


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RESEARCH PAPERS

Do We Live in a World of Responsibility?

- Philosophical seeking of responsibility's ethics –

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Abstract

Often pronounced and more and more capitalized, the notion of “responsibility” acquires new clarifications, especially under the aspect of its moral dimension. The fact according to which the responsibility should become “the arch key of the entire moral edifice” – according to Kant – is an affirmation that still has to be proven theoretically and explained at the moral action level. A problem regarding the question about the new matters of human action is tough put into discussion – such problem represents some “applicable ethics” – and does not involve unprecedented debts and obligations, and can lead towards significant risks, able to require new approaches of moral philosophy, different from those classical, specific to imputability and regarding the responsibility. In this way, the responsibility assigns a relationship in three terms: the responsible person, the field of responsibility (tasks, actions, attitudes) and the jurisdiction towards which we should answer to (court, people assigned by a decision, awareness, God).

Keywords: *Responsibility, moral responsibility, awareness, answerability, applicable ethics, inter-human relationships, individual or collective responsibility.*

Responsibility has been seen as an answer to some problems, rather than being a problem; the freedom is a problem, as well as moral awareness, moral virtues or values. “Responsibility is not a problem, and if it is, it assumes few answers, and for these reasons, its difficulty results [...], Sponsio, spondere, to be a guarantor, to allow, to commit. For the Other and in front of the Law, meaning towards the others Community. It involves a path of continually answer, of responding to the present, of being responsible for the Other in my presence... The first content of responsibility is this presence, of your own and of your fellow, presence that ignores the ideas of: for what and why the answers should be given (s.n.).” The common language has established in some measures the meaning of

responsibility notion, making a connection to the debts and obligations that revert to an individual related to a certain position in the society; this fact also imposes some ways of acting, reasonable and careful, meaning “responsible”.

According to “Ethical dictionary of moral philosophy”, issued in Paris 1996, the philosophical view over the responsibility “aims towards the conditions of imputable character of acts and our lacks”.

A problem regarding the question about the new matters of human action is tough put into discussion – such problem represents some “applicative ethics” – and does not involve unprecedeted debts and obligations, and can lead towards significant risks, able to require new approaches of moral philosophy, different from those classical, specific to imputableness and regarding the responsibility.

And, if things would be different, should discerning between moral responsibility and responsibility be applied? The responsibility is the topic of all days. But who are the responsible persons? The question comes with unyieldingness, almost quotidian, either concerning a new road or aerial catastrophe or related to unemployment, rate of infantile death, education, proliferation of AIDS, to the sphere of ecological or political points of view.

Often pronounced and more and more capitalized, the notion of “responsibility” acquires new clarifications, especially under the aspect of its moral dimension. The fact according to which the responsibility should become “the arch key of the entire moral edifice” – according to Kant – is an affirmation that still has to be proven theoretically and explained at the moral action level. “On one hand, we should prove that insertion of responsibility in any moral speech of our times; on the other hand we should better formulate the responsibilities in places we develop activities, thus emitting the confusing utilizations that make these obscure”. We are facing an initial indetermination, which certainly “comes from the complexity of responsibility’s phenomena, but also from the objective impossibility of having an exhaustive knowledge”.

The Vocabulary of Philosophy (Paris, 1980) defines the responsibility as “solidarity of human being with his actions, recognizing himself as author and which, taking into consideration the intentions, assumes the virtues and non-virtues, thus involving awareness and freedom for the agent”; it represents the “precurory condition of any real or judicial obligation” (M. Blondel). The definition emphasizes the necessity of reporting a participant to actions that this has had in a conscious way, thus involving the feeling of being connected to his activities and of being responsible for them.

In this way, the responsibility assigns a relationship in three terms: the

Do we live in a world of responsibility?

responsible person, the field of responsibility (tasks, actions, attitudes) and the jurisdiction towards which we should answer to (court, people assigned by a decision, awareness, God).

The psychology dictionary appreciates that responsibility “is the ability of stimulating an action that serves socially and of finishing it, thus conferring identity and the entire manner of using it, but also the evaluation (the value) that should be given to it”; in this way, the most important responsibility is that we should have towards the own person, towards the necessity of not idling away the availabilities and of “not passing through life without a contribution to society’s progress, no matter how significant this contribution would be”.

Neither of these definitions makes references to the fact that people are also responsible for what happens around them because of their actions; obviously, this situation does not involve the future of persons and of human beings.

Making a delimitation between responsibility and moral responsibility, “The small dictionary of Ethics” issued at Fribourg in Switzerland 1993, appreciated that as concerns the moral point of view, the responsibility does not assume either a reward or lack of punishment; whereas, considering the judicial point of view, the human being becomes an object of the civil punishment or reward.

The definitions analyzed make a distinction between responsibility and moral responsibility, implicit for the first definitions and explicit – but not fully enough, according to this opinion – and in the situation of the third.

We are now able to suggest a first definition of moral responsibility: a worthily assuming made by a person for the actions and consequences of these actions carried out on purpose, as well as the fact of being responsible to own conscience as concerns the personal attitude towards the others activities.

One might ask us from the beginning if the approach in a triadic manner of the relationship answerability – responsibility – moral responsibility, introducing the notion of “moral responsibility”, has a higher relevance for the analysis of the phenomenon under discussion. We believe in this: the distance between answerability and responsibility is at least high as that between responsibility and moral responsibility; there are three levels, different stages of various heights for the same ability achieved by an individual within his socialization process.

The responsibility is not the same with making responsible, where the first means the result and the second the process. This signifies that according to circumstances from the beginning of individual’s socialization, this will be more or less responsible; as a matter of fact, less or not at all. By making responsible, one might understand the specific process of inducing to human being, by

education different levels of responsibility, successively higher. As E. Dupréel properly remarked, the processes of making responsible can be considered as generators, as intensifiers of internal life, to which the form is achieved. In this way, our human condition is built.

The responsibility is not something we were born with it. Probably some dimensions of the moral sense – understood as moral conscience - are born as existing with potentiality. But, the responsibility does not certainly exist at the beginning; we do not born with it, but we become responsible in time. Firstly, we become responsible by own actions. This is a minimal; condition of the responsibility. Then, we are responsible towards an authority that invests us with this quality: The Law of community, God or the laic authority. Finally, I am responsible towards the others, in any face I see, according to the formula used by Lévinas: “You will not kill anymore!”

As a matter of fact, to be responsible in a moral way means more than that, means the fact of being also responsible for the others responsibility: “I will not let you kill either!”

“Am I the guardian of my brother?” – Cain asked himself, by rejecting any responsibility towards other potential actions. As considering the moral point of view, the answer is: “Of course I am”. This does not involve the idea that I should answer for your actions, but only that my responsibility is not exonerated by what happens around me.

This is because “Responsibility is not directly registering within the basic of an inter-subjective point of view. It represents, event within its construction process, an answer to the Other (s.n.) in the same time with self affirmation; and, as Lévinas emphasizes, and this inter-subjectivism is already found within a sphere exceeding the level of dialogical and reflexive registers, thus finding the roots into infra – verbal communication, as for instance: the look.” The remark is essential: the responsibility is not the exclusive result of the awareness; the feelings, the gestures that are expressed in this way, are also understood as specific manifestations of the responsibility, carrying with them a cognitive dimension, but not expressed by the awareness logic.

The answerability ensures the minimal condition of an individual into a society, that resulting from the respect of social norms and from the wish of ensuring the normal functionality of relationships established in the society.

If the responsibility ensures the society’s equilibrium, the responsibility is the one not depending greatly by the restructuring – sometimes even on revolutionary path – and of developing the social life. Assuming in a conscious

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way, after an own effort of clarifying and understanding, not only “what it is”, but especially “what is aimed to be”, the individual exceeds his area of answerability, thus integrating within the collectivity as responsible human being that proposes the creative invasion of the norms, even if this thing is socially desirable. The responsible human being implicitly assumes the consequences of his actions; he might be positively punished or, more often, in a negative way, since he breaks knowingly the social norms, if he considers these things as necessary.

From this point of view, one might understand that a human being will not assume the answerability of his actions, included within a normative frame; the social individual, meaning the responsible human being will assume this, thus representing the prototype of the historical, active and innovative agent, thus proposing to transform the society, and by this, himself. Of course, the answerability and responsibility can be included within any area of human action, but mentioning that the first has especially a judicial level, where the last one proves especially a moral point of view.

The moral responsibility is more than that; it is the highest plan of the responsibility. It is about an individual’s responsibility, individual that sees the Other as being more important than himself. The responsibility will thus become the action of creating the accomplished moral sense, which proves to be responsible not only for own actions, but for those of his neighbors.

Assuming the moral responsibility means the way of assuming the task of social and moral progress, without affecting the Other! Having the quality of moral commandment, the Other is placed within a dimension of ideal. This means that fundamental exigency that is raised towards responsible moral awareness does not affect anybody, is not real but ideal, since in real life, the Ego can determine any potential bad actions.

For these reasons, the moral responsibility signifies a new path of currently being highly ideal: “to be – for – the others”.

The idea of being responsible in name of others signifies the idea of being responsible for “the generic other”: “No human being or any generation will be exonerated by the responsibility of experiences – god or bad – which we commonly live.”

On the other hand, for reasons more often met to citizens rights, the judicial doctrines have insisted on the idea of individual’s responsibility towards own actions. Judicially speaking, we are not responsible either for intentions or wishes and, the less for the others’ actions. Even these doctrines have progressed

nowadays towards an idea of decline of the individual responsibility, towards an assuming a collective responsibility or a social responsibility.

Being extremely original, and why not saying - valid in this way the conception of Dimitrie Gusti that affirms that individual responsibility is directly proportional to the level of collective responsibility. Even if it is an attribute of the individual, the responsibility has origins and objective and external origins as concerns the individual, thus fulfilling a social function. Only in this way, "The moral principle of responsibility might represent an active principle", with a part especial view in creating and forming the character.

Gusti does not approve the idea according to which "the collective responsibility" is "primitive and mystic", and by individualization this would become moral responsibility, passing from "the law of talion" towards the appreciation of guilt's intention.

We are not only assisting to a paradox, with negative effects over the responsibility's symptoms:

a) on one hand, the individual responsibility – that of own actions – is not able to satisfy the requirements of social progress, risking to be damaged, and even to corrupt the inter-human relationships ;

b) on the other hand, the indubitable social advantages that social assuming of responsibility introduce will lead towards a general thinning of its carrying out, event to the feeling of its collapsing.

In other words, we are more and more convinced and aware of the fact that responsibility signifies the condition of our humanity, but we are less willing to assume precise tasks, of proving it either to individual, group or institution levels.

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Multiculturalism, Feminism, Postcolonialism and Postmodernism: The Deconstruction of The Structures of Domination in Contemporary Society

I. BHARATI MUKHERJEE'S DECONSTRUCTIVE FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY

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Abstract

Bharati Mukherjee's novels are exemplary for what one can call the ontology of the hyphenated being in exile, of the postcolonial subject on the margins, the one who belongs to no particular landscape, who has no place to call "home." In Jasmine, for instance, this ambivalence is seen as a cause of personal disintegration and existential difficulty. Only through the extremely personal facets of her life is the narrator of Jasmine able to make some form of resistance and some subversion of the discourse that surrounds her. The Holder of the World, however, is drawn on a much different scale and the ambivalence that is still present--within Hannah who is fragmented between the native Indian and the Puritanism of her homeland, between her assumed English identity and her new place as a lover of an Indian prince--works in a very different way. For on this more epic scale, this ambivalence can be seen as a political weapon of considerable strength. Although Hannah encounters the difficulties of a divided self, the main focus of the ambivalence is how it can alter the discourses within which she is involved. In all her works, including in the two above novels, Bharati Mukherjee deconstructs the colonial discourse yet does not shy away from equally striking against the post-colonial establishment. She does this from the position of the exile, a hyphenated postcolonial being, within neither culture, despite being produced by both of them, a being in constant shuttling, existing in an ambivalent place that he or she tries to deconstruct and reconstruct in what can be called a deconstructive feminist epistemology, a deconstructive feminist postcolonial discourse.

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Keywords: Ambivalence, Being-(in) Exile, Feminism, Genetic, Hyphenated, Postcolonialism, Exile, Home, Multiculturalism.

Who is the exile? And by what process does the exile--as symbol, as metaphor--come from his or her position on the margins to inhabit, dislocate, and make uncertain a previously sure center (all the while remaining on the periphery)? The exile holds, by the word's very definition, a peripheral place, neither truly at home in his or her homeland, nor truly a native of the newly achieved shore. The exile gains acceptance in the new land while remaining inescapably "Other." The exile may play many roles, inhabit many parts, and be the sum of many different cultures. In this radical alterity and diffuseness, the exile leads us to question the notion of our own singularity and wholeness. The exile, although a part of his or her new land, remains exterior to it and never fully integrated into it. From this singular position (situated both on the outside and on the inside), the exile casts in question the very notion of the boundary.

Bharati Mukherjee's fiction captures precisely the radical nature of exile, the effects exile has on the individual, and, more importantly, the effects that the notion of exile has on our beliefs about our own lives: the certainty of our identities, the functions of our memories, our convictions about our own and "the Other's," as well as others' cultures. Julia Kristeva views "writing [as] impossible without some kind of exile."¹ This is certainly the case with Mukherjee's writing, which is based on the very principle and structure of exile, its alterity, its division.

Jasmine, "Mukherjee's most popularly read novel,"² stemming from an earlier plot from the author's *The Middleman and Other Stories* (1988), entered the literary landscape in 1989, the same year as Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*. *Jasmine* is set mainly in the seventies and eighties (with movements back and forth on the axis of time, for better character enhancement and fluidity of plot) when the violent separatist demands of the militant Sikhs forced many Hindus to migrate from Punjab. The novel is structured around the life of its narrator (who, for reasons that will become apparent later, will for the moment remain nameless), an adolescent Hindu widow who uproots herself from the familiar and travels from Hasnapur, India, to America, in search of a new life and identity. The novel is not a conventional narration of a life (many literary works have taken autobiography as their formal model), but is told through the prism of the narrator's memory and

¹ Julia Kristeva, *The Kristeva Reader*, trans. Toril Moi, London: Blackwell, 1986, p. 246.

² Bharati Mukherjee, University of Minnesota, 3 Jan. 2006, retrieved at <<http://voices.cla.umn.edu/vg/Bios/entries/mukherjeebharati.html>>.

from her present location in the American Midwest. Furthermore, though it is very much an account of the events that have happened to the main character of the novel, Mukherjee's work is also an account of the myriad cultural influences that have gone to make the heroine who she is, and through the main character, the novel becomes the embodiment of the story of exile itself:

We are the outcasts and deportees, strange pilgrims visiting outlandish shrines, landing at the end of tarmacs. [...] We ask only one thing: to be allowed to land; to pass through; to continue [...] I phantom my way through three continents. (101)

The narrator "phantoms" her way through the continent; that is, she can never consider herself a full, fleshly presence. The question posed is one of self-formation: What, precisely, makes the narrator who she is, and why can she not achieve wholeness? The narrator's journey takes her from the small Indian village in which she grew up, through the big city of Jullundhar after she marries an engineer called Prakash, across the seas to the United States after his death, into the home of a Punjabi academic, and then into the home of a Western couple, before she runs away to her present home with a banker in Iowa. Each setting, each stage in the narrator's journey, stands as an index to a new cultural setting, a new possible "homeland" for the exile to settle in, to try to identify with. It is against the background of these homes and these landscapes that the central character constructs a series of ambivalent subjectivities by which she can attempt to feel at home.

The novel emphasizes the cultural differences between all these homelands (no matter what country they might be in) and does not homogenize the differences between them. "India" and "the West" are not the sole binary with which the main character deals: her Indian village is very different from Jullundhar; and Professorji's America is not the same as Bud Ripplemeyer's. Put in Lacanian terms, each "India" and each "America" has its own unique symbolic Order, and each lays its traces within the imaginary unity that the narrator seeks. This is not to say that Mukherjee's novel entirely rejects the Indian/Western dichotomy that characterizes a great deal of post-colonial literature and theory, but rather that it is aware of the complications and contradictions that remain within that dichotomy. Throughout her new life in America, the narrator is constantly perceived as "the Other," as the incarnation of the colonial stereotype of the female native. Because of this exoticism, her American husband is at first attracted to her: "Bud courts me because I am alien. I am darkness, mystery, inscrutability" (200). Similarly, she knows: "I rejuvenate him simply by being who I am" (200),

and “I’m less than half his age, and very foreign” (7). It is the fascination with “the Other” that creates the constant interrogation of gender relationships in the novel: “You were glamour, something unattainable” (199). Even when it is not a question of fulfilling the stereotype of her own ethnicity, the narrator is trapped within the darkness of her skin. The farmers of Baden “want to make me familiar” (33) precisely as a reaction to her alienness, as a defense against the danger posed by her foreignness. “Educated people” (with their liberal stake in multiculturalism) “are interested in differences” (33).

In either case, however, the truth of the narrator’s being cannot be reached outside of the Indian/Western dichotomy. As Frantz Fanon points out in his ground-breaking study of the psychology of colonialism, “Ontology [...] does not permit us to understand the being of the black man. For not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man.”³ No matter what the differences in the cultural milieus in which the narrator comes to create herself (even while she is in India), it is always within relation to the foreign shore, the West. No matter which cultural surroundings she finds herself in, the narrator attempts to re-inscribe herself in the social order, to become one with the new homeland in which she finds herself. In the modern parlance of identity politics, she does her best to *assimilate* and, in doing so, dissolve the vestiges of her old self. She learns to walk, move her hips, and mount escalators like a Westerner in order to avoid detection when she is living as an illegal alien with Lilian Gordon. Similarly, when Wylie asks her whether she has a problem with the microwave, she replies, “I don’t have a thing about radiation” (169), despite the fact that she does not know what radiation is. These outward shows and mimicking of Western behavior come to have an interior, affective result on who she considers herself to be. “I couldn’t tell if with the Hasnapuri sidle, I’d also abandoned my Hasnapuri modesty” (133). This is precisely how those proponents of assimilation expect the neutralization of ethnic identity to proceed in the well behaved immigrant: first the adoption of the ways of Western living, followed by the adoption of their values.

However--and this is the double bind of the exile--as well as mimicking the host culture, the narrator also feels the need to partake in a double mimicry, that is, to mimic herself as the West would have her be seen. This is demonstrated most clearly by the interview Jasmine has with Mary Webb, who believes that in a previous life she was an Australian aboriginal. Although highly ambivalent towards the notion of reincarnation, the narrator feels the need to play the part of

³ Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Mask*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann, London: Pluto, 1986, p. 101.

the committed Hindu, the mystic from the East: “I tell her that yes, I am sure that I have been reborn several times, and that yes, some lives I can recall vividly” (126). In this particular example of mimicry--in this doubling of the *imago*, the acting out of a stereotype within a stereotype, which creates a subjectivity for the central character much like that of a Chinese box--we also see the element of subversion that can exist in such mimicry. As can be seen in the mimicry of some of Salman Rushdie’s migrant characters and as has been pointed out by Homi Bhabha, such repetition of the dominant stereotypes inscribed in a culture can become a mocking of that culture’s discourse, can become a concrete position from which to attack that discourse. This is certainly the case in the trepidation caused in both Half-face and Bud, both of whom are disconcerted by the central character’s ability to perform the part of the Westerner (and both of whom also find such a performance sexually stimulating). However, Mukherjee pushes this dynamic one step further than Rushdie (and also goes further than Bhabha’s theoretical analysis) by illustrating the subversive power of the migrant playing a stereotype of the dominant culture. The scene involving Mary Webb is, more than anything else, a set piece of satirical writing. Mary Webb’s pretensions are being laid out for ridicule, her easy acceptance of the mysticism of the Indian and its dismissal of the possibility of secular values having penetrated the religious subcontinent. The thing that crowns the satirical moment, however, is the central character’s acceptance of the stereotype. For, by playing the part that Mary Webb has eked out for her, she is exposing it as merely a part, a role, a lifeless stereotype with no depth.

Subversion is not the central character’s central reason for utilizing mimicry and playing out the dominant discourse’s stereotypes on arriving in the United States. Rather, it is a tool for survival, a means of surviving the reality of her exile. These central tenets--mimicry and acceptance of the stereotype of the “Indian woman”—are the two methods by which the narrator of *Jasmine* attempts to balance the precarious nature of her subjectivity. They are the methods by which each transformation of her identity is accomplished, how each incarnation of her as a woman, as an exile, is born unto the world. I have refrained from giving “the narrator” a more concrete denomination up to this point precisely because of the dynamic of re-birth at work throughout the novel, which gives the narrator a new name each time she is “re-born” into a new cultural incarnation. She is born and lives her early life in the village as “Jyoti,” and then, when she is married to Prakash, he calls her “Jasmine” because “he wanted to break down the Jyoti I’d been in Hasnapur and make me a new kind of city woman” (77). These new names

are far from arbitrarily imposed. They are names that not only inscribe the exchange of selfhood that has occurred; they also inscribe the narrator securely into the Symbolic Order of the culture she is entering. She marries Bud, who calls her "Jane," an Anglicization (and neutering) of her original Indian name.

Bud calls me Jane. Me Bud, you Jane. I didn't get it at first. He kids. Calamity Jane. Jane as in Jane Russell, not Jane as in Plain Jane. But Jane is all I want to be. Plain Jane is a role, like any other. My genuine foreignness frightens him. I don't hold that against him. It frightens me, too. (26)

"In Baden, I am Jane. Almost" (26). The referencing of the staples of American popular culture--Tarzan and the movie actress Jane Russell and even the folksy reference to "Plain Jane"--place the narrator's new name in a symbolic chain that links and binds her subjectivity into an American cultural matrix. "Jane"--the very prosaic nature of the name makes it both desirable and detestable to *Jasmine*'s central character (who has recently, of course, been the much more exotic Jasme). Its Anglicization is an attempt to make the central character safe, to inscribe her into the dominant culture, to domesticate her and render her foreignness less dangerous. Yet, at the same time, the very English name points out the ambivalence that manifests itself as an unstoppable shuttling. The outward show--*Jasmine*'s darkness, her past--is alien and in contradiction to the safety of her name. In this opposition lies the contradiction that severs the links that might have kept her whole. She enters into the "role" and consciously takes on a new identity, but this identity is anything but secure.

Of course, there is something more to this naming compulsion, the insistence of imprisoning the subject in a name that inscribes him or her into the common cultural stock. In every instance the narrator takes on a new name, a man gives it to her--the man both names her and brings her into the world in which he is already a native. Prakash calls her "Jasmine," Bud calls her "Jane," and Taylor calls her "Jase," each one naming the woman he wants her to be. What is more, there is something particularly gender biased toward a number of the constructions that these various names create. "Jase," for example, the exotic and carefree woman that Taylor falls in love with, "was a woman who bought herself spangled heels and silk chartreuse pants" (176). It is no surprise that "Jane," after a disgruntled farmer shoots her husband, is the kind of woman who will submerge her own desires so as to look after her injured spouse. Even the one name that is not chosen by her man (her first name, "Jyoti," which is given to her by her grandmother) is bestowed on her by a representative of the old patriarchal Punjabi tradition, her grandmother, who tries to prevent her from continuing her schooling

and is shocked by the fact that “Jyoti/Jasmine” wishes to move away to the city.

What seems to overarch the cultural differences that separate the different names the narrator uses, and the different cultural selves that those names differentiate, is a patriarchal system of control--one that is current in all cultures, a masculine colonialism that stands over and above all the other hegemonic discourses of race or color. Can we say, then, that Mukherjee’s text falls into the trap that, according to post-colonial theory, many recent feminists texts have done, of producing “the ‘Third World Woman’ as a singular monolithic subject?”⁴ That is, has Mukherjee used the female’s subjection by masculinity as a transcendental signified and by doing so homogenized the cultural differences that separate “Western” and “Indian” women?

I think not and for two reasons. The first is that to see patriarchy as a single and homogeneous entity in the novel would, in itself, be a reduction of the varied ways in which masculinity exerts its influence over the narrator. We cannot consider the rapist Half-face, using all the violence and might available to a man in relation to a woman, the same as Prakesh, who produces an identity for the narrator with all the force that Half-face does, but with none of the attendant violence. If anything, the similarity in the *position* of the man--as the namer and inductor of the narrator into new worlds--only underlines the difference of *function* that the man performs, how culturally different each individual man is from his counterpart in other worlds. Second, we cannot consider a patriarchal system the central means of operation in the narrator’s various identity formations because of the role played by the narrator herself. Thus far we have considered the narrator’s creation of new identities--her assimilation and objectification and the new names that induct her into the social order of whichever culture--as being a question of outside agency, of an aggressive force perpetrated by a cultural imperialism on the body and soul of the exile. However, the orientation of *Jasmine*’s narrator is such that she is an active force in re-forming herself in the shape of the culture into which she enters (and also in interrupting and deforming that culture’s discourse). She says of her relationship with Taylor that he “did want to change me. He didn’t want to scour and sanitize the foreignness. My being different from Wylie or Kate didn’t scare him. I changed because I wanted to” (185). Here the exile’s assimilation and difference is wielded by the exile herself. Her new identity is self-born and self-created, actually in opposition to the culture she has entered into (in this case, an Academic, Western liberal culture, which purposefully *imposes* on the

⁴ Chandra Talpade Mohanty, “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” *Feminist Review* 30, Autumn 1988, p. 65.

exile a difference and desires the exotic, “the Other”).

In terms of post-colonial theory, this is an interesting move in a different direction for the notion of identity formation of “the Other” of Western discourse. In most post-colonial theorizing of the last thirty years or so, what has been stressed is the construction of “the Other” by the colonizing discourse. From Said in his groundbreaking *Orientalism*⁵ to the more recent writings by Homi Bhabha,⁶ the question concerns how the West constructs the Oriental or the colonized African. There is not much question of agency, of an ethics, that attends the theory or what the Marxists might call a *praxis*. There has been consideration of ethnicity and race, mainly by those working within ex-colonies. For example, Senghor spoke of the notion of “Negritude”: “Negritude is nothing more or less than what some English speaking Africans have called *the African personality*.⁷” This “African personality” was a humanism that may be placed in opposition to the colonizing discourse of the West. Fanon, on the other hand, in a piece more practical than his theoretical work, states that “the historical necessity in which the men of African culture find themselves to racialize their claims and to speak more of African culture than of national culture will tend to lead them up a blind alley.”⁸ Both suggest, like Cabral,⁹ that the colonized is a fighter who must use culture as a weapon. The suggestion is that the identity, whether racial or national, most suited to interrupting the dominance of Western discourse over a colonized “Other” would be a static, singular, and at home. Whereas assimilation, the negating of this “at home” identity, to a myriad of identities drawn from the discourse of the Western “Other” would most probably be considered a betrayal, a collaboration. However, it is precisely this course that Mukherjee seems to be positing as a positive means of acting in the world. She puts forth assimilation, mimicry, and even collaboration as the components of an ethics of exile.

Bharati Mukherjee is a naturalized American citizen and has been in the country since 1961. She neither rejects the term “Asian-American” to describe herself, nor is she happy being called an Indian writer. She sees herself as an American writer, albeit of Bengali origin. However, despite these declarations, it would not be either correct to consider her merely someone who has assimilated uncritically a Western position (for she has been accused of “race treachery”) or,

⁵ Edward Said, *Orientalism*, London: Routledge, 1978.

⁶ Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London: Routledge, 1994.

⁷ Léopold Sédar Senghor, *The Africa Reader: Independent Africa*, London: Vintage, 1970.

⁸ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967, p. 168.

⁹ Amilcar Cabral, *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral*, New York: Monthly Review, 1973, p. 35.

which has also been claimed, to see her as mainly pitting a nationalism of her new country, America, against the nationalism of the post-colonial world. America is not an identity so much as a place to re-enact transfigurations of her identity. The reason she came to the United States was that she “desired ‘America,’ which to [her] is the stage for the drama of self-transformation.”¹⁰

This is something different, a third term that falls between the binaries constituting cultural identity with the West and cultural identity with the Asiatic “Other.” Rather, she chooses “America” as a staging post in a series of transformations that are not static (as those binary opposites are), but enacted as a drama, in continual motion. As Brennan says of Salman Rushdie, Mukherjee too presents a “defiant challenge to traditional ways of conceiving the ‘national.’”¹¹ The inverted commas enclosing “America” point in this direction America is not merely a single, static edifice, but a shifting, incomplete staging post as much to be altered by the process of self-transformation as effecting it.

The emphasis on the agency of the individual in the ethics of the exile, which develops out of Mukherjee’s *Jasmine*, should, at this point, be further examined. In the above quotation, the emphasis is placed firmly on the I--“I desired ‘America,’”—suggesting that Mukherjee, her narrator, and any subject are separate from and above the identity that they create for themselves out of the detritus of culture. This was the way that Said thought of the subject in *Orientalism*. Although he followed Foucault in many of his observations on the nature of the discourse that constructed the Orient and the Oriental, he could not follow Foucault to the radical limit of the French theorist’s conception of discourse and the subject. Foucault saw the subject as the product of discourses, merely another apparatus of power, discourse coming before and creating the notion of subjectivity. Said was too much of a humanist to take his theory of Orientalism to this extent: “Yet unlike Michel Foucault, to whose work I am greatly indebted, I do believe in the determining imprint of individual writers upon the otherwise anonymous collective body of texts constituting a discursive formation like Orientalism.”¹²

The individual writer *can* influence discourse, can choose to intervene. There is the suspicion in Said’s work (a suspicion which also can be leveled at Foucault

¹⁰ Bharati Mukherjee, “American Dreamer.” *Mother Jones* January/February 1997, Dec. 2005, retrieved at <<http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/columns/1997/01/mukherjee.html>>.

¹¹ Timothy Brennan, *Salman Rushdie and the Third World: Myths of the Nation*, London: Macmillan, 1989, p. 34.

¹² E. Said, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

in some of his most political works and interviews¹³) that there is a subject beneath the discursive formation of Orientalism to be saved, to be unearthed, an individual outside and above the discourse who creates his or her identity. Although this sometimes seems the model of subjectivity that *Jasmine* sets out, I would argue that Mukherjee is not actually proposing a subject capable of agency outside the discourse that forms her and that “self-transformation” is a more complex a term than might be first thought.

Mukherjee’s narrator puts forth two notions of subjectivity in the exile--demonstrated in the novel by the narrator and Du. “My transformation,” the narrator says, “was genetic, Du’s was hyphenated” (222). Both are particular strategies of identity that arise in response to the condition of exile. Du is a refugee, a Vietnamese boy whom the narrator and Bud adopted and, throughout the novel, the narrator sees as having an experience similar to her own: he is a foreigner in a strange land; he has felt the need to fit in. However, unlike the narrator, he has been able to balance the two sides of his identification, Vietnamese-American, and has been able to hold on to two different identities, two different roles. In many ways, Du seems to be the perfect American: good at school, with perfect English, and an engineer. But he can easily leave behind his

American self (deciding to return to his Vietnamese sister in Los Angeles) with the same ease as an actor might have coming out of character. In this conception of identity (one similar to Said’s), there seems to be a Du beneath the formation of an American identity-- an original, primary Du--still existing beneath the American identity he has put on like the duffel coat the narrator buys him when he first comes to America. But this is not the case with the narrator, whose various cultural identities cannot be suspended, as Du’s are, but are contributive to her very being. “Plain Jane” may be a role, but it is a role without an actor; it is as much a part of her as Jyoti was and remains to be. There is no solid identity or subject outside of the roles the narrator plays.

These two different kinds of existences, the hyphenated and the genetic, have--each in its own way--a considerable effect on the ethics of exile and on the nature of the individual’s subjectivity. They both have very different conditions, and both present a different possibility for subversion of the dominant discourse. In the case of Du, the ability to resist the dominant discourse is based simply on his ability to adapt and, in the end, to move on. And this is precisely what he does in the novel when he finds himself unhappy with his life with the Ripplemayers.

¹³ See for example *Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, New York: Semotext(e), 1996.

This is also the political stance that many nationalists from ex-colonial countries take: to thy own self be true; return to your natural home. However, in the final analysis, hyphenation might be able to rid a country of its colonial masters, but it will not be able to make a meaningful intervention in the underlying authoritarian discourse that makes colonialism possible. Hyphenation, in the political sphere, will lead only to one master being replaced by another.

The central character's genetic transformation presents an entirely different possibility for resistance and subversion--despite the fact that it immediately presents itself as assimilation or collaboration. The changes within her are "genetic," meaning they are ingrained into her being. The character, thus, cannot shrug off the roles she plays because those roles constitute who she is. By playing out the stereotypes of the dominant culture, by inhabiting the matrices of their discourse, the central character of *Jasmine* is able to question them from the inside. Through her many character roles, what is put in doubt is not simply one particular cultural milieu (in the way that Du's return to his Vietnamese roots questions the American dream), but the notion of a singular identity and a singular discourse generally. Du's transformation only perpetuates the illusion of wholeness, the narrator's slipping between roles and vanishing between them, and presents an actual possibility for an ethics.

This is the reason why, throughout *Jasmine*, the narrator's different identities are figured as ghosts or spirits and why it is important that the novel takes the form of someone looking back, placing memory as its organizing principle. Very early on, before the reader is introduced to the narrator's story, Jasmine sees that "in the white lamp light, ghosts float towards me. Jane, Jasmine, Jyoti" (21). These are ghosts because they are partial beings, partly dead (the narrator having moved on), partly still alive (still active in the formation of who she is), none of which solidified into the narrator's "self." Nor do these ghosts follow each other in natural succession: the narrator is Jyoti, then she is Jasmine, then Jasme, and then Jane. Rather, each of these ghosts interacts with the others. Even the narrator's latest reincarnation (Jane) can inform the first (Jyoti): "My grandmother may have named me Jyoti, Light, but in surviving I was already Jane, a fighter and adapter" (40). In this way, the "genetic" model of identity is not linear or temporal, but spatial. It is as if, rather, all the "individuals" that the narrator has been are laid out flat on a table top, and the narrator's actual being is constituted by the movement, the *shuttling*, between these individuals: "Jyoti, Jasmine: I shuttled between identities" (77).

This notion of "shuttling" is reminiscent of one of the most important works

in the post-colonial field since its inception, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's "Can the Subaltern Speak?" In this essay, which she later expanded and included in her *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present*, Spivak attempts to find the essence of a single woman, the Rani, outside of the remits of colonial discourse. Yet Spivak does not posit either Said's or Foucault's model of the self (because it is not a matter of choosing between the self as the humanist subject or object of discourse), but rather a model along similar lines to these in Mukherjee's: "Between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into pristine nothingness, but into a violent shuttling."¹⁴ Here, Spivak characterizes the shuttling within discourse, the movement of the self between the various identities produced by the cultural milieu, as a *violent* process. Mukherjee would not disagree: the process of identity formation she shows her narrator passing through is certainly violent and harrowing—not the least in Prakash's death, the narrator's rape, and Bud's shooting (for which she blames herself because she was not "Karin," not able to be the "perfect" American wife). However, Mukherjee also sees it as a positive and, ontologically ethical, means of being.

Let me return, now, to the "ethics of exile" and the place for "self-transformation" in it. A subject who is outside of and above the cultural discourse does not carry out the notion of self-transformation; no such stable subject exists in Mukherjee's notion of being-as-shuttling. However, this does not preclude the notion of agency, or, rather, the notion of an applicable ethics. This is clear at the end of the novel, when the narrator decides to leave Bud for the uncertainty of life with Taylor. The ethics of exile is not a choice between identities (between Jane or Jasme), but a choice between reification and instability; it is the active choice to actively interrupt and re-create the self, to plunge the static self into the turmoil of exigency and chance.

The narrator proclaims, "Adventure, risk, transformation: the frontier is pushing indoors through un-caulked windows. Watch me re-position the stars, I whisper to the astrologer who floats cross-legged above my kitchen stove" (240). There is no certainty to this way of living, merely a promise to re-position the stars by reference to the new self. It does not suggest a destruction of the past. The astrologer who opened the novel and presented the narrator with a reified version of fate at the very beginning of her life is not dismissed, is not forgotten, but is included in the numerous positions within discourse between which she shuttles.

¹⁴ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present*, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard UP, 1999, p. 227.

This is the fate of the exile: to be not merely the object of discourse, but of its interruption, its re-configuration, and its reformation.

In her novel of 1994, *The Holder of the World*, Mukherjee takes up a number of the themes that she dealt with in *Jasmine* from a different perspective. Once more, the novel involves a life narrative, filtered through a framing narrative that draws attention to the exigencies of memory and of history. And, once more, the central figure in that life narrative is a woman and an exile, this time Hannah Easton, a seventeenth-century American woman from Salem who travels with her husband to India. Once more, we see the process of exile as a process of self-transformation: Hannah begins her journey as a good Puritan woman and concludes it as the “Bibi” (the name given to black mistresses of white colonialists) of a Hindu prince, a woman defined by the sensuality of the East. The nature of this self-transformation is marked because of the enormous divergence between West and East that the historical setting provides, increasing the feeling of absolute alterity, the utter “Otherness” that separates the two cultures. This self-transformation, placed as it is at the very beginning of modern colonialism, acts as an index to the (post-) colonial question that was less explicit in *Jasmine*. It explicitly enters the “postcolonial field,” which “Edward Said writes about” and to which “modern anthropologists can no longer return with their erstwhile certitudes.”¹⁵

The Holder of the World presents a reversal of the situation in *Jasmine*. Seventeenth-century Salem was, of course, an English colony, too. Through the novel’s main character, the Western colonized subject (nevertheless a Westerner) goes East to another colony (“the Other” colonizing the other “Other”). Through Hannah, *The Holder of the World* reconstructs the primal scene of colonial discourse, the moment of the first clash of Western and Indian civilization. Nonetheless, Mukherjee does not represent this clash as a political or materialistic altercation, but in terms of how the discourse of colonialism functions over the political realities of the colonial situation. Even before Hannah travels with her husband, Gabriel, to India, she is seduced by her husband’s tales--by narration, by words, his obvious fabrications--and Gabriel’s discourse of travel is placed firmly within the tradition of the exoticization (and therefore Other-ing) of the sub-continent in sailors’ tales. “She thrilled to his sea-faring yarns. He had jumped pirate ships in Madagascar. He had slept in the Garden of Eden, inside an Asian mountain guarded by angels. Children enchanted the deadly cobra with a mere

¹⁵ Vijay Mishra and Robert Ian Vere Hodge, “What is Post (-) colonialism?”, *Textual Practice* 5 (1991): 400.

piped melody. [...]

The soil of Hindustan was ground up sapphire” (67). It is also notable that in Gabriel’s tales the Orient is presented as both a sensual paradise (the “soil” that was “sapphire”) and a prelapsarian one (for he “slept in the Garden of Eden”). It is more voluptuous than mundane Salem, as well as having a prior religious claim. The imaginary homeland of “India” is a contradictory construction, not a single reality. Throughout this novel, Mukherjee is less interested in the actuality of Indian life than she is concerned with its status as an imaginary construct:

The New World was hard and savage; it was soft and bountiful. It was evil, it was innocent. [...] Probably every colonist and every Englishman ascribed to one or many of those views, serially or simultaneously, whatever the nature of their mutual contradiction. (72)

The fact that a view can be subscribed to “serially or simultaneously” involves a certain paradigmatic shift. Mukherjee is not trying to say that those Englishmen who held these views were even changeable or hypocrites. Rather, she is pointing up the way the discourse that constructs the New World operates, its strange logic, the way that reality is reformed and deformed under the Western eye. The Western eye places the New World in a series of opposition with itself, and from this opposition, arises the ambivalence that opens up within the migrant when he or she enters a new landscape. The eye alters the landscape, just as the person who sees is also altered. That there may be a contradiction in the shifting landscape does not, for Mukherjee, alter its power to form a reality that many believe to be “true.”

But it is not merely India, the colonized state that is an imaginary construct of the colonial imagination. England, too, is presented as an imaginary homeland, “a fantasy England” (127). Nevertheless, this homeland across the sea was just as ambivalent as the new colonial land; the colonists also thought “serially or simultaneously”: “England was refined and cultured; it was soiled and sinful” (72). The situation, then, that Mukherjee presents in *The Holder of the World* is more complex than the suggestion proposed by Said, among many others, that the Orient is a construction of the West (a West, he seems to suggest, that gains stability by opposing itself to the mysteriousness of the New World.) Rather, while remaining in opposition, the two worlds can change each other, their discourse entering into a strange game of cultural tag, in which the two worlds can never hold the same position, but continuously circle each other.

It is clear that, as Chakrabarty has noted in his study of precisely this colonial moment, “«India» and «Europe» [...] refer to certain figures of

imagination whose geographical referents remain somewhat indeterminate.”¹⁶ Not only are the geographical referents indeterminate, but so are the actual limits of their cultural and symbolic weight; there are many contradictory significations involved in the representation of “India” and of “England.” However, no matter what the contradictions at the hearts of the imaginary lands, the most important (and, again, imaginary) aspect of colonial discourse is the placing of the two cultures in opposition with each other: where England is dour, India is fruitful and colorful; where India is sinful, England is a bastion of virtue; where England is corrupt and decadent, India is pure and innocent. The oppositions abound. As James Clifford points out in discussing the general operations of colonial discourse, there is a tendency to dichotomize the relationship between the “Occident” and the “Orient,” binding them in an us-them contrast.¹⁷

It is noticeable that though the colonists themselves can, in many ways, be considered exiled from their homeland, the ethics of exile does not function in their discourse. There is no self-formation, no reinvention, and no deformation. For example, the way in which the wives of the East India Company men react to their husbands’ relationships with their Bibis, is extremely telling. “Black bibis know their place, so a wife’s safety lies in assigning them a place that is harmless” (133). The response of the women to the new culture--a culture that is more sexually liberal, where the marriage bonds are more fluid--is to cast the Bibi in the class structure of the land the Occidental women have left behind. The Bibi is not threatening because she has been given a place in the social hierarchy where she is “no more than a cute little pet” (131). This minimization of the threat is not purely a psychological transference of the sexual threat posed by the Bibis; it is a cultural reaction. They are pets: they are reduced to not only something harmless, but also something genderless and animalistic. The connection that might have linked the English women and the Indian women (their femininity) is denied through the simple act of denying that the women are even human.

Not only are the Bibis reduced to something less than human, but they are even denied the dignity of being individuals. They are stereotypes from the store of stereotypes that make up the shared colonial portrait of the native: the Bibis are “devious temptresses, priestesses of some ancient irresistible and overpowering sensuality” (31).

While the ethics of the exile is to exploit the notion of static subjectivity, to

¹⁶ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2000, p. 29.

¹⁷ James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1988, p. 258.

de-center it and scatter it among the competing claims of various cultural discourses, the women of Whitetown purposefully reify the selfhood of the Bibi, as Bhabha explains colonial discourse is meant to do when dealing with the colonized “Other”:

The stereotype is not a simplification because it is a false representation of a given reality. It is a simplification because it is an arrested, fixated form of representation that, in denying the play of difference (which the negations through the Other permits), constitutes a problem for the *representation* of the subject in signification.¹⁸

The Bibi can be nothing other than the confining limits that colonial discourse places on her, and, being nothing more than an object of sensuality, she cannot, therefore, pose a threat in any of the other areas of the white women’s influence.

The importance of the imagined homelands and the Other-ing stereotypes of the colonial imagination, then, is to present a static version of the world, one in which the civilizations of West and East are diametrically opposed. As the narrator of the novel ironically notes, “How comforting a world that can be divided into halves” (270). However, as the latter parts of the novel seem to suggest, the world need not be ordered in this binary way, and, once more, it is the spirit of the exile that begins to attack the certainty of that edifice. In *Jasmine*, the structure of exile, including the multiplicity of different cultures, brings into question the stability and singleness of the self. In *The Holder of the World*, the relationship of self to the world is reversed. It is the exiled self (the self that is an exile to itself and enters whole heartedly into a process of self-transformation) that can question the singularity and stability of a discourse that proposes “culture” as a monolithic and an unassailable given. In *The Holder of the World*, the self and culture enter into a dialogic relationship that interrupts the simple singularity of either, making both radically multiple. It is Hannah, “the Bibi of Salem,” a woman who gives herself freely to the ethics of the exile, who can disrupt the dualism of the two separate cultures and put to play the point at which their boundaries meet.

As we saw in *Jasmine*, there is a marked ambivalence about the position of the subject on the margins, who belongs to no particular landscape, who has no place to call “home.” In *Jasmine* this ambivalence is seen as a cause of personal disintegration and existential difficulty. Only through the extremely personal facets of her life, is the narrator of *Jasmine* able to make some form of resistance and some subversion of the discourse that surrounds her. *The Holder of the World*,

¹⁸ H. Bhabha, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

however, is drawn on a much different scale, and the ambivalence that is still present--within Hannah who is fragmented between the native Indian and the Puritanism of her homeland, between her assumed English identity and her new place as a lover of an Indian prince--works in a very different way. For on this more epic scale, this ambivalence can be seen as a political weapon of considerable strength. Although Hannah encounters the difficulties of a divided self, the main focus of the ambivalence is how it can alter the discourses within which she is involved. She is considered throughout the novel as someone who could make a difference.

An extremely important aspect of Hannah's life-story is the disappearance of Rebecca Easton, Hannah's mother, who runs away with a Native American Indian leaving Hannah, who is brought up as a Puritan, with the memory of a mother who gave in to her own sensuality. Although it might appear so at the beginning of the novel, this is not merely a repetition of a common colonialist fantasy concerning the native (the cultured woman who gives into the baser side of her nature and takes a foreign mate). Rather, it is a moment of self-transformation, a transgression of the ordinary boundaries of culture that Hannah seeks to forget, but understands in its fullness when she makes a similar transgression years later by becoming the Raja's Bibi. The experience of her mother opens out into a larger analogy between the colonial situation in America and in India, both in the past and in the future: “[P]erhaps piracy on the Coromandel Coast [...] was the seed of the frontier dream, the circus dream, the immigrant dream of two centuries later.” An observant reviewer rightly commented that Mukherjee had created “a different kind of multicultural story, one that imaginatively links the 17th-century colonial New World (Puritan New England) with the Old World (England and Mughal India),” without necessarily realizing the full significance of this “different kind of multicultural story.” As an American writer, Bharati Mukherjee clearly understands the power of bringing into close contact, and thus into creative fission, the notions of “the frontier dream” (which is still firmly embedded in the American national consciousness as a positive nation-building force) and the negative connotations of the colonial situation in English-controlled India.

Later in the novel, another analogy collapses the notion of a singular India into itself. On her journey, Hannah has produced Christian, Muslim, and Hindu “selves” (268). Her religious transformations, being part of various religious cultures without being of them, allow her to interrupt a single “India.” There is a difference, she notes, between the colonizer’s relationship with Islam and that with Hinduism: “English attitudes saw Islam as a shallow kind of sophistication;

Hinduism a profound form of primitivism. Muslims might be cruel, but true obscenity attached itself to Hindus” (219). Here, the discourse of colonialism--once more using the tactics of hierarchy and stereotype--separates Islam from Hinduism, making Islam a mirror image of itself while placing Hinduism in the position (previously held by the entirety of “India”) of complete and unknowable “Other.” Further divisions and analogies are drawn: the desires of the Company factors and the Muslim Emperor are contrasted with the Hindu minority led by the Raja (the combined force of Western and Eastern imperial might pitted against a colonized resistance), and then, soon after, the Raja himself is compared with the colonizing force. As he calculates the possibility of victory or defeat in the field of battle, he is “as happy as some Company factor figuring a profit” (243). The effect of these comparisons and divisions is to unsettle the simplistic binaries of the colonizer/colonized, to unsettle the simplistic unitary description in a complexity of differences. It does exactly the work of deconstruction as described by Robert Young. It makes an intervention in the dominant discourse “in a way that makes the same no longer the same, the different no longer simply different,” yoking “difference and sameness in an apparently impossible simultaneity.”¹⁹

This is that which, despite the differences between and within the various cultural formations that Hannah comes into contact with, remains a ruling principle. No matter what orientation the pilgrims, the American Indians, the Company men, the pirates, the Muslim traders, and the Hindu resistance are placed in, no matter on what side of the dichotomy of colonizer/colonized Hannah places them as she disrupts the discourse of binarism, there seems to be one single unifying factor that links them all. Each individual group (not merely the colonizers, but every group) is intent on keeping its cultural and personal identity static, and that is the reason for the continuation of violence and oppression in the colonial situation. Hannah realizes this when she tries to convince the Raja, whom she loves, to give up his duty and run away with her.

He refuses:

She saw that her native New World forgetfulness would be forever in conflict with Old World blood-memory. There was no great unutterable crime, no great analog to a life time’s single-minded dedication that had set Aurangzeb and Jadav Singh on their course [...] He was a king. They were kings. It was their duty to fight. (253)

What Hannah cannot do is to convince Jadev Singh to do as she has done

¹⁹ Robert Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race*, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 36.

and open himself up to the self-transformative power of being in exile. He is too firmly wedded to his “imaginary homeland” and his position within it. He is king; that is his position; therefore, he must fight. That is the socially constructed thing for a man in his position to do. What is more, the repetition of the notion of kingship seems to suggest, as to some extent *Jasmine* does, that the structure of holding onto a static cultural identity is in some way patriarchal. Just as the men in *Jasmine* are always the ones who safeguard a static cultural identity, so masculine systems--kingship, hierarchy, and colonial trade--keep watch so that the boundaries of static cultural systems may not be disturbed.

In contrast to the masculine need to dismiss the play of difference, Mukherjee seems to posit the power of femininity to transgress those boundaries. This is not to say that Mukherjee believes it is the nature of womanhood itself that allows these transgressive tendencies. After all, the women of Whitetown are as guilty as the Raja of attempting to hold the boundaries of their cultural system. Rather, there is something about the structural possibilities of femininity--perhaps femininity’s marginality within cultural systems--that make it particularly suited to being open to the play of differences and to being part of the ethics of exile. It is Hannah and Bhagmati (Hannah’s Hindu servant and friend) who make the most forceful attempts to restructure and reconstruct their identities and, by doing so, to restructure the cultural formations in which they find themselves. Their distinctly feminine friendship blurs the cultural boundaries that separate them: “She wasn’t Hannah anymore; she was Mukta, Bhagmati’s word for ‘pearl.’ And she gave Bhagmati a new name: Hester, after the friend she had lost” (271). This swapping of signifiers functions in the same way as naming did in *Jasmine*: it both inscribes each woman in the other’s culture and, by doing so, disturbs the separation between the Western and the Indian. At the end of the novel, it is Hannah/Mukta and Bhagmati/Hester who travel to the Emperor in an attempt to stop the war, a war that stands as a symbol and ultimate expression of the violence of cultural intransigence. And, according to Mukherjee, it is only Hannah who could make such an attempt, precisely because of her structural position as an exile: “Only a person outside the pale of the two civilizations could do it.” Only the exile who is beyond the cultural frameworks that have made her, precisely because she is caught in an unstoppable shuttling between them, can attempt a disruption of their force and their violence.

This is the message of *The Holder of the World*. Yet this message--the one that can be gleaned from the life of Hannah Easton as an allegory or representation that explains the structural position of the exile and the construction and

deconstruction of imaginary homelands in the colonial scene--is not in itself secure. The novel's framing device, its narration by Beigh Masters, the "asset-hunter" who pieces together the narrative of Hannah's life from the twentieth century, adds another layer of indeterminacy to our reading and a further complexity and richness to Mukherjee's novel. Beigh's presence as the narrator striving to narrate does not stand in relation to her subject with any certainty; her re-telling of the life of Hannah Easton is a *re-telling*, one that is conditional and incomplete. She has gathered evidence for eleven years so that she might make a "reconstruction not just of a time and a place, but also of a person" (138). If we were to compare Beigh's reconstruction to the works of post-colonial theoretical discourse, she would be the academic trying to reconstruct the meaning of the colonial subject. Hers would be the same attempt made by Spivak in "Can the Subaltern Speak?"--an attempt to excavate from the ruins of history the meaning of the subject within her cultural context. However, as Spivak also found, this kind of reconstruction is filled with difficulty, that to reach out might also constitute an "un-grasping":

The palace was a legend of deferment and difference [...] I was halted by the discourse of the European sublime and percolated through it, Kalidasa, the fifth-century Sanskrit court-poet beloved of Goethe, both out of Rani's reach [...] There were no papers, the ostensible reason for my visit, and of course, no trace of the Rani. Again, a reaching and an un-grasping.²⁰

That Beigh's reconstruction is in question, that it might constitute a "reaching and an un-grasping," is emphasized by the contrast of her methodological approach with that of her boyfriend, Venn. Venn is inventing a machine that can reconstruct the past in all its specificity, a machine that is able to read all the discursive information of a time and a place and, therefore, reconstruct that time and place in "real-time." His aim is for veracity and for completeness: "The past presents itself to us, always, somehow simplified. He wants to avoid that fatal unclutteredness." He wants to be able to reconstruct the past in a neutral way that does not place it in any kind of hierarchy that does not credit any single aspect of a place or time above another. In some ways, he makes the same attempt to step outside of discourse that many post-colonial critics do, attempting to stand above the colonial question and describe its operations as they really are. Venn's first attempt at creating the past involves a reconstruction of a Boston street on October 29, 1989. Beigh tests the reconstruction and walks on the street, reaches out, and

²⁰ Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999, p. 242.

touches a faucet. The experience is disappointing because it has no value, has no object. She asks, “Why did I intercept a lady in her yellow jacket demonstrating faucets in a Kansas City bathroom?” (279).

Venn’s second reconstruction is of the day on which Hannah saw the battle begin on the battlements and is created using Beigh’s preceding narrative. This time the moment is full of visceral excitement: Beigh dodges bullets and canon balls, watches Bhagmati die, and touches the Emperor’s Tear (an enormous diamond, the search for which began Beigh’s interest in Hannah). However, the difference between the two reconstructions is that the second is based on Beigh’s own personal viewpoint: “[T]he program will give you what you most care about” (281). Compared to Venn’s reconstruction, Beigh’s presents itself as less anchored in the real world. Beigh presents the personal aspect as a positive force, implying that the personal valuation should be placed above a neutral iteration of facts: “I talk about asset hunting, the fact that data are not neutral [...] There are hot leads and dead ends. To treat all information as data [...] is to guarantee an endless parade of faucets in Kansas City” (279). This is the danger of a post-modernist approach to the post-colonial question. There is no means for intervention if every datum has the same weight as the next, if every subjectivity is dissolved into a simple combination of electronic signatures. However, this does not mean that we must turn away from a post-modernist perspective and try to return to a halcyonic time when all was certain because the means of our analysis were truth. The criterion for placing value on a particular datum is not its truth, but its *value*.

These are the necessary tactics of the asset hunter. It is not a question of truth, but one of value. As such, Beigh also bypasses Spivak’s dilemma of how one can reach the truth of a subject beyond its own “deferment and difference,” how one can peel aside the discourse and know the truth of a person or a land. Rather, Beigh’s methodology is not interested in the truth, but it offers the value of a tactical intervention. Her Hannah, her India, her story are more valuable because of the intervention that Hannah (as Beigh has rendered her) makes in deconstructing the discourse of static certainty. All data may be equally true (or false) in this conception of the world; but to speak of truth or falsehood means that we are still in the domain of the question of factuality, of the actuality of being. But the intervention necessary in the logic of the asset hunter is one that is made on a more pragmatic basis: What can change the world, or even, as Beigh’s intervention does, what can change the past?

Once more then, we are returned to the notion of ethics, of intervention. Like the narrator in *Jasmine* and like Hannah’s intervention to disrupt the discourses of

the colonial situation, Beigh's reconstruction of Hannah's history also acts as an intervention. She is not creating truth, but something that makes a tactical incursion into the dominant discourse. In all three examples, Mukherjee's prose injects hope into an area of literature and theory that is usually overtly pessimistic. She suggests that an intervention can be made into the stability and singularity of all deterministic discourses, including the discourses of post-colonialism. It is from this basis that, in her political pronouncements, she has criticized the "bitter, exiled discourse" of immigrants with "their tight defensiveness, their aggressiveness, and their blinkered vision."²¹ She is defiant of a post-colonial literary establishment that believes "if you're India-born, you must write about India and you must write about an Indian woman or peasants being victimized."²² Bharati Mukherjee does not attack colonialism because she is of Indian descent. She attacks all stable monolithic discourses. She deconstructs the colonial discourse, but does not shy away from equally striking against the post-colonial establishment. She does this from the position of the exile: within neither culture, despite being produced by both of them. Her writing, in this way, is infused with the ethics of the exile and deconstructive feminist epistemology. Bharati Mukherjee's novels are a great example of multiculturalism, feminism, postcolonialism and postmodernism and through her ethnically diverse characters, especially her women heroes, Bharati Mukherjee purposely deconstructs the structures of domination in contemporary society.

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²¹ Bharati Mukherjee, "Imagining Homelands," *Letters of Transit: Reflections on Exile, Identity, Language, and Loss*, London: The New Press, 2000, p. 69.

²² Tina Chen and Sean X. Goudie, "Holders of the Word: An Interview with Bharati Mukherjee (1997)," Dec. 2005, retrieved at <http://social.chass.ncsu.edu/jouvert/vlil/bharat.htm>.

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Delimitation of the Referendum from other Politico-Legal Concepts

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Abstract

The present article sketches a delimitation of the referendum from the other political-legal concepts. The popular veto is a procedure of semi-direct democracy. The popular initiative does not imply an existing decision on which to pronounce, but hence to suggest even a new law. The recall or revocation is an application of the semi-direct democratic regime when exercising the judicial function. The plebiscite becomes however the main decisional procedure with normative.

Keywords: *semi-direct democracy, popular veto, citizens, law, popular initiative, Constitution, Parliament, the option, the recall, the plebiscite, popular revocation.*

1. Delimitation of popular veto

The popular veto is a procedure of semi-direct democracy. This used to consist of “the procedure by which a law voted by the parliament is implemented can be taken out from vigor if, in a term of its application, a previously established number of citizens asks that the law be subject to popular vote, and the elective body do not approve it.¹ The difference mentioned by Tudor Draganu is of temporal nature, the popular veto would be acting after the law entered into force and it was already applied, while the referendum acts so that the law stays in force.

The difference however lies under the normative power of the two enactment instruments. Therefore if the referendum blocks the entry into force of a normative act, the popular veto has a greater power, abrogating in fact a normative act which has already effects as a consequence of its application.

¹ Tudor Draganu, *Drept constituțional și instituții politice, Tratat elementar*, vol. I, Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 1998, p. 244.

Paul Negulescu defines the popular vote as a right to cancel which the people holds upon the law voted by the parliament, right which the people can use only in a certain term and after its expiration the law is supposed to be approved by the people and therefore it produces all its effects.² By the author's description, the popular veto appears as a resolutely condition of the civil part which affects the law approved by the legislative authority. This procedure is found in the Swiss cantons Lucerne, Geneve, Neuchatel.

Therefore, this procedure does not block the improvement or judicial development of a law, but only its application. The law is accomplished in a legal point of view, unlike the case when the referendum is mentioned, when it is improved from a legal point of view only by popular ratification.

2. Popular initiative

Regarding the description made by Tudor Draganu, this procedure represents a measure which should be applied in two stages. Therefore, on the first hand, we have an initiative of legislative project which is suggested by a certain number of citizens, in order to be approved by the legislative authority. If the parliament refuses to approve the mentioned initiative, the electorate can organize a new voting tour and thus forces the parliament to enact according to the obtained result which represents the popular will.

The popular initiative does not imply an existing decision on which to pronounce, but hence to suggest even a new law.

Ion Deleanu considers the popular initiative as a technique of semi-direct democracy which is appointed by the Constitution by the phrase "legislative proposal". The legislative initiative is the process to obtain the law at the direct citizens' proposal. The author describes two types of initiative: the proposal that the Parliament should decide upon the opportunity of its legislative intervention in a certain filed or the collective application so that the Parliament should act upon a legislative project already formed, "the formulated legislative". The Parliament is bound to act, even if it does endorse the initiative.³

The popular initiative is defined by Ioan Muraru and Elena Simina Tanasescu as "the procedure by which the people of a state give the impulse (initiate) a decision process; this decision beginning can be completed also by people's intervention (referendum) or by a decision adopted by the authorities

² Paul Negulescu, *Curs de drept roman constituțional*, Bucharest, 1928, p. 286.

³ Ion Deleanu, *Instituțiile și procedurile constituționale*, vol. II, Servo-Sat, Arad, 1998, p. 454.

legally named by the people (law approved by the Parliament).⁴ Results that the popular initiative has no decisional nature, being a participation modality for the exercise of power, not for the exercise of sovereignty.

3. The option

In Tudor Drăganu's opinion, there are significant differences between the referendum and the opinion, this is just a form of referendum. The option requires that the parliament propose for approval by the electorate, two or more variants, and the people should make a choice, instead of expressing by yes or no, in case of referendum.

Such a procedure was applied in France, when at the referendum on 21st of October 1945 the electorate has to choose among:

- a) Restoring into force the Constitution from 1875.
- b) Organizing a Constituent with unlimited power.⁵

4. Recall the judicial decisions

The recall or revocation is an application of the semi-direct democratic regime when exercising the judicial function. It is applied in United States of America, its purpose being to prevent judges from abusive of their right which is recognized to control the constitutionality of the laws.

The scope is obviously different from that of the referendum, here the recall interferes because of the judicial decisions.

5. The plebiscite

The word plebiscite also derives from Latin language, where from the combination of the words *plebs* and *scire* appeared the name of a juridical institution different from that of referendum, which consisted in addressing a question (*scrire*) *plebei* (voting citizens named by the authorities only with the goal to discover their opinion, so only with advisory nature, because the opinion expressed so could be ignored by the Patricians and soldiers' forum).⁶

As we mentioned before, the plebiscite becomes however the main decisional procedure with normative character, being compared with the law by Gaius. Moreover, during the empire, when the difference between the populace

⁴ Ioan Muraru and Elena Simina Tănăsescu, *Dreptul constituțional și instituțiile politice*, vol II, C. H. Beck, Bucharest, 2006, p. 134.

⁵ M. Duverger, *Dreptul constituțional si institutiile politice*, Paris, 1973, pp. 93-96, quote by Tudor Draganu in the mentioned work, p. 245.

and people has no longer the same importance, and the difference between the law and plebiscite is diminished to extinction, so that between the most of the laws adopted during that period were in fact the result of the plebiscite.

The authors consider that in our times, “between the two juridical institutions the differences are only of nuance and connotation. Only at terminology level the term referendum has a positive connotation, in order to favour a real democracy, ant it risks of transformation into a plebiscite are not to be ignored. The negative connotation of the term plebiscite would be due to its wrong or abusive use, because they sought the legal approval of the authority which had initiated it, than a real verification of all the society layers. Since this separation, it is obvious that two different institutions, beginning with the authority which organizes the voting method, the scope and objective of the vote are arte other than the referendum. Even the authors make other distinction, starting from the original sense of the plebiscite that it derivates towards a “populist instrument and of demagogical nature”⁷. The sub layer of this fine delimitation would be that the ancient difference between the populace and people as a subject of popular referendum, is still producing juridical consequences “at the level of language latent meanings can still be found”. The difference is based on the ancient distinction between the people and populace, but in our days, to organize a referendum requires an informed electorate, politically responsible, that vote aware of the consequences of consultation, and the plebiscite is addressed to a group of people that vote aware of the consequences of consultation, the plebiscite is addressed to a group of persons who vote as they are told, or by deceptive means and intimidation.

The plebiscite represents the alteration, in caesarian sense, of the referendum, so that the popular sovereignty is no longer active, but passive, it accepts and does not decides⁸. It represents a classic procedure of adopting the totalitarian constitutions under an apparent democracy. The theoretical possibility to reject a proposal really exists, but the consultation is practically organized in such a way that the success is certified: only one constituent alternative, open vote, separate lists for the opponents...The motivation to organize is to obtain an apparent legitimacy for the authorities appeared after a coup d'état.

In Romania this procedure was used twice by: Al.I.Cuza for the ratification of the Developed State in Convention of Paris, and by Charles the 2nd for the

⁷ Ioan Muraru, Elena Simina Tănașescu, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 135.

⁸ Dan Claudiu Dănișor, *Dreptul constituțional și instituțiile politice*, Basic course, Universitaria, Craiova, 1999, p. 187.

ratification of the conceded⁹ constitution in 1938. Every time they used an open vote and separate lists for the opponents.

The author concludes as follows “the significant difference of the referendum is that in case of referendum the people are asked to choose, while in case of plebiscite the people are asked to quit.”¹⁰

In French literature, the plebiscite means a popular vote which has as object the manifestation of trust in a certain person or an act of his/her.¹¹ The difference consists in the fact that the plebiscite has as object only a manifestation of trust. Nor, it is not governed by the Constitution, but it appears as a, extra-constitutional procedure, by which tries to present the appearance that the nation adheres to certain acts of some autocrat governors.

On a closer analysis, the plebiscite is not a democratic procedure, because the people cannot choose among several candidates, but mostly to refuse to trust in a single candidate. History shows us that the plebiscites have overwhelming majorities.

Tudor Drăganu considers that the meaning of the plebiscite is even larger in our country, by this procedure it is understood any popular vote.

Pierre Pactet mentions that the referendum procedure may decline and become plebiscite. The theory clearly differentiate the two concepts: referendum is when the vote is given according to personality of the question author.¹² In fact, the author warns about that the transformation is almost undetectable because it is difficult to detach the question from the author, even if the author is the President himself/herself, and not a collegial authority or a forum.

Generally, it may be considered that the transformation would be easy if it meets some characteristic elements, the most important is the blackmail from the starting point: if the question author transforms the positive vote in a condition of keeping his/her position is plebiscite because the author himself/ herself invites the electorate to vote in his/ her favor and not considering the question. Other characteristic elements are the concentration and personalization of the power in author’s favor, high complexity of the question, the necessity of a single answer,

⁹ The conceded constitution is a constitution that which makes the transition from the absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, being approved only by the king, as a concession for the people. The sovereign limits his/her powers, limits his/her exercise of power. His/ her own will is in fact an euphemism, even if the king is the one who approved it, all the people are the constituent true power, even if meditated.

¹⁰ *Idem*, p. 187.

¹¹ Tudor Drăganu, *Dreptul constituțional și instituțiile politice*, Elementary essay, vol. I, Lumina Lex, Bucharest, 1998, p. 245.

¹² Pierre Pactet, *Institutions politiques, Droit constitutionnel*, Masson, Paris, 1985, p. 92.

while in fact there would be two questions and the manipulation of the public opinion through official propaganda. The plebiscite represents a shocking pressure for the citizens of a democratic state.

6. Popular revocation

Dan Claudiu Dănișor defines the popular revocation as “the procedure by which a certain number of electors may cause a pre-term termination of a representative’s mandate or the whole unit.”¹³ This procedure is used when the petitions of the electorate are not longer satisfied by the chosen one. In case of individual revocation, if the percentage of those who solicits is sufficient, the representative is in minority and he/she has to give up, and in case of collective revocation, the result is the actual dissolution of the legislature.

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¹³ Dan Claudiu Danisor, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

Modal Logic and Its Forms

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Abstract

The discursiveness in the process of (logical) argumentation must take into consideration a series of aspects connected to the concepts used, the definitions resulted with the help of these concepts, the theories analyzed. From this perspective, the modal logic and its specific forms involve a reevaluation of reasoning. Moreover, through pertinent discursive argumentations are visible problematical approaches which have certain philosophical significances. Therefore, the new logics reflect at the level of discursiveness a certain meaning which participates in its turn in assuming a certain logical paradigm.

Keywords: *the modal logic, the temporal logic, the epistemic logic, the logic of action, the logic of acceptance, the dynamic logic, the teleological logic.*

1.1 General characterization of the modal logic

The modal logic (founded in fact by Aristotle¹) represents that part of logic where the modal propositions are studied. The modal propositions are formulated like this: “It is necessary to learn the modal logic”, “It is possible for us to go on a trip tomorrow”, “It is forbidden to walk on this road” etc. In these sentences one can notice expressions such as: “it is necessary to”, “it is possible to”, “it is forbidden to” which are the subject matter of modal logic. Still along these there are other expressions or notions specific to this type of logic: “contingent”, “existent”, “falsified”, “logical-false”, “factual-true”, “obligatory”, “permitted”, “good”, “worse”, “always”, “later” etc. All these expressions (notions) belong to the modal logic especially, and if they are analyzed privately, they belong to subfields (“private logics”) of the modal logic. In other words, in modal logic are used modalities that relate to propositions, events or certain states of facts. “The modal logics are generally built as superior levels of the logic of propositions and the logic of predicates. The logic of prepositions, its axiomatic and semantic is

¹ Aristotle analyzed four modalities: possible, contingent, impossible and necessary.

accepted as a support platform (...). The modality is seen thus, as a manner or a supplementary specification of the way in which a sentence can be true”². The term “modal logic” has a double meaning: (i) the limited meaning through which the alethical logic is approached; (ii) the broad meaning through which the deontic logic, the epistemic logic, the temporal logic (the chronological logic), the dynamic logic, the logic of acceptance, the teleological logic, the existential logic and so on are approached..

A distinction concerning the logical interpretation of *modalities* is necessary. Thus, if one combines the calculation of propositions with the modal logic then he/she obtains a propositional modal logic. If the calculation of predicates is combined with the modal logic then one obtains the modal logic of predicates.

G. H.von Wright distinguishes the following modalities:

- (1) alethical: necessary, possible, impossible, contingent;
- (2) deontic: obligatory, permitted, forbidden, indifferent;
- (3) epistemic: verified, admissible (non falsified), disproved (falsified), indecisive (undecided);
- (4) existential: universality, existence, nonexistence, presence and absence of a property

Among those who contributed to the development of the modal logic we can mention: C. I. Lewis, Robert Feys, G. H. von Wright, von Halden and so on. The modal logic amasses a rather consistent series of formal systems. Connecting different modalities (for example, *necessary* and *possible*), the systems of modal logic emphasize the relations specific to the logical square of oppositions. “The logical systems provided with these modal relations are usually regulated which means that by eliminating the modal functors from the theses of the modal system we find again the theses of the classical logic”³. In other words, in a modal system we can find rules which are specific to the traditional logic (to which a series of modal axioms is added). The spreading of the modal logic and its methods has also acquired relevance through the appearance of a semantics based on the notion of the possible world. On the other hand, there are known modal logics which through diverse applications have contributed to the appearance and development of new fields specific to scientific theories.

² Cornel Popa, *Logic and Metalogic (Logică și metalogică)*, Volume II, Fundația România de Mâine Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002, p. 244.

³ Petre Botezatu, *Logico-philosophical Interpretations (Interpretări logico-filosofice)*, Junimea Publishing House, Iași, 1982, p. 150.

TYPES OF MODAL LOGICS SYSTEMS

One can mention among the main systems of the modal logics the following:

G.H. von Wright's modal logic (1916-2003) emphasizes two equivalent axiomatic systems (*the P system* and *the O system*): an axiomatic system where the primitive operator is permission (P) and the defined operators are obligation (O) and interdiction (F) and an axiomatic system where the primitive operator is obligation (O) and the defined operators are interdiction (F) and (P)⁴.

Jan Lukasiewicz's modal logic (1878-1956) in which the Polish logician shows that modalities cannot be analyzed within a bivalent system of logic. From this point of view, starting from a bivalent logic [where are used only the values *true* (1) and *false* (0)], he succeeds in developing a structure of a trivalent logic [where he adds to the traditional values the value *possible* ($\frac{1}{2}$)⁵]. Jan

Lukasiewicz's modalities have been afterwards researched by Clarence Irving Lewis and C.H. Langford who introduced the “doubtful” functor marked with D. Through the “doubtful” functor one can formulate *the principle of the excluded quart* (*quartum non datur*), according to which any proposition *p* can have one of the values 1 (true), 0 (false) or $\frac{1}{2}$ (possible) which in the Lukasiewiczian symbolism can be formulated like this: “Any proposition **p** is either necessary or doubtful or impossible”⁶.

Grigore Moisil's modal logic (1906-1973) where on the basis of symbolizations specific to Jan Lukasiewicz's system another system is built (1942) at its foundation one can find the operator S which is read (“maybe without”).

The structure of a modal proposition is given by *dictum* and *modus*:

(a) **Dictum** (which is noted with **D**) – comprises the basic information;

(b) **Modus** (which is noted with **M**) – comprises supplementary information about the opinions, the feelings, the attitudes of the subjects of knowledge.

For example:

It is possible to snow tomorrow.

where:

⁴ Cornel Popa, *quoted works*, p. 324.

⁵ **M** represents the initial from the German word “möglich” = “possible” (examples: $Mp \xrightarrow{\text{se citeste}} (\text{IT IS READ})$)

“p is possible”; $NMp \xrightarrow{\text{se citeste}} (\text{IT IS READ})$, “p is not possible”).

⁶ Anton Dumitriu, *The History of Logic (Istoria logicii)*, Vol. 4, Technical Publishing House, Bucharest, 1998, p. 199.

Modus- “it is possible”

Dictum – “to snow tomorrow”

In modal logic there is a distinction between two types of sentences. In fact, this distinction becomes concrete as far as the linguistic expressions of modal propositions are concerned. It is about the distinction between those sentences where the modal word is attached to the copula (for example: “Any divisor of 12 is necessarily a divisor of 60”)⁷ and those sentences where, on one hand, the modal expression is prefixed to a whole sentence (for example: “Some people from this room might know something about the modal logic”) and on the other hand, the modal expression is postfixed to the proposition itself (for example: “To get to that certain street you have to go round that park, it is necessary to do this”)⁸. The value of truth of the modal propositions depends on the value of truth of the dictum and the truthfulness of the modus.

Examples:

- the proposition “It is necessary for students to pass their final exams to apply for a university” is a true one;
- the proposition “It is impossible to think if he/she does not have a finger at his/her left hand” represents a false one.

1.2 Forms of modal logic

1.2.1 THE DEONTIC LOGIC (OR THE NORMS LOGIC⁹ OR THE IMPERATIVE LOGIC OR THE LOGIC OF DUTY)

The deontic logic ($\tau \circ \delta \circ o \nu =$ to déon = “duty”, “obligation”) is the one that uses operators specific to its field in prescriptive (normative) reasonings. The deontic logic is a logic of obligations that has a practical character. Among those that can be considered forerunners of the deontic logic one can mention Aristotle (“Nichomachica Ethics” and “the Motion of Animals”), Martinus Schickardus (“Judiciary Logic” - 1615), Ernst Mally, L. Lapie, Karl Menger, W. Dubislaw, Alfred Hofstadter, J. Jorgensen, Rose Rand, A. Hofstadter, Alf Ross, A. Ledent, K. Grelling. Of course one should not forget the contribution of philosophers well-known in the history of thinking such as T. Hobbes (who in the paper, “Leviathan”

⁷ The sentences where the modal component is inside the proposition are called modal propositions *sine dicto* (without a distinct dictum).

⁸ The enunciations where the modal expression is prefixed or postfixed to the proposition are made of an assertory proposition (*de dictum*) and a proposition that shows the modal nature of its content (*de modus*). If these two components are separated in the linguistic formulations, the latter being applied to the former as a whole then those certain enunciations represent modal propositions *cum dicto*.

⁹ Another sense equivalent to the logic of norms is also *the logic of normatives*.

conceives a moral philosophy like a science on *natural laws*), B. Spinoza (who builds a logical system of the ethical norms within which the sentences are *moreo geometrico* demonstrated), John Locke (who speaks about the empirical origin of the moral norms), David Hume (who argues the relationship between the enunciative propositions and the prescriptive ones), I. Kant (who makes a classification of the norms and makes a connection between the deontic categories and the modal ones), J. S. Mill (who in the paper “The System of logic” analyses the logic of practice to which are subordinated the moral and the practice). But those who really dealt with the first deontic calculations (1950) are the Finnish Henrik von Wright¹⁰, the French G. Kalinowschi¹¹, E. Garcia Mayne¹².

The deontic logic allows through the instruments that it offers problematic approaches with certain philosophical significances: “Among these one can mention the discussion of the principle of universalization (when something is obligatory/permited/prohibited then it is like this for all) and the formal treatment of Hume’s law referring to the dichotomy between facts and values, due to which from descriptive propositions it is not possible to derive any other normative proposition”¹³.

The main deontic modalities are: obligatory, permitted, forbidden, indifferent.

Therefore, if one takes the word PURPIREA, then it will represent the equipollence of the following forms:

- the first vowel “U” expresses the formula *not permitted non-p* (*it is not permitted for S to be non-P*)
- the second vowel “I” expresses the formula *it is not obligatory p* (*it is not obligatory for S to be P*)
- the third vowel “E” expresses the formula *it is forbidden non-p* (*it is forbidden for S to be non-P*)
- the fourth vowel “A” expresses the formula *it is obligatory p* (*it is obligatory for S to be P*)

¹⁰ Henrik von Wright analyses the first ideas concerning the deontic logic in works such as “Deontic logic”, *Mind*, 1951, “Norm and action”, 1963, and “An essay in deontic logic and the general theory of action”, 1968.

¹¹ G. Kalinowski created two systems of deontic logic in “Théorie des propositions normatives”, 1953.

¹² E. Garcia Mayne built a system of judiciary logic in the work “Los principios de la ontología formal del derecho y su expresión”, 1953.

¹³ Cosma Luminița, Pop Mihaela, Dumitru Anca (trans.), *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Human Sciences (Enciclopedie de Filosofie și Științe Umane)*, All Educational Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004, pp. 609-610.

The deontic logic reduces itself to the modal logic. From this perspective, one can mention Alan R. Anderson's reductionist conception. Thus in the paper *The formal analysis of normative system* (1956) Alan R. Anderson shows that the deontic logic is reduced to the modal logic with the help of the notion "sanction" (not completing a fact does not necessarily imply the sanction).

This problem was also dealt with by A. N. Prior in his work "Escapism". Also, in deontic logic one speaks about the existence of some paradoxes that reflect certain limitations of applying the logic formulae on the cases specific to this type of logic¹⁴. From this perspective, one can mention the following deontic paradoxes:

(1) Arthur N. Prior's first paradox ("the paradox of the derived obligation") which is known with the formulation "if p is forbidden then if p is obligatory, q is too" and which has the formula $Fp \rightarrow O(p \rightarrow q)$, which is read "if p is forbidden then if p is obligatory, q is too";

(2) Arthur N. Prior's second paradox ("the good Samaritan's paradox) – which is known under the formulation "if p is forbidden then its conjunction with a certain q is also forbidden" and which has the formula $Fp \rightarrow F(p \& q)$;

(3) Alf Ross's paradox¹⁵ - which is known with the formulation "if it is obligatory p , then it is obligatory p or q " and which has the formula $Op \rightarrow O(p \vee q)$ (for example: "if it is obligatory to mail a letter, then it is obligatory to mail the letter or burn it").

Another deontic system of major importance in the modal logic is *Smiley-Hanson's system*¹⁶, which has as main characteristic the demonstration of some theorems with repeated deontic functors.

The formalization of the judiciary reasoning is possible through the logic of norms which belongs to the deontic logic. A normative proposition is neither true nor false; it can either be or not be rational.

A peculiarity of the deontic logic is the judicial logic, a term which in the reference literature has two meanings:

- a limited one- where one approaches the logic of lawful norms;

¹⁴ Gheorghe Enescu, *Logic Dictionary (Dicționar de logică)*, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1985, pp. 266-267.

¹⁵ Alf Ross (1899-1979) is considered a philosopher of law of Danish origin.

¹⁶ In fact, through Smiley-Hanson's system one understands the totality of those systems of deontic logic resulted from the researches done by T. J. Smiley and W. H. Hanson. From this perspective Lennart Åqvist distinguishes 10 classes of such models ("subsystems"): OK system, OM system, OS-4 system, OB system, OS-5 system, OK^+ system, OM^+ system, $OS4^+$ system, OB^+ system, $OS5^+$ system.

- an enlarged one- where one approaches the logic of the judicial norms and the logic of argumentation from the judicial field.

When the rational analysis concentrates on a judicial logic, in fact, one approaches the majority of the problems of formal logic (terms/notions; inductive and deductive reasonings and so on). This situation expresses a relationship between the deontic logic and the researches connected to the deontic syllogistic (Z. Ziembka), the semantics of deontic logic (S. Kripke, S. Kanger, J. Hintikka). Also, within the judicial logic there are added different postulates specific to this field. Among these postulates one can mention: (i) *nulla poena sine lege* (*there is no punishment without law*) and (ii) *nullum crimen sine lege* (*there is no offence without law*).

In some reference works one tried to put the basis of the deontic logic on “the theory of the actionable modalities or the human possible related to the human situations and the agents’ abilities and the logic of accepting as a theory of the value judgments accepted by an agent, a group or a community”¹⁷. Thus, there are visible certain reevaluations concerning some classical systems and also some systems of the modal logic. Introducing some agents and taking into consideration their characteristics and implementing at the level of such course of action the concept of “actionable situation” (described through some descriptive true propositions) one does nothing but offer a perspective centered on making the modal logic pragmatic. It fact, it is about a specific program through which there are offered models applicable in the socio-human sciences and the field of artificial intelligence. In this way, one tried to build semantic theories on trees for the dynamic deontic logic and for the deontic logic referring to the states resulted from the human conduct.

1.2.2 THE TEMPORAL LOGIC (OR THE TIME LOGIC OR THE CHRONOLOGICAL LOGIC OR THE CHANGE LOGIC¹⁸)

The temporal logic is the one that applies in the study of reasonings made of propositions that have a temporal aspect. Among the temporal modalities (operators) one can mention: “always”, “at least”, “sometime”, “sometimes”, “before”, “after”, “simultaneous”, “the latest”, “earlier”, “now”, “until” and so on.

¹⁷ Cornel Popa, *quoted works*, p. 359.

¹⁸ Temporal logic is studied by G.H. von Wright as a logic of change: “(...) any transformation of state can be regarded as a function of truth of some elementary state transformations (...) the p-expressions could be named in a general sense the *state descriptions* and the T-expressions as *change descriptions*”, in G.H. von Wright, *(Norm and Action) Normă și acțiune*, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1982, pp. 34 – 51.

The problem of temporal enunciations was dealt by thinkers such as: Aristotle¹⁹, Diodor Cronos²⁰, William of Shyreswood (1190-1249), Heinrich Gustav Reichenbach (1823-1889), Arthur N. Prior (1914-1969)²¹, Nicholas Rescher²², G.H. von Wright (who introduces the temporal quanta of the type “always”, “sometimes”).

The temporal logic²³ (or the time logic or the chronological logic) deals with the temporal enunciations, in other words those propositions where the content depends on the way in which a state of fact that these express, can set in time. Consequently, “the combination of logic categories with time gives birth to some systems whose study is profitable and contributes to a better understanding of the notions connected to the concept of time (such as the verbal flexions and the verb tenses), of the relationships between modalities and time and the structure of time and the nature of negation.”²⁴

Also, the temporal enunciations can be closed or open. The closed temporal enunciations are those in which when one indicates the exact temporal moment of a state of fact (“in the past”, “in the future”), moment that can be found in a specific chronology, thing which is possible through a process of temporal quantification. (examples: “In the past people lived better”, “One can travel in the future with the help of thought”, “Romanians have gained their liberty and dignity in December 1989” or “It always snows in Vatra-Dornei” or “It sometimes rains at the seaside”). The open temporal enunciations are those which use words such as: tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, today, yesterday (examples: “I sit for an exam at Maths tomorrow” or “The day after tomorrow we are going on a trip”).

The temporal logic appears in an axiomized form in Arthur N. Prior’s work “Time and Modality” (1957). In fact, a long time ago Diodor interpreted the necessity in temporal terms when he says that “The necessity is what is true and what will always be true”. Also in the work “Past, Present and Future”, Arthur N. Prior uses the Polish marking belonging to Jan Lukasiewicz and takes as a starting

¹⁹ At Aristotle this problem appears when the future contingents are analyzed.

²⁰ Diodor Cronos interpreted the necessity in temporal terms when he says that “The necessity is what is true and what will always be true”, from this perspective he explains the implication according to time.

²¹ Arthur N. Prior, *Time and Modality*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1957.

²² Nicholas Rescher analyses the problem of temporal logic in chapter XII, “Chronological Logic” from Topics, p. 196-228, from *Philosophical Logic*, D. Reidel Publ.Comp., Dordrecht, 1968.

²³ In some specialty works there is a distinction at a conceptual level between the temporal logic and the time logic. Thus, the temporal logic is regarded as a logic from the time perspective and the time logic is the time from the logic perspective.

²⁴ Newton Da Costa, *Classical and Neoclassical Logics (Logici clasice și neclasice)*, Technical Publishing House, Bucharest, 2004, p. 179.

point the Wrightian modal systems when he proposes a Diodorean system of temporal logic.

The temporal logic relates to the temporal intervals²⁵ and the temporal relations²⁶ (“before”, “after”, “simultaneous”). Thus, one can admit the existence of a differentiated temporal logic in accordance with the adopted structure of time: circular, linear, linear time logic with beginning or linear time logic without beginning ($K_l^{\infty -}$), linear time logic with ending, linear time logic without ending ($K_l^{\infty +}$), linear time logic without beginning and without ending ($K_l^{\infty \pm}$), dense linear time logic²⁷ (K_{ld}^{∞}), continuous time logic (K_{lr}^{∞})²⁸. All these forms of temporal logic can generate in certain systems concrete (valid) inferential forms. However, a specific axiomatization is not possible yet, for the time being, in some temporal structures. At the same time, one should remember that, if the temporal propositions comprise a variable part then one can say about them that they represent “time functions”. Moreover, the temporal functions can be quantified (“ $\forall t$ ” – “no matter the time”; “ $\exists t$ ” – “there is a time in which”).

Met within some specific temporal systems (metrical, additive, causal, relativist, ramified, linear, rational, integral, real²⁹), this type of logic (temporal logic) implies differentiation criteria which situate the operational analysis within the logical formalisms (the temporal logical system which imposes modalities specific to the grammatical time³⁰, the temporal logic system which imposes modalities ordered on the axis anterior-contemporary-simultaneous³¹, the temporal logical system of dating³²). There are obvious in this case the different temporal systems through which the used type of modality acquires pragmatic valences³³.

Therefore, the temporal logics come:

²⁵ *The logical theory of intervals (Teoria logică a intervalor)* represents a branch of temporal logic.

²⁶ The logical analysis of these relationships is analyzed by modern physics, an example from this perspective being the W. Heisenberg's uncertainty relationships.

²⁷ The density formulae are analyzed by the logic of rational time ($K_{ld}^{\infty \pm}$).

²⁸ The continuity formulae are analyzed by the *real time logic*.

²⁹ Petru Ioan, *Logic and Metalogic (Logică și metalogică)*, Junimea Publishing House, Iași, 1983, p. 159.

³⁰ The modalities specific to the grammatical time logic are: F_n = in the future; P_n = in the past; F = sometimes in the future; P = sometimes in the past; G = always in the future; H = always in the past.

³¹ The modalities specific to such temporal logic (which are ordered in an anterior-contemporary-simultaneous way) are: T = in the next moment; Y = in the anterior moment;

³² The modality of the temporal logic system of dating is given by a predicator of temporal making R_t , which in the form $Rt(p)$ has the meaning: “at the t moment, p takes place”.

³³ Florentina Călmățuanu, *Typologies of the deductive systems (Tipologii ale sistemelor deductive)*, “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University Press, Iași, 2006, p. 208-219.

- from formulae which are valid independently from the order structure of time (the group of these formulae is known in the specialty literature as having the name “minimal temporal logic”);
- by adding formulae that correspond to some possible properties of the **R** order structure of time in accordance with some specific formulae;
- from formulae that correspond to linearity, density and continuity etc;
- by non-admitting some specific formulae.

However, the logical context emphasizes the fact that the term “temporal logic” reminds of different meanings such as: (i) Linear Temporal Logic; (ii) Temporal Logic of Action - TLA; (iii) Branching Logic.

Also there is a distinction between temporal logic (which is logic from the time perspective) and tense logic (*tense logic* – a logic through which the tense is analyzed from a logical perspective). Arthur Prior introduced *tense logic* to explain the idea of logical time from the logical perspective. In the same way, Leslie Lamport introduced *temporal logic* of actions in order to make easy the checking of some systems. From this point of view there has been introduced a language for the temporal logic of actions known as TLA⁺.

The universe of the temporal logic is built on the theory of Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZM) groups. The temporal logic found applications in formal checkings [(i) *model checking*³⁴ – which supposes an exhaustive systematic exploration of the mathematical model; the aimed aspects from this perspective being those connected with *linear temporal logic* (LTL)³⁵ and *computational tree logic* (CTL)³⁶; (ii) of the *logical inference* type – where there are aimed problems of understanding some softwares of formal validation of the mathematical reasoning (HOL Theorem prover³⁷, ACL2³⁸, Isabelle³⁹ or Coq⁴⁰], through which there can be demonstrated certain specific theorems.

³⁴ Web address: <http://www.cs.utt.ro/~marius/curs/vf/curs2.pdf>, accessed 22nd August 2009.

³⁵ Amir Pnueli (n. 1941) and Zohar Manna (n. 1939) dealt with this field in works such as “The Temporal Logic of Reactive and Concurrent Systems: Specification”, Springer-Verlag, 1991; “The Temporal Logic of Reactive and Concurrent Systems: Safety”, Springer-Verlag, 1995; “The Temporal Logic of Reactive and Concurrent Systems: Progress” (the preparing stage).

³⁶ *Computational tree logic* (CTL) is in fact a ramified logic of time. This field was particularly dealt by Edmund Clarke and E. Allen Emerson.

³⁷ *HOL Theorem* prover is a program that allows “the demonstration” of theorems.

³⁸ *ACL2* (*A Computational Logic for Applicative Common Lisp*) is software system which consists of a programming language, a theory extended in fact, to the first level of the formal logic (the predicates logic, of the first order, the logic of predicates, of the-n order).

³⁹ *Isabelle* is HOL Theorem prover’s successor.

⁴⁰ *Coq* allows the checking of mathematical expressions (assertions) (web address: <http://coq.inria.fr/about-coq>, accessed 2nd September 2009).

Also the *temporal intervals logic* (which is a specific form of temporal logic) developed by Ben Moszkowski, found its usefulness in the formal description of the hardware and software systems.

The formation of the temporal enunciations reminds, on the one hand, of their defining from a temporal point of view (their truthfulness and falsity do not take into account the time of assertion), and on the other hand, of their temporal non defining (the truthfulness or the falsity depend on the time of assertion). This problem can also be found in the interest sphere of the logician Petru Ioan when he analyses the formalization of the enunciations temporally affected⁴¹. Thus, at the centre of these researches there is the fundamental concept of temporal logic which is called *temporal accomplishment* expressed through the following formula:

$$R_t(a) = A \text{ is accomplished at the time } t$$

In this way, there results the construction of the system R of temporal logic as an extension of the common logic.

1.2.3 THE EPISTEMIC LOGIC

The epistemic logic is a specific logic through which one tries to explain “those in tensional contexts of belief and knowledge”⁴². Consequently, in the reference literature there was proposed an *epistemic logic* (different from *the logic of belief*) in the true sense of the word as soon as Jaakko Hintikka’s work *Science and Belief* (1962) was published. Specific to these two types of logic is the fact that both remind of a semantic of the possible worlds⁴³. Therefore, within an epistemic logic we study propositions where the modalities of knowledge *to know* and *to believe* are obvious, which are in fact, interdefinable/irreducible (a property resulted from the fact that those certain modalities represent expressions of the knowledgeable subject’s attitudes.) This fact allows at a theoretical level a distinction between “*a stricto-sensu epistemic logic* (of knowledge) and a *doxastic logic* (of opinion)”⁴⁴.

Starting from the note *Bap* (*a* thinks that *b*)⁴⁵ and *Kap* (*a* knows that *p*)⁴⁶ one

⁴¹ Petru Ioan, *Logical Perspectives (Perspective logice)*, Junimea Publishing House, Iași, 1987, pp. 252-253.

⁴² Marie-Dominique Popelard and Denis Vernant, *Elements of logic (Elemente de logică)*, European Institute, Iași, 2003, p. 100.

⁴³ In logic the moment one talks about *a semantic of the possible worlds*, one admits that the logical laws represent enunciations valid in all possible worlds.

⁴⁴ Florentina Călmățuiu, *quoted works*, p. 220.

⁴⁵ The “B” letter comes from, “Believe”.

⁴⁶ The “K” letter comes from “Know”.

can make a calculi database which supposes the existence of the following theorems:

$Kap \supset KaKap \xrightarrow{\text{se citeste}} \text{IT IS READ}$ If a knows that p , then a knows that a knows that p

$Bap \supset KaBap \xrightarrow{\text{it's read}} \text{IT IS READ}$ If a thinks that p , then a knows that a thinks that p

$Kap \supset BaKap \xrightarrow{\text{it's read}} \text{IT IS READ}$ If a knows that p , then a thinks that a knows that p

As a result, the laws of the scientific contexts specific to the epistemic logic⁴⁷ are characterized through the epistemic in tensional operators. Their role consists in the fact that they express modalities that refer to the cognitive relationship.

Examples of epistemic in tensional operators: “it is known that”(knowledge operator), “it is really thought that”, “ it is supposed that”, (belief act operators), “it is demonstrable that”, “it is reasonable to think that” (operators specific to a logic of justifying or founding).

Newton da Costa shows that the epistemic logic sets on the one hand within the category of the thetic systems and on the other hand in the category of the non-thetic systems of the second species⁴⁸ (there are formulated hypotheses and suppositions which cannot be considered in the true sense of the word as true or false but are rather considered systematizations of some results obtained as a consequence of the experimental researches).

Within this epistemic logic one can find the autoepistemic logic introduced by Moore and completed by Stalnaker. Built on the basis of the propositional modal logic, the autoepistemic logic has as a specific form of language the introspective modal operator L . for instance, a formula La is read” it is believed that a is true”. A variant of the autoepistemic logic is *Nonmonotonic modal logic N* (also called *the pure logic of necessity*) which is considered a *weak logic* because it does not contain its own modal axioms.

⁴⁷ The importance of the epistemic logic is relevant in the theory of knowledge, an example from this perspective being the one which reminds of Gödel’s theorems through which it is shown that no form of knowledge can offer an unconditional guarantee of truth.

⁴⁸ The non-thetic systems of second species are part of the heterodox (nonclassical) logic system which is that logic where there are not satisfied at least two of the conditions of existence specific to the orthodox (classical) logic.

1.2.4 THE EXISTENTIAL LOGIC

Existential logic has as existential modalities: the universality, the existence, the partiality (the presence of a property) and the void. That is why, the logic of acceptance is regarded as a logic of the value judgments.

1.2.5 THE TELEOLOGICAL LOGIC

The teleological logic is a logic of goals and subordinates to a logic of human actions. Also, this type of logic combines perfectly with elements of *the logic of preference*. Built on analogy and not on an extension of the deontic logic, the teleological logic (the teleo-logic differs from the deonto-logic) comes to justify the necessity of the concept of “goal” at the level of a complex relationship assumed between certain logical entities. Thus, one can find at the level of a teleological logic formulae such as $S(a, t_1, p)$ and $S(a, l, p)$ which are read “agent a proposes at the moment t_1 as goal the state p ” and “agent a wants to reach the state p through l ”, formulae which can be found in a unitary relationship of the type $S(a, t_1, p, t_2, q, l)$ which is read “agent a proposes at the moment t_1 and in the conditions p to achieve at the moment t_2 , the state q through the series of acts l ”.

One can notice in this case a connection between the teleological logic and the dynamic one where it appears as a fundamental idea of a pragmatic nature which is given by the relationship goal-conduct.

The respective agent is in other words in an actionable situation and being based on a choice it adopts a certain conduct to reach a goal. In these conditions, the goal as a form of concretization supposes a sequence of conducts through which a decision is taken.

1.2.6 THE DYNAMIC LOGIC

The dynamic logic represents a type of modal logic which reminds of the modalities of human action. That is why this type of logic has been positioned together with the logic of acceptance alongside the deontic logic or even the teleological logic in a general logic of action.

V. R. Pratt is the one who put the basis of the dynamic logic focusing on some former researches accomplished by R. M. Floyd and C. A. R. Hoare. EPDL – *elementary propositional dynamic logic* is given by an alphabet specific to the atomic formulae, an alphabet specific to the atomic programs and certain concepts derived from some definitions. At the same time, the semantic construction of this type of logic has been possible on the basis of the theory of the possible worlds which was promoted by Saul. A. Kripke and on the basis of some researches done by Jakko Hintikka and Stig Kanger.

The applications of such type of dynamic logic can be found in the making of some logical programs where the component operations (from the virtual world) belong to the agents (from the real world). Thus, in the terms of the dynamic logic one can describe both the workings of household appliances (the washing machine, the cooker, the microwave oven) and daily actions specific to the different agents (taking into account the criteria of age, weight, sex, profession etc.). For instance, before an exam the teacher proposes to his/her students more ways of taking the exam (written, oral, both written and oral) and then taking into consideration what has been negotiated a conclusion has been reached. In the language of the dynamic logic one admits that it was about the operation of choice meaning that was preferred a subgroup x_1 (written exam) from the general group X (written exam, oral exam, oral and written exam). All in all, through some expert and artificial intelligence systems but also with the help of an algorithm which uses operations specific to the dynamic logic (first or n order), different social and technical problems can be solved. Consequently, the necessity of a dynamic logic becomes major as long as the latter subordinates positively speaking to a logic of (human) action.

1.2.7 THE LOGIC OF ACCEPTANCE

The logic of acceptance reminds of the idea of argumentation in favor of a logical object. In other words, everything that is given arguments must be accepted too. The appearance of a logical theory of acceptance was caused by the need to build a syntactic, semantic and pragmatic model of a certain argumentative course of action. From this perspective, the analysis of a logic of acceptance is done by Cornel Popa⁴⁹ when he shows that it represents the Cartesian product: $Ag \times W \times D$ (where Ag- the group of agents, W- the group of the actionable situations or of the possible worlds, D –any of the subfields D1-D17). Among these subfields one can enumerate: the world of opinions, proposals, value judgments, offers, orders, advice, excuses, decisions in a certain field, theories, solutions to some theoretical or practical problems etc. The modalities with which the logic of acceptance operates are: “accepted”, “rejected”, “doubtful” (“doubt”), “accepts with full conviction”, “rejects with full conviction”.

Thus, there are emphasized two variants specific to the logic of acceptance:

- (i) the trivalent variant (V1) = {a, r, d}

⁴⁹ Cornel Popa, “The logic of acceptance, the opinions and the argumentation” (*Logica acceptării, opinioare și argumentarea*), in “*Spiru Haret*” University Annals, Studies of Philosophy Series, No. 3, 2001, Fundația România de Mâine Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001, pp. 61-78 and in Cornel Popa, *Logic and Metalogic (Logică și metalogică)*, Volume II, Fundația România de Mâine Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002, pp. 394-429.

where: a – “accepts”;
 r – “rejected”;
 d – “doubtful” (“doubt”).

(ii) the pentavalent variant (V2) = {a, r, d, c, s}

where: a – “accepts”;
 r – “rejected”;
 d – “doubtful” (“doubt”);
 c – “accepts with full conviction”;
 s – “rejects with full conviction”.

The evaluation of the two variants specific to the logic of acceptance supposes a perspective meant to justify the necessity of a new type of axiomatization at the level of the possible attitudes. Thus, the acceptance of the logical laws specific to the theory of acceptance allows the agents (Ag) to accept or tolerate them. To sum up, those certain agents’ behaviour is one of a dynamic type and depends on the reference system where they show their own attitudes. Consequently, the theory of acceptance is a world of the human conduct where the acceptance (rejection) determines a certain action. From this perspective, different variants of logic of acceptance have been built by relating to certain actionable situations.

1.2.8 THE LOGIC OF ACTION

The logic of action comes from the manifestation of the logic of acceptance. Moreover, in the context of the new formalizations the logic of action includes the deontic logic, the teleological logic, the logic of preferences and the theory of decisions. The logic of action is visible exactly through the introduction, at the level of a logic of acceptance, of some actionable situations for each agent (Ag) involved in an argumentative-pragmatic course of action. Thus, in the field of the logic of action one can find branches of logic that remind especially of the human practical activities.

However, when one admits that the analysis of the human acts generates the appearance of a logic system it is about, in fact, a “logic in action” and not a “logic of actions” (which has to do with the field of praxeology). In this context, Petre Botezatu states that one has to avoid the confusion that could arise between the fact of thinking of logic as a theory of action (the genetic logic) and the logic understood as a theory of the efficient action (praxeology). The genetic logic is a theory of action in a completely different meaning to praxeology. It has to do with the logical system which can be taken out from the analysis of the human acts: this is in fact *the logic of action*, but not the *logic of actions* which is in the competence

of praxeology".⁵⁰ However, logic and praxeology although they stand as distinct fields of analysis, fundament each other circularly, meaning that logic supposes praxeology and praxeology supposes logic.

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⁵⁰ Petre Botezatu, *The creation of logicity (Constituirea logicității)*, Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, București, 1983, p. 85.

The Impact of the Totalitarian System

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*Each age is a sphinx which collapses into the abyss
once its mystery has been revealed.*

Heinrich Heine

Abstract

To understand the specificity of Romanian literature after 1948 and its evolution and to assume Paul Goma with lucidity and self-critical spirit, it is important to establish a tight presentation of this period which has several stages. And this is all the more necessary, as the Romanian literature, subjugated to ideological and political objectives of the Communist Party, was deprived of the freedom needed for the development of any art, becoming an area of confinement of non comprehensive language (the "meaningless formal games" did not have any sense) and hosting "export truths".

Keywords: *The Communist Party, The Second World War, The Romanian literature, The political factor, Freedom, The art, The virtue, The sufferings, The Communist Party, Paul Goma.*

In order to assume Paul Goma with lucidity and self-critical spirit, we need to know, besides the writer's biography, the history of the environment which forms him, Goma's identity and his writing, being generated by the political, moral and ideological context. Therefore, we consider that a review of this period as a whole may reveal the causes of this writer's apparition who, handing the expressive instruments he has and motivated by the realities in which he lived, strengthened his stature by differentiation from others, embodying the very difference.

To understand the specificity of Romanian literature after 1948 and its evolution, it is important to establish a tight presentation of this period which has several stages. And this is all the more necessary, as the Romanian literature, subjugated to ideological and political objectives of the Communist Party, was deprived of the freedom needed for the development of any art, becoming an area

of confinement of non comprehensive language (the “meaningless formal games” did not have any sense) and hosting “exports truths”. In such a way, the Romanian writer has become “no more than a poor relative of the rest of the world literature: he is in a sort of quarantine of false problems, false realities. He mimes the confrontation of ideas and is bound to a strange hide-and-seek game with the contemporaneity, to which he looks through the keyhole: the door never opens totally”¹. Passing over the first decade which is characterized only by one type of propaganda literature, during the following decades the regime had control not only on editorial production but also on writers’ consciences, which it has seduced and manipulated. In addition to the writers of good faith, some were lured by “the smile diplomacy of the party cultural minds”², considering that any collaboration with the System will facilitate the selection of their work. Even if at the time they believed that this tactic will bear fruit, the propulsion of false values had negative effects, many writers returning to the darkness of inferiority. Therefore, by removing any paths that would put people in a position to judge the truth, the System wanted the creation of “the new man”: “Jealousy turns into hatred, impotence becomes virtue in totalitarian regimes, and the virtue of the incapable ones was the ticket to the function of censors, of manipulators whose duty was to guillotine the free thinking”³. Therefore, the political factor is one that has dominated the national interest and that we must account for, in order to understand the fate of Romanian literature after the World War II. However, this will not be possible if we do not compare the socio-political, literary and cultural ambience from Romania with that from other satellite states that have hosted the Communist regime since 1948. To accomplish this project we will follow this line: a presentation of socio-political context of Europe after the war, recording the differences that occur between the two halves of the continent, discussing the effects of the System from the host countries and the writers who have not agreed to deal with the totalitarian regime.

If to speak about the consequences of the Second World War we have to say, just from the beginning, that for most Europeans it meant not only a heroic battle, but a gradual degradation of life in which people have been betrayed and humiliated, driven to crimes and baseness, having to take their lives from nothing and walk silently over the dark tombs of the past. The years 1945-1947 have been

¹ Monica Lovinescu, *Seismografe. Unde scurte II*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1993, p. 221.

² Eugen Negrici, *Literatura română sub comunism*, second edition, Fundația Pro Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006, p. 13.

³ Bogdan Ficeac, *Cenzura Comunistă și formarea „omului nou”*, Nemira Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999, p. 111.

decisive for the fate of Europe: The continent was divided into two: the central and eastern parts (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania) came under Soviet domination, and the western part became “the free world”. To secure the monopoly of power and maintain the “leading role”, Stalin reproduced the Soviet power in the satellite states, eliminating or absorbing other parties. The stated aim of the Communists in 1945 and 1946 was to “finish” the unfinished bourgeois revolution in 1848, by redistributing property, ensuring equality and democratic rights in that part of Europe, where these values were always dispersed. Of course, at the first sight, they seemed to be tangible and seductive goals, but the things evolution has proved the contrary. And this mainly because the communist parties have turned to strategies of disguised pressure, to repression and terror. The political opponents were defamed, arrested, judged as fascists or collaborators, imprisoned and even executed (1946-1947).

The socialists were a real obstacle in the development of the totalitarian system. “Unable to defeat them, the Communists decided to join them or, more precisely, to make the Socialists join *them*. Thus, in 1948, communist-socialist «unions» spread across the Soviet bloc: Romania in February 1948, Hungary and Czechoslovakia in June, Bulgaria in August and Poland in December”⁴. Although this account of the imposition of the Soviet power in Eastern Europe was common throughout all countries of the region, there were significant local differences. This is the case of Romania and Bulgaria, where the Soviet intervention was stronger. This is explained first by the fact that both countries were at war against the Soviet Union, but also because they had a geographical position that inevitably led to Soviet domination.

If we are to have a flashback, it is understood that the hopes for a democratic Eastern Europe after 1945 were minimal. In Central and Eastern Europe the indigenous liberal or democratic traditions were insufficient to deal with old dominant social layers, authoritarian and venal, which would later provide the communist states with people educated by the same principles. “Hence the USSR was not going to leave this part of Europe (the Soviet army forces remained in Hungary until the mid ‘50s, and again after 1956 and in Romania until 1958), and as events were to confirm, the future of Eastern Europe remained closely linked to the fate of East giant neighbour”⁵ (except Czechoslovakia, which was after 1945 the Soviet Union’s main ally in the region). That being so, at the end of September

⁴ Tony Judt, *Epoca postbelică. O istorie a Europei de după 1945*, trans. Georgiana Perlea, Polirom Publishing House, Iași, 2008, p. 132.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 136.

1947, Stalin called communist parties from Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, France, Italy and the USSR for a meeting in Poland for the establishment of Cominform (Information Bureau of Communist and Workers Parties), designed to coordinate the international communist activity and improve the communication between Moscow and the satellite parties. In fact, the real objective was the wish to restore the Soviet domination in the international movement.

Once coming to power, the Communists quickly passed to economic uniformisation, the Soviet irrational measures being faithfully reproduced in the entire communist block. On September 30, 1948, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej from the Romanian Communist Party announced that “we want to achieve a socialist accumulation at the expense of the rural capitalist elements” - in a country where the “capitalist elements” of the rural economy gleamed in absentia⁶. From this point of view, the economic history of the East after the Second World War has some commonalities with Western European recovery from the same years, especially that the West has given priority to economic growth and productivity at the expense of services and commodities. As time passed, politics and administration have become synonymous with repression and corruption, traditional abuses being dressed in rhetoric of equality and social progress: “the Sovietized Eastern Europe has steadily rolled away from the western half of the continent. While Western Europe was preparing to enter an era of dramatic transformation and unprecedented prosperity, Eastern Europe was slipping into the abyss: a bleak period of inertia and resignation, rhythmed by cycles of protest and obedience, which was to last almost for four decades”⁷. Except the Germans, the Western Europeans were generally indifferent to the loss of Eastern Europe, where history seemed to have stopped. But the line separating East from West was imprinted in European intellectual and cultural life between 1947 and 1953.

Of course, there is another explanation of the situation, especially due to the fact after the war many figures were removed from the political scene and instead of them there appeared young writers, artists, journalists and political activists for whom communism was not a conviction, but a faith - as noted later Alexander Wat. Pavel Kohout, who was to gain international fame in the following decades as a post-communist dissident and playwright, originally was known in his native Czechoslovakia as an ardent supporter of the new regime (when he was only 24 he wrote an “Ode to our Communist Party”). It is the same for Paul Goma who, in

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 165.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 187.

1968, after Ceaușescu's speech about non-interference policy, saying that Romania will not send troops to Czechoslovakia, becomes a member of the Communist Party. As *Czesław Miłosz* noted, explains Tony Judt, the communism operated on the principle that writers do not need *to think*, but only *to understand*, understanding that was a commitment, because at that time, young intellectuals did not want more. "We were the children of war", wrote *Zdeněk Mlynář* (who joined the Czechoslovak Communist Party in 1946, when he was 15) "and, as we did not manage to fight against anyone, we carried on the spirit of war in the early postwar years, when we finally had the opportunity to fight for something"⁸. The innocent enthusiasm with which some young East Europeans have been thrown themselves into the arms of communism ("I feel the revolution!" exclaimed the writer Ludvík Vaculík when he joined the party) helps us understand the great disillusion that followed, the intellectuals being stunned to discover the reality of Stalinist power. After 1948 Eastern Europeans were faced with a double exclusion: first from their own history, because of the Soviet presence, and later from Western consciousness. Eastern European writings about the West in the early '50s have in common a note of grief and stupefaction: *Miłosz* called it "deceived love" in *The Captive Thought*. "In *Notes for a Definition of Culture* (1948), T. S. Eliot could say with sufficient confidence that our era is a decline, that cultural standards are lower than those of fifty years ago and that evidence of this decay is evident in all spheres of human activity"⁹. "Does Europe not realize, wrote the exiled Mircea Eliade in April 1952, that a part of its own body was amputated? Because... all these countries *are* in Europe, all these peoples are part of the European community"¹⁰. But things were not like that. Stalin succeeded to take the East out of the equation. In July 1955 there were ten years of coldness between East and West, Stalin's death (March 1953) generating wider protests and calls for change. Thus between 1953 and 1956, five million prisoners were released from the Gulag. But things did not stop here. Red Army's brutal intervention in Hungary (1956) and suppression of anti-Soviet movement show, once again, that reforms could not occur except under the auspices of the Party. At the same time, these events encouraged the emergence of a new generation of intellectuals dissidents like Paul Goma in Romania, Wolfgang Harich in the GDR etc.

It was clear that the communist ideology brought only terror and false promises, the countries of Eastern Europe being absorbed by stagnation,

⁸ Zdeněk Mlynář *apud* Tony Judt, *op.cit.*, p. 192.

⁹ T. S. Eliot *apud* Tony Judt, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

¹⁰ Mircea Eliade *apud* Tony Judt, *op. cit.*, p. 193.

corruption and cynicism that had to last for decades. If the ‘60s were characterized by a naive faith and a hope hardly to materialize, “the ‘70s were the saddest decade of the twentieth century, an era of cynicism, of lost illusions and modest hopes, having a culture focused on individual and not on the community”¹¹. Only in 1975, two years after the opening of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, measures to improve East-West relations and, “the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, freedom of religion and opinion” were proposed. In August 1975, the Helsinki agreements were signed and approved unanimously. Thus, they opened the way to communicate with the other half of the continent. After the eighth decade, there appeared speeches and writings that invoked “human rights” and “personal freedoms”.

A special case was Romania – the most “Eastern” country from all the Communist satellites of Moscow regime. It was under communist rule from December 30, 1947 until December 22, 1989 and has seen the longest persecution. In addition to the over one million prisoners (this number does not include people deported to the USSR) from prisons, labor camps and from the Danube-Black Sea Channel, tens of thousands of which have died, Romania was also characterized by the severity of prison conditions and by various “experimental” prisons, especially that from Pitesti, where for three years, from December 1949 until late 1952, prisoners were encouraged to “re-educate” each other through physical and mental torture.

Communism in Romania experienced two periods: the first period is the consolidation of Communist power, between 1948-1964, the second period corresponds to Ceaușescu’s era - 1965-1989 – period which is divided into two: the internal relaxation period (1965-1974) and the neo-Stalinist or personal power period (1974-1989). As mentioned Ș. Papacostea, “there are, grosso modo, two important stages in the process of mystification of Romanian history: a Stalinist pure one, in the ‘50s, which simply subordinated the historical discourse to the goals of a foreign power, thus minimizing the national character and its values, and another neo-Stalinist one, in the early ‘60s, which exacerbated the national feeling as an instrument of a totalitarian variant”¹². This transition in the last two decades of the regime can be explained by the abandon of the early instruments of social analysis proposed by “the classics of Marxism-Leninism”: “The generation of

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp.439-440.

¹² Ș. Papacostea in Pavel Chihaia, *Fața cernită a libertății*, Jurnalul literar Publishing House, Bucharest, 1991, p. 13.

militant Marxists and internationalists with predominant proletarian origins and social experiences, which led the party during ‘40s and ‘50s, was massively replaced in 1964-1968 by new effective activists and supporters of rural origin who did not have Marxism and internationalism as spontaneous and intellectual required references”¹³. After contributing at the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, the Romanians have obtained the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their national territory in 1958 and adopted an increasingly independent path. Under Dej (1965) as well as under Ceaușescu, Romania refused to get involved in Moscow disputes. Ceaușescu became a “de Gaulle of Eastern Europe”, as *The Economist* wrote in August 1966.

“As for true de Gaulle, who visited Bucharest in 1968, he noted that although the Ceaușescu’s communism did not fit the West, it was probably perfect for Romania: *chez vous un tel régime est utile, car il fait marcher les gens et avancer les choses* (“Such a regime is quite useful for you, because it puts people in motion and makes things move”)”¹⁴. Not being involved in internal debates, Bucharest intellectuals had no other choice but to content themselves with the “proxy” participation to a cosmopolitan French culture, with which the Romanians have always had a special affinity. Moreover, after the war, France remained the only state that could reflect on and define the cultural status of the entire continent, the rival cities being destroyed or absorbed by local problems. Since the early ‘20s, as European countries fell prey to all dictators, political refugees or those being in intellectual exile headed to France, Paris being the capital of Europe.

One of the basic weapons used by the communist regime in Romania for rising up the culture, but also the public space, was the censorship. As stated Bogdan Ficeac, “censorship played simultaneously two roles: a negative one, which was to prohibit, purify and castrate, and a positive one, to create, by ideological selection, a “literary front”, a “historical front”, a “scientific front” etc. Therefore, the major function of censorship was likely to create new elites according to an ideological canon established by the sovereign”¹⁵, elites that had to fully respect the dictatorial requirements – “the written word had to be submitted unconditionally to the canons imposed by propaganda and, especially, had to set the verb in a poor cliché, lacking the richness of the Romanian language, easy to assimilate mainly through obsessive repetition”¹⁶. In 1968, formulating his conception of literature and cultural policy, Ceaușescu imposed certain limits on

¹³ Daniel Barbu, *Repubica absentă*, Nemira Publishing House, 1999, Bucharest, p. 46.

¹⁴ Tony Judt, *op.cit.*, p. 397.

¹⁵ Bogdan Ficeac, *op.cit.*, p. 11.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p.113.

the field, restricting the formal and thematic freedom: “literature should be – and this is an unshakable axiom – to serve society, to spread among masses a picture consistent to Marxist-Leninist ideology. In order to achieve these objectives, the literature must be intelligible, so that “formal meaningless” games have no sense; the “stylistic diversity” is valid only if it may contribute to understanding and to a stronger representation of the content. Criticism in art is also permitted, only if it is limited to ethical or mentality conflicts. Basically, the writers have been refused the right to disclose the economical, political and ideological sources of these conflicts”¹⁷. Therefore, the goal was to have total submission to political purpose and not to national interest. Those who disobeyed were forced to do so, the taken measures being very different: prison, forced work into camps, internment in psychiatric homes, home arrest, etc. All these measures were accompanied by ideological manipulation at all levels of life. Detainees were distributed in prisons according to their age and social class: political interbelic militants were imprisoned in Sighet, intellectuals were kept in Aiud, peasants in Gherla and students, who represented the new generation, in Pitesti. Prisoners were forbidden to communicate, the re-education process having four phases¹⁸: external unmasking; internal unmasking; moral unmasking, made public; and the last phase: the prisoner, after being re-educated, had to torture his best friends, who were to go through the same phases. Therefore, the aim was to make the young people lose their humanity and become torturers after their release. In these circumstances, it can be said with certitude that, “under Ceaușescu, the Communism degenerated from national-Leninism into a kind of neo-Stalinist satrapy where nepotism and Byzantine level inefficiency relied on a tentacular secret police”¹⁹. But it was not able to fully subdue the spirit of intellectuals, because, instead of a drawer vigorous literature, writers created an unusual prose worthy of interest.

Even though, “crucified between brutality and parody in recent years”, Romanian communism fell, the repercussions of this dictatorship continued to influence the works themselves and the writers, as well as the readers, the police, the bureaucracy, a big part of the party remaining the same. In other words, allying to the opinion of Bogdan Ficeac, “the communist state structures and the old elites must no longer be exchanged and replaced because it is presumed that they have suddenly disappeared. Communism does not turn into its opposite, democracy, but

¹⁷ Anneli Ute Gabanyi, *Literatura și politica în România după 1945*, trans. Irina Cristescu, Fundația Culturală Română Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001, p. 178.

¹⁸ Virgil Ierunca, *Fenomenul Pitești*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1991, pp. 32-33.

¹⁹ Tony Judt, *op.cit.*, p. 570.

simply leaves the scene. Power vacuum theory allows power to survive and to take other forms”²⁰. In these circumstances, the exiled writer, who knows the facets of this political game, linked to the moment when he had to confront destiny and escape, often even forced to escape from this aggressive area, seeks to recover, in writing, the real life, the unconditional one, which becomes the route of his writing.

It is the same for Paul Goma. Living at maximum limit-situations, observing the pains, the prose writer realizes the revealing and initiative meaning of these experiences that he immortalizes in writing. We could ask, although we are not the only ones, which would be, in this context, the source of the well-known writer? Could he not become a writer without biography (that of being arrested detained or deported, as Virgil Podoabă calls it)? Of course, opinions are divided and even if it is difficult to give justice to those who assume that they have the truth, or those who seek to discover it, having a more or less clear picture about it, we must recognize that “the sufferings he had to endure as a prisoner and deported are an existential propaedeutic for his writing”²¹, being, only later, put to its origin. But how and to what extent is a question that sparks further discussion and can find the answer only knowing the entire perimeter of the Goma-world. Therefore, we thought that a presentation of the socio-political context can facilitate, in addition to framing the writer in the space that determines him, to understand his conception of life and literature (materialized, with great erudition, in his work) and may help us to explain the need to develop a program to remember and not to keep silent the experienced or assumed tragedies:

“And I’ve decided not to ever forget them
not to revenge, but not to forget them
and especially, especially
NOT TO KEEP SILENT”²²

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²² Paul Goma, *Gherla*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 1991, p. 221.

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Preliminaries to a Philosophical Polemic – Blaga’s Ethnicism, in the Interpretation of V. Băncilă and C. Fântâneru

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Abstract

L. Blaga’s traditionalism, defined as early as 1924 (*Filosofia stilului*), has as fundamental value the absolute, an expression which dissolves in its essence the abstraction, the stylization, the eternity. For Blaga, the traditionalism finds its expression in nationalism, a concept defined as ‘spiritual collectivism born from the thirst for absolute’.

The idea will be resumed and developed by Vasile Băncilă in his work *Lucian Blaga și energia românească* (1936), but we have to specify that Băncilă was having mostly in attention Blaga’s papers published up to that moment (especially *Încercare metafizică*, 1934, and *Daimonion*, 1930). According to Băncilă, Blaga’s interest in the forms of archaic culture was proceeding from ‘the conscience of a destiny emanated by the infinity’. As it was expected, such views had a critical reception. Exemplary in this regard remains the polemic between Blaga and Rădulescu-Motru, unfolded between 1943–1944 in the two pennant-publications of the epoch, “Revista de filosofie” and “Saeculum”, representing, in fact, the dispute between the scientifical trend and that of mystery and vital impulse.

One after the other, the key of interpretations was claimed by Blaga’s admirers and advocates, from V. Băncilă to C. Fântâneru, the latter mostly known as a poet, a literary critic, and less as a classical thinker and interpreter. Appealing to Plato’s dialogues, C. Fântâneru identifies Blaga’s metaphysics as ‘a state of existence between mystery and revelation’. The mythical thinking is a form of becoming, opposed to the loss, the unraveling. Euporia excludes aporia, being the conclusion of this investigation.

These ideas and interpretations are essentially in contradiction with the opinion that L. Blaga’s philosophical concepts didn’t influence his poetry, a proof being the lasting of “the lost generation” as a demonstration that “the mystery has its persistence”.

Keywords: traditionalism, ethics of anonymity, culture of primitiveness, Romanian ethnicism, mythical thinking.

In a paper appeared in 1924¹ dedicated to the philosophy of style and entitled *Filosofia stilului*, L. Blaga established the fundamental terms in which it is embodied the content of an artwork in a culture. Identifying what he himself has defined as *a nisus formativus* (... formative or format, that is the dough through which the human spirit gets closer the indeterminate material which constitutes the value of the artwork)², Blaga noticed that the form of manifestation of the world of senses, *ideoplastia*, as he named it, meaning the ideal artwork's model, materialized under the influence of the thought³, is nothing else but the style, specific not only to art, but by extinction, especially to "any form or social elaboration."⁴

Blaga sustains that the style does not represent an emanation of the aesthetics under a form or another, but an invasion situated *beyond* the aesthetics that is *a cultural invasion*⁵. Regarded as a temporal sequence, the styles have in common, as the thinker from Lăncram believes, the un-aesthetic origin, moving between *the individual, the absolute, and the typical* and normally and objectively removing any artwork, from the time when it has been created, from the values and the specificity ("the style") of the epoch, leading it on an *intuitive way*, to the absolute conscience of its uniqueness.

Analyzing, for instance, the absolute as a fundamental value of a culture, Blaga finds out that to this aesthetic category corresponds, in metaphysics, the eternity, in science, the solitary phenomenon, in moral, the ecstasy, the contemplation, and in art, the symbol. As a consequence, the absolute, as an artistic style, leads the artist towards a traditional approach, meaning the area where the ideal abstracts itself in anonymity.

This model of the absolute style, in which the spirit is the dogma (seen as a seal of the absolute), finds, according to Blaga, the full expression in the Jewish culture, in which the anonymity leads to the destruction of the personal individuality, to the symbolic, abstract, and passive contemplation of the uniqueness of the supreme artwork.

Therefore, culture manifests itself through the repetition of the same forms, in different plans of existence. The correspondences between the various forms

¹ Lucian Blaga, *Filosofia stilului*, Cultura Națională, Bucharest, 1924.

² Lucian himself defined *nisus formativus* as a fundamental value constituted from the plastic material of the senses and in which are gathered all the imaginations of the human conscience. *Filosofia stilului*, p. 44.

³ Lucian Blaga, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 81.

have as basis a *nexus formativus*, that is a common source. For example, for the Greeks, *nexus formativus* was the pure and unbounded *idea*. Other people choose different cultural forms, but exclusive on the basis of the correspondences.⁶ As a result, *the style of the artwork* is equally established by the values of the epoch, but also by the original seed. *The value of the artwork* is intuitively revealed. The life intuitively lived means, according to Blaga, a higher evaluation of the *subconscious* values.⁷

The artwork's style is not necessarily a matter of aesthetics, but more a social one, a cultural emanation which evolves together with the epoch. The style makes the artwork more beautiful, it gives its value, and it brings the artwork to a *common denominator*, which is something else than *nexus formativus*.

In this respect, Blaga analyzes *the traditionalism* having the absolute as a fundamental value. From a philosophical point of view, the traditionalism corresponds to the infinite, the eternity, and the unique. The artistic expression of the traditionalism is the abstraction and the stylization. Blaga's traditionalism is opposing the formalism but also the falsity of modernism, being a higher artistic movement, which overcomes both the modernism (as an expression of the individualism), but also the classicism (concerned by the typical). In Blaga's opinion, the nationalism is “the new church”, or *dogma*, based on a “spiritual collectivism born from the thirst for absolute.”⁸

Analyzing the concept of “dogma” we notice that the meaning given by Blaga corresponds to Bergson's conception, having the meaning of something “boundless”, irrational. This new type of art is meant to resign in front of an immeasurable reality, as Blaga sustains.

As a result, the contemporary spirit is, according to the same thinker, in search for a new way to escape the chaos. The “new” art, whose signs appear in all the fields of culture, leads to a “new division of the spirit”⁹ in which the person is sacrificed in order to face the anonymity. *The anonymity's ethics*, represents in Blaga's view, the only way to truth and equilibrium¹⁰ able to separate us from the *vague and decadent* sentimentalism and to bring us a wave of *manhood* and *irreducible spirituality*.

The idea will be resumed by V. Băncilă (01.01.1897 – 10.06.1979) in his work *Lucian Blaga și energia românească*, first presented as a public conference,

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 80.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 73.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 72.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 74.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 78.

at Cluj, in 1936, and published, with an amount of additions and amendments, first in the *Gând românesc* magazine (year II, 1937) and later, in a separate volume (1937). The basis of V. Băncilă's analysis is represented by the papers published by L. Blaga, up to that moment, especially *Censura transcedentă*, (*Încercare metafizică*, 1934), *Orizont și stil* (1935), and *Geneza metaforei și sensul culturii* (1937). The mentioned volumes, in addition to some collections of essays *Filosofia stilului* (1924) and *Daimonion* (1930), were bringing in the Romanian cultural area a new vision, proving not only a wide area of lectures, but mostly an associative, logical and extremely original ability. Blaga was interested in the forms of archaic culture of a natural primitivism, which must have lived according to Blaga's opinion, in a "cosmic horizon", having the conscience of a destiny "emanated by the infinity". Essentially, this conservative view, of the traditional style of living, resistant to any attempt of change, mostly corresponded to Blaga's thinking, in the centre of which there was its fundamental un-historicity. In this context, the philosopher's interest for the rural humanity, different from the urban one, perverted by the effects of the civilization, finds its expression in the interest for the culture of the primitiveness, which is "naïve", aurora, "creative of fairytales" opposed to the "cold, mechanic, and rational" civilization. These opinions can be found in his fundamental work *Trilogia culturii* (constituted by the following: *Orizont și stil*, 1936, *Spațiul mioritic*, 1936, and *Geneza metaforei și sensul culturii*, 1937), all being included in the European philosophical movement, which has dominated the thinking from Nietzsche to Spengler, sustaining the positivist Occident's decline and the fall of the trust in the values of reason.

During a diplomatic mission in Bern (between the 1st of April 1928 – 31st of October 1932), L. Blaga, despite having a very busy¹¹ official diplomatic agenda, did not stop to be preoccupied by the "system", a phrase which signified not a philosophic system of the philosopher, but more a "symphonic" one, maybe even encyclopedic or universalistic, in the spirit of the artwork of Cantemir, Hașdeu, or Eminescu, which might have corresponded, in his view, "with the dominant notes of the Romanian culture."¹² The interest he gives to the concept of culture (extensively analyzed in the volume *Geneza metaforei și sensul culturii*), speaking about an *anthological mutation* through which the man, different from animalism, may reveal The Mystery. The man, as Blaga sustains, is a *creator of culture*, being therefore, the only being able to live between mystery and revelation. Trying to

¹¹ Mircea Eliade, "Converbiri cu L. Blaga", *Vremea*, 1934, in L. Blaga, *Filosofia stilului*, p. 484.

¹² Constantin Turcu, "Lucian Blaga în diplomația românească", in Lucian Blaga, *Culegere de studii*, Cartea Românească Publ. House, 1987, p. 525.

solve the mystery, the man lives and creates culture, while “the transcendent brakes” are with the Great Anonymous, the one who maintains the equilibrium in the universe, forcing the man to realize his status of a creator of culture...¹³

Following Spengler, Blaga admits that “Any culture, getting older, transforms itself into a civilization”, adding that: “The culture is a fantasy of the human spirit only by its stylistic source”.¹⁴ Opposed to culture is the civilization, as an expression of the human’s need for security and self preservation. The man creates his comfort from the need of security, surrounding it through imitation with the signs of a style...¹⁵

This observation is more valuable as, during the forth decade of the previous century, a researcher from the “saeculist” camp, meaning the followers of the ideology promoted by Blaga in “Saeculum” magazine from Sibiu (old series, 1943–1944), Melania Livadă¹⁶, finds out that Blaga is not such a “fashionable philosopher, as much as one belonging to the «infinity’s spirit», which makes the philosophical spirits to get warm during a time of winter wisdom”¹⁷. Trying to find an explanation for both the obvious interest of Melania Livadă in sustaining Blaga’s opinions in the polemic with C. Rădulescu-Motru, but also for Ștefan Augustin Doinaș’ observation, according to which Blaga’s philosophy remained “mostly unassimilated”¹⁸, we discover an undisputed truth, based on an amount of knowledge, hard to be subscribed in the absence of a mental exercise. The reasons, for which the exegetical interpretations on the metaphor and myth have been proved more pronounced in the poetry’s campus, and less consonance for the Romanian thinking, are related to how Blaga was understood as a philosopher.

A first proof of the critical reception we are having in the polemic started in July 1943, once with the publication in *Revista Fundațiilor Regale* of C. Rădulescu-Motru’s “Offensive against the scientific philosophy”. Essentially, Motru regarded Blaga’s philosophy as “anti scientifical” as dominated by “the sovereignty of mystery”. We quote: “How much reason and how much mysticism is in Blaga’s philosophy we cannot determine as long as we lack the necessary tools to measure the vital, irrational and illogic impulse”, according to Motru’s view.¹⁹ Or, the essence of Blaga’s ideology is exactly the integration in mystery,

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 481.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 485.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 485.

¹⁶ Melania Livadă, *Lucian Blaga. Comentarii la o discuție filosofică*, Dacia Traiană, Sibiu, 1944, p. 7.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 8.

¹⁸ Lucian Blaga, *Filosofia stilului*, p. 301.

¹⁹ Melania Livadă, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

where reason has no access. Therefore, Blaga's "mythosophy" places the man in front of an explanatory aspiration which gives the measure of "the knowledge's drama". The mystery is "cryptic", *the transcendent censure* acting as a barrier to its solving. The path chosen by L. Blaga is, according to Melania Livadă, the only one rightful, in the "spirit of infinite", through the revealing of the *mystery* and of *the ethnic ontology*. M. Livadă sustains that there is a common path for many foreign philosophical schools, maybe the only one meant to be highlighted, a small part from the poet's and the philosopher's originality.²⁰

In this case, any new attempt of searching the Romanian *ethnicity* represents a definite contribution at the autochthonous philosophical progress, for at least two reasons: 1) by ethnicism the originality of the Romanian thinking is guaranteed; 2) any creative idea conceived by a local thinker assures an extra chance for success for the Romanian philosophical school. As a first conclusion, we can launch the idea of the spirit of infinite promoted by L. Blaga, while he was the leadership of the magazine "Saeculum" from Sibiu, it was not a simple fashion, but it was the existential condition of the Romanian philosophy.²¹

This idea is examined by V. Băncilă, in the analyzed study²². By resuming Blaga's thesis from *Geneza metaforei și sensul culturii*, V. Băncilă observes that what is individual is *minor*, and what is ethnic is *major*. In other words, the Romanian energetic lines have an *ethnic meaning*, leading on *imperial ways*, towards a mysterious continent.²³ Therefore, V. Băncilă finds that the Romanian ethnic realities, as they are perceived by L. Blaga, are revealed only by personal experiences, during the contact with the world of shapes, of meanings, and wonders.

The artistic process used by Blaga in order to reach this objective reality, is defined by V. Băncilă as the *agnostic method*, that is the search of a link between the self and the world, meant to express and reveal a general reality. From a philosophical point of view, Blaga's knowledge becomes an *agnostic*²⁴ product, able to offer the key for the creation's interpretation, in other words to create its own explanations.

Blaga's *ethnic* is not a *precise* product, and less a finite one. It is a multi categorial quantity, of which all the threads of creation are bounded. The ethnic

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

²² Vasile Băncilă, *Lucian Blaga și energia românească*, Colecția "Gând românesc", Bucharest, 1938.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

does not exist outside the reality, and its definition remains a *mystery* as Băncilă says: “The creation’s mystery is the divinity’s mystery: and its explanation, if it were possible, *should be forbidden*.²⁵

According to what we have analyzed, we reach V. Băncilă’s fundamental conclusion from the analysis of Blaga’s work, that is *the ethnic is a philosophy*, in fact it is the *slow* and *diffuse* philosophy, which for the people, has the attributes of a philosophy, meaning the unitary attitude towards life. At the same time, the ethnic is a reality, simultaneous metaphysical and having metaphysical implications, whose scientific basis may be identified, if not in science, at least in the axiomatic truths given by faith.

Regarding from this point of view, Blaga’s ethnic becomes the basis of philosophy, its guarant, on the principle that the axiomatic truths also stand for the universal truths. V. Băncilă’s conclusion, started from the analysis of Blaga’s philosophy, is that the ethnic represents the act of birth of a certain type of local philosophy, would also be the basis of its latter development. Even though the proper philosophy does not have an ethnic characteristic, however, it reflects a certain ethnic reality, that is the ground for the beliefs, the attitudes, and not least of the social collective that has generated it. So, the ethnic is the basis of philosophy, offering the structural ‘local axioms’, on which the universality of the philosophical interests relays.

Noticing that philosophy is subjective, V. Băncilă emphasises the idea of a private, intrinsic link between philosophy and the ethnic element, idea which is depicted from research on “the articulations and peaks of Blaga’s view” on philosophy. The ethnic direction, that has found a major expression in Blaga’s work, starts according to V. Băncilă from the “ancestral fund”, “from the primordial Romanian spirit” of the philosophy that has appeared “exactly on time”.²⁶ In other words “the critical awakening” of the Romanian people, at a spiritual and metaphysical level has been made “by predestination” and less from elements that belong to the “exterior picturesque”. The philosophical conscience about *ourselves* is part of our deep spiritual fund, Blaga’s merit being that of revealing the character of the Romanian philosophic artwork, identified by: 1. vocation, 2. creative precocity, 3. a natural adhesion to the metaphysical.

Starting from these suggestions, we will find a common link between philosophy and poetry in L. Blaga’s work, a duality that reveals the key of interpretation of Blaga’s artwork: poetry and philosophy have common sources,

²⁵ Vasile Băncilă, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 13.

forming a complex reality, a harmonious one, and mostly, without any resemblance, on the autochthonous spiritual lands. Regarded from this point of view, Blaga's work has, of course, an ethnic character, as long as the ethnic implies the idea of return to the origins, but also the prediction of the future. Blaga's ethnicism is not an empiric one, a predominant social one..., but it is most *transcendental* having its sources in the deep rural reality, to which the philosopher often appeals.

About the same transcendental experience that assures the access to 'the intuition of our times', C. Fântâneru (01.01.1907 – 21.03.1975) also refers to in his study *Poezia lui Lucian Blaga și gândirea mitică*²⁷, which was regarded by V. Durnea "useful even nowadays, at least in some of its parts."²⁸

Noticing that the epoch he was crossing was filled by certain *euphoria*, a state characterized by an accentuated loss of the spiritual content, C. Fântâneru uses "the mythical thinking", meant to assure the fullness of the sources. *The euphoria* the critic appeals to, a concept taken from Plato's dialogues, represents exactly what L. Blaga was defining by "metaphysics", meaning the state of existence between mystery and revelation. The mythical thinking or the *euphoric* one is a state of attempt, of spiritual fecundation, of retrieval of some dried or deserted veins of the spirit, including the discovery of some new veins. From this point of view, the mythical thinking is a form of "becoming, opposed to the loss", to the unraveling once with the aporia.

At a spiritual level, "the grace", "the wonder" are methods of "becoming" opposed to the Christian tradition, which states the "eternal return". Exactly in this area is, as C. Fântâneru highlights, L. Blaga's distance from the theological knowledge: "Blaga has reached the denial of the theological knowledge by the lucid observation of *the becoming*".²⁹

Entering into details, having a thorough training on classicism, the critic finds out that *the becoming* represents the fundamental human condition, crumbled by the incessantly death of each moment. The human becoming has as model the natural becoming, or what Plato intuited "with the destructive precision of a modern physician": What is the most troubling is what is happening with knowledge...

Moreover, in what concerns the fact that we can *learn*, this supposes more

²⁷ Constantin Fantaneru, *Poezia lui Lucian Blaga și gândirea mitică*, Colecția Convorbiri Literare, Bucharest, 1941.

²⁸ Eugen Simion, *Dictionarul General al Literaturii Române*, Literele E/K, Encyclopedical Univers Publishing House, Bucharest, 2005, p. 129.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

the loss of knowledge... By creating a new conscience instead of the forgotten one, the *study* brings again the knowledge, making it to appear the same. Never being identical to itself, as a divine being, it replaces the lost knowledge by unraveling, a new knowledge, as if it had left the old one to replace it, claiming that it resembles to the old one. Plato’s text (from *Symposion*, 207-208 a.b), quoted by Fântâneru, shows *the becoming* as a way of saving the knowledge (*episteme*), from oblivion (*lethe*). Therefore, the becoming is a reminiscence from “the immortal soul”, which does not relieve the human being from searching and researching. The thinking which relates itself to the copy of the eternal being, meaning at *the becoming*, there is a *likely* thinking, as long as the image of becoming resembles with the eternal being’, as Fântâneru concludes³⁰, adding that: “Appeared under the protection of «the mythical thinking» but not under that of the rational one, the faith that the human being has the possibility of becoming was possible through the metaphysical knowledge.”³¹

So, the mythical thinking, hidden under symbols, schemes, myths prefigures a new mode of “seeing” or perceiving the things, beyond the visible space or, speaking in a synthetically way, where the *invisible* reflects itself in visible.

In Blaga’s conception, the mythical thinking has as equivalent “the Luciferian knowledge” the only one allowed to the man and that represents, in essence, the return to the elementary powers of the human being, who is not allowed other way of knowledge, beyond the intuitive ability.

By appreciating his forerunner’s effort, V. Băncilă, of analyzing the mythical and the folklorical valences of Blaga’s creation, C. Fântâneru considers that “Covering the becoming with extra significances /Lucian Blaga/ will bring higher the deeds and the elements at the mythical level of principles and verses...”³²

If to all that has been mentioned, it is added Fântâneru’s effort to identify “L. Blaga’s influence, the configurism” as it is named by the critic, in the wide field of the recent lirical production (correponding to the 40s of the past century, the period while C. F had the function of artistic director at *Universul literar*, 1938–1941- n.a.), was confirmed the thesis of Ştefan Augustin Doinaş, which states that in the field of lyrical creation, Blaga had a very strong influence, determining even “a Romanian expressionism post Blaga”³³. If we include Fântâneru himself in this myriad, as a poet, with the volume *Râsul morților de aur* (1940), characterized as “a hermetic pushed to extreme”, from which do not miss images inspired from the

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 18.

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 19.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 24.

³³ Lucian Blaga, *op. cit.*, p. 501.

autochthonous folklore.³⁴ We find out that “the abundance of transcendent meanings” of the lyric analyzed by C. Fântâneru indicates, in his opinion “a stage of Bizantinism” in which “the mystery has its dialects”. If nowadays, names of poets as Aurel Chirescu (awarded with the title of “The Young Poets” by the Royal Fundation), Grigore Popa or Ion Sofia Manolescu are no longer of interest, the presence in Mihai Beniuc’s enumeration (with a lyric fragment *Cântece de pierzanie*) or of Vlaicu Bârna, is a proof that the literary of left orientation has recovered, if not spiritually, at least physically, the most promising poets of “the lost generation”.

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³⁴ Eugen Simion, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

ESSAYS
PRESENTATIONS
REVIEWS

The Voicelessness of Human Being

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Abstract

Gnoseologic outpouring to the other, trying to meet, to question and to know him through dialogue can bump against the hard evidence of his absence. Then the call to the other changes into a leap towards the absence of the other, into a projection towards the vacuum of a non-presence. This metaphysical gap opens as a hole around which gravitates the ontic sphere of the moment that wanted to be a dialogue. Coping with the absence of the other redirects the flow of thought towards the appellant self transforming the prospects of a dialogue into the reality of a monologue in which a single individuality is lost in solitude in order to regain the depths of the self-identity.

Keywords: otherness, loneliness, self, consciousness, absence, ego, addressing.

I talk to the other. Beyond the limit of my subjectiveness, the life field has opened to other type of subjectivity, which I wanted to call. Its occurring and its potential availability will motivate my intention towards opening to outside world. Tough, such rushing may often become a confusing run down within the abyss, which excludes any shape of a potential answer. I may say that the other isn't aiming towards the exposal I develop, and does not assume the experience of attention focused towards it. My thoughts will thus confront to its surrounding, and will come back to me as a cold and discouraging echo.

Why such non-attention, which sends me back to the lonely echo pressure, should exist? From where does it come? And what moral support helps it? In such frame, it is about the one I address to, actually present in front of me? What kind of type do we talk here? Somebody's missing from a meeting. He *answers* to the waiting, by replacing its appearance with the avidity syncope, specific by an empty parenthesis that introduces the following: discontinuity, significant interruption within the flow of some images and oscillations complex, loosing in this way its

homogeneity. Considering this frame, the missing becomes more and more important rather by richness of meanings and effects, than its simple presence. The lack of the one we wait for will emphasize, in a discouraging way, the mechanism of a systematization imposed by a plan firstly accepted. Its subsequent rejection will signify an exception, able to generate wonder and surprise. The absent attracts, and as result, focusing of attention will open new interrogations, assumptions that aims towards it. It becomes the incitement topic, around whom its fantastic aspect of present absence gravitates. Though, nobody can address to it, hoping to achieve a reaction of answer; those that wait such answer will become aware of its lack and its effects. Therefore, they recognize its absurdity on trying to make an approach, on waiting some obvious replies, of a character that is not present. But, I am sometimes confronted with the same absence of answers even in the presence of the other, when he or she is with me, and who I approach directly and without retentions. As natural, when the one staying in front of me does not react by following my exposal, I will not try to communicate, but with the mask of its exteriority; as result, I will prove a stone-still enigma specific to nuances of false expressions. My words are heard as resonances of no meanings, which import the sound, but not the thoughts carried by them. I develop here a monologue in temple, where the statue represented by my interlocutor is my faithful witness of loneliness that covers me. Such signal proves that sometimes we are captive of loneliness, even if we are physically closed to those that might free us from such state.

The call I send to the other, the vibration that lengthens my identity to him or her, will carry by itself an own language and structure, an ample mechanism, where sending to a complex of states and ideas are dominant. I talk to my interlocutor and I am covered by the amplitude that defines the entireness of confessions felt by me. Like this, by evoking a landscape of thoughts and affective modulations, I invite the other to a spiritual and common floating, within the fluctuation of such place. I am for him or her guide and host, starting from the very beginning. Any invitation includes the abstracting focused on a future chance. For instance, the invitation to dance or any theatre representation will announce a chance of such participation, regarding moments subsequent to immediate future. By calling the other in the view of a discussion, I call to dynamics, thus emphasizing the chance of talking to an opened interlocutor and fully involved in that dialogue. Meeting his or her attention, my demarche will vanish and then will stop to an expression that will not receive any reply or confirmation.

That monologue performed in front of a statue, meaning of that I address to,

will reach the culmination and thus, will become an invitation, a call towards a closed field, without windows or any access paths. It seems that often, the non-attention of the interlocutor is based upon calling his or herself interiority. Here, he or she falls down deeply under the nostalgia of inner extension of self, full closing towards his or her concerns under pressure. Right here, the human being from my subjectiveness edge will manifest a neutral presence, indifferent as regards my call. As result, such a presence does not accomplish the difference between of being or not being called. It establishes by itself an own fixed postulation, allows to be overcome and covered by message's pressure; it is approached without reducing the consistency of its closing. The common language says that such presence signifies *the shape*. And this expression might indicate an underlying feature of current situation. The salutation or pleading case might also be characterized by *the shape*, meaning those formalisms that integrate within a surface structure, in order to mask the absence of profound absences. In this way, the salutation might sometimes be an automatism of being obliged to, and not an authentication expression; in the same time, the pleading case might be a sounding exercise lacked of affective spirit involvement, as well as inward devotedness. Here we meet the masks of anonymous complaisance, which floats among people. Sitting near me, the other can assist *formally* to my speech. Clear proof of his or her attentive awareness is not accompanying me; the energy of analytical vigilance is not aiming towards my exposal. They are reserved within heart beats of oneself, beyond the physical shape, at which the aspect of human being is drawn to; I call it as interlocutor sitting around.

Such physical outline, this shape emphasizes the image upside-down towards oneself, the signal of late corporality, which remained behind the spirit running down to own non-inclusion. Talking to the other, which does not pay attention to my speech efforts, I meet the formality of a seemingly listening, the dry shape of a portrait formed by frames and colors, maintaining the superficial of human becomingness. Tough, such portrait will simultaneously hide the absence of an authentic listening. Here my word sounds towards the hollow appeared between me and the other's awareness. Distance separating us will overwhelm us, assimilating the projection that I have started simultaneously with my calling. In such situation, jumping to human being proves to be a running down, besides its unsearchable feature. Taking into account the communication point of view, at which we aim to, the one sitting in front of me is present, but yet absent to me. The failure of interaction with the other, un-fulfillment of breakthrough as regards the private effervescence of his or her defining paradigm, meaning that step taken to

metaphysical branch that separates us, will clear away my energy of thoughts, by an unclear multitude of rays and trends. The homogeneous unity of exposing in front of the other will be finally broken by his or her non-attention, as consequence. It becomes an exhausting pronunciation, impressed by the temptation of fragmentizing in sequences. These are repeated in order to impose a message and to find a formula of assertive breakthrough, beyond the exteriority of an interlocutor under assumption. Simultaneously with the repetition, exposing will lose its expansiveness specific to own subject, which is gradually overshadowed by the formulation concerning; this also happens to expressions as much as adequate. More often, the way of expressing the pronunciation and imposing a tautological dynamics will not find a place for its consignee; the address is represented by that human captive under the internal twirl, which exists at the level of opening and underlying a reply or an answer.

In this situation, I misspend myself within the excess of a speech, not fulfilled because of avidity that meets my calling and invocation. Re-bringing to oneself from such vanishing away, on the echo resonances rhythm, emphasizes the prelude of a final state. This will conclude my calling towards internal subjectiveness, behind a non-crystalline portrait of non-attention. This last state is actually the pressure of my words' conversion to non-pronunciation. And simultaneously with occurrence of impassivity voicelessness between me and the other, the expectation of resemblance between the two of us will be therefore activated. My new attitude of non-calling the one I wanted as interlocutor will thus become the reflection of his or her attitude; in this way, paying more attention to oneself and suspension of its availability to external connections will also be taken in view. Retired within own inward flow, I become as the other: a galaxy locked by thoughts and emotions, forgotten by oneself in the half-shade of cosmic voicelessness.

Eugeniu Coșeriu – The Man and His Language

-review-

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Eugeniu Coșeriu had a main contribution to the development of linguistic disciplines being what Anatol Ciobanu named him – “the prince of linguistic sciences”, being considered the founder of total linguistics, namely the human language.

The work *The Man and His Language, A Philosophy Study of Language and General Lingvistic* is the fist Romanian anthology of studies belonging to Coșeriu in the area of language philosophy, language theory and also general linguistics, this work being made by 24 translators from the following universities: Suceava, Iași, Cluj, and reacherchers from the Linguistic Institute of Bucharest; the arguments, anthology and notes were made by Dorel Fînaru.


This issue can be considered the most important publishing in 2009, that is *a very valuable comparative-cumulative translation*, considering that the entire work of Coșeriu is much more popular in Japan than in Romania.

The titles of all 16 texts included in the volume are very interesting: *the Man and His Language*, *Diversity of Language and Diversity of Lingvistic*, *Metaphorical Creation of the Language* and in the appendix the readers can find a letter from Eugeniu Coșeriu to professor Dumitru Irimia from “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University.

The message of this anthology is constituted by Coșeriu’s very own words: “if you want to get to a definition of language you would see what is the link with another one and philosophy, the language being”, any system of signs that serves to intercommunication or to communicate ideas and feelings between two and more than two persons.

The issuse is very useful for researchers and many others because in the notes is made a reference to the first edition of each study, the list of works used for translation, the translator’s name, the bibliography and the explanation of different terms.

So, this book is very important for philosophers and linguists because it offers us the possibility to know a part of a very large work of the one who is considered “the most important and complex personality of language sciences of 20th century and for whom the language is not anything else than the openness of all cultural possibilities of the human being”.



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