus*.

In the case of Torre David, the space is not occupied and refunctionalized informally as a conflict with the power holders who built it. The building was not chosen for any specific reason, such as representing the system which built it, representing specific power-holders, or as a fight against capitalism, liberal democracy or consensus. The building was chosen because it was available. The idea is that the informal and the tactical should not be opposed to the strategic, in permanent conflict, rather than the tactic builds upon the strategic, leaving subversion as implicit meaning of their actions. In a study of informal practices which create the city of Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Valerie Clerc shows that the *favelas, bidonvilles*, etc. are a reverse of urban politics, but are created by those politics in the first place. The strategic orients the configuration of the tactic and participates through their dispositif in their creation. The evolution of informal buildings and urban regions depend on the evolution of the legislative system and urban regulations, because on the one hand they limit further the access to residence in the context of continuous urban growth, and, on the other, informal neighborhoods develop in those places where the regulations are inadequate and incite to their avoidance, not where the regulations and laws are very strict.²⁵ Thus direct conflict is always avoided. This is Michel de Certeau's understanding of

²⁴ Anne Querrien, "The exodus lives on the street corner," in *Urban Act*, ed. AAA and PEPRAV (Montrouge: Moutot Imprimeurs, 2007), 307-313.

²⁵ Valerie Clerc, "Du formel à l'informel dans la fabrique de la ville. Politiques foncières et marches immobilières à Phnom Penh," *Espace et Sociétés*, 143 (2010), 63-79.

tactics and strategies. The tactics do not fight the strategic. Although opposed, tactics unconsciously subvert the strategic through the “thousand ways of poaching”, going pass them, without abandoning them or fighting them directly. The formal and informal, the strategic and the tactical are impossible to separate in the creation and the appearance of the tactic. The formal, the strategic is not the thing *against* which the informal or the tactical appears. Rather, the strategic is a preexistent condition for the appearance of the tactic with which it interacts. An opposition without conflict.

Strategic uses define less the transformation of living spaces, and more the transformation of the living conditions they circumscribe. As political subjects, both the architect and the inhabitant are engaged in space arrangements and tactical living practices that turn them into active agents of space formation, who contribute to the activation of living spaces directly. Tactical uses engage the collective organism in processes of association, correspondence, and engagement. Yet the difference between strategy and tactics lies in the conceptual shift in the relation between design and decision. Contrary to strategic uses, tactical uses set the priority of decisions over design or, rather, *design as decision*. The continuous extension of cities involves the need to reconsider the demographic conditions, the socio-cultural and economico-political constraints of society, and the current organization of space. Architects must build inside already built environments – this alone calls for flexible habitation practices, the adaptability of spatial concentrations and dilatations, and the rethinking of political, institutional, and community criteria that articulate the critical limits of the city. The regularities of urban systems are turning into processes of occupation and re-appropriation; organization makes room for tactical positioning, and thus makes fluid the classical notion of composition. Inhabitants can interfere with their surrounding life space in order to operate decisions of habitation; on the other hand, they become the agents of architectures and nomadic practices that challenge mechanisms of spatial and existential articulation, generating dispositions of habitation. The relation between decision and disposition is fundamental. Dispositions of habitation bring changes in contemporary paradigms by proposing elastic orders that define individual variations and pluralities. They are meant to distribute spatial positions and condition decision-based logics that follow a flexible and reinformed way of interpreting information about the immediate living space. Decision does not fulfill a regulative role here, nor is it reduced to correlating structures and information – it gains an operative role that goes from a

predictable and measurable vision of the world, to a differential vision that encompasses the complex variations in the general syntax of space.²⁶

Architecture is no longer a process of building or over-building the space. It becomes a practice of public utility. It must adapt to new habitation practices and in doing so, it needs to shift the accent from the critical architectural object to critical architectural action. We may consider the examples above as the possible emergence of an architecture of support and engagement into new urban politics, especially in the case of Torre David, where the inhabitant is the first agent, albeit unconscious, of eco-social transformation. The consequence of this idea is that *architecture might need to assume a geographical living condition*, where geography is not only an investigative research into reality – *it engages the production of research spaces* and transforms the environment into an active information agent. This also opens questions upon architecture itself as actant and engagement, challenging the regulative norms of efficiency, as it produces differences and transforms the living space continuously.

Tactical use is an adaptive practice. As urbanism replaces existing circulation systems with new and more “accessible” ones, that can be further normalized, this process has direct impact on architecture in that it can absorb the conditions of plurality and re-organize the regimes and spaces of collective memory by dismantling spatiality in favor of the production and assemblage of spaces, conventional or unconventional equally. It is this inner conflict too that threatens architecture and brings it closer to what Bill Millard once called a “passive uricide”, when buildings and infrastructure fall victims to gradual forces that are manifest in the very act of construction. While one can think of architectural techniques that could sabotage the orders, what is more interesting to imagine is the possibility of an architecture of opposition, an architecture which is not created through urban cartographies, but through a turning of formal, political, social, and technological considerations in order to unveil undistorted and affective intensities. It is what we could call a *diagenetic* architecture.²⁷ In its basic acceptance, diagenesis is the totality of chemical, mineralogical and structural transformations that sediments suffer when passing through the process of their consolidation and after they have lost connection to their formation environment. Could we, therefore, imagine an architecture that could lose its connection to the formation environment? Could we imagine an architecture that can break away

²⁶ See also Manuel Gausa’s discussion of the term *dispositions* in *The Metapolis Dictionary of Advanced Architecture*, 174.

²⁷ The idea of *diagenetic architecture* is also discussed in Sabin Borş, “Architecture – Between Tactics and Diversion,” *Arhitext magazine* no. 12 (December 2009), 72-79.

from its tactical alliance with the political and the economic, as pure diversion or social “manoeuvre” open to continuous deterritorialization and infiltration?

Lars Bang Larsen’s idea of a society without qualities addresses the issue of reducing the way we think society to the matrices of state and capital. The author defines this society without qualities as “one in which a systemic pressure on cultural and democratic institutions results in a whittling down of civil liberties.” While it is integrated into global networks of instrumentality through new information technologies, the society without qualities has the potential for becoming, as it is never manifest as such; it is a “precondition for a society to come.” Making reference to Negri’s *Empire*, Larsen brings into discussion the possible shift of modernization “towards the expropriation of the common and the dissolution of the concept of the public.”²⁸ With money being the one thing that connects us and that we cannot have in common, it would be all too easy to think that in order to alter this situation, one could disturb financial networks and profit flows; yet it would be interesting to conceive a politics and an architecture of undoing. Could architecture build without an image of the building to come? Could it build without actually controlling or ordering space? Could it contest its own image and its own context?

IV. Disequilibriums and mutations – challenging the context

After acknowledging that the informal and the formal are not in direct conflict, the architect can help the appearance of the tactical inside the structure that should represent the power-holder. The philosophy of conflict, based on a democratic tradition in politics, argues that power holders try to control and order their space. A strategy, in de Certeau’s terms is: “the calculus of force-relationships which becomes possible when a subject of will and power (a proprietor, an enterprise, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated from an «environment.» A strategy assumes a place that can be circumscribed as proper (*propre*) and thus serve as the basis for generating relations with an exterior distinct from it (competitors, adversaries, «clienteles,» «targets,» or «objects» of research).”²⁹ The places of strategies have all their positions clearly determined. For each individual, group, action, function there is a specific place. Or, as Ranciere argued, the space of the power-holders is the police, where there is no

²⁸ Lars Bang Larsen, *The Society Without Qualities*, [online] on <http://www.e-flux.com/journal/the-society-without-qualities-2/> [accessed 3.11.2013].

²⁹ Michel De Certeau, *L’invention du quotidien* vol 1. *Arts de faire* (Paris: Gallimard, (1990) [1980]), XLVI.

place for any void, for anything that “is not”.³⁰ The result of strategic thinking is therefore the over-determination of urban and architectural spaces.

Richard Sennett (2007) argues that the result of over-determination is the creation of the Brittle City, a closed system based on equilibrium and integration. Equilibrium means not favoring one objective in spite of others, but also that the extent of strategic thinking extends over all the territory. Integration meaning that every part of the system has a place in an overall design: “Things that do not fit are diminished in value (...) context (...) polite but potent word in repressing anything that does not fit in, ensuring that nothing sticks out, offends or challenges.”³¹ The Brittle City is the Police version of the city, but also a tool for ensuring consensus. What can be challenging or controversial in spatial occupation or use is eliminated, so that consensus is ensured. What is achieved is coherence of the urban realm and the visual readability of the city, ensuring that “20th century bureaucrat’s horror of disorder” is not affected and a complete visual control of the territory is achieved. This comes however, at the cost of “mixed social and economic use (...) all leading to social exclusion in the name of visual order and pleasure.”³² The response to the over-determined Brittle City is The Open City: “the unexpected encounter, the chance discovery, the innovation in diverse spaces, dense, both public and private, spaces that do not fit together”, whose planner must “champion dissonance.”³³ The Open City admits conflict and dissonance and works with both. As the architectural studio aaa (atelier d’architecture autogeree) states in the description of their actions, when producing spaces, and public spaces in particular, one starts with identifying all the claims for it, starting from the very small to those of power-holders, transforming them into the project brief and less of a threat and more of an opportunity for a rich and meaningful project for all.³⁴ How is the Open City created? Through abandoning the idea of a goal, a terminus point for the interventions upon it. The Open City cannot rise from a general master plan. The master plan is the tool for the creation of the Brittle City because it has a very clear goal ahead, what is subject to change is the means to achieve

³⁰ Jacques Ranciere, *Dissensus. On Politics and Aesthetics* (London, New York: Continuum, 2010), 36.

³¹ Richard Sennett, “The Open City,” in *The Endless City*, eds. Ricky Burdett and Deyan Sudjic (London: Phaidon, 2007), 291.

³² Richard Sennett, “Boundaries and Borders,” in *Living in the Endless City*, eds. Ricky Burdett and Deyan Sudjic (London: Phaidon, 2011), 329.

³³ Sennett, “The Open City,” 292.

³⁴ Doina Petrescu, *How to make a community as well as the space for it* (2007) [online] on PEPRAV - Plate-forme Européenne de Pratiques et Recherches Alternatives de la Ville (<http://www.peprav.net/tool/spip.php?article31>, 2007) [accessed 24.11.2011].

that goal. This is not to say that, in contrast, actions for creating the Open City are done without an end in sight, rather that it focuses on multiple ends, updated after each action: “Rather than a lock-step march towards achieving a single end, we look at different and conflicting possibilities of each stage. Keeping these possibilities intact and leaving conflict in play opens up the design system.”³⁵ Conflict is not the main issue of contestational architecture. Conflict is important only as long as it produces an evolution of the project, challenging the idea of equilibrium brought by the Brittle City. The Open City, the city of constant disequilibrium, uses conflict as a tool for challenging the permanency of situations.

In an article provocatively titled «*Give me a gun and I will make all buildings move*» *An ant’s view of architecture*, Bruno Latour and Alben Yaneva claim that the beauty and attraction to perspective, a cultural legacy that goes back to the Renaissance and is maintained in our ways of drawing and projecting, determines a way of thinking that separates architecture from the environment in which a building is being built, as well as from the actual living of that space. According to Latour and Yaneva, a building is a “disputed territory” that must reflect the movements taking place inside it, its dislocations and mutations, the accidents and transformations a space is subjected to. Centuries after the discovery of perspective and the invention of projective geometry, there is still no convincing way of drawing the controversial space a building encompasses. For the authors, a building should be imagined as a navigation through a controversial landscape of information, a series of animated projects the trajectories of which describe unstable definitions, valuations, and crossings. “Recalcitrant materials” and construction technologies generate a moving modulator that regulates the various intensities of engagement, concentrate the fluxes of actors and distribute them “so as to compose a productive force in space-time.”³⁶ Here, architecture is mutation. It assumes a tectonic condition, following the space-time faults involved by moving into space. This is also a way to do away with the idea of “context” in its static and circumstantial understanding, replacing it with a dynamic view that unveils irregular movements, as well as physical reactions and manifestations. It is a position closely linked to the ideas expressed by Michelle Addington in her essay “*Architecture of Contingency*” (2010): architecture favors bi-dimensional surfaces, as a result of the *a priori* belief that perception originates and is determined by geometry. Addington argues that perception is given by the local and accidental

³⁵ Sennet, “The Open City,” 296.

³⁶ Bruno Latour and Alben Yaneva, “«Give me a gun and I will make all buildings move» An ant’s view of architecture,” in *Explorations in Architecture: Teaching, Design, Research*, ed. Reto Geiser (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2008), 80-89.

exchange between body and environment, for which the built surface is the function of circumstances and constructed contexts. Here, architecture is contingency; it is relation and happening, touch and exteriority, opposition and performance.³⁷ This idea of exteriority has, we would argue, less to do with *orientation* and space determination, a phenomenological view that remains partly rooted in the determinism of perspective, and more with *radiation*. Architecture is radiation. The body is the constituent of space, and architecture appears only through “tangible action”. Context itself becomes radiation: it does not define the individual’s relation to fields of perspective, but it is formed through architecture’s formal objectivity in relation to the body as the articulating node of form. From construction, architecture becomes *emergence*.

Architecture should not create spaces that could be circumscribed to current semiotic paradigms. It must imagine geographies shaped as anticipations of participatory dynamics arising within collectives.³⁸ In doing so, architecture not only avoids the dialectical relation between the production of new spaces and the new forms of liberty and democracy,³⁹ but transforms the “urban landscape” into a spontaneous experience and interpretation, as a direct result of physical participation to the geography of a space. Habitation is slowly replaced by situation, describing continuous movements, rhythms, and displacements. What the idea of urban geography brings is the flexibilization of the inhabitants’ positioning in relation to the spaces of a city, in order to generate new relations, permissions and accesses. In doing so, inhabitants influence the systems from the outside, in a wilding gesture of “emancipation” from what Sanford Kwinter calls the “behaviorally engineered urban spaces”: “Wildness emerges in a system once we lose the ability to predict from the outside what it will do. [...] Wilding became a new and terrifying word for urban drift; for ad hocism; for the collective, unstable phenomena of pack, mass and crowd; for the spontaneous emergence of epidemia and «stim»; perhaps most significantly, for the unruly and uncontrolled

³⁷ Michelle Addington, “Architecture of Contingency,” in *Hylozoic Ground. Liminal Responsive Architecture: Philip Beesley*, eds. Perilla Ohrstedt, and Hayley Isaacs (Cambridge, ON: Riverside Architectural Press, 2010), 66-75.

³⁸ The following ideas are discussed at length in Sabin Borş, “Anticipative geographies and experimental archaeologies,” in *The Would-Be City: In(ter)ventions in the post-communist urban space*, eds. Ina Stoian and Daniela Calciu (Cluj-Napoca: Tact, 2012), 264-271.

³⁹ Trevor Paglen, “Experimental Geography. From Cultural Production to the Production of Space,” in *Experimental Geography. Radical Approaches to Landscape, Cartography and Urbanism*, ed. Nato Thompson (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2008), 30-33.

emancipation of self-organizing social forces from the rigid geometries of socially and behaviorally engineered urban spaces.”⁴⁰

The twinning of a geographical condition of architecture and these wilding self-organizing social forces gives birth to nettings of indiscipline. But it also contributes to consolidating vicinities as the common living spaces and locality of participation. In *The Production of Locality*, Arjun Appadurai (1996) states that:

To make the link between *locality* as property of social life and neighborhoods as social forms requires a more careful exposition of the context issue. The production of neighborhoods is always historically grounded and thus contextual. That is, neighborhoods are inherently what they are because they are opposed to something else and derive from other, already produced neighborhoods. [...] Frequently, these contexts, against which neighborhoods are produced and figured, are at once seen as ecological, social, and cosmological terrains. [...] The many displaced, deterritorialized and transient populations that constitute today’s ethnoscape are engaged in the construction of locality, as emotional structure, often against erosion, dispersal and implosion of neighborhoods as coherent social forms.⁴¹

It is crucial that architecture reconstructs the context in which the disjunctions between territory, subjectiveness and social movement were operated, on the one hand, and the constant degradation of the relation between spatial and virtual vicinities, on the other hand. It must build by assuming the conjectural paradox where life situations arise, in order to reorient the critical discourse and to propose forms of participatory property, the locality of which can oppose the teleologies of society and the determinisms by which it has been built. The inhabitant is an agent whose ability to challenge the syntaxes of spaces that organize and order the multiple everyday economies determines new flows, rifting power lines and institutional access. This challenge is the political act opening the space to the social re-articulation of living spaces.

Bibliography:

1. Addington, M. “Architecture of Contingency.” In *Hylozoic Ground. Liminal Responsive Architecture: Philip Beesley* (pp. 66-75), edited by Ohrstedt, P. and Isaacs, H. Cambridge, ON: Riverside Architectural Press, 2010.

⁴⁰ Sanford Kwinter, *Far from Equilibrium, Essays on Technology and Design Culture* (New York, Barcelona: ACTAR, 2008).

⁴¹ Arjun Appadurai, “The Production of Locality,” in *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Arjun Appadurai (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 182-198.

2. Appadurai, A. "The Production of Locality." In *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Appadurai, A. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
3. De Certeau, M. *L'invention du quotidien 1.arts de faire*. Paris: Gallimard, (1990) [1980].
4. Chasin, N. "Architecture from the Fabric of Life Itself. Team 10 and the pre-history of participatory urbanism." *Arhitektov bilten/Architect's bulletin* 188/189 (2011): 67– 69.
5. Clerc, V. "Du formel à l'informel dans la fabrique de la ville. Politiques foncières et marchés immobiliers à Phnom Penh." *Espace et Sociétés* 143, (2010): 63-79.
6. Cohen, J. L. "Scholarship or Politics? Architectural History and the Risk of Autonomy." *Journal of the Society of American Historians* 67, (3) (2008): 325-329.
7. Day, C. *Consensus Design. Socially inclusive process*. Oxford, Amsterdam, Boston, London, New York, Paris, San Diego, San Francisco, Singapore, Sydney, Tokyo: Architectural Press, 2003.
8. Franks, B. "New Right/New Left. An Alternative Experiment in Freedom." In *Non – Plan. Essays on Freedom, Participation and Change in Modern Architecture and Urbanism*, edited by J. Hughes, S. Sadler, 32-43. Oxford: Architectural Press, 2000.
9. Garnier, J-P. "Scénographies pour un simulacre: l'espace public reenchanté." *Espace et Societes* 134 (2008): 67-81.
10. Heurтин, J. P. "The Circle of Discussion and the Semicircle of Criticism." In *Making things Public. Atmospheres of democracy*, edited by B. Latour, and P. Weibel, 754-769. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.
11. Hoskyns, T. "Designing the Agon. Questions on Architecture, Space, Democracy and «The Political»." In *Making things Public. Atmospheres of democracy*, edited by B. Latour, and P. Weibel, 798-803. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.
12. Latour, B., and Yaneva, A. "«Give me a gun and I will make all buildings move» An ant's view of architecture". In *Explorations in Architecture: Teaching, Design, Research*, edited by R. Geiser, 80-89. Basel: Birkhäuser, 2008.
13. Le Corbusier. *Towards a New Architecture*. New York: Dover Publications, (1986) [1923].
14. Leach, N. *Anestetica. Arhitectura ca anestezic*. Bucharest: Paidea, 1999.

15. Till, J. "The Negotiation of Hope." In *Architecture and participation*, edited by P. Blundell Jones, D. Petrescu, J. Till. Oxon: Taylor and Francis, 2005.
16. Larsen, L. B. *The Society Without Qualities*. 2013. [online] on <http://www.e-flux.com/journal/the-society-without-qualities-2/> [accessed 3.11.2013].
17. Latour, B. *Reassembling the social. An introduction to actor-network-theory*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
18. Mayer, J. "The Functional Site; or, The Transformation of Site Specificity." In *Space, Site, Intervention: Situating Installation Art*, edited by E. Suderburg, 24-25. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
19. Mihali, C. *Despre architect, despre chemarile si datoriile lui*. 2011. [online] on <http://ciprianmihali.blogspot.ro/2011/05/despre-arhitect-despre-chemarile-si.html> [accessed 6.06.2011].
20. Mouffe, C. "Some Reflections on an Agonistic Approach to the Public." In *Making things Public. Atmospheres of democracy*, edited by Bruno Latour, and Peter Weibel, 804-807. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005.
21. Mouffe, C. *The Democratic Paradox*. London, New York: Verso, 2000.
22. Müller, W. "Adherence." In *The Metapolis Dictionary of Advanced Architecture. City, Technology and Society in the Information Age*, edited by Gausa, M., Guallart, V., Muller, W., et al. Barcelona: ACTAR, 2003.
23. Negri, A., Petcou, C., Petrescu, D., Querrien, A. *What makes a biopolitical space?*, [online] in Eurozine, 2007. www.eurozine.com/articles/2008-01-21-negri-en.html [accessed 24.11.2011].
24. Paglen, T. "Experimental Geography. From Cultural Production to the Production of Space." In *Experimental Geography. Radical Approaches to Landscape, Cartography and Urbanism*, edited by N. Thompson, 30-33. Brooklyn: Melville House, 2008.
25. Petrescu, D. *How to make a community as well as the space for it*. 2007. [online] on <http://www.peprav.net/tool/spip.php?article31> [accessed 24.11.2011].
26. Ranciere, J. *Dissensus. On Politics and Aesthetics*. London, New York: Continuum, 2010.
27. Richardson, T., & Connely, S. "Reinventing public participation: Planning in the Age of Consensus." In *Architecture and participation*, edited by P. Blundell Jones, D. Petrescu, J. Till, 77-104. Oxon: Taylor and Francis, 2010.
28. Ruby, A. "pragmatopia." In *The Metapolis Dictionary of Advanced Architecture. City, Technology and Society in the Information Age*, edited by M. Gausa, V. Guallart, W. Muller, et al. Barcelona: ACTAR, 2003.

29. Secci, C. "Réceptions et appropriations des sciences humaines par les architectes. Les cas des CIAM et du Team Ten (1928-1962)." *Espace et Sociétés* 142, (2010): 17-31.
30. Sennet, R. "The Open City." In *The Endless City*, edited by R. Burdett, and D. Sudjic, 290-297. London: Phaidon, 2007.
31. Sennet, R. "Boundaries and Borders." In *Living in the Endless City*, edited by R. Burdett, and D. Sudjic, 324-331. London: Phaidon, 2011.
32. Sudjic, D. *The Edifice Complex. The Architecture of Power*. London: Penguin Books, 2011 [2005].
33. Querrien, A. "The exodus lives on the street corner." In *Urban Act*, edited by AAA and PEPRAV, 307-313. Montrouge: Moutot Imprimeurs, 2007.

The Role and Place of the “Secular Element” in the Process of Preserving the Ecclesiastic and Religious Life of Orthodox Believers in the Post-brest Period

Mykola SHKRIBLIAK, *Ph.D. cadidate,*
assistant professor
Chernivtsi National University, Ukraine
@yahoo.it

Abstract

The article analyzes the role and place of the “secular element” in the process of preserving ecclesiastic and religious life of Orthodox believers in the post-Brest period and provides a historical and theological analysis of the phenomenon of church brotherhoods as beyond the hierarchical structures of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

The author pays a considerable attention to the effect of church brotherhoods as beyond the hierarchical structures on the ecclesiastic and religious life of Orthodox believers in the post-Brest period, visualizes forms and methods of their struggle for the restoration of Orthodox hierarchy and the legalization of its activity in the XVIIth century. The author provides conceptual objectivation of ideological, religious, social and political transformational processes that greatly affected the further destiny of Kyiv Orthodox Metropolitanate in XVII century.

Keywords: *Secular Element, Church Brotherhoods, Sodality, Beyond Hierarchical Structures, Kyiv Metropolitanate, Orthodox Hierarchy.*

The inner life of the Kyiv Metropolitanate both in pre- and post-Brest periods is characterized by a serious crisis of ecclesiastic and hierarchical order. After the Union of Brest (1596), all the bishops of the Metropolitanate found themselves under the jurisdiction of a “new” – “Uniate Church” and only two eparchies – the eparchies of Przemyśl and Lviv – headed by the bishops Hedeon Balaban and Mykhailo Kopystensky who were anti-Uniates, remained Orthodox nearly a century, however were unable to function properly. That is to say that in 1596 these bishops, actively supported by Prince Konstanty Ostrojski called anti-Uniate council in Brest that had no results except a disclosure of its members. Therefore, the hierarchs of Kyiv Metropolitanate instead of helping the Russian Orthodox Church to overcome the crisis, they only aggravated it. During these

quite complex confessional and political transformations in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Ukrainian Orthodox laity was uniting into church brotherhoods that became major centres of social and religious life. Now their main task is a struggle for preserving the centres of Orthodoxy (first post-Uniate generation), the restoration of hierarchy (20s of XVII century) and the legalization of its activity (30's of XVII century).

The topicality is determined first of all by the fact that most scholars consider the activity of church brotherhoods in the context of a struggle between the representatives of the official ecclesiastic power (usually local bishops and even a metropolitan), usually emphasizing on the influence of the fraternal movement on the inner life and order of the Kyiv Metropolitanate, and also on its determinant role in enlightenment, education, book printing and also in the process of preserving the national and religious consciousness. However, a lot of historians think that perhaps the greatest merit of the brotherhoods is a struggle against the Union on its territory. This thesis is a cross cutting theme in the Soviet historiography, where, in our opinion, the struggle for the spheres of influence, the minimization of the brotherhoods' role and the spiritual power of bishop or metropolitan inside the church became the key factors of the Union of Brest in 1596. This approach caused the disfigurement of the idea about a peculiarity of church brotherhoods' functioning and their role in the social and religious life of Orthodox believers in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Despite a great number of specialty literature concerning this problem, the efficient aspect of church brotherhoods in the context of social and religious transformations at the beginning of XVII century so far was not objectively and deliberately evaluated.

Thus, the actualization of the issue of brotherhoods' movement and the role of "secular element" in the preservation of centres of church and religious life of Orthodox Christians in post-Brest period is objectively determined, that gives ground to deem actual the topic of the research. Moreover, the statements and conclusions formulated in the article shed some light on separate fragments of both ecclesiastic and secular history of Ukraine.

The aim of our research lies in an attempt to reveal and objectively interpret the role of brotherhoods' movement in the social and religious life of Orthodox Christians under the conditions of absence of state government and foreign religious and political influence by reference of thorough analysis of historical realities (available through reference base) and of historiographic materials.

The realization of the aim and logic of research determines to find the solution to the following tasks:

The Role and Place of the “Secular Element” in the Process of Preserving the Ecclesiastic and Religious Life of Orthodox Believers in the Post-brest Period

- illustrate the social and historical background of church brotherhoods’ creation;

- analyze the specific of functioning of church brotherhoods and the forms of their cooperation with hierarchical structures of Ukrainian Orthodox Church;

- clarify the role and place of church brotherhoods in legal actions aiming to legalize the church and religious life in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The objects of our research are the forms of church brotherhoods’ influence as beyond hierarchical structures on ecclesiastic and religious life of Orthodox Christians of first post-union generation and the methods of their struggle for the restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy and the legalization of its activity in the XVIIth century. The object of the research also includes ideological, religious, social and political transformations that determined the further destiny of Kyiv Orthodox Metropolitanate in XVII century.

The subject of the research is presented by the theological and historiosophic discourse of church brotherhoods’ role in the process of preservation of centres of ecclesiastic and religious life of the Orthodox Christians under the conditions of foreign spiritual, religious and political influence.

The complexity of approaches used to outline a complicated specter of questions that point out social and historical determinants of church brotherhoods’ creation, demonstrating the specific of functioning and allowing to interpret their role in social and religious role of Orthodox Christians in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the beginning of XVIIth century, incited the author to use more general scientific methods of historical and theological research, namely the actualization, as well as the chronological, simultaneous, analytical and hermeneutic research.

Traditional principles of modern theological knowledge such as the principle of historicism, objectivity, external confessionalism and poly-methodism became *methodological bases* for the research.

By analyzing the *historiography* of the above mentioned issues, we may conclude that ecclesiastic historians, theologians and scientists who were researching the internal life of Ukrainian Orthodox Church at the beginning of XVIIth century and the laity’s attempts to take it out of the deep crisis outlined a circle of the most important questions connected with the brotherhood’s movement. The historiography dedicated to church brotherhoods is in fact rich, although their appearance and functioning at the early stages suffers from the lack of reference sources. The issue which public associations that existed attached to

Orthodox churches (parishes, bishoprics) – whether the latter can be labeled as brotherhoods¹ – remains a controversial reality.

A. Papkov states that brotherhoods genealogically originate from ancient Russian “bratchyn” that according to his interpretation are Orthodox unions (societies) of secularism.² The famous scientist, ecclesiastic and religious figure I. Ohienko shares the same opinion. Relying on the ancient historic sources, he proves that “ the beginning of our church brotherhoods is hidden in the hoary antiquity – in Ipatiev’s chronicles the “bratchyny” churches are already mentioned connected with 1134 and 1159 years, for example, in Polotsk they are mentioned as old-established ones”.³ The contemporary Russian researcher M. Dmitirev is convinced that in the context of the interpretation of this problem, the assiduously founded conclusion of the academician Y. Isaevich⁴ is substantially important. The main idea which it comprises is that brotherhoods, according to the terminology of historical sources, can be called only those organizations that spread in Western Ukraine since 80s-90s of the XVIth century.⁵ On the contrary, the authors of “History of Orthodox Church in Ukraine” avoid the topic of territory of brotherhoods’ origination. However, it is claimed that they “appeared in the last third of the XVIth century”.⁶ At the same time, if we are to take into account Y. Isevich’s determinations, unlike chronological measures, only the geographical ones coincide. Thus, the first organization that, according to Y. Isaevich must be called “brotherhood”, if we take into account only the first criteria, is the Lviv Svyato-Uspensk brotherhood. Nevertheless, it originated much earlier, namely in 1439, and not at the end of the XVIth century.⁷ Needless to mention that this very brotherhood served as an example for the creation of analogical centres of

¹ Михаил Дмитриев, *Между Римом и Царьградом: Генезис Брестской церковной унии 1595 –1596 гг.* (Between the Rome and Tsargrad: Genesis of the Brest Church Uniat in the period of 1595 –1596) (Москва, 2003), 83-84.

² Папков, Александр, *Древнерусский приход. Краткий очерк церковно-приходской жизни в Восточной России до XVIII и в Западной России до XVII в.* (Ancient Russian church. The short essay of the church-ecclesiastical life in the East Russia until the period of XVIII c. and West Russia until the period of XVII c.) (Сергиев Посад, 1897), 394-395.

³ Огієнко, Іван, *Українська Церква* (The Ukrainian Church) (Упоряд., авт. передмови М. С. Тимошик. – Київ, 2007), 197.

⁴ Details look: Дмитриев, Михаил, *Work of reference*, 93.

⁵ Исаевич, Ярослав, *Братства та їх роль в розвитку української культури XVI – XVIII ст.* (The Brotherhoods and their role in the development of Ukrainian Culture in the XVI – XVIII c.), (Київ, 1996), 39.

⁶ *Історія православної Церкви в Україні* (The History of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine: Compilation of the works), (Київ, 1997), 93.

⁷ Кущинський Антін, *Коротка історія Української православної церкви* (The short history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church) (Чикаго, 1971), 35.

The Role and Place of the “Secular Element” in the Process of Preserving the Ecclesiastic and Religious Life of Orthodox Believers in the Post-brest Period

religious, educational, spiritual and cultural life in Vilnius (Svyato-Duhiv), in Lutsk (Chesno-Hresensk), in Kyiv (Bohoyavlensk). Alongside with these well-organized church unions of laity, ten less famous church brotherhoods operated in many cities and villages of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

In contemporary science the time of brotherhoods' appearance is still widely discussed. We consider that the starting point is the last quarter of XVI century when the activity of brotherhoods was legalized by the highest church and state power.⁸ At that very time, as B. Gudzyak fairly points out “the crucial moment in the process of transformation of non-formal unions of Russian laity into formally organized brotherhoods” came.⁹ Here we can see a division of history of church brotherhoods into two periods: before and after legalization. The result of the latter was actually the usurpation of the ecclesiastic power in the Church by the secular “element” that was inevitably leading to the deterioration of the crisis, the best solution to this had to be the alteration of the church jurisdiction. In this context, the activity of church brotherhoods and laity in the religious sphere is the characteristic feature which became an active intervention into the inner life of the Church, and we consider that a crisis in the traditional system of secular protectorship in the Kyiv Metropolitanate incited the episcopacy to initiate the search at the end of the XVIth century.

Considering the fact that the article is dedicated to the situation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and to the functioning of beyond-hierarchical structures in post-Brest period, the author didn't stop to interpret events and phenomena that had place in their life till the Union of Brest in 1596. At the same time we want to mention that all the Orthodox brotherhoods on the Ukrainian and Belarusian territory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the XVIIth century had a specific meaning for the Kyiv Metropolitanate. Their ideology and practice of massive civil movement for strengthening the church discipline and for preserving the religious purity were approved by Eastern patriarchs: Joachim of Antioch (1586) and Jeremias of Constantinople (1588 – 1589). Brotherhoods were considered as an instrument for the Orthodox Church reform, and for this reason, the patriarchs, by means of their blessings, provided

⁸ Ісаєвич, Ярослав, *Братства та їх роль в розвитку української культури XVI – XVIII ст.* (Brotherhood and their role in the development of Ukrainian culture) (Київ, 1996), 40.

⁹ Гудзяк, Борис, *Криза і реформа: Київська митрополія, Царгородський патріархат і генеза Берестейської унії* (*Crisis and reforms: Kyiv Metropolitanate, Tsargorod patriarchate and genesis of Brest Uniat*) (Пер. з англ., 2000), 426.

them with a status of *europiegias* that granted autonomy in their activity and served as a reliable immune from influence of the local hierarchy.¹⁰

The new course and the moral support of patriarchs stimulated the reform of brotherhoods' movement, the expansion of the socially significant activity. Apart from the inner ecclesiastic regulation, brotherhoods also were developing schools, printing, charity, were supporting clinics etc. In this activity, they were usually supported by church hierarchs.¹¹ The strong partnership of brotherhoods' members with nobility imposed the brotherhoods' influence on *sejm*'s struggle for the rights of the Orthodox Christians in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Church brotherhoods delegated their representatives at provincial *sejmiks*, took part in conclusions of instructions at central *sejms*.¹² In addition to general statutes about the provision of freedom of conscience for Orthodox Christians, it also contained demands to preserve the right of brotherhoods itself, especially their *stavropegias*. Sometimes it had some effect on the decisions of *sejms*. Brotherhoods took an active part in the preparation of *sejms* at the beginning of XVII century. Lviv members were present at the Warsaw *sejm* in 1600, where they tried to influence officials, though without succeeding in it.¹³ The delegates of brotherhoods, together with the nobility, took part in a well-known Sandomyr synod (1606) where the demands for "soothing of Greek religion" were formulated. And one of the points of the synod's constitution of 1607 about "the Greek religion" concerned brotherhoods directly. "Church brotherhoods of Greek religion can still preserve their rights and privileges" – was mentioned in the document.¹⁴

The clergy also realized the role of brotherhoods as a peculiar form of religious oppression that possessed a broad social basis. It was clearly felt in the first decade of the XVIIth century, where the Orthodox hierarchy didn't exist first of all in some newly formed brotherhoods. In "older" brotherhoods (Lviv, Vilnius, Lublin, Przemyśl), the attitudes of secular part were highly intense: the ideology of control over clergymen dominated there. For the most part such policy caused

¹⁰ *Історія православної Церкви в Україні* (History of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine), 95.

¹¹ *Книга протоколів братства при церкві Воздвиження Хреста Господнього в Дрогобичі за 1678 – 1828 pp.* (The Book of the Brotherhoods' Protocols in the church of God Christ Vozdizhennya in Drohobych in 1678 – 1828) // ЦДДА України у м. Львові. – Ф. 129. – Оп. 3. – С. 65. – sh 1-2.

¹² *Історія православної Церкви в Україні* (History of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine), 97.

¹³ The same source, 96.

¹⁴ Details look: Грушевський, Михайло, *Історія України–Руси. – Т. 5. Суспільно-політичний устрій і церковний устрій і відносини в українсько-руських землях 14 –17 віків* (History of Ukraine and Rus – Vol. 5. Social-political modes and ecclesiastical mode and relations in Ukrainian and Russian territories in 14 – 17 c.) (Львів, 1905), 157.

The Role and Place of the “Secular Element” in the Process of Preserving the Ecclesiastic and Religious Life of Orthodox Believers in the Post-brest Period

negative results. At the same time, as exemplified by brotherhoods formed at the beginning of the XVIIth century, we can see some signs of the priority consolidation of the clergy. Thus, there could be clearly traced a “pro-church” tendency alongside with some attempts to free brotherhoods from their unnecessary – according to spiritual archbishops’ view – immunity and “laicity”. It was already mentioned the piety before clergy that was demonstrated while forming a list of Lutsk brotherhood, according to the Statute, later confirmed by the patriarchs Theophanes of Jerusalem (1620) and Kyrylo of Constantinople (1621-1623) – the older is the presbyter of a church of Feast of the Cross. This particular church (not a brotherhood), according to scientists, preserved a stavropepic status.¹⁵ The priesthood (mainly the Kyiv-Pechersk clergymen) also tried to maintain an initiative while forming the Kyiv brotherhood in 1615-1616 and concluding its “Upys”, although funds for its formation were taken from a foundation that a laic person – the landlady Halsha (Elizabeth) Hulevychivna – left for the construction of an Orthodox monastery, a school and a hospital.¹⁶

The Kyiv brotherhood was formed under the conditions according to which the cultural and political centre of Ukrainian lands was moving to Kyiv. Under the protectorate of the Kyiv clergy, nobility, local magistracy, the Cossack layer had at its disposal considerable cultural forces, that Kyiv possessed in 1615-1620 (first of all, the migration of intelligentsia from Halychyna to Kyiv that started in a time of Eliseus Pletenetsky, Kyiv-Pechersk archimandrite in 1599-1624). The brotherhood school, formed on the model of a Lviv one, became a centre of church education, and brotherhood’s consolidation of religious and political opposition began to create a real threat for adherents of pro-Uniate policy. The Uniate Kyiv metropolitan Joseph Veliamyn Rutsky thought that the main obstacle for introduction of the Union in Kyiv is the presence of “new brotherhood, established by schismatics three years ago without the king’s privilege...It’s difficult to think about something good until this brotherhood exists and it can be quashed either by voyevoda’s authority or by a claim to royal king’s court”.¹⁷

The aspiration of different layers of Orthodox community for joining the brotherhoods’ movement as the only recognized centre of traditional

¹⁵ *Історія православної Церкви в Україні* (History of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine), 97.

¹⁶ Грушевський, Михайло, *Історія України–Руси* (History of Ukraine and Rus History of Ukraine and Rus), Vol. 5, 160.

¹⁷ *Боротьба Південно-Західної Русі проти експансії Ватикану та унії (X – XVII ст.): Збірник документів і матеріалів* (The Opposition of the South-West Russia and expansion of Vatican and its Uniat in X – XVII c. Compilation of documents and materials) (Упоряд. Є. А. Гринів та ін., Київ, 1988), 210.

ecclesiasticism during the period of absence of high ecclesiastic hierarchy received an impulse in 1616. It happened due to the fact that Zaporozhian Cossacks, under the command of Petro Konashevych-Sahaidachny, joined the Kyiv brotherhood as a collective member. Since then, Cossacks were constantly asserting the rights of Kyiv brotherhood and its schools in the petition to sejms.

However, the significance of the brotherhoods' movement as a driving force of preservation and restoration of Orthodox Church organization in post-Brest period reached a culmination point in 1620. That year, the Kyiv brotherhood became the major partner of Cossacks headed by hetman P. Sahaidachny. In the restoration of Orthodox hierarchy, the hetman acted as the voice of brotherhood being its member and protector. The patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem in 1620 honoured deserts of brotherhood with 3 charters for the active part in the construction of churches and preservation centres of Orthodox ecclesiastic and religious life: the first charter provided legitimization for the establishment of brotherhood and blessed the foundation of "younger" union of laity, others two provided stavropegeic status and outlined the main instructions for future activities. The patriarch Theophanes also paid attention to church brotherhoods in other cities and villages. He confirmed ancient rights and provided churches and brotherhoods of Lutsk, Vilnius, Slutsk and Lviv with stavropegias.¹⁸

The historians fairly claim the beginning of 20s in the XVIIth century to be "the time of the biggest revival of brotherhoods' movement in ecclesiastic and social life." Church brotherhoods, at that time, had a sizable reputation among Orthodox Christians of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for the following deserts: the preservation of centres of the Orthodoxy and church traditions in the post-Brest period; the social struggle for rights of Orthodox congregation; the restoration of Orthodox hierarchy. They also possessed a convincing social basis: by all means they were supported by the nobility. Moreover, the newly departed hierarchs mostly came for brotherhoods' movement. Yet, the main factor that produced a positive impression on the consolidation of secular church movement became a Cossacks' collective membership in Kyiv brotherhood. By this reason V. Lipinskii had written: "the Orthodox Church restored in XVII c, not by the means of polemic with Catholics, but by the restoration of th Orthodox ascetic monastery and moral, warring for their faith Orthodox brotherhoods".¹⁹

¹⁸ Ісаєвич, Ярослав, Work paper, 52.

¹⁹ Липинський, Вячеслав, Листи до братів-хліборобів (Letters to the farmer brothers) (Київ-Філадельфія, 1945), 125.

The Role and Place of the “Secular Element” in the Process of Preserving the Ecclesiastic and Religious Life of Orthodox Believers in the Post-brest Period

In the mean time, the years ‘20 of the XVIIth century are characterized by the peak of aggravation of antagonisms in the Orthodox Church with brotherhoods being their initiators and carriers. In the last quarter of the XVIth century, the brotherhoods’ opposition against episcopacy pushed hierarchs to a closer union with secular authorities and Roman Catholic Church. The hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Metropolitanate) were looking for salvation from this “secular element” in the Union. This element was interpreted by the Soviet historians as “the rule of the people” (although very often the “rule” was going far beyond the scope of canonic ecclesiastic dictates). Even those who remained under the jurisdiction of the Constantinople patriarchy had conflicts with brotherhoods; for instance, the bishop of Lviv, Gedeon. Sources testify that the relations between him and the local Svyato-Uspensk brotherhood were always disloyal. Even the cooperation in a struggle against the Union could not reconcile them.²⁰

Brotherhood members’ mistrust to hierarchs and protracted conflicts only interfered with a mutual case. Owing to the aggressiveness of the Lviv brotherhood in 1607-1608, the Lviv cathedral nearly passed into Uniates’ hands. Consecrated by a patriarch and affirmed by the king henchman of late Gedeon Balaban – his relative Isaiah – it caused the opposition of the Lviv brotherhood; the procedure of the bishop’s throne replacement got complicated, Uniates also bid for it; the Orthodox believers obtained it due to Jeremias Tyssarovsky who, in order to gain king’s trust, pretended an adherent to Uniate ideas. This and many other facts give us ground to speak about serious brotherhoods’ movement threat to the church unity.²¹

It is worth mentioning that during the first two decades of the XVIIth century, the brotherhoods’ claims to domination over ecclesiastic life strengthened and “the rule of the people” expanded its competence in church by means of bishops’ authority. We can find plenty of evidences speaking of the excessiveness of brotherhoods’ people power. However, its greater part is mentioned only in the statements of the Uniate clergy or those of Orthodox clergy who embraced the Uniate Church. For example, Cassian Sakowicz wrote: “While living in Lublin brotherhood, I saw some heavy-drinkers, innkeepers deliver popes’ robes, vessels, crosses, Gospel, carry them to shrines on their own, touch with filthy hands things that they don’t even worth look at, and when I tried to make suggestions, I saw

²⁰ Наталія Полонська-Василенко, *Історія України* (History of Ukraine) Vol.1 (Київ, 1989), 132.

²¹ Грушевський, Михайло, *Історія України–Руси* (History of Ukraine and Rus History of Ukraine and Rus), Vol. 5, 160.

neither improvements nor corrections, moreover, I brought down their anger on myself. An odd thing is that they entrust clergy with their conscience, but can't entrust with vessels, crosses, Gospel!"²² – in this way Sakowicz criticizes the members of the brotherhood. This ecclesiastic polemicist also writes about Vilnius brotherhood: "You keep clergy and monks in your authority, elect them on your own volition and accept to your brotherhood, judge them and expel those you don't like... You praise them till they dance to your pipe, fawn, roll over for you and if someone stops rising in the service, he must fend for himself; you must remember well when brotherhoods' foremen, brothers-laity, having convicted one clergyman, consecrated their hands in Presviter's beard"²³.

In this context, the historians' thesis according to which "the expression of extreme opposition to episcopacy was a widespread among brothers idea which bore nearly protestant character" becomes quite objective.²⁴ Brothers convinced themselves and others that "neither popes, nor archbishops, nor metropolitans can save us, but the sacrament of the Orthodoxy with a protection of Ten Commandments!"²⁵ Undoubtedly, orders introduced by brotherhoods (especially those of the oldest ones, because above-mentioned evidences were registered particularly there), contradicted the traditions of episcopal authority in the Church. While establishing new brotherhoods in the XVIIth century, the clergymen tried to ensure a status worthy church traditions. Nevertheless, this collision sharpened after the restoration of Orthodox hierarchy. Historians fairly point out that "new archbishops, with all due respect to brotherhood's institution and will all acknowledgement of its deserts before the Church, couldn't help feeling greatly and bitter how difficult it was to cope with brotherhoods' people power".²⁶ The situation was even more complicated because the brotherhoods' stavropegic immunity, their own mechanism of jurisdiction – brothers' court – in a period of few decades became an example of efferent tendencies for other ecclesiastic institutions, especially monasteries. After the restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy, the brotherhoods found themselves in a danger of regulation of

²² Quote on: Орест Левицький, *Внутрішній стан Західно-руської Церкви в Польсько-литовській державі в кінці 16 ст. та Унія* (The internal condition of the West-Russian church in the Polish-Lithuanian state in the end of 16th c and the Uniat) (Розвідки про церковні відносини на Україні-Руси XVI – XVIII ст., Львів, 1900), 18.

²³ Орест Левицький, *Внутрішній стан Західно-руської Церкви*, 20-21.

²⁴ *Історія православної Церкви в Україні* (History of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine), p. 100.

²⁵ *Акты, относящиеся к истории Южно-Западной Руси* (The Acts related to the History of the South – West Rus). – Изд. А. Петрушевичем (By A. Petrushevich), (Львов, 1868), 210.

²⁶ Грушевський, Михайло, *Ілюстрована історія України* (Illustrated History of Ukraine) (Київ, 1990), 72.

The Role and Place of the “Secular Element” in the Process of Preserving the Ecclesiastic and Religious Life of Orthodox Believers in the Post-brest Period

ecclesiastic life on the territory of the Kyiv Metropolitanate, ensuring local jurisdiction of metropolitan and diocesan bishops. Such changes, however, were always an encumbrance for both government’s opposition and local Catholic congregation.

The years ‘20 of the XVIIth century – is a time of first decisive actions of higher clergy aimed at reaching the centralization of authority that, first of all, touched the activity of brotherhoods and couldn’t help provoking an adequate reaction of the latter. Such a remarkable event (1624 – 1626) was a trip of Meletius (Smotrytsky), archbishop of Polotsk to the East, to Orthodox patriarchs. Without specifying some aspects of this mission, we must point out that the Ukrainian archbishop, perhaps, by order of the Kyiv metropolitan Job Boretsky, cared for the patriarch of Constantinople to abolish ancient privileges concerning Orthodox monasteries and brotherhoods (the bishop Meletius brought an appropriate charter).²⁷ This decree caused a resolute protest against the new hierarchy not only of church brotherhoods but also for stavropegic monasteries, first of all a Kyiv-Pechersk one. The Metropolitan Job was forced to justify himself.²⁸

But brotherhoods seemed to be not fully satisfied. The leaders of Lviv and Vilnius brotherhoods in 1626 sent their representatives to Constantinople. The latter brought a new charter with a compromise according to which stavropegias of Lviv and Vilnius brotherhoods, “the ancient ones” that were granted by patriarch Jeremias remained valid and new ones, presented by patriarch Theophanes in 1620 were cancelled.²⁹

The decision of Constantinople patriarch was vague. Partially it can be explained by the fact that the decision was made under the influence of different flows of Orthodox environment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Researchers state that “it, obviously, represented, first of all, the tension of relationships between brotherhoods, stavropegic monasteries and hierarchy, and, secondly, witnessed dissimilarity of the brotherhoods’ movement itself, the presence of hidden contradictions between «older» and «newer» brotherhoods which differed by principles of their attitude to clergy and the level of autonomy in relation to ecclesiastic hierarchy.”³⁰ Objectively, this decision was aimed against

²⁷ Степан Голубев, *Киевский митрополит Петр Могила и его сподвижники. Опыт исторического исследования*. В 2-х тт. (Kyiv metropolitan Petro Mohyla and his associates. The experience of the historical research in 2 volumes), Київ, 1883 – 1898, Vol. 1, 124-125.

²⁸ Степан Голубев, *Киевский митрополит Петр Могила и его сподвижники*, 126.

²⁹ Акты (Acts), изд. А. Петрушевичем, 91.

³⁰ *Історія православної Церкви в Україні* (History of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine), 100.

the autonomy of lower ecclesiastic institutions, first of all, the Kyiv brotherhood became for a long time a ground of this brotherhood's prepossession to the activity of Ukrainian Orthodox Church higher clergy.

We may presume that this preconception completely marked the position of brotherhoods to half-way measures of Orthodox hierarchs that wanted to come to terms with Uniates at the end of 20's. The Vilnius brotherhood, according to archbishop Meletius' testimony, during 1626 – 1627 “participated in that redemptive activity”, although later evaded despite the efforts of archbishop of Polotsk. We can state about brothers' active oppression by archbishop Meletius' allusions about the council in 1628. It was vividly illustrated in the allusions a dissatisfaction of “secular element” - lower middle class citizens and Cossacks – with Uniate plans that were being hatched by church brotherhoods.

To tell the truth, this opposition was not equally felt on the whole territory of the Kyiv Metropolitanate. The passivity is being traced especially in Right-bank Ukraine, more particularly – in Halychyna. There are some examples. Thus, the representatives of Lviv Svyato-Uspensk brotherhood showing loyalty to king's orders even participated in the Lviv (Uniate) council in 1629. One more example of brotherhoods' irreverent attitude to hierarchs is a letter of Job Boretsky to the Lviv brothers (1627), where metropolitan reproaches addressees for elementary disrespect to him and for the non-performance points of P. Sahaidachny's spiritual Will. The hierarch sadly indicates that for his work in the Church's favor he could expect more sympathy: “if only this gratitude... could be better...”³¹

However, the emersion of hierarchy and its attempts to renew the jurisdiction on the territory of the Kyiv Metropolitanate meant “beginning of the end” of brotherhoods' movement hegemony. After the metropolitan Job Boretsky's death, his successor Isaiah Kopynsky also tried to take brotherhoods under his pastoral guardianship. For instance, in 1632, the archbishop blessed the establishment of “youth” brotherhood at “older” one in Lutsk. He confirmed the Regulations of the new brotherhood and formulated a chain of wishes and instructions for the future. The confrontation between church brotherhoods as beyond hierarchical structures of the Kyiv Metropolitanate and clergy didn't stop until the beginning of downfall and stagnation of brotherhoods' movement. The metropolitan Petro Mohyla

³¹ *Лист київського митрополита Борецького Іова та гетьмана Голуба Оліфера до братства з повідомленням про пожертвування гетьманом Сагайдачним Петром 1500 золотих на братську школу* (The letter of the Kyiv metropolitan Iov Boreckiy and hetman Golub Olifer to the brotherhood with message about the offering of 1500 golds for brotherhood school by Petro Sahaidachny). Оригінал. 24 липня 1622 р, sh. 3.

The Role and Place of the “Secular Element” in the Process of Preserving the Ecclesiastic and Religious Life of Orthodox Believers in the Post-brest Period

managed to cut brother down to size in the 30's that was impossible to do without the legalization of the Orthodox hierarchy.

It is worth mentioning that brotherhoods intensified their activity together with other layers of Orthodox society once again over the “kingless” period. After the death of Sigismund III, the Vilnius brotherhood sent to the convocational sejm a special request to senators and nobility to provide rights for Orthodox peasants. Brotherhoods also took part in agitation. The Lviv stavropegic and “younger” brotherhoods were raising some funds for sending deputies to provincial Vilnius sejm. Directions and instruction on ensuring the freedom of conscience, given in May 1632 to ambassadors elected at this sejm, were created under the influence of the brotherhoods' deputies.³² Half-way formulas of convocational and election sejms including “Paragraphs for soothing” by Vladyslav IV contained allowance for functioning of old and formation of new brotherhoods' schools, seminaries, hospitals, free access to magistrates positions. Moreover, after his election, the Polish king Vladyslav founded individual charters for brotherhoods.³³

The recognition of brotherhoods' activity by secular authority alienated them from ecclesiastic hierarchs even more. Some conflicts and confrontation caused by the brothers' struggle for spheres of influence in church continued. The long-running conflict between the Lviv brotherhood and the metropolitan of Kyiv, Petro, concerning the publishing activity in which even Parthenius, the patriarch of Constantinople was dragged, serves as a bright example. New milestones in the history of Ukrainian Orthodox Church was marked by the Petro Mohyla's election as the metropolitan of Kyiv who immediately started the reformation of ecclesiastic and religious life in the Kyiv Metropolitanate.³⁴ As to brotherhoods, a new metropolitan strived for finding a reasonable compromise in relations between clergy and brothers. In fact, the matter lied in the necessity to balance the administrative system which meant that brothers had to be cut down to size. The Kyiv metropolitan managed to do it. However, it did not happen because he turned out to be a better church shepherd than his predecessor. A crucial role in it played the legalization of Orthodox hierarchy on the 30's of the XVIIth century.

³² Папков, Антон, Work paper, 307-311.

³³ Ісаєвич, Ярослав, Work paper, 100.

³⁴ Details look: Шкрібляк Микола, *Митрополит Петро Могила і провідні тенденції «золотої доби» Київської митрополії: церковно-релігійний та національно-культурний контексти* (Metropolitan Petro Mohyla and lead tendencies of the “Gold Age” of Kyiv Metropolitan: ecclesiastical-religious and national-cultural contexts) // *Філософсько-богословська спадщина мислителів XVII – XX ст.: колект. монографія / За наук. ред. член.-кор. НАПН України В. О. Балуха, Чернівці, 2013), 166 – 185.*

Fence-mending and closer cooperation between clergy and laity Petro Mohyla started from Lviv Svyato-Uspensk brotherhood whose patrons traditionally were representatives of Mohyla's family and that is why Lviv brothers were especially disposed to Kyiv metropolitan. The Przemyśl church brotherhood also sympathized the metropolitan with his struggle for the legitimization of the Orthodox clergy and for this reason partially made common cause with him. However, a decisive moment in the consolidation of metropolitan's authority became the subordination of the Kyiv brotherhood to ecclesiastic authority. Shortly before his election, being a Kyiv-Pechersk archimandrite, under Cossacks pressure, Mohyla managed to become not only a guardian but also the eldest among brothers. Since then, a steady subordination of brotherhoods' movement to higher ecclesiastic clergy has begun.³⁵

The integration of brotherhoods into one hierarchic structure became an important aspect of the church reform of Mohyla's period that weakened social and political basis of brotherhoods' movement and, undoubtedly, strengthened the influence of renewed Orthodox hierarchy which once and for all soothed former brotherhoods' claims. The Kyiv metropolitan carried out his arch-flamen's activity in a way brotherhoods mostly sought his protection and help from the governmental oppression; they resorted to him in case of inner problems demonstrating their loyalty and obedience, "having accepted him as shepherd and father in God's Church."³⁶ Petro Mohyla extended his influence on stavropegic brotherhoods having prohibited them to interfere with the inner life of the Church. The first Hierarch of the Kyiv Metropolitanate took charge of functions concerning sending representatives on internal matters of church brotherhoods; he organized fundraising for them and carried out control over its exploitation.

In the second part of the XVIIth century, the church brotherhoods completely lost both political independence and the one within the ecclesiastic institution, having turned into an ordinary element of the Church hierarchic structure. And although Petro Mohyla invited brotherhoods to the Kyiv council in 1640, they began to look more and more like a symbol of original local tradition and less like a manifestation of former grass-roots democracy. Such institution as brotherhoods seemed to steadily drain its resource. Records of the 50's – 90's about elections of brotherhoods' elders and Father Superiors of the monasteries subdued to them, witness about the stagnation of brotherhoods' movement that faced serious crisis

³⁵ Климов, Віталій, Колодний, Анатолій, Жуковський, Аркадій, *Феномен Петра Могили* (Phenomenon of Petro Mohyla) (Київ, 1996), 67-70.

³⁶ The same source, 68.

The Role and Place of the “Secular Element” in the Process of Preserving the Ecclesiastic and Religious Life of Orthodox Believers in the Post-brest Period

phenomena: the discipline reduced dramatically, the former staff scattered, the cooperation between secular and ecclesiastic members of brotherhoods was gradually lost.

Conclusions

Thus, interpreting the role and place of “the secular element” in the preservation of ecclesiastic and religious life of Orthodox Christians in the post-Brest period, it is clear that the functioning of church brotherhoods as a specific form of beyond hierarchical structures of Ukrainian Orthodox Church (the Kyiv Metropolitanate) is quite specific. Their activity possesses a rather controversial character and therefore, it leads to vague consequences.

With the emergence of church brotherhoods, the collisions between clergy and laity sharpened. The latter strived for taking charge of functions of Orthodox Church representatives. Such ambitions brothers formed long before the Union of Brest, although their active realization was carried out in the 1620’s – the time of Orthodox hierarchy’s renewal by Theophanes of Jerusalem. The traditions of supremacy of the “secular element” in the ecclesiastic issue, the autonomy from the episcopal authority and its own jurisdiction, cherished in the bosom of the oldest stavropegic brotherhoods, contradicted the principles of the church order. The grass-roots democracy and the immunity of the brotherhoods that helped to preserve Orthodox centres under extreme, unfavorable social and religious conditions became an obstacle for integrity and structuredness of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the course of renewal of traditional structures.

The ecclesiastic leadership of the Kyiv Metropolitanate (especially the metropolitan Petro Mohyla) who conducted the system of inner ecclesiastic reforms aimed at the steady integration of brotherhoods into local ecclesiastic structures, as well as at a process of subordination to the local bishop’s jurisdiction, which lasted starting from the middle of the 20’s to the middle of 70’s in a form of specific action of Orthodox hierarchy and certain decision of authoritative structures. In the XVIIth century, their activity aimed mostly at solving local tasks and internal regulation which caused such a peculiar feature of Ukrainian Orthodox ecclesiasticism as “sobornopravnist”. Brotherhoods’ rule of the people represented one of the models of secularism’s participation in the ecclesiastic life. However, this was not enough for a full value existence of brotherhoods and for the preservation of their influence on the ecclesiastic, religious, spiritual and cultural life in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. On

the background of the growth of spiritual power in the Church, the authority of laity's church unions (regardless a form and a status of existence) was rapidly falling. As a consequence, the stagnation of brotherhoods' movement and the eventual stop of its historical existence took place.

Bibliography:

1. Berger, Daniel. *History of the Church of the United Brethren*. Dayton, 1897.
2. Higgins, Alfred. *A History of the Brotherhood Church*. Stapleton, 1982.
3. Isajewicz, Jaroslav. *Bractwa cerkiewne w diecezjach przemyskich obrzqdku wschodniego w XVI – XVIII wieku* (Church brotherhood of Peremyska eparchy of oriental rite during 16 – 17 century). Polska – Ukraina. 1000 lat sąsiedstwa. Przemyśl, 1996.
4. Lewicki, Kazimierz. *Książę Konstanty Ostrogski a Unja Brzeska 1596 r.* (Prince Constantine Ostrozhsky end Union of Brest). Lwów, 1933.
5. *Акты, относящиеся к истории Южно-Западной Руси* (The Acts related to the History of the South – West Rus). – Изд. А. Петрушевичем (By А. Petrushevich), Львов, 1868.
6. *Боротьба Південно-Західної Русі проти експансії Ватикану та унії (X – XVII ст.): Збірник документів і матеріалів* (The Opposition of the South-West Russia and expansion of Vatican and its Uniat in X – XVII c. Compilation of documents and materials.) / Упоряд. Є. А. Гринів, 1988.
7. Гарасевич, Михайло. *Історична відомість про минуле і сучасне становище ієрархів руської з'єднаної церкви у Великій, Білій і Червоній Русі* (Historical work about the past and present condition of hierarchs of Rus united Church in Great, White and Red Rus). м. Відень, 1826 р. // Відділ рукописів Львівської наукової бібліотеки імені Василя Стефаника НАН України, Ф. 3, Оп. 1, С. 811, 58 sh.
8. Голубев, Степан. *Киевский митрополит Петр Могила и его сподвижники. Опыт исторического исследования*. В 2-х тт. (Kyiv metropolitan Petro Mohyla and his associates. The experience of the historical research in 2 volumes), 1883 – 1898.
9. Грушевський, Михайло. *Ілюстрована історія України* (Illustrated History of Ukraine), Київ, 1990.
10. Грушевський, Михайло. *Історія України–Руси* (History of Ukraine and Rus). Т. 5. Суспільно-політичний устрій і церковний устрій і відносини в українсько-руських землях 14 – 17 віків (Social-political mode and

The Role and Place of the “Secular Element” in the Process of Preserving the Ecclesiastic and Religious Life of Orthodox Believers in the Post-brest Period ecclesiastical-religious mode and relations in Ukrainian and Russian territories), Львів, 1905.

11. Гудзяк, Борис. *Криза і реформа: Київська митрополія, Царгородський патріархат і генеза Берестейської унії (Crisis and reforms: Kyiv Metropolitanate, Tsargorod patriarchate and genesis of Brest Uniat)* / Пер. з англ., Львів, 2000.
12. Дмитриев, Михаил. *Между Римом и Царьградом: Генезис Брестской Церковной Унии 1595 –1596 гг. (Between the Rome and Tsargrad: Genesis of the Brest Uniat in 1595 – 1596)*. Москва, 2003.
13. Ісаєвич, Ярослав. *Братства та їх роль в розвитку української культури XVI – XVIII ст. (The Brotherhoods and their role in the development of Ukrainian Culture in the XVI – XVIII c.)*, Київ, 1996.
14. *Історія православної Церкви в Україні (History of the Orthodox church in Ukraine: Compilation of research works)*, Київ, 1997.
15. Климов, Віталій, Колодний, Анатолій, Жуковський, Аркадій. *Феномен Петра Могили (Phenomenon of Petro Mohyla)*, Київ, 1996.
16. *Книга протоколів братства при церкві Воздвиження Хреста Господнього в Дрогобичі за 1678 – 1828 рр. (The Book of the Brotherhoods' Protocols in the church of God Christ Vozdizhennya in Drohobych in 1678 – 1828)* // ЦДІА України у м. Львові, Ф. 129, Оп. 3, С. 65, 64 sh.
17. Кущинський, Антін. *Коротка історія Української православної церкви (The short history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church)*, Чикаго, 1971.
18. Левицький, Орест. *Внутрішній стан Західно-руської Церкви в Польсько-Литовській державі в кінці 16 ст. та Унія (The internal condition of the South-Russian Church in the Polish-Lithuanian state in the end of 16th c. and the Uniat)* // Розвідки про церковні відносини на Україні–Руси XVI – XVIII ст., Львів, 1900.
19. Липинський, Вячеслав. *Листи до братів-хліборобів (Letters to the farmer brothers)*. Київ-Філадельфія, 1945.
20. *Лист київського митрополита Борецького Іова та гетьмана Голуба Оліфера до братства з повідомленням про пожертвування гетьманом Сагайдачним Петром 1500 золотих на братську школу (The letter of the Kyiv metropolitan Iov Boreckiy and hetman Golub Olifer to the brotherhood with message about the offering of 1500 golds for brotherhood school by Petro Sahaidachniy)*. Оригінал. 24 липня 1622 р.
21. Огієнко, Іван. *Українська Церква (The Ukrainian Church)*. Упоряд., авт. передмови М. С. Тимошик, Київ, 2007.

22. Папков, Александр. *Древнерусский приход. Краткий очерк церковно-приходской жизни в Восточной России до XVIII и в Западной России до XVII в.* (Ancient Russian Church. The short essay of ecclesiastical-church life in the East Russia until XVIII c. and the West Russia until XVII c.). Сергиев Посад, 1897.
23. Полонська–Василенко, Н. *Історія України* (History of Ukraine). Київ, 1989.
24. Шкрібляк, Микола. *Митрополит Петро Могила і провідні тенденції «золотої доби» Київської митрополії: церковно-релігійний та національно-культурний контексти* (Metropolitan Petro Mohyla and lead tendencies of the “Gold Age” of Kyiv Metropolitan: ecclesiastical-religious and national-cultural contexts) // *Філософсько-богословська спадщина мислителів XVII – XX ст.: колект. монографія / За наук. ред. член.-кор. НАПН України В. О. Балуха, Чернівці, 2013.*

ESSAYS

PRESENTATIONS

REVIEWS

About Philosophy, on Its Birthday

Doina Cernica, Journalist

TV Moldova 1 tells us “Good morning!” with a special guest for the International Day of Philosophy 2013, Ana Pascaru, lecturer, researcher, doctor habilitated in philosophy, the representative of the Philosophy Department of the Academy of Sciences in the Republic of Moldova. We stop the air heater (we are accommodated to “Chisinau”, the oldest hotel of the capital city in the Moldavian Republic, hotel which initially was an adjacent building of the Academy) in order to hear her better. She speaks about the history of the day, she talks about the importance of Philosophy in our lives and she announces the program of the “Philosophy and human perspective” Scientific Conference which is dedicated to her, with guests from the specialty department of the “Ștefan cel Mare” University of Suceava. This kind of welcome in front of the whole country is pleasant, we should hurry up, but I cannot help myself. In Romania, I am drinking coffee with Bessarabians at dawn, more exactly at 5:20 A.M., when on TVR2 is recast “The Messenger” from the night before. Here I preferred the tea. “Black, green, raspberry tea, what do you want?” And here it is, a new wave of heat in the coldness of the room: are congratulated, on the feast of Saints Michael and Gabriel, today, according to the Julian calendar, the persons bearing the names of these saints and, at the same time, angels. But, unexpectedly, the window shakes and opens, and the thoughts go towards Mihail-Radu Solcan, who would have reached 60 years now. For some people he was the professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Bucharest, for others, a friend... a special man. Assigned on the third Thursday in November, in accordance with the strategy in philosophy took up during the 169-session of UNESCO in 2002, the International Day of Philosophy always evokes Socrates, and now, in 2013, also the achievement of 2400 years from the founding of Plato’s Academy and, with it, of the first school of philosophy in the world. As regards the celebration of this day in the Republic of Moldova, this one, under the title already referred to, has a history of 11 years, as attested by the program of the current edition, organised by the philosophy department of the Academy of Science in the Republic of Moldova, in collaboration with the Association for philosophy in the Republic of Moldova and the University of the Academy of Sciences in the Moldavian Republic. Let us

retain Ana Pascaru's statement resumed in the opening discourse, according to which the manifestations that preceded the Conference at the Academy have granted a special attention to the centennial of Albert Camus' birth and to his "advice to remain in the field of the truth". Resumed on posters, flyers, and screens, the famous creation of Rafael, "The school of Athens", with its vintage meaning, also suggested by the era of the artist, but especially by the protagonists, has always collaborated with the students and the PhD students – a numerous, if not even dominant presence for the establishment and maintenance of an optimistic atmosphere, although the concerns on both facets of the life taken into account by the philosophical investigations, the findings of the research and in particular the fate of the philosophical education, are far from being meaningless. Another evocation of the great thinkers of the Antiquity belonged to the professor Sorin Tudor Maxim, from Suceava, who reminded the participants that in Suceava the philosophical education exists since the era of Stephen the Great, as is shown by the concerns at Putna monastery and by the faces of Plato and Aristotle on the fresco from Voronet Monastery. In his quality of senior of the guests coming from the right hand of the Prut river, he presented his colleagues, which, in turn, have introduced themselves during the meeting, with the titles of the communications included in the program: the Reader Professors Dan Ioan Dascalu ("Individualism and morality in the contemporary capitalism") and Bogdan Popoveniuc ("Objectivity between science and faith"), the Lecturer PhD Niadi-Corina Cernica ("Globalization and globality") and the Associate Professor Enrique Javier Nogueras Valdivieso, professor at the University of Granada ("Ausiàs March: Poetry and scholastics. The failure of powers of the soul"). As far as he is concerned, the Professor PhD Sorin Tudor Maxim, an expert in moral and political philosophy, approached the theme "Illusions of democracy. Premises and solutions for the control of power in a globalized world", wishing and desiring for the Conference, in the spirit of philosophy's parents, "the tackling of problems". Of course, I have not proposed a retelling of this scientific manifestation dedicated to the International Day of Philosophy in Chisinau, an ordinary and special day, at the same time, in the Republic of Moldova, but I would mention two salutes addressed to the participants. One of them was addressed to the director of the History Institute of the Academy, Gheorghe Cojocar, who has recently become the coordinator of the Department of Philosophy, continuing (maybe finishing, we hope) a migration "similar to the migratory races in history", that "we could believe the Philosophy has been confronted with a fatality of History", word dominated however by the conviction of the "mutual benefit, academic benefit".

The literary Youth

The other salutation, signed by Rodica Ciobanu, dean of the Faculty of Socio-human Sciences of the University of the Academy of Sciences in the Moldavian Republic, university designed, together with the high school of the Academy, as a seminary of the researchers in a variety of fields, remained in our memory by the confession that, as graduate of philosophy, she feels thankful, because “in a sense, the philosophy changed my way of thinking and, perhaps, of being”. Although initially structured on two modules – “The philosophy in the contemporary world”, moderated by Professor PhD Gheorghe Bobana, from the University of the Academy, and “The philosophy and the education”, Reader PhD Vitalie Ojovanu, from the “Nicolae Testimitanu” State University of Medicine and Pharmacy from the Republic of Moldova (representing a department with a remarkable activity in the Bioethics field) – the papers of the Conference belonged to a single “fabric”, which highlighted their interdependence and which allowed to the young people a better coverage of their problems. Young people which, as a matter of fact, have proved to be preoccupied with the fate of the Philosophy in the Republic of Moldova. In this respect, the PhD student Sergiu Luca underlied a real indictment, finding impressive similarities between the attitude of the Emperor Nero in relation to philosophers, who were expelled from Rome and from the Roman Empire, and the current elites of Moldova with respect to philosophy, the first being educated by the philosopher Seneca, and these ones (also) by prestigious philosophy teachers. The young man’s grievous inventory begun with the closing of the Faculty of Philosophy from the Republic of Moldova, in 2001, action which continued in the following years, with other eliminations, limitations and damaging changes. If Ana Pascaru remembered the persistent attempts to transform Philosophy in “a basic, non optional course”, requiring solidarity (“it also depends on how we support each other”) and hoping that “the hand of the Providence keep us together”, on the contrary, the intervention of the Reader PhD Ion Sârbu, from the Commercial Cooperative University from Moldova, also belonging to another generation, has been as severe as that of his younger confrere: “The Philosophy, the mother of sciences, should not be aggressed, as she is old, now, in the era of the specialisation, when we need so much its general coverage!” In the same direction, the Professor PhD and researcher Victor Juc, from the Institute for Legal and Politic Research of the Academy, pleaded for the concrete recognition of the opportunity of a history of international relations philosophy as object of study, the Professor PhD Eudochia Saharnean from the State University of the Republic of Moldova, expressed her belief that “the philosophical education could help to overcome the humanitarian crisis in the Republic of Moldova (e.g. the demographic crisis – the exodus, the increase of

crimes, of the domestic violence, of the crisis of values, of the crisis shaking the society from its foundations)”, reviewing the ministerial departments to which she made appeal for a philosophical education at an early age and the PhD student Sorin Scutelnic, from the University of the Academy, talked about the meaning of the therapy through philosophy, about “the need to create the monitoring powers in a cause-effect system, of a gestalt with such a destination, because from a distance, from a perspective, the parts of a mosaic are much easily understood”. Only apparently with a different point of view, in fact completing that of his colleague, Professor PhD Vasile Tapoc, from the same State University of the Republic of Moldova, argued, in the spirit of those belonging to the old generation, a knowledge of the self, but an active knowledge – “Do you want to change the world, but what about your own changes?!” – he realistically mentioned “If more than three persons come for the section of Philosophy, this is a success (Noica neither, he was not able to gather 22 candidates)!”, finishing with wisdom and optimism: “The philosophy should be captivating for those who did not get in here”. Conclusion that led us to the thought about the choices in full knowledge of the facts and to the feeling of suitability of the introduction since this school year in Romania of the philosophical education (in “competition” with the financial education) as an optional subject within the elementary school. And also to the awareness of the comfort generated by the defense of the Conference works in the Romanian language (with a single exception), one of the most beautiful languages of the European Union, at a time when, at scientific events, in Romania is more and more frequently preferred the English language, although the condition of host also supposes its dignity. At dusk, the news of the cessation of Ukraine’s steps towards the European Union monopolized the T.V. debates and many private discussions. Although worried to remain in some way “denuded” in front of Russia, our friends (and many of their friends and some of the friends of those ones, etc.) have confessed to be confident that “the circulation” will positively influence also the attitude towards Philosophy. We did not say anything. Because we wanted to be polite. And also because of our ignorance. The path towards the field of the truth is never simple, nor short.